CHANCELLORSVILLE 


AND 


GETTYSBURG 


CAMPAIGNS  OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR.—V\. 


CHANCELLORSVILLE 


AND 


GETTYSBURG 


r,v 


ABNER   DOUBLEDAY, 

BREVET    MAJOR-GENERAL   U.S.A.,   AND    LATE    MAJOR  GENERAL   U.S.V.  :    COMMAND 
ING    THE    FIRST    CORPS   AT    GETTYSBDRG. 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES    SOFTENER'S    SONS 

743  AND  745  BROADWAY 

1882 


• 


COPYRIGHT  BY 
CHARLES   SCRIBNER'S   SUMS 


TROW'S 

PRINTING  AND  BOOKBINDING  COMPANY 
201-213  East  I2/V6  Street 

NEW   YORK 


PEEFACE. 


IN  writing  this  narrative,  which  relates  to  the  decisive 
campaign  which  freed  the  Northern  States  from  invasion, 
it  may  not  be  out  of  place  to  state  what  facilities  I  have  had 
for  observation  in  the  fulfilment  of  so  important  a  task.  I 
can  only  say  that  I  was,  to  a  considerable  extent,  an  actor  in 
the  scenes  I  describe,  and  knew  the  principal  leaders  on 
both  sides,  in  consequence  of  my  association  with  them  at 
West  Point,  and,  subsequently,  in  the  regular  army.  In 
deed,  several  of  them,  including  Stonewall  Jackson  and  A. 
P.  Hill,  were,  prior  to  the  war,  officers  in  the  regiment  to 
which  I  belonged.  As  commander  of  the  Defences  of  Wash 
ington  in  the  spring  of  1862,  I  was,  owing  to  the  nature  of 
my  duties,  brought  into  intimate  relations  with  the  states 
men  who  controlled  the  Government  at  that  time,  and  be 
came  well  acquainted  with  President  Lincoln.  I  was  pres 
ent,  too,  after  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg,  at  a  very  interesting 
Cabinet  Council,  in  which  the  pursuit  of  Lee  was  fully  dis 
cussed  ;  so  that,  in  one  way  and  another,  I  have  had  better 

250845 


vi  PREFACE. 

opportunities  to  judge  of  men  and  measures  than  usually 
falls  to  the  lot  of  others  who  have  written  on  the  same  sub 
ject. 

I  have  always  felt  it  to  be  the  duty  of  every  one  who  held 
a  prominent  position  in  the  great  war  to  give  to  posterity 
the  benefit  of  his  personal  recollections ;  for  no  dry  official 
statement  can  ever  convey  an  adequate  idea  to  those  who 
come  after  us  of  the  sufferings  and  sacrifices  through  which 
the  country  has  passed.  Thousands  of  men — the  flower  of 
our  Northern  youth — have  gone  down  to  their  graves  un 
heralded  and  unknown,  and  their  achievements  and  devotion 
to  the  cause  have  already  been  forgotten.  It  is,  therefore, 
incumbent  upon  us,  who  were  their  comrades  in  the  field, 
to  do  all  in  our  power  to  preserve  their  deeds  from  oblivion. 

And  yet  it  is  no  easy  task  to  relate  contemporaneous 
events.  Whoever  attempts  it  must  be  prepared  for  severe 
criticism  and  the  exhibition  of  much  personal  feeling. 
Borne  of  this  may  be  avoided,  it  is  true,  by  writing  a  color 
less  history,  praising  everybody,  and  attributing  all  disas 
ters  to  dispensations  of  Providence,  for  which  no  one  is  to 
blame.  I  cannot,  however,  consent  to  fulfil  my  allotted 
task  in  this  way,  for  the  great  lessons  of  the  war  are  too 
valuable  to  be  ignored  or  misstated.  It  is  not  my  desire  to 
assail  any  of  the  patriotic  men  who  were  engaged  in  the 
contest,  but  each  of  us  is  responsible  for  our  actions  in  this 
world,  and  for  the  consequences  which  flow  from  them  ;  and 


PREFACE.  vii 

where  great  disasters  have  occurred,  it  is  due  both  to  the 
living  and  the  dead  that  the  causes  and  circumstances  be 
justly  and  properly  stated. 

Richelieu  once  exclaimed,  upon  giving  away  a  high  ap 
pointment :  "Now  I  have  made  one  ingrate  and  a  thousand 
enemies."  Every  one  who  writes  the  history  of  the  Great 
Rebellion  will  often  have  occasion  to  reiterate  the  state 
ment  ;  for  the  military  critic  must  necessarily  describe  facts 
which  imply  praise  or  censure.  Those  who  have  contributed 
to  great  successes  think  much  more  might  have  been  said 
on  the  subject,  and  those  who  have  caused  reverses  and  de 
feats  are  bitter  in  their  denunciations. 

Nevertheless,  the  history  of  the  war  should  be  written 
before  the  facts  have  faded  from  the  memory  of  living  men, 
and  have  become  mere  matters  of  tradition. 

In  a  narrative  of  this  kind,  resting  upon  a  great  number 
of  voluminous  details,  I  cannot  hope  to  have  wholly  escaped 
error,  and  wherever  I  have  misconceived  or  misstated  a  fact, 
it  will  give  me  pleasure  to  correct  the  record. 

A.  I). 

NEW  YOKE,  January,  1882. 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

LIST  OF  MAPS, .  xiii 


CHANCELLORSVILLE. 


CHAPTER   I. 
THE  OPENING  OF  1863— HOOKER'S  PLANS,        ...      1 

CHAPTER  II. 
FRIDAY,  THE  FIRST  OF  MAY, 11 

CHAPTER  III. 
THE  DISASTROUS  SECOND  OF  MAY, 20 

CHAPTER  IV. 
THE  ROUT  OF  THE  ELEVENTH  CORPS,        .        .        .        .25 

CHAPTER  V. 
JACKSON'S  ADVANCE  iS  CHECKED,       .  .     35 


x  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  VI. 

PAGE 

SICKLES  FIGHTS  His  WAY  BACK— ARRIVAL  OP  THE  FIRST 
CORPS, 41 

CHAPTER   VII. 
THE  BATTLE  OP  THE  THIRD  OP  MAY,       .        .        .        .45 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
MAY  FOURTH — ATTACK  ON  SEDGWICK'S  FORCE,        .        .    63 

CHAPTER  IX. 
PREPARATIONS  TO  RENEW  THE  CONFLICT,        .        .        .75 

CHAPTER   X. 
BATTLE  OF  BRANDY  STATION  (FLEETWOOD),    .  .     81 


GETTYSBURG. 

CHAPTER  I. 
THE  INVASION  OF  THE  NORTH, 87 

CHAPTER   II. 

HOOKER'S  PLANS— LONGSTREET  OCCUPIES  THE  GAPS  IN 
THE  BLUE  RIDGE— ALARM  IN  RICHMOND— HOOKER 
SUPERSEDED  BY  MEADE, 98 

CHAPTER  HI. 

STUART'S  RAID— THE  ENEMY  IN  FRONT  OF  HARRISP.UR<; 
— MEADE'S  PLANS, 117 


CONTENTS.  xi 

CHAPTER   IT. 

PAGE 

THE    FIRST    DAY    OP    THE    BATTLE    OP    GETTYSBURG, 
WEDNESDAY,  JULY  1,  1863, 124 

CHAPTER  V. 
BATTLE  OP  GETTYSBURG— THE  SECOND  DAY,   .        . '         15G 

CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  THIRD  DAY— JOHNSON'S  DIVISION 
DRIVEN  OUT, 186 

CHAPTER  VI I. 

GENERAL  RETREAT  OF  THE  ENEMY— CRITICISMS  OF  DIS 
TINGUISHED  CONFEDERATE  OFFICERS,         .        .        .  204 

APPENDIX  A, 211 

APPENDIX  B, .  222 

INDEX, .  227 


LIST    OF   MAPS. 


PAGE 

FIELD  OF  OPERATIONS  IN  VIRGINIA,          .  .        .1 

OPERATIONS  ON  THE  FIRST  OF  MAY,  1863,  6 

JACKSON'S  ATTACK  ON  HOWARD,  MAY  1,   .        .        .        .18 
BATTLE  OF  THE  THIRD  OF  MAY,        .        .        .        .        .45 

SEDG WICK'S  POSITION, 62 

FROM  THE  POTOMAC  TO  HAURISBURG 1G9 

DIAGRAMS  OF  POSITIONS  IN  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG  : 

I.,    .         .        .        ...        .         .        .        .        .        .125 

II., 127 

in.,       ..........  ia;s 

IV., 186 

GETTYSBURG  :   FINAL  ATTACK  OF  THE   FIRST  DAY  AND 

BATTLE  OF  THE  SECOND  DAY,     .....  160 
DIAGRAM  OF  THE  ATTACK  ON  SICKLES  AND  SYKES,          .  165 


CHANCELLORSVILLE 


CHANCELLORSVILLE. 


CHAPTEK  I. 

THE  OPENING  OF  1863.— HOOKER'S  PLANS. 

AFTEK  the  great  disaster  of  Fredericksburg,  General  Burn- 
side,  the  Commander  of  the  Union  Army,  was  superseded  by 
Major-General  Joseph  Hooker,  a  graduate  of  West  Point, 
who  having  formerly  held  a  high  position  on  the  staff  of 
General  Gideon  J.  Pillow  in  the  war  with  Mexico,  was  sup 
posed  to  be  well  acquainted  with  military  operations  on  a 
large  scale.  He  had  subsequently  left  the  army,  and  had 
been  engaged  in  civil  pursuits  for  several  years.  He  was  a 
man  of  fine  presence,  of  great  personal  magnetism,  and  had 
the  reputation  of  being  one  of  our  most  efficient  and  suc 
cessful  corps  commanders. 

When  the  campaign  of  Chancellorsville  commenced,  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  posted  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Kappahannock,  opposite  Fredericksburg,  among  the  Staf 
ford  hills,  in  a  position  which  was  considered  almost  im 
pregnable.  It  rested  upon  the  Potomac  Eiver,  and  as  all  its 
supplies  came  by  water,  they  were  not  subject  to  delay  or 
interruption  of  any  kind  ;  nor  were  they  endangered  by  the 
movements  of  the  enemy. 
VI.— 1 


2      CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

At  tlie  period  referred  to,  General  Hooker  had  under  him  a 
force  of  about  124,500  men  of  all  arms,  11,500  of  which  were 
cavalry. 

On  the  opposite  side  of  the  river,  the  Army  of  Northern 
.Virginia,  tinder  General  Robert  E.  Lee,  numbered,  accord 
ing  to  their  official  reports,  about  sixty-two  thousand  men, 
three  thousand  of  which  were  cavalry;1  but  the  difference 
was  amply  compensated  by  the  wide  river  in  front  of  the 
enemy,  and  the  fact  that  every  available  point  and  ford  was 
well  fortified  and  guarded.  General  Thomas  J.  Jackson, 
commonly  called  Stonewall  Jackson,  held  the  line  below 
Hamilton's  crossing  to  Port  Royal.  Two  out  of  four  divi 
sions  of  Longstreet's  corps  were  absent.  The  fourth,  under 
Major-General  Lafayette  McLaws,  was  posted  from  Hamil 
ton's  crossing  to  Banks'  Ford.  Still  farther  up  and  beyond 
the  front  of  either  army,  the  crossing-places  were  watched 
by  che  rebel  cavalry  under  Major-General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
supported  by  the  Third  Division  of  Longstreet's  corps,  that 
of  Anderson. 

Both  armies  had  spent  the  winter  in  much  needed  rest, 
after  the  toilsome  and  exhausting  marches  and  bloody  bat 
tles  which  terminated  Lee's  first  invasion  of  Maryland. 
The  discipline  of  our  army  was  excellent,  and  it  would  have 
been  hard  to  find  a  finer  body  of  men,  or  better  fighting 


1  Napoleon  says  100,000  men  on  the  rolls  are  only  equivalent  to  about  80,000 
muskets  in  action.     It  is  doubtful  if  Hooker  had  over  113,000  men  for  actual  com 
bat.     Lieut. -Colonel  W.  T.  Forbes,  Assistant  Adjutant  General,  who  has  had  ac- 
\  /        cess  to  the  records,  after  a  careful  estimate,  places  the  number  as  follows.     First 
\J      V         Corps,  16,000  ;  Second  Corps,  16,000 ;   Third  Corps,  18,000  ;  Fifth  Corps,  15,000  j 
J\      /\       Sixth  Corps,  22,000  ;  Eleventh  Corps,  15,000;   Twelfth  Corps,    11,000:  total  in- 
/   \7      \    fantry  and  artillery,  113,000;  Pleasonton's  cavalry,  1,500;  total  effective  force, 
/         '••<         \ll-l,500.    H>.  estimates  Lee's  army  at  62,000,  which  the  Confederate  authorities, 
Hotchkiss  and  Allan,  place  as  follows :  Anderson's  and  McLaws  divisions  of  Long- 
street's  Corps,  17,000;  Jackson's  Corps,  83.500;  Stuart's  Cavalry.  2.700;  Artil 
lery,  5,000:  add  4,000  on  engineer,  hospital  duty,  etc. 


THE  OPENING  OF  1863.— HOOKER'S  PLANS.  3 

material  than  that  assembled  on  this  occasion^  in  readiness 
to  open  the  spring  campaign.  Hooker  was  justly  popular 
with  his  troops.  They  had  confidence  in  his  ability  as  a 
general,  and  he  had  gained  their  good  will  by  anticipating 
their  wants,  and  by  generously  granting  furloughs  to  those 
who  were  pining  from  home-sickness  ;  trusting  that  old  as 
sociations  and  the  honor  of  the  men  would  induce  them  to 
rejoin  their  colors  when  their  leaves  of  absence  had  ex 
pired.  In  this  way  he  almost  stopped  the  desertion  which 
had  been  so  prevalent  under  Burnside.  Only  one  portion  of 
the  army  was  dissatisfied ;  the  position  recently  occupied  by 
General  Franz  Sigel,  the  favorite  commander  of  the  Eleventh 
Corps,  had  been  given  to  General  O.  O.  Howard.  The  large 
German  element  in  that  corps  were  discontented  at  the 
change.  They  knew  little  and  cared  less  for  Howard's  repu 
tation  as  a  great  Biblical  soldier,  the  Havelock  of  the  army 
as  he  was  called,  owing  to  his  having  studied  for  the  minis 
try  in  the  Presbyterian  church.  They  felt  when  their 
countryman  Sigel  was  deprived  of  his  command,  that  it  was 
a  blow  to  their  nationality,  and  therefore  lost  some  of  the 
enthusiasm  which  always  accompanies  the  personal  influ 
ence  of  a  popular  leader. 

The  rainy  season  was  nearly  over,  the  time  had  come  for 
action,  and  it  was  essential  to  strike  a  decisive  blow  before 
the  term  of  service  of  the  nine  months  and  two  years'  men 
had  drawn  to  a  close.  Hooker's  plan  of  campaign  was  sim 
ple,  efficacious,  and  should  have  been  successful.  The  rebels 
occupied  a  long  line  and  could  not  be  strong  everywhere. 
He  resolved  to  make  a  pretence  of  crossing  with  three  corps,  ^v 
under  Major-General  Sedgwick,  below  Fredericksburg,  while 
the  remaining  four  corps  under  Major-General  Slocum  made 
a  detour  and  crossed  twenty-seven  miles  above  at  Kelly's 
Ford.  The  latter  were  then  to  march  down  the  river  against 


4  CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

the  left  flank  of  the  rebel  army  and  re-open  Banks'  Ford  ; 
thus  re-uniting  the  two  wings  of  the  army  and  giving  a  se 
cure  line  of  retreat  in  case  of  disaster.  "When  this  was  accom 
plished  it  was  proposed  to  give  battle  in  the  open  country 
near  the  ford,  the  position  there  being  a  commanding  one 
and  taking  the  whole  line  of  rebel  works  on  the  heights  of 
Fredericksburg  in  reverse.  Owing  to  his  great  preponderance 
of  force,  Hooker  had  little  reason  to  doubt  that  the  result 
would  be  favorable  to  our  arms.  To  carry  out  this  plan  and 
make  it  a  complete  surprise  to  the  enemy  it  became  necessary 
to  leave  Gibbons'  division  of  Couch's  corps  behind,  for  as  his 
encampment  at  Falmouth  was  in  full  view  of  the  Confederate 
forces  on  the  opposite  side,  to  withdraw  it  would  have  been  to 
notify  them  that  some  unusual  movement  was  going  on.  So 
far  the  idea  was  simply  to  crush  the  opposing  army,  but  Hook 
er's  plan  went  farther  and  involved  the  capture  of  Lee's  entire 
force.  To  accomplish  this  he  directed  Stoneman  to  start 
two  wreeks  in  advance  of  the  main  body  with  ten  thousand 
cavalry,  cross  at  the  upper  fords  of  the  Eappahannock,  and 
sweep  down  upon  Lee's  communications  with  Eichmond, 
breaking  up  railroads  and  canals,  cutting  telegraph  wires, 
and  intercepting  supplies  of  all  kinds.  As  the  rebel  com 
missariat  found  great  difficulty  in  keeping  more  than  four 
days'  rations  on  hand  at  a  time,  Stoneman's  raid  would  al 
most  necessarily  force  Lee  to  fall  back  on  his  depots  and 
give  up  Fredericksburg.  One  column  under  Averell  was  to 
attack  Culpeper  and  Gordonsville,  the  other  under  Buford 
to  move  to  Louisa  Court  House,  and  thence  to  the  Fred 
ericksburg  Railroad.  Both  columns  were  to  unite  behind  the 
Pamunkey,  and  in  case  our  army  was  successful  Stoneman 
was  directed  to  plant  his  force  behind  some  river  in  an  ad 
vantageous  position  on  Lee's  line  of  retreat,  where  he  could 
detain  the  rebel  army  until  Hooker  could  again  assail  it  and 


THE  OPENING  OF  1863.— HOOKER'S  PLANS. 

compel  it  to  surrender.    A  brave  programme  !   Let  us  see  how 
it  was  carried  out. 

It  was  an  essential  part  of  Hooker's  project  that  the  cav 
alry  should  precede  the  infantry  by  about  two  weeks.  If 
they  did  their  work  thoroughly,  Lee  would  be  out  of  pro 
visions,  and  his  retreat  would  give  us  all  the  moral  effect  of 
a  victory.  The  rebel  cavalry  at  this  time  being  reduced  to 
about  3,000  men,  it  was  not  supposed  that  Stoneman  would  \ 
encounter  any  serious  resistance.  He  accordingly  started  on 
April  13th  to  carry  out  his  instructions,  but  another  rain 
storm,  which  made  the  river  unfordable,  and  very  bad  roads, 
detained  him  until  the  28th.  It  has  been  suggested  that 
he  might  have  crossed  higher  up,  but  cavalry  officers  who'' 
were  there,  tell  me  that  every  ravine  had  become  an  impass-  & 
able  river.  Hooker  became  impatient  and  refused  to  wait 
any  longer,  so  when  the  water  subsided,  all — infantry,  artil 
lery,  and  cavalry — were  sent  over  together.  The  result  was 
that  the  battle  was  ended  before  Stoneman  got  fairly  to 
work,  and  his  operations  had  little  or  no  effect  in  obstruct 
ing  Lee's  movements. 

To  confuse  the  enemy  as  much  as  possible,  demonstra 
tions  had  been  made  at  both  ends  of  the  line.  On  April 
21st  a  small  infantry  force  was  sent  to  threaten  Kelly's 
Ford.  On  the  same  day,  I  went  with  part  of  my  division 
down  the  river  to  Port  Conway,  opposite  Port  Royal,  twenty 
miles  below  Fredericksburg,  made  a  pretence  of  crossing 
in  pontoons,  and  built  fires  in  every  direction  at  night,  to 
give  the  impression  of  a  large  force.  On  the  24th  General 
Wadsworth  went  on  a  similar  expedition  to  the  same  place, 
crossed  over  in  boats,  and  returned.  These  movements  had 
a  good  effect,  and  caused  Jackson  to  strengthen  his  force  in 
that  quarter.  On  the  27th,  the  storm  having  abated,  Meade's 
corps  (the  Fifth),  Howard's  corps  (the  Eleventh),  and  SI> 


THE  OPENING  OF  1863.— HOOKER'S  PLANS.      7 

cum's  corps  (the  Twelfth),  the  whole  being  under  command 
of  General  Slocum,  left  camp  for  Kelly's  Ford,  each  ac 
companied  by  three  batteries.  A  detachment  was  thrown 
over,  in  boats,  on  the  evening  of  the  28th,  which  dispersed 
the  picket  guard ;  and  by  the  next  morning  the  entire  force 
was  across  the  river  and  on  their  way  to  the  Eapidan,  the 
Fifth  Corps  taking  the  direction  of  Elley's  Ford  and  the 
Eleventh  and  Twelfth  Corps  that  of  Germania  Ford.  Stone- 
man's  cavalry  crossed  at  the  same  time  with  the  others, 
and  moved  to  Culpeper,  where  he  halted  for  a  time  to  re 
organize  his  force,  and  get  rid  of  surplus  horses,  baggage, 
etc.,  which  were  sent  to  the  rear.  The  next  day  Averell 
kept  on  to  Rapidan.  Station  with  4,000  sabres,  to  engage  "W. 
H.  F.  Lee's  rebel  brigade,  so  that  it  could  not  interfere 
with  the  operations  of  the  main  body,  which  moved  south 
east  across  Morton's  Ford  and  Racoon  Ford  to  Louisa  Court 
House,  where  the  work  of  destruction  was  to  begin.  Stone  - 
man's  further  movements  will  be  related  hereafter.  One 
small  brigade  of  three  regiments  with  two  batteries  was 
placed  under  the  command  of  General  Pleasonton  and  di 
rected  to  report  to  General  Slocum,  to  precede  the  infantry 
on  the  different  roads. 

Stuart,  who  commanded  two  brigades  of  rebel  cavalry,  un 
der  Fitz  Hugh  Lee  and  W.  H.  F.  Lee,  and  whose  duty  it 
was  to  watch  these  upper  fords,  received  news  of  the  cross 
ing  at  9  P.M.,  on  the  28th. 

The  turning  column  reached  Chancellorsvitte  with  but 
little  opposition,  as  both  Lee  and  Stuart  thought  it  was  mak 
ing  for  Gordonsville  and  the  Virginia  Central  Railroad.  In 
consequence  of  this  miscalculation,  Stuart  planted  himself 
at  Brandy  Station.  When  he  found  that  he  was  out  of  po 
sition  and  that  it  was  too  late  to  prevent  the  crossing  at 
Germania  Ford,  he  made  a  circuit  with  Fitz  Hugh  Lee's 


CHAXCELLORSVILLE   AND   GETTYSBURG. 

brigade  to  get  between  Slocum  and  Lee,  and  sent  W.  H. 
F.  Lee's  brigade  to  impede  Stoneman's  operations.  The 
passage  of  Germania  Ford  turned  Elley's  Ford  and  United 
States  Ford,  and  Mahone's  and  Posey's  brigades,  who  were 
on  guard  there,  retreated  on  Chancellorsville,  where  Ander 
son  had  come  up  with  Wright's  brigade  too  late  to  prevent 
the  crossing. 

By  6  P.M.  on  the  30th,  Hooker  found  himself  in  command 
of  four  corps  at  Chancellorsville,  with  another — that  of 
Sickles — near  at  hand.  Anderson  fell  back  to  Tabernacle 
Church  as  our  troops  advanced,  and  began  to  fortify  a  line 
there.  Stuart  sent  Fitz  Hugh  Lee's  brigade,  which  was  very 
much  exhausted,  to  Todd's  Tavern  for  the  night,  while  he 
started  with  a  small  escort,  to  explain  the  situation  to  General 
Lee  at  Fredericksburg.  On  the  road,  not  far  from  Spottsyl- 
vania,  he  came  unexpectedly  upon  one  of  Pleasonton's  regi 
ments,  the  Sixth  New  York  Cavalry,  numbering  about  200 
men,  which  was  returning  from  a  reconnoissance  it  had  made 
in  that  direction.  He  avoided  the  encounter  and  sent  back 
to  Todd's  Tavern,  at  first  for  a  regiment,  but  subsequently 
for  the  entire  brigade.  When  these  reinforcements  came  up 
a  furious  cavalry  contest  took  place,  with  charges  and  coun 
ter-charges,  and  hand  to  hand  combats.  It  was  not  without 
an  element  of  romance,  in  that  lonely  spot,  far  from  either 
army,  under  the  resplendent  light  of  the  full  moon  ;  recall 
ing,  in  the  words  of  a  Southern  chronicler,  some  scene  of 
knightly  glory.  Our  troops  were  surrounded,  but  cut  their 
way  out  with  the  loss  of  their  gallant  commander,  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  McVicar,  who  led  them  to  the  charge. 

Meanwhile  the  other  portion  of  the  contemplated  move 
ment  had  also  been  going  forward.  On  the  28th,  the  Sixth 
Corps,  under  Sedgwick,  and  the  First  Corps,  under  Eey- 
nolds,  were  moved  down  near  the  river,  three  or  four  miles 


THE  OPENING  OF  1863.— HOOKER'S  PLANS.      9 

below  Fredericksburg,  and  bivouacked  there  in  a  pouring 
rain.  As  it  was  possible  that  the,  two  corps  might  be  at 
tacked  when  they  reached  the  other  side,  the  Third  Corps, 
under  Sickles,  was  posted  in  the  rear  as  a  reserve. 

The  next  day  two  bridges  were  laid  at  Franklin's  old 
crossing  for  the  Sixth  Corps,  and  two  more  a  mile  below  for 
the  First  Corps.  Men  in  rifle-pits  on  the  other  side  impeded 
the  placing  of  the  pontoons  for  a  while,  but  detachments 
sent  over  in  boats  stormed  their  intrenchments,  and  drove 
them  out.  Brooks'  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps  and  Wads- 
worth's  division  of  the  First  Corps  then  crossed  and  threw 
up  tete-de-ponts.  The  enemy  made  no  other  opposition  than 
a  vigorous  shelling  by  their  guns  on  the  heights,  which  did 
but  little  damage.  A  considerable  number  of  these  missiles 
were  aimed  at  my  division  and  at  that  of  General  J.  C.  Rob 
inson,  which  were  held  in  reserve  on  the  north  side  of  the 
river,  but  as  our  men  were  pretty  well  sheltered,  there  were 
but  few  casualties. 

It  soon  became  evident  that  the  enemy  would  not  attack 
the  bridge  heads,  they  being  well  guarded  by  artillery  on 
the  north  bank,  so  Sickles'  corps  was  detached  on  the  30th 
and  ordered  to  Chancellorsville. 

Sedgwick  used  the  remainder  of  his  men  to  great  advan 
tage  by  marching  them  back  and  forth  among  the  hills  in 
such  a  way  as  to  lead  Lee  to  suppose  that  a  very  large  force 
confronted  him.  As,  however,  Sedgwick  did  not  advance,  and 
more  accurate  reports  were  furnished  by  Stuart  in  relation  to 
what  had  taken  place  up  the  river,  Lee  saw,  on  the  night  of 
the  30th,  that  the  movement  in  front  of  Fredericksburg  was 
a  feint,  and  his  real  antagonist  was  at  Chancellorsville.  He 
had  previously  ordered  Jackson's  corps  up  from  Moss  Creek 
and  now  advanced  with  the  main  body  of  his  army  to  meet 
Hooker,  leaving  Early's  division  of  Jaclison's  corps  and 
1* 


10     CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

Barksdale's  brigade  of  McLaws'  division  of  Longstreet's 
corps  to  hold  the  heights  of  Fredericksburg  against  Sedg- 
wick.  Jackson,  who  was  always  prompt,  started  at  midnight, 
and  at  8  A.M.  the  next  day  stood  by  the  side  of  Anderson  at 
Tabernacle  Church.  McLaws'  division  had  already  arrived, 
having  preceded  him  by  a  few  hours. 

The  error  in  the  movements  thus  far  made  is  plain.  It  is 
a  maxim  in  war  that  a  single  hour's  delay,  when  an  enemy  is 
strengthening  his  position  or  when  reinforcements  are  com 
ing  up,  will  frequently  cost  the  lives  of  a  thousand  men.  In 
the  present  instance  it  was  simply  suicidal  for  Hooker  to 
delay  action  until  Anderson  had  fortified  his  lines  and  Lee 
had  come  forward  with  the  main  body  to  join  him.  Hooker 
should  have  pressed  on  immediately  to  seize  the  objective. 
Banks'  Ford  was  almost  within  his  grasp,  and  only  a  portion 
of  Anderson's  division  barred  the  way.  The  possession  of 
that  ford  would  have  brought  Sedgwick  twelve  miles  nearer 
to  him,  and  would  have  forced  Lee  to  fight  at  a  great  dis 
advantage  both  as  to  position  and  numbers.  Hooker  knew, 
from  a  captured  despatch  which  Pleasonton  placed  in  his 
hands,  that  Lee  was  still  in  Fredericksburg  on  the  30th,  un 
certain  how  to  act ;  for  he  did  not  know  the  strength  of 
Sedgwick's  column,  and  feared  that  the  main  attack  might 
come  from  that  direction.  The  four  corps  at  Chancellorsville 
amounted  to  about  forty-six  thousand  men  ;  and  18,000  more 
were  close  at  hand  under  Sickles.  The  troops  had  made 
but  a  short  march  and^were  comparatively  fresh.  Four  miles 
further  on  lay  the  great  prize  for  which  Hooker  was  contend 
ing.  He  had  only  to  put  out  his  hand  to  reach  it,  but  he 
delayed  action  all  that  long  night  and  until  eleven  o'clock  the 
next  morning.  When  he  did  make  the  effort  the  line  he 
was  about  to  occupy  was  well  fortified  and  held  by  all  but 
one  division  and  one  brigade  of  Lee's  arrnv. 


CHAPTER  II. 
FRIDAY,  THE  FIRST  OF   MAY. 

THERE  are  two  excellent  roads  leading  from  Chancellors- 
ville  to  Fredericksburg — one  a  plank  road,  which  keeps  up 
near  the  sources  of  the  streams  along  the  dividing  line  be 
tween  Mott  Run  on  the  north  and  Lewis  Creek  and  Mas- 
saponax  Creek  on  the  South,  and  the  other  called  the  old 
turnpike,  which  was  more  direct  but  more  broken,  as  it 
passed  over  several  ravines.  There  was  still  a  third  road,  a 
very  poor  one,  which  ran  near  the  river  and  came  out  at 
Banks'  Ford. 

On  May  1st,  at  11  A.M.,  Hooker  moved  out  to  attack  Lee  in 
four  columns. 

Slocum's  corps,  followed  by  that  of  Howard,  took  the 
plank  road  on  the  right. 

Sykes'  division  of  Meade's  corps,  followed  by  Hancock's 
division  of  Couch's  corps,  went  by  the  turnpike  in  the 
centre. 

The  remainder  of  Meade's  corps — Griffin's  division,  fol 
lowed  by  that  of  Humphreys — took  the  river  road. 

Lastly,  French's  division  of  Couch's  corps  was  under  orders 
to  turn  off  and  march  to  Todd's  Tavern. 

Each  column  was  preceded  by  a  detachment  of  Pleason- 
ton's  cavalry,  which,  in  fact,  had  been  close  to  Anderson's 
pickets  all  the  morning. 


12     CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

Before  these  troops  started,  Sickles'  corps  arrived,  after  a 
short  march,  from  Hartwood  Church,  and  were  posted  in 
rear  of  the  Chancellorsville  House  as  a  reserve,  with  one 
brigade  thrown  out  to  Dowdall's  Tavern,  otherwise  known  as 
Melzi  Chancellor's  house.  Another  brigade  was  left  at  the 
Ford  to  guard  the  passage  against  Fitz  Hugh  Lee's  cavalry. 

Hooker,  who  was  a  very  sanguine  man,  expected  to  be 
able  to  form  line  of  battle  by  2  P.M.,  with  his  right  resting 
near  Tabernacle  Church,  and  his  left  covering  Banks'  Ford. 
It  did  not  seem  to  occur  to  him  that  the  enemy  might  be 
there  before  him  and  prevent  the  formation,  or  that  he  would 
have  any  difficulty  in  moving  and  deploying  his  troops  ;  but 
he  soon  found  himself  hampered  in  every  direction  by  dense 
and  almost  impenetrable  thickets,  which  had  a  tendency  to 
break  up  every  organization  that  tried  to  pass  through  them 
into  mere  crowds  of  men  without  order  or  alignment. 
Under  these  circumstances  concert  of  action  became  exceed 
ingly  difficult,  and  when  attempts  were  made  to  communi 
cate  orders  off  of  the  roads,  aids  wandered  hopelessly 
through  the  woods,  struggling  in  the  thick  undergrowth, 
without  being  able  to  find  any  one.  It  was  worse  than 
fighting  in  a  dense  fog.1  The  enemy,  of  course,  were  also 
impeded  in  their  movements,  but  they  had  the  advantage  of 
being  better  acquainted  with  the  country,  and  in  case  they 
were  beaten  they  had  a  line  at  Tabernacle  Church  already  in 
trenched  to  fall  back  upon:  The  ravines  also,  which  crossed 
the  upper  roads  at  right  angles,  offered  excellent  defensive 
positions  for  them. 

McLaws,  who  had  advanced  on  the  turnpike,  managed  to 


1  One  brigade  of  Griffin's  division  was  out  all  night  tr.ying  to  find  its  way 
through  the  thickets,  and  did  not  reach  the  main  army  until  4  A.M.  Wilcox's 
brigade,  which  came  the  next  day  from  Banks'  Ford  to  reinforce  the  enemy,  had  a 
similar  experience. 


FRIDAY,  THE  FIRST  OF  MAY.  13 

form  line  of  battle  with  his  division  on  each  side  of  the  pike, 
against  Sykes,  who  had  now  come  forward  to  sustain  his 
cavalry  detachment,  which,  in  spite  of  their  gallantry — for 
they  rode  up  and  fired  in  the  faces  of  the  enemy — were  driven 
in  by  the  Eleventh  Virginia  Infantry  of  Mahone's  brigade. 
Jackson  on  his  arrival,  had  stopped  the  fortifying  which 
Anderson  had  commenced,  and  according  to  his  invariable 
custom  to  find  and  fight  his  enemy  as  soon  as  possible,  had 
moved  forward ;  so  that  the  two  armies  encountered  each 
other  about  two  and  a  half  miles  from  Chancellorsville. 
Sykes  indeed,  met  the  advance  of  McLaws'  division  only  a 
mile  out,  and  drove  it  back  steadily  a  mile  farther,  when  it 
was  reinforced  by  Anderson's  division,  and  IRamseur's  bri 
gade  of  Eodes'  division.  Anderson  gave  Sykes  a  lively  fight 
and  succeeded  in  getting  in  on  his  flanks  ;  for,  owing  to  the 
divergence  of  the  roads,  neither  Slocum  on  the  right  nor 
Meade's  two  divisions  on  the  left  were  abreast  with  him. 
He  tried  to  connect  with  Slocum  by  throwing  out  a  regiment 
deployed  as  skirmishers,  but  did  not  succeed.  As  the  enemy 
were  gaining  the  advantage  he  fell  back  behind  Hancock, 
who  came  to  the  front  and  took  his  place.  Slocum  now 
formed  on  the  right,  with  his  left  resting  on  the  plank  road, 
and  his  right  on  high  ground  which  commanded  the  country 
around.  Altogether  the  general  line  was  a  good  one ;  for 
there  were  large  open  spaces  where  the  artillery  could  move 
and  manoeuvre,  and  the  army  were  almost  out  of  the  thickets. 
The  reserves  could  have  struggled  through  those  in  the  rear, 
and  have  filled  the  gaps,  so  that  there  is  no  reason  to  sup 
pose  our  forces  could  not  have  continued  to  advance,  or  at  all 
events  have  held  the  position,  which,  from  its  elevation  and 
the  other  advantages  I  have  stated,  was  an  important  one, 
especially  as  the  column  on  the  river  road  was  in  sight  of 
Banks'  Ford,  which  it  could  have  seized  and  held,  or  have 


14  CHANCELLORSV1LLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

struck  the  right  flank  of  the  enemy  with  great  effect.  The 
troops  had  come  out  to  obtain  possession  of  Banks'  Ford, 
and  all  the  surplus  artillery  was  waiting  there.  To  retreat 
without  making  any  adequate  effort  to  carry  out  his  plans 
made  the  General  appear  timid,  and  had  a  bad  effect  on 
jihe  morale  of  the  army.  It  would  have  been  time  enough  to 
fall  back  in  case  of  defeat ;  and  if  such  a  result  was  antici 
pated,  the  engineers  with  their  4,000  men,  aided  by  Sickles' 
corps,  could  easily  have  laid  out  a  strong  line  in  the  rear  for 
the  troops  to  fall  back  upon.  General  Warren,  Chief  Engi 
neer  on  Hooker's  staff,  thought  the  commanding  ridge  with 
the  open  space  in  front,  upon  which  Hancock  was  posted, 
a  very  advantageous  position  for  the  army  to  occupy,  and 
urged  Couch  not  to  abandon  it  until  he  (Warren)  had  con 
ferred  with  Hooker.  After  the  order  came  to  retire,  Couch 
sent  to  obtain  permission  to  remain,  but  it  was  peremptor 
ily  refused.  Hooker  soon  afterward  changed  his  mind  and 
countermanded  his  first  order,  but  it  was  then  too  late  ;  our 
troops  had  left  the  ridge  and  the  enemy  were  in  possession 
of  it.  There  was  too  much  vacillation  at  headquarters. 
Slocum,  who  was  pressing  the  enemy  back,  was  very  much 
vexed  when  he  received  the  order,  but  obeyed  it,  and  re 
treated  without  being  molested.  It  is  true,  Wright's  brigade 
had  formed  on  his  right,  but  the  advance  of  the  Eleventh 
corps  would  have  taken  that  in  flank,  so  th,at  the  prospect 
was  generally  good  at  this  time  for  an  advance.  The  col 
umn  on  the  river  road  also  retired  without  interference.  As 
Couch  had  waited  to  hear  from  Hooker,  Hancock's  right 
flank  became  somewhat  exposed  by  the  delay,  but  he  fell 
back  without  serious  loss.  French  also,  who  had  started  for 
Todd's  Tavern,  returned.  He  encountered  the  enemy,  but 
was  ordered  in  and  did  not  engage  them. 

That  portion  of  the  country  around  Chancellorsville  within 


FRIDAY,  THE  FIRST  OF  MAY.  15 

the  Union  lines  on  the  morning  of  May  2d,  may,  with  some 
exceptions,  be  described  as  a  plain,  covered  by  dense  thickets, 
with  open  spaces  in  the  vicinity  of  the  houses,  varied  by 
the  high  ground  at  Talley's  on  the  west  and  by  the  hills 
of  Fairview  and  Hazel  Grove  on  the  south,  and  terminat 
ing  in  a  deep  ravine  near  the  river.  Our  general  line  was 
separated  from  that  of  the  enemy  by  small  streams,  which 
principally  ran  through  ravines,  forming  obstacles  useful  for 
defensive  purposes.  This  was  the  case  on  the  east  and 
south,  but  on  the  west,  where  Howard's  line  terminated, 
there  was  nothing  but  the  usual  thickets  to  impede  the 
enemy's  approach. 

As  the  narrative  proceeds,  the  position  of  the  Confederate 
army,  who  held  the  broken  ground  on  the  other  side  of 
these  ravines,  will  be  more  particularly  described. 

After  all,  a  defensive  battle  in  such  a  country  is  not  a  bad 
thing,  for  where  there  are  axes  and  timber  it  is  easy  to  for 
tify  and  hard  to  force  the  line  ;  always  provided  that  free 
communications  are  kept  open  to  the  central  reserve  and 
from  one  part  of  the  line  to  another.  It  must  be  confessed 
that  the  concealment  of  the  thickets  is  also  favorable  to 
the  initiative,  as  it  enables  the  attacking  party  to  mass  his 
troops  against  the  weak  parts  without  being  observed. 
Hooker  probably  thought  if  Lee  assailed  a  superior  force  in 
an  intrenched  position  he  would  certainly  be  beaten ;  and 
if  he  did  not  attack  he  would  soon  be  forced  to  fall  back 
on  his  depots  near  Richmond  for  food  and  ammunition.  In 
either  case  the  prestige  would  remain  with  the  Union  gen 
eral. 

The  rebels  followed  up  our  army  closely,  and  it  is  quite 
possible  that  a  sudden  attack,  when  it  was  heaped  up  around 
Chancellorsville,  might  have  been  disastrous  to  us.  Grad 
ually,  under  the  skilful  guidance  of  Captain  Payne  of  the 


16  CHANCELLORSVILLE   AND   GETTYSBURG. 

Engineers,  who  had  made  himself  well  acquainted  with  the 
country,  the  different  corps  took  the  positions  they  had 
occupied  on  the  previous  night,  and  order  came  out  of  chaos. 
The  line,  as  thus  established,  covered  all  the  roads  which 
passed  through  Chancellorsville.  The  left,  held  by  Meade's 
corps,  rested  on  the  Eappahannock,  near  Scott's  Dam ;  the 
line  was  then  continued  in  a  southerly  direction  by  Couch's 
corps,  facing  east,  French's  division  being  extended  to  a 
point  near  to  and  east  of  Chancellorsville,  with  Hancock's 
division  of  the  same  corps  holding  an  outpost  still  farther 
to  the  east.  Next  came  the  Twelfth  Corps  under  Slocum,  fa 
cing  south,  and  then,  at  some  distance  to  the  west,  in  echelon 
to  the  rear  along  the  Plank  Koad,  Howard's  corps  was  posted. 
The  Third  Corps  under  Sickles  was  kept  in  reserve,  back  of 
the  mansion.  The  next  morning  two  brigades  and  two  bat 
teries  of  Birney's  division  were  interposed  between  Slocum 
and  Howard,  with  a  strong  line  of  skirmishers  thrown  out 
in  front.  The  Eighth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry  picketed  the 
roads  and  kept  the  enemy  in  sight.  The  thickets  which 
surrounded  this  position  were  almost  impenetrable,  so  that 
an  advance  against  the  enemy's  lines  became  exceedingly 
difficult  and  manoeuvring  nearly  impracticable,  nor  was  this 
the  only  defect.  Batteries  could  be  established  on  the  high 
ground  to  the  east,  which  commanded  the  front  facing  in 
that  direction,  while  our  own  artillery  had  but  little  scope ; 
and  last,  but  most  important  of  all,  the  right  of  Howard's 
corps  was  "  in  the  air,"  that  is,  it  rested  on  no  obstacle. 

Hooker  was  sensible  that  this  flank  was  weak,  and  sent 
Graham's  brigade  of  Sickles'  corps  with  a  battery  to 
strengthen  it ;  but  Howard  took  umbrage  at  this,  as  a  re 
flection  on  the  bravery  of  his  troops  or  his  own  want  of 
skill,  and  told  Graham  that  he  did  not  need  his  services  ; 
that  he  felt  so  secure  in  his  position  that  he  would  send  his 


FRIDAY,    THE  FIRST   OF  MAY.  17 

compliments  to  the  whole  rebel  army  if  they  lay  in  front  of 
him,  and  invite  them  to  attack  him.  As  Hooker  had  just 
acquiesced  in  the  appointment  of  Howard  to  be  Commander 
of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  he  disliked  to  show  a  want  of  confi 
dence  in  him  at  the  very  commencement  of  his  career,  and 
therefore  yielded  to  his  wishes  and  ordered  the  reinforce 
ments  to  return  and  report  to  Sickles  again. 

Chancellorsville  being  a  great  centre  of  communication 
with  the  plank  road  and  turnpike  leading  east  and  west,  and 
less  important  roads  to  the  south,  and  southeast,  Hooker 
desired  above  all  things  to  retain  it ;  for  if  it  should  once 
fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  our  army  would  be  unable 
to  move  in  any  direction  except  to  the  rear. 

General  Lee  formed  his  line  with  Wickham's  and  Owens' 
regiments  of  cavalry  on  his  right,  opposite  Meade's  corps, 
supported  by  Perry's  brigade  of  Anderson's  division ;  Jack 
son's  line  stretched  from  the  Plank  Koad  around  toward  the 
Furnace. 

Before  night  set  in,  Wright  and  Stuart  attacked  an  out 
lying  post  of  Slocum's  corps  and  drove  it  in  on  the  main 
body.  They  then  brought  up  some  artillery  and  opened  fire 
against  Slocum's  position  on  the  crest  of  the  hill.  Failing 
to  make  any  impression  they  soon  retired  and  all  was  quiet 
once  more. 

The  enemy  soon  posted  batteries  on  the  high  ground  a 
mile  east  of  Chancellorsville,  and  opened  on  Hancock's  front 
with  considerable  effect.  They  also  enfiladed  Geary's  di 
vision  of  Slocum's  corps,  and  became  veiy  annoying,  but 
Knap's  battery  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  replied  effectively  and 
kept  their  fire  down  to  a  great  extent. 

As  the  Union  army  were  hidden  by  the  thick  undergrowth, 
Lee  spent  the  rest  of  the  day  in  making  a  series  of  feint 
attacks  to  ascertain  where  our  troops  were  posted. 


FRIDAY,  THE  FIRST  OF  MAY.  19 

When  night  set  in,  the  sound  of  the  axe  was  heard  in  every 
direction,  for  both  armies  thought  it  prudent  to  strengthen 
their  front  as  much  as  possible. 

The  prospect  for  Lee  as  darkness  closed  over  the  scene 
was  far  from  encouraging.  He  had  examined  the  position 
of  the  Union  army  carefully,  and  had  satisfied  himself  that 
as  regards  its  centre  and  left  it  was  unassailable.  Let  any 
man  with  a  musket  on  his  shoulder,  encumbered  with  a  car 
tridge-box,  haversack,  canteen,  etc.,  attempt  to  climb  over  a 
body  of  felled  timber  to  get  at  an  enemy  who  is  coolly  shoot 
ing  at  him  from  behind  a  log  breastwork,  and  he  will  real 
ize  the  difficulty  of  forcing  a  way  through  such  obstacles. 
Our  artillery,  too,  swept  every  avenue  of  approach,  so  that 
the  line  might  be  considered  as  almost  impregnable.  Before 
giving  up  the  attack,  however,  Stuart  was  directed  to  cau 
tiously  reconnoitre  on  the  right,  where  Howard  was  posted, 
and  see  if  there  was  not  a  vulnerable  point  there. 


CHAPTEK  HE. 

THE    DISASTROUS   SECOND   OF   MAY. 

AT  dawn  of  day  General  Lee  and  General  Jackson  were 
sitting  by  the  side  of  the  plank  road,  on  some  empty  cracker 
boxes,  discussing  the  situation,  when  Stuart  came  up  and  re 
ported  the  result  of  his  reconnoissance.  He  said  the  right 
flank  of  Howard's  corps  was  defenceless  and  easily  assailable. 
Jackson  at  once  asked  permission  to  take  his  own  corps — 
about  26,000  muskets — make  a  detour  through  the  woods  to 
conceal  his  march  from  observation,  and  fall  unexpectedly 
upon  the  weak  point  referred  to  by  Stuart.  It  was  a  start 
ling  proposition  and  contrary  to  all  the  principles  of  strategy ; 
for  when  Jackson  was  gone  Lee  would  be  left  with  but  a 
few  men  to  withstand  the  shock  of  Hooker's  entire  army, 
and  might  be  driven  back  to  Fredericksburg  or  crushed.  If 
the  Eleventh  Corps  had  prepared  for  Jackson's  approach  by 
a  line  properly  fortified,  with  redoubts  on  the  flanks,  the 
men  protected  in  front  by  felled  timber  and  sheltered  by 
breastworks,  with  the  artillery  at  the  angles,  crossing  its  fire 
in  front,  Jackson's  corps  would  have  been  powerless  to  ad 
vance,  and  could  have  been  held  as  in  a  vice,  while  Lee, 
one-half  of  his  force  being  absent,  would  have  found  him 
self  helpless  against  the  combined  attack  of  our  other  corps 
which  could  have  assailed  him  in  front  and  on  each  flank. 

There   was,  therefore,    great  risk   in   attempting   such   a 


THE   DISASTROUS  SECOND  OF  MAY.  21 

manoeuvre,  for  nothing  short  of  utter  blindness  on  the  part 
of  the  Union  commanders  could  make  it  successful. 

Still,  something  had  to  be  done,  for  inaction  would  result 
in  a  retreat,  and  in  the  present  instance,  if  the  worst  came 
to  the  worst,  Jackson  could  fall  back  on  Gordonsville, 
and  Lee  toward  the  Virginia  Central  Eailroad,  where  they 
could  reunite  their  columns  by  rail,  before  Hooker  could 
march  across  the  country  and  prevent  the  junction.  Jack 
son  received  the  required  permission,  and  started  off  at 
once  by  a  secluded  road,  keeping  Fitz  Hugh  Lee's  brigade 
of  cavalry  between  his  column  and  the  Union  army  to  shield 
his  march  from  observation. 

At  2  A.M.  Hooker  sent  orders  for  the  First  Corps,  under 
Keynolds,  to  which  I  belonged,  to  take  up  its  bridges  and 
join  him  by  way  of  United  States  Ford,  and  by  9  A.M.  we 
were  en  route. 

The  first  sound  of  battle  came  from  some  guns  posted  on 
the  eminence  from  \vhich  Hancock  had  retreated  the  day 
before.  A  battery  there  opened  fire  on  the  army  trains 
which  had  been  parked  in  the  open  plain  in  front  of  the 
Chancellorsville  House,  and  drove  them  pell  mell  to  the 
rear. 

At  dawn  Hooker  rode  around,  accompanied  by  Sickles,  to 
inspect  his  lines.  He  approved  the  position  generally,  but 
upon  Sickles'  recommendation  he  threw  in  a  division  of  the 
Third  Corps  between  the  Eleventh  and  Twelfth,  as  he 
thought  the  interval  too  great  there. 

As  soon  as  Jackson  was  en  route,  Lee  began  to  demon 
strate  against  our  centre  and  left,  to  make  Hooker  believe 
the  main  attack  was  to  be  there,  and  to  prevent  him  from 
observing  the  turning  column  in  its  progress  toward  the 
right.  A  vigorous  cannonade  began  against  Meade,  and  a 
musketry  fire  was  opened  on  Couch  and  Slocum  ;  the  heavi- 


22     CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

est  attack  being  on  Hancock's  position,  which  was  in  ad 
vance  of  the  main  line. 

In  spite  of  every  precaution,  Jackson's  column  as  it  moved 
southward  was  seen  to  pass  over  a  bare  hill  about  a  mile 
and  a  half  from  Birney's  front,  and  its  numbers  were  pretty 
accurately  estimated.  General  Birney  at  once  reported 
this  important  fact  at  General  Hooker's  headquarters.  It  is 
always  pleasant  to  think  your  adversary  is  beaten,  and 
Hooker  thought  at  first  Jackson  might  be  retreating  on  Gor- 
donsville.  It  was  evident  enough  that  he  was  either  doing 
that  or  making  a  circuit  to  attack  Howard.  To  provide  for 
the  latter  contingency  the  following  order  was  issued : 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 
CHANCELLORSVILLE,  Va.,  May  2,  1863,  9.30A.M. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  SLOCUM  AND  MAJOR-GENERAL  HOWARD  : 

I  am  directed  by  the  Major-General  Commanding  to  say  that  the 
disposition  you  have  made  of  your  corps  has  been  with  a  view  t ;  a  front 
attack  by  the  enemy.  If  he  should  throw  himself  upon  your  flank, 
he  wishes  you  to  examine  the  ground  and  determine  upon  the  positions 
you  will  take  in  that  event,  in  order  that  you  may  be  prepared  for  him 
in  whatever  direction  he  advances.  He  suggests  that  you  have  heavy 
reserves  well  in  hand  to  meet  this  contingency.  The  right  of  your  line 
does  not  appear  to  be  strong  enough.  No  artificial  defences  worth 
naming  have  been  thrown  up,  and  there  appears  to  be  a  scarcity  of 
troops  at  that  point,  and  not,  in  the  General's  opinion,  as  favorably 
posted  as  might  be. 

We  have  good  reason  to  suppose  that  the  enemy  is  moving  to  our 
right.     Please  advance  your  pickets  for  purposes  of  observation  as  far 
as  may  be  safe,  in  order  to  obtain  timely  information  of  their  approval, 
(Signed)  JAMES  H.  VAN  ALLEN, 

Brigadier-General  and  Aide-de-camp.' 

For  what  subsequently  occurred  Hooker  was  doubtless 
highly  censurable,  but  it  was  not  unreasonable  for  him  to 
suppose,  after  giving  these  orders  to  a  corps  commander, 


THE  DISASTROUS  SECOND   OF  MAY.  23 

that  they  would  be  carried  out,  and  that  minor  combats  far 
out  on  the  roads  would  precede  and  give  ample  notice  of 
Jackson's  approach  in  time  to  reinforce  that  part  of  the  line. 

"When  the  enemy  were  observed,  Sickles  went  out  with 
Clark's  battery  and  an  infantry  support  to  shell  their  train. 
This  had  the  effect  of  driving  them  off  of  that  road  on  to 
another  which  led  in  the  same  direction,  but  was  less  ex 
posed,  as  it  went  through  the  woods.  A  second  reconnois- 
sance  was  sent  to  see  if  the  movement  continued.  Sickles 
then  obtained  Hooker's  consent  to  start  out  with  two  divi 
sions  to  attack  Jackson's  corps  in  flank  and  cui  it  off  from 
the  main  body. 

Sickles  started  on  this  mission  at  1  P.M.  with  Birney's  di 
vision,  preceded  by  Eandolph's  battery.  As  Jackson  might 
turn  on  him  with  his  whole  force,  Whipple's  division  of  his 
own  corps  reinforced  his  left,  and  Barlow's  brigade  of  the 
Eleventh  Corps  his  right.  He  was  greatly  delayed  by  the 
swamps  and  the  necessity  of  building  bridges,  but  finally 
crossed  Lewis  Creek  and  reached  the  road  upon  which 
Jackson  was  marching.  He  soon  after,  by  the  efforts  of  Ber- 
dan's  sharpshooters,  surrounded  and  captured  the  Twenty- 
third  Georgia  regiment,  which  had  been  left  to  watch  the 
approaches  from  our  lines.  Information  obtained  from  pris 
oners  showed  that  Jackson  could  not  be  retreating,  and  that 
his  object  was  to  strike  a  blow  somewhere. 

Birney's  advance,  and  the  capture  of  the*  Twenty -third 
Georgia  were  met  by  corresponding  movements  on  the  part 
of  the  enemy.  A  rebel  battery  was  established  011  the  high 
ground  at  the  Welf ord  House,  which  checked  Birney's  ad 
vance  until  it  was  silenced  by  Livingston's  battery,  which 
was  brought  forward  for  that  purpose.  Pleasonton's  cavalry 
was  now  sent  to  the  Foundry  as  an  additional  reinforcement. 
Sickles'  intention  was  to  cut  Jackson  off  entirelv  from  Me- 


24  CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

Laws'  and  Anderson's  divisions,  and  then  to  attack  the  latter 
in  flank,  a  plan  which  promised  good  results.  In  the  mean 
time  Pleasonton's  cavalry  was  sent  forward  to  follow  up 
Jackson's  movement.  Sickles  requested  permission  to  at 
tack  McLaws,  but  Hooker  again  became  irresolute  ;  so  that 
this  large  Union  force  was  detained  at  the  Furnace  without  a 
definite  object,  and  the  works  it  had  occupied  were  vacant. 
While  Sickles  was  not  allowed  to  strike  the  flank,  Slocum's 
two  divisions  under  Geary  and  Williams  were  sent  to  push 
back  the  fortified  front  of  the  enemy  in  the  woods ;  a  much 
more  difficult  operation.  Geary  attacked  on  the  plank  road, 
but  made  no  serious  impression,  and  returned.  Williams 
struck  farther  to  the  south,  but  was  checked  by  part  of  An 
derson's  division.  A  combined  attack  against  Lee's  front 
and  left  flank,  undertaken  with  spirit  earlier  in  the  day, 
wo-uld  in  all  probability  have  driven  him  off  toward  Freder- 
icksburg  and  have  widened  the  distance  between  his  force 
and  that  of  Jackson  ;  but  now  the  latter  was  close  at  hand 
and  it  was  too  late  to  attempt  it.  As  the  time  carne  for  the 
turning  column  to  make  its  appearance  on  Howard's  right,  a 
fierce  attack  was  again  made  against  Hancock  with  infantry 
and  artillery,  to  distract  Hooker's  attention  from  the  real 
point  at  issue. 

Pleasonton,  after  dismounting  one  regiment  and  sending 
it  into  the  woods  to  reconnoitre,  finding  his  cavalry  were  of 
no  use  in  such  a  country,  and  that  Jackson  was  getting  far 
ther  and  farther  away,  rode  leisurely  back,  at  Sickles'  sugges 
tion,  to  Hazel  Grove,  which  was  an  open  space  of  consid 
erable  elevation  to  the  right  of  the  Twelfth  Corps.  As  he 
drew  near  the  roar  of  battle  burst  upon  his  ears  from  the 
right  of  the  line  and  a  scene  of  horror  and  confusion  presented 
itself,  presaging  the  rout  of  the  entire  army  if  some  imme 
diate  measures  were  not  taken  to  stem  the  tide  of  disaster. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  ROUT  OF  THE  ELEVENTH  CORPS. 

NOTWITHSTANDING  Hooker's  order  of  9.30  A.M.,  calling  How 
ard's  attention  to  the  weakness  of  his  right  flank,  and  the 
probability  that  Jackson  was  marching  to  attack  it,  no  pre 
cautions  were  taken  against  the  impending  danger  ;  for  sim 
ply  establishing  a  front  of  two  regiments  toward  the  west 
when  half  his  command  would  hardly  have  been  sufficient, 
unless  protected  by  works  of  some  kind,  was  perfectly  idle 
as  a  barrier  against  the  torrent  about  to  overwhelm  the 
Eleventh  Corps.  So  far  as  I  can  ascertain,  only  two  compa 
nies  were  thrown  out  on  picket,  and  they  were  unsupported 
by  grand  guards,  so  that  they  did  not  detain  the  enemy  a 
moment,  and  the  rebels  and  our  pickets  all  came  in  together. 
Great  stress  has  been  laid  upon  the  fact  that  Howard  did 
have  a  reserve  force — Barlow's  brigade  of  2,500  men — facing 
west,  which  Hooker  withdrew  to  reinforce  Sickles  ;  but  it  is 
not  shown  that  Howard  made  any  remonstrance  or  attached 
any  great  importance  to  its  removal.  Even  if  it  had  re 
mained,  as  there  were  no  strong  intrenchments  in  front  of  it, 
it  is  not  probable  that  it  would  have  been  able  to  resist 
Jackson's  entire  corps  for  any  length  of  time.  There  was  no 
reason  other  than  Howard's  utter  want  of  appreciation  of  the 
gravity  of  the  situation  to  prevent  him  from  forming  a  strong 
line  of  defence  to  protect  his  right  flank.  If  made  with 
VI.— 2 


2(5  CHAIJpELLORSVILLE   AND  GETTYSBURG. 

felled  timber  in  front  and  redoubts  on  the  flanks,  Jackson 
could  not  have  overleaped  it,  or  even  attacked  it  without 
heavy  loss.  If  he  stopped  to  do  so,  Sickles'  corps  and 
Williams'  division  of  the  Twelfth  Corps,  with  the  reserve 
forces  under  Berry  and  French,  would  soon  have  confronted 
him.  If  he  had  attempted  to  keep  on  farther  down  to  attack 
the  United  States  Ford,  he  would  have  met  the  First  Corps 
there,  and  would  have  permanently  severed  all  connection 
between  himself  and  Lee,  besides  endangering  his  line  of  re 
treat.  The  apathy  and  indifference  Howard  manifested  in 
relation  to  Jackson's  approach  can  only  be  explained  in  the 
supposition  that  he  really  believed  that  Jackson  had  fled  to 
Gordonsville,  and  that  the  demonstrations  on  his  front  and 
right  proceeded  merely  from  Stuart's  cavalry  ;  and  yet  why 
any  one  should  suppose  that  Lee  would  part  with  half  his 
army,  and  send  it  away  to  Gordonsville  where  there  was  no 
enemy  and  nothing  to  be  done,  is  more  than  I  can  imagine. 
Jackson  was  celebrated  for  making  these  turning  move 
ments  ;  besides,  it  was  easy,  by  questioning  prisoners,  to 
verify  the  fact  that  he  had  no  surplus  trains  with  him.  Noth 
ing,  in  short,  but  ammunition  wagons,  and  ambulances  for 
the  wounded ;  a  sure  indication  that  his  movement  meant 
fight  and  not  retreat. 

From  10  A.M.,  when  Hooker's  order  was  received,  to  6  P.M., 
when  the  assault  came,  there  was  ample  time  for  Howard  to 
form  an  impregnable  line.  His  division  commanders  did 
not  share  his  indifference.  General  Schurz  pointed  out  to 
him  that  his  flank  was  in  the  air,  but  he  seemed  perfectly 
satisfied  with  his  line  as  it  was,  and  not  at  all  desirous,  of 
changing  it  in  any  particular.  Schurz,  of  his  own  volition, 
without  the  knowledge  of  his  chief,  posted  three  regiments 
in  close  column  of  division,  and  formed  them  in  the  same 
direction  as  the  two  regiments  and  two  guns  which  were 


THE  ROUT  OF  THE  ELEVENTH  dORPS.      27 

expected  to  keep  Jackson  back,  but  the  shock,  when  it  came, 
was  so  sudden  that  these  columns  did  not  have  time  to 
deploy.  Devens,  having  two  reserve  regiments,  also  faced 
them  that  way,  of  his  own  accord,  behind  the  other  two,  but 
having  no  encouragement  to  form  line  in  that  direction  it  is 
probable  both  generals  hesitated  to  do  so. 

Jackson  having  debouched  from  the  country  road  into  the 
plank  road,  was  separated  from  Lee  by  nearly  six  miles  of 
pathless  forest.  He  kept  on  until  he  reached  the  turnpike, 
and  then  halted  his  command  in  order  that  he  might  recon 
noitre  and  form  line  of  battle.  He  went  up  on  a  high  hill 
and  personally  examined  the  position  of  the  Eleventh  Corps. 
Finding  that  it  was  still  open  to  attack,  and  that  no  prepara 
tions  had  been  made  to  receive  him,  he  formed  Bodes'  and 
Colston's  divisions  two  hundred  yards  apart,  perpendicular 
to  the  plank  road,  with  the  road  in  the  centre,  and  with 
Hill's  division  both  on  the  plank  road  and  turnpike  as  a  sup 
port  to  the  other  two.  Fitz  Lee's  brigade  of  cavalry  was 
left  on  the  plank  road  to  menace  Howard  from  that  direction. 

It  will  be  seen  by  a  glance  at  the  map  that  his  lines  over 
lapped  that  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  for  a  long  distance,  both 
in  front  and  rear.  The  first  notice  our  troops  had  of  his 
approach  did  not  come  from  our  pickets — for  their  retreat 
and  his  attack  were  almost  simultaneous — but  from  the  deer, 
rabbits,  and  other  wTild  animals  of  the  forest,  driven  from 
their  coverts  by  his  advance.  It  is  always  convenient  to 
have  a  scape-goat  in  case  of  disaster,  and  the  German  ele 
ment  in  the  Eleventh  Corps  have  been  fiercely  censured  and 
their  name  became  a  byword  for  giving  way  on  this  occa 
sion.  It  is  full  time  justice  should  be  done  by  calling  atten 
tion  to  the  position  of  that  corps.  I  assert  that  when  a 
force  is  not  deployed,  but  is  struck  suddenly  and  violently 
on  its  flank,  resistance  is  impracticable.  Not  Napoleon's  Old 


28  CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

Guard,  not  the  best  and  bravest  troops  that  ever  existed, 
could  hold  together  in  such  a  case,  for  the  first  men  assailed 
are — to  use  a  homely  but  expressive  word — driven  into  a 
huddle;  and  a  huddle  cannot  fight,  for  it  has  no  front  and  no 
organization.  Under  such  circumstances,  the  men  have  but 
a  choice  of  two  evils,  either  to  stay  where  they  are  and  be 
slaughtered,  without  the  power  of  defending  themselves, 
or  to  run,  and  the  only  sensible  thing  for  them  to  do  is 
to  run  and  rally  on  some  other  organization.  The  attempt 
to  change  front  and  meet  this  attack  on  such  short  notice 
would  have  been  hopeless  enough,  drawn  up  as  Howard's 
men  were,  even  if  they  had  been  all  in  line  with  arms  in 
their  hands ;  but  it  is  a  beautiful  commentary  on  the  vigi 
lance  displayed,  that  in  many  cases  the  muskets  were  stacked 
and  the  men  lounging  about,  some  playing  cards,  others 
cooking  their  supper,  intermingled  with  the  pack-mules  and 
beef  cattle  they  were  unloading.  It  will  be  remembered 
that  in  the  order  previously  quoted,  Howard  was  directed 
" to  advance  his  pickets  for  the  purpose  of  observation"  in  order 
that  he  might  have  ample  time  for  preparation.  The  object  of 
this  injunction  is  plain  enough.  It  was  to  make  sufficient 
resistance  to  Jackson's  advance  to  detain  it,  and  not  only 
give  time  to  the  Eleventh  Corps  to  form,  but  enable  Hooker 
to  send  his  reserves  to  that  part  of  the  line.  The  pickets, 
therefore,  should  have  been  far  out  and  strongly  backed  with 
a  large  force  which  would  take  advantage  of  every  accident  of 
ground  to  delay  the  rebel  column  as  long  as  possible.  How 
ard  seemed  to  have  no  curiosity  himself,  as  he  sent  out  no 
parties;  but  Sickles  and  Pleasonton  had  their  spies  and 
detachments  on  the  watch,  and  these  came  in  constantly 
with  the  information,  which  was  duly  transmitted  to  How 
ard,  that  Jackson  was  actually  coming.  Schurz  also  became 
uneasy  and  sent  out  parties  to  reconnoitre.  General  Noble. 


THE  ROUT  OF  THE  ELEVENTH  CORPS.      29 

at  that  time  Colonel  of  the  Seventeenth  Connecticut  Infantry, 
two  companies  of  whose  regiments  were  on  the  picket  line 
there,  writes  as  follows  :  "  The  disaster  resulted  from  How 
ard's  and  Deveus'  utter  disregard  and  inattention  under 
warnings  that  came  in  from  the  front  and  flank  all  through 
the  day.  Horseman  after  horseman  rode  into  my  post  and 
was  sent  to  headquarters  with  the  information  that  the 
enemy  were  heavily  marching  along  our  front  and  proceed 
ing  to  our  right ;  and  last  of  all  an  officer  reported  the  rebels 
massing  for  attack.  Howard  scouted  the  report  and  insulted 
the  informants,  charging  them  with  telling  a  story  that  was 
the  offspring  of  their  imaginations  or  their  fears." 

If  this  be  true,  there  has  been  but  one  similar  case  in  our 
annals,  and  that  was  the  massacre  of  the  garrison  of  Fort 
Sims,  by  the  savages,  in  1813,  near  Mobile,  Alabama ;  soon 
after  a  negro  had  been  severely  flogged  by  the  commanding 
officer  for  reporting  that  he  had  seen  Indians  lurking  around 
the  post. 

Adjutant  Wilkenson,  of  the  same  regiment,  confirms  Gene 
ral  Noble's  statement  and  says,  "  Why  a  stronger  force  was 
not  sent  out  as  skirmishers  and  the  left  of  our  line  changed 
to  front  the  foe  is  more  than  I  am  able  to  understand." 

General  Schimmelpfennig,  commanding  a  brigade  of 
Schurz's  division,  says  he  sent  out  a  reconnoissance  and  re 
ported  the  hostile  movements  fully  two  hours  before  the 
enemy  charged. 

The  Germans  were  bitterly  denounced  for  this  catastro 
phe,  I  think  very  unjustly,  for  in  the  first  place  less  than 
one-half  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  were  Germans,  and  in  the 
second  place  the  troops  that  did  form  line  and  tempo 
rarily  stop  Jackson's  advance  were  Germans  ;  principally 
Colonel  Adolph  Buschbeck's  brigade  of  Steinwehr's  division, 
aided  by  a  few  regiments  of  Schurz's  division,  who  gave  a 


30  CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

volley  or  two.  Buschbeck  held  a  weak  intrenched  line  per 
pendicular  to  the  plank  road  for  three-quarters  of  an  hour, 
with  artillery  on  the  right,  losing  one-third  of  his  force.  The 
enemy  then  folded  around  his  flanks  and  took  him  in  re 
verse,  when  further  resistance  became  hopeless  and  his  men 
retreated  in  good  order  to  the  rear  of  Sickles'  line  at  Hazel 
Grove  where  they  supported  the  artillery  and  offered  to  lead 
a  bayonet  charge,  if  the  official  reports  are  to  be  believed. 
Warren  says  he  took  charge  of  some  batteries  of  the  Eleventh 
Corps  and  formed  them  in  line  across  the  Plank  Road  with 
out  any  infantry  support  whatever. 

In  reference  to  this  surprise,  Couch  remarks  that  no  troops 
could  have  stood  under  such  circumstances,  and  I  fully 
agree  with  him. 

An  officer  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  who  was  present  informed 
General  Wainwright,  formerly  Colonel  of  the  Seventy-sixth 
New  York,  that  he  wras  playing  cards  in  the  ditch,  and  the 
first  notice  he  had  of  the  enemy  was  seeing  them  looking 
down  on  him  from  the  parapet  above. 

As  for  Devens,  who  was  nearest  the  enemy,  it  is  quite 
probable  that  any  attempt  by  him  to  change  front  to  the 
west  previous  to  the  attack  would  have  been  looked  upon  by 
Howard  as  a  reflection  on  his  own  generalship  and  would 
have  been  met  with  disfavor  if  not  with  a  positive  repri 
mand.  The  only  semblance  of  precaution  taken,  therefore, 
was  the  throwing  out  two  regiments  to  face  Jackson's  ad 
vance.  Devens  could  not  disgarnish  his  main  line  without 
Howard's  permission,  and  it  is  not  fair,  therefore,  to  hold 
him  responsible  for  the  disaster.  As  it  was,  he  was  severely 
wounded  in  attempting  to  rally  his  men.  The  only  pickets 
thrown  out  appear  to  have  been  two  companies  of  the  Seven- 
tsenth  Connecticut  Infantry. 

Just  as  Jackson  was  about  to  attack,  a  furious  assault  was 


THE  ROUT  OF  THE  ELEVENTH  CORPS.      31 

made  at  the  other  end  of  the  line,  where  Meade  was  posted. 
This  was  repulsed  but  it  served  to  distract  Hooker's  atten 
tion  from  the  real  point  of  danger  on  the  right. 

It  would  seem  from  all  accounts  that  nothing  could  van 
quish  Howard's  incredulity.  He  appeared  to  take  so  little 
interest  in  Stonewall's  approach  that  when  Captain  George 
E.  Farmer,  one  of  Pleasonton's  staff,  reported  to  him  that  he 
had  found  a  rebel  battery  posted  directly  on  the  flank  of  the 
Eleventh  Corps,  he  was,  to  use  his  own  language,  "  cour 
teously  received,  but  Howard  did  not  seem  to  believe  there  was 
any  force  of  the  enemy  in  his  immediate  front."  Sickles  and 
Pleasonton  were  doing  all  they  could  to  ascertain  Jackson's 
position,  for  at  this  time  a  small  detachment  of  the  Third 
Corps  were  making  a  reconnoissance  on  the  Orange  Court 
House  Plank  Road,  and  Rodes  states  that  our  cavalry  was 
met  there  and  skirmished  with  Stuart's  advance.  Farmer 
said  he  saw  no  Union  jrickets,  but  noticed  on  his  return  that 
Howard's  men  were  away  from  their  arms,  which  were 
stacked,  and  that  they  were  playing  cards,  etc.,  utterly 
unsuspicious  of  danger  and  unprepared  for  a  contest. 
Notwithstanding  the  reports  of  Jackson's  movement  from 
spies  and  scouts,  Howard  ordered  no  change  in  his  lines. 

An  attempt  has  been  made  to  hold  Colonel  Farmer  respon 
sible  for  this  surprise,  on  the  ground  that  he  should  have 
charged  the  battery  and  brought  in  some  prisoners,  who 
would  give  full  information  ;  but  there  had  been  warnings 
enough,  and  prisoners  enough,  and  as  Colonel  Farmer  had 
but  forty  men,  he  would  have  had  to  dismount  half  of  them 
to  make  the  assault,  and  writh  part  of  his  force  holding  the 
horses,  he  could  only  have  used  about  twenty  men  in  the 
attack,  which  is  rather  too  few  to  capture  guns  supported  by 
an  army.  Besides,  Farmer  was  sent  out  by  General  Pleason 
ton  with  specific  instructions,  and  was  not  obliged  to  recog- 


32     CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

nize  the  authority  of  other  officers  who  desired  him  to  make 
a  Don  Quixote  of  himself  to  no  purpose. 

If  the  two  wings  of  the  rebel  army  had  been  kept  apart, 
the  small  force  left  under  Lee  could  easily  have  been 
crushed,  or  driven  off  toward  Richmond.  The  commander 
of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  however,  far  from  making  any  new 
works,  did  not  man  those  he  had,  and  left  his  own  lines  to 
go  off  with  Barlow's  brigade  to  see  what  Sickles  was  doing. 

The  subsequent  investigation  of  this  sad  business  by  the 
Congressional  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  was 
very  much  of  a  farce,  and  necessarily  unreliable ;  for  so  long 
as  both  Hooker  and  Howard  were  left  in  high  command,  it  was 
absurd  to  suppose  their  subordinates  would  testify  against 
them.  Any  officer  that  did  so  would  have  soon  found  his 
military  career  brought  to  a  close. 

Howard  was  in  one  or  two  instances  mildly  censured  for 
not  keeping  a  better  lookout,  but  as  a  general  thing  the 
whole  blame  was  thrown  on  the  Germans.  Hooker  himself 
attributed  the  trouble  to  the  fact  that  Howard  did  not  fol 
low  up  Jackson's  movements,  and  allowed  his  men  to  stray 
from  their  arms. 

A  great  French  military  writer  has  said,  "  It  is  permissible 
for  an  officer  to  be  defeated;  but  never  to  be  surprised." 

It  is,  of  course,  only  fair  to  hear  what  Howard  himself  has 
to  say  in  relation  to  this  matter. 

He  writes  in  his  official  report  of  the  battle  as  follows  : 

Now  as  to  the  cause  of  the  disaster  to  my  corps. 

First. — Though  constantly  threatened,  and  apprised  of  the  moving 
of  the  enemy,  yet  the  woods  were  so  dense  that  he  was  able  to  mass  a 
large  force,  whose  exact  whereabouts  neither  patrols,  reconnoissances, 
nor  snouts  ascertained. 

He  succeeded  in  forming  a  column  opposite  to  and  outflanking  my 
right. 


THE  ROUT  OF  THE  ELEVENTH  CORPS.      33 

Second. — By  the  panic  produced  by  the  enemy's  reverse  fire,  regi 
ments  and  artillery  were  thrown  suddenly  upon  those  in  position. 

Third. — The  absence  of  General  Barlow's  brigade,  which  I  had 
previously  located  in  reserve,  and  in  echelon  with  Colonel  Von  Gilsa's, 
so  as  to  cover  his  right  flank. 

The  first  proposition  implies  that  Howard  did  not  know 
Jackson  intended  to  attack  his  right,  and  therefore  did  not 
prepare  for  him  in  that  direction,  but  as  his  front  was  well 
fortified,  and  his  flank  unprotected,  it  was  plainly  his  duty 
to  strengthen  the  weak  part  of  his  line.  To  suppose  that 
Jackson  would  run  a  great  risk,  and  spend  an  entire  day  in 
making  this  long  circuit  for  the  purpose  of  assailing  his 
enemy  in  front,  is  hardly  reasonable;  for  he  could  have 
swung  his  line  around  against  it  at  once,  had  he  desired  to 
do  so. 

The  fierce  rush  of  the  rebels,  who  came  in  almost  simul 
taneously  with  the  pickets,  first  struck  General  Von  Gilsa's 
two  small  regiments  and  the  two  guns  in  the  road,  the  only 
force  that  actually  fronted  them  in  line. 

Von  Gilsa  galloped  at  once  to  Howard's  Headquarters  at 
lApwdall's  Tavern  to  ask  for  immediate  reinforcements.  He 
was  told,  "he  must  hold  his  post  with  the  men  he  had,  and 
trust  to  \3rod  ;  "  information  which  was  received  by  the  irate 
German  with  .objurgations  that  were  not  at  all  of  an  orthodox 
character. 

Devens'  division,  (thus  taken  in  flank,  was  driven  back  upon 
Schurz's  division,  and  t  hat  being  unable  to  form,  was  heaped 
up  after  some  resistance  on  Steinwehr's  division,  in  the  ut 
most  confusion  and  disorder.  Steinwehr  had  only  Busch- 
beck's  brigade  with  him;  the  other  — that  of  Barlow  — 
having  been  sent  out  to  reinforce  Sickles;  but  he  formed 
line  promptly,  behind  a  weak  intronchment,  which  had  been 
thrown  across  the  road,  and  with  the  aid  of  his  artillery  kept 
2* 


34  CHANCELLORSV1LLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

Jackson  at  bay  for  three-quarters  of  an  hour.  Howard  exert 
ed  himself  bravely  then,  and  did  all  he  could  to  rally  the  fu 
gitives,  but  Rodes'  division,  which  attacked  him,  was  soon 
reinforced  by  that  of  Colston,  and  the  two  together  folded 
around  his  flanks,  took  his  line  in  reverse,  and  finally  carried 
the  position  with  a  rush  ;  and  then  Buschbeck's  brigade  re 
tired  in  good  order  through  the  flying  crowd,  who  were 
streaming  in  wild  disorder  to  the  rear  past  Hooker's  head 
quarters. 

And  now,  with  the  right  of  our  line  all  gone,  with  a 
yawning  gap  where  Sickles'  corps  and  Williams'  division  had 
previously  been  posted,  with  Lee  thundering  against  our 
centre  and  left,  and  Jackson  taking  all  our  defences  in  re 
verse,  his  first  line  being  close  on  Chancellorsville  itself, 
it  seemed  as  if  the  total  rout  of  the  army  was  inevitable. 

Just  before  this  attack  Hooker  had  decided  to  interpose 
more  force  between  the  wings  of  the  rebel  army,  in  order  to 
permanently  dissever  Jackson  from  the  main  body.  If  Sickles 
had  been  allowed  to  attack  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy  oppo 
site  the  Furnace,  as  he  requested  permission  to  do  earlier  in 
the  afternoon,  this  co-operative  movement  could  hardly  hejje 
failed  to  produce  great  results ;  afterward  it  was  too  lute  to 
attempt  it.  As  already  stated,  Williams'  division,,  struck 
Anderson  in  front  on  Birney's  left,  and  Geary  attacked 
McLaws'  across  the  Plank  Road  to  the  right  of  Hancock. 
Geary  found  the  enemy  strongly  posted,  and  as  he  made  no 
progress,  returned  to  his  works.  "When  the  rout  of  the 
Eleventh  Corps  took  place,  Williams  also  hastened  back, 
but  wras  fired  on  by  Jackson's  troops,  who  now  occupied  the 
intrenchments  he  had  left.  Sickles  thinks  if  this  had  not 
occurred  several  regiments  of  the  enemy  would  have  been 
cut  off  from  the  main  body. 


CHAPTER  V. 

JACKSON'S  ADVANCE  IS  CHECKED. 

THE  constantly  increasing  uproar,  and  the  wild  rush  of 
fugitives  past  the  Chancellorsville  House,  told  Hooker  what 
had  occurred,  and  roused  him  to  convulsive  life.  His  staff 
charged  on  the  flying  crowd,  but  failed  to  stop  them,  and  it 
became  necessary  to  form  a  line  of  fresh  troops  speedily,  for 
Jackson  in  his  onward  march  was  sweeping  everything  be 
fore  him.  It  was  not  easy  to  find  an  adequate  force  for  this 
emergency,  for  the  whole  line  was  now  actively  engaged, 
Slocum  being  attacked  on  the  south,  and  Couch  and  Meade 
on  the  east.  Fortunately,  Berry's  division  was  held  in  re 
serve,  and  was  available.  They  were  true  and  tried  men, 
and  went  forward  at  once  to  the  rescue.  Berry  was  directed 
to  form  across  the  Plank  Road,  drive  the  rebels  back,  and  re 
take  the  lost  intrenchments ;  an  order  easy  to  give,  but 
very  difficult  to  execute.  In  fact,  the  most  he  could  do 
under  the  circumstances,  was  to  form  his  line  in  thte  valley 
opposite  Fairview,  and  hold  his  position  there,  the  enemy 
already  having  possession  of  the  higher  ground  beyond. 

Before  Berry  went  out  Warren  had  already  stopped  several 
of  the  Eleventh  Corps  batteries,  and  had  formed  them  across 
the  Plank  Road  behind  the  position  the  infantry  assumed. 
The  fire  of  these  guns  was  very  destructive  and  was  the  prin 
cipal  agent  in  checking  the  enemy.  As  soon  as  they  formed 


36  CHANCELLORS VILLE  AND  'GETTYSBURG. 

in  line,  Warren  gave  orders  to  Colonel  Brest,  Chief  of  Artil 
lery  to  the  Twelfth  Corps,  to  post  more  batteries  on  the 
eminence  called  Fairview,  to  the  rear  and  left  of  the  others. 

Few  people  appreciate  the  steadiness  and  courage  required, 
when  all  around  is  flight  and  confusion,  for  a  force  to  make 
its  way  through  crowds  of  fugitives,  advance  steadily  to  the 
post  of  danger  in  front,  and  meet  the  exulting  enemy,  while 
others  are  seeking  safety  in  the  rear.  Such  men  are  heroes, 
and  far  more  worthy  of  honor  than  those  who  fight  in  the 
full  blaze  of  successful  warfare. 

The  thickets  being  unfavorable  to  cavalry,  Sickles  had 
sent  Pleasonton  back  to  Hazel  Grove  with  two  mounted  regi 
ments,  the  Eighth  New  York,  the  Seventeenth  Pennsylvania, 
and  Martin's  battery,  w7hile  the  Sixth  New  York  was  scout 
ing  the  woods  dismounted.  Upon  reaching  the  open  space 
which  he  had  left  when  he  went  to  the  front,  Pleasonton 
found  the  place  full  of  the  debris  of  the  combat — men, 
horses,  caissons,  ambulances — all  rushing  furiously  to  the 
rear.  To  clear  the  way  he  charged  on  the  flying  mass,  at 
Sickles'  suggestion,  who  had  ridden  in  advance  of  his  troops 
which  were  still  behind  at  the  Furnace.  Sickles  directed 
Pleasonton  to  take  command  of  the  artillery,  and  the  latter 
hastily  collected  twenty- two  guns,  consisting  of  his  own  and 
the  Third  Corps  batteries.  Unfortunately  there  was  no  time 
to  load  or  aim,  for  the  rebels  were  close  at  hand,  and  their 
triumphant  yells  wrere  heard  as  they  took  possession  of  the 
works  Buschbeck  had  so  gallantly  defended.  In  another 
moment  our  troops  would  have  been  compelled  to  give  up 
this  advantageous  position,  which  was  on  an  eminence  over? 
looking  Chancellorsville  and  the  Plank  Eoad,  and  which  was 
really  the  key  of  the  battle  field.  There  was  but  one  way  to 
delay  Jackson,  some  force  must  be  sacrificed,  and  Pleasonton 
ordered  Major  Peter  Keenan,  commanding  the  Eighth  Penn- 


JACKSON'S  ADVANCE  IS  CHECKED.        37 

sylvania  Cavalry,  to  charge  the  ten  thousand  men  in  front 
with  his  four  hundred.  Keenan  knew  if  he  threw  his  little 
force  into  that  seething  mass  of  infantiy,  horses  and  men 
would  go  down  on  all  sides,  and  there  would  be  few  left  to 
tell  the  tale.  A  sad  smile  lit  up  his  noble  countenance, 
as  he  said,  "  General,  I  will  do  it."  At  thirty-four  years  of 
age,  literally  impaled  on  the  bayonets  of  the  enemy,  he  laid 
down  his  life  and  saved  the  army  from  capture  and  his 
country  from  the  unutterable  degradation  of  the  establish 
ment  of  slavery  in  the  Northern  States.  History  will  record 
the  service  rendered  on  that  occasion  as  worthy  to  be  classed 
with  the  sacrifices  of  Arnold  Winckelried  in  Switzerland,  and 
the  Chevalier  d'Assas  in  France. 

A  large  part  of  his  command  were  lost,  but  the  short  inter 
val  thus  gained  was  of  priceless  value.  Pleasonton  was  en 
abled  to  clear  a  space  in  front  of  him  and  to  bring  twenty- 
twro  guns  loaded  with  double  canister  to  bear  upon  the 
enemy.  They  came  bursting  over  the  parapet  they  had  just 
taken  with  loud  and  continuous  yells,  and  formed  line  of 
battle  within  three  hundred  yards  of  Pleasonton,  displaying 
a  United  States  flag  to  deceive  him.  He  soon  detected  the 
impostiire,  and  fired  into  their  masses  with  all  his  guns  at 
once.  The  discharge  seemed  fairly  to  blow  them  back  over 
the  works  from  which  they  had  just  emerged.  Their  artil 
lery  under  Colonel  Crutchfield  which  had  been  brought  up 
to  sweep  the  Plank  Road  was  almost  annihilated  by  the  fire 
of  the  battery  on  the  Plank  Road.  This  gave  time  to  reload 
the  guns. 

The  enemy  rallied  and  opened  a  furious  musketry  fire 
from  the  woods  against  Pleasonton  and  Berry.  Both  stood 
firm  and  then  came  two  charges  in  succession  which  reached 
almost  to  the  muzzles  of  Pleasonton's  guns,  which  were  only 
supported  by  two  small  regiments  of  cavalry — the  Sixth 


38  CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND   GETTYSBURG. 

New  York,  and  a  new  and  untried  regiment,  the  Seventeenth 
Pennsylvania.  The  whole  did  not  amount  to  over  1,000 
| men.  The  One  Hundred  and  Tenth  Pennsylvania  regiment, 
of  Whipple's  division,  arrived  in  time  to  strengthen  the  cav- 
'alry  support,  and  many  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  men  fell  into 
(line  also.  The  last  charge  of  the  enemy  was  baffled  by  the 
opportune  arrival  of  Birney's  and  Whipple's  divisions,  and 
.  Barlow's  brigade,  which  formed  in  column  of  brigades  be 
hind  Pleasonton.  They  had  been  ordered  back  at  the  first 
report  of  the  disaster. 

By  this  time,  too  (about  9  P.M.),  Hays'  brigade  of  French's 
corps  had  been  posted  on  the  right,  in  rear  and  oblique  to 
Berry's  second  line.  The  latter  had  greatly  strengthened 
his  position  with  log  breastworks,  etc.  Captain  Best,  of  the 
Fourth  United  States  Artillery,  in  the  meantime  had  exerted 
himself  to  collect  forty  or  fifty  guns  belonging  to  the 
Twelfth,  Third,  and  some  he  had  stopped  from  the  Eleventh 
Corps,  and  had  arranged  them  at  Fairview,  to  fire  over  the 
heads  of  Berry's  troops  into  the  thicket  where  the  enemy 
were  Bested  and  along  the  Plank  Road. 

Hooker  was  so  disheartened  at  the  unexpected  success  of 
the  enemy,  that  when  the  first  shock  came  he  sent  word  to 
Sickles  to  save  his  command  if  he  could,  and  at  one  time 
there  is  little  doubt  that  he  thought  of  retreating  and  leav 
ing  the  Third  Corps  to  its  fate.  For  when  the  enemy 
charged  there  was  an  awful  gap  in  our  lines ;  Birney's, 
"Whipple's,  and  Williams'  divisions  and  Barlow's  brigade 
were  all  absent.  Fortunately  Jackson  was  unable  to  press 
his  advantage ;  for  the  ardor  of  the  charge,  the  darkness, 
the  thickets  and  the  abattis  in  which  his  forces  became  en 
tangled,  caused  Bodes'  and  Colston's  divisions  to  be  all  in 
termingled,  creating  such  disorder  and  confusion  that  mili 
tary  organization  wras  suspended,  and  orders  could  neither 


JACKSON'S  ADVANCE  IS  CHECKED.        39 

be  communicated  nor  obeyed.  Jackson  therefore  halted  his 
men  in  the  edge  of  the  woods,  about  a  mile  and  a  half  from 
Chancellorsville,  posted  two  brigades  on  the  two  roads  that 
came  in  from  the  south,  and  sent  for  Hill's  division,  which 
was  in  rear  and  which  had  not  been  engaged,  to  take  the 
front,  while  the  other  two  divisions  fell  back  to  the  open 
space  at  Dowdall's  Tavern  to  reform  their  lines.  Pending 
this  movement  he  rode  out  on  the  Plank  Eoad  with  part  of 
his  staff  and  a  few  orderlies  to  reconnoitre,  cautioning  his 
pickets  not  to  fire  at  him  on  his  return.  When  he  came 
back  new  men  had  been  posted  and  his  approach  was  mis 
taken  for  the  advance  of  Pleasonton's  cavalry.  His  own 
troops  fired  into  him  with  fatal  effect.  Nearly  all  his  escort 
were  killed  or  wounded  and  he  received  three  balls,  which 
shattered  both  arms.  His  horse  ran  toward  the  Union  lines, 
and  although  he  succeeded  in  turning  him  back,  he  was 
dashed  against  the  trees  and  nearly  unhorsed.  He  reached 
the  Confederate  lines  about  the  time  our  artillery  again 
opened  up  the  Plank  Road  with  a  fire  which  swept  every 
thing  from  its  front.  Several  of  his  attendants  were  killed 
and  others  wounded.  The  rebels  found  the  utmost  diffi 
culty  in  keeping  their  men  in  line  under  this  tremendous 
fire.  Sentries  had  to  be  posted,  and  great  precautions  taken 
to  prevent  the  troops  from  giving  way.  General  Pender 
recognized  Jackson  as  he  was  carried  past  and  complained 
of  the  demoralizing  effect  of  this  cannonade,  but  Jackson 
replied  sharply  and  sternly,  "You  must  hold  your  ground, 
General  Pender."  He  was  removed  to  the  Wilderness  Tav 
ern,  and  as  General  Lee  was  in  some  fear  that  Averell's  cav 
alry,  then  at  Elley's  Ford,  might  make  a  dash  and  capture 
him,  he  was  sent  on  to  Guiney's  Station,  on  the  Fredericks- 
burg  and  Richmond  Railroad,  where  he  died  on  the  10th  of 
May.  Whether  the  rebels  killed  him  or  whether  some  of 


40     CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

his  wounds  came  from  our  own  troops,  the  First  Massachu 
setts  or  Seventy-third  New  York,  who  were  firing  heavily 
in  that  direction,  is  a  matter  of  some  doubt.  While  leaning 
over  him  and  expressing  his  sympathy,  A.  P.  Hill  was  also 
wounded  by  the  fire  from  a  section  of  Dimick's  battery, 
posted  in  advance  in  the  Plank  Eoad,1  and  the  command  of 
his  corps  was  assigned  at  his  request  to  the  cavalry  general, 
J.  E.  B.  Stuart. 

When  our  artillery  fire  ceased,  Hill's  troops  took  position 
in  front  of  the  others. 


1  Young  Dimick  was  the  son  of  a  distinguished  general  of  the  regular  army. 
Though  wounded  on  this  occasion  he  refused  to  leave  the  field.  The  next  day  he 
again  sought  the  post  of  danger  and  was  mortally  wounded  while  holding  the 
Tlank  Road. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

SICKLES    FIGHTS    HIS    WAY    BACK.— ARRIVAL    OF    THE 
FIRST  CORPS. 

SICKLES,  with  his  ten  thousand  men  heaped  up  at  Hazel 
Grove,  was  still  cut  off  from  the  main  body  and  could  only 
communicate  with  Hooker's  headquarters  by  means  of  by 
paths  and  at  great  risk.  The  last  orders  he  received,  at  5  P.M., 
had  been  to  attack  Jackson's  right  flank  and  check  his  ad 
vance.  He  determined  to  do  this  and  force  his  way  back, 
and  with  the  co-operation  of  Williams'  and  Berry's  divi 
sions,  retake  the  Plank  Eoad  with  the  bayonet.  Ward's  bri 
gade  was  posted  in  the  front  line  and  Haynian's  and  Gra 
ham's  brigades  a  hundred  yards  in  rear.  A  special  column, 
under  Colonel  Egan  of  the  Fortieth  New  York,  was  formed 
on  the  extreme  left.  The  muskets  were  uncapped  and  at  mid 
night  the  command  moved  silently  against  the  enemy,  and 
in  spite  of  a  terrific  outburst  of  musketry  and  artillery  from 
the  open  space  at  DowdalPs,  the  Plank  Eoad  and  the  works 
which  Buschbeck  had  defeoded  were  regained.  Berry  at 
once  moved  forward  his  line  to  hold  them.  Many  guns  and 
caissons  taken  from  Howard's  corps,  and  Whipple's  ammu 
nition  train  of  pack  mules  were  also  recovered.  The  confu 
sion  into  which  the  enemy  were  thrown  by  this  assault 
against  their  right,  enabled  Berry  to  easily  repulse  the  attack 
on  him,  and  he  continued  to  hold  the  position.  The  result  of 
this  brilliant  movement  was  the  inoccupation  of  a  great  part 


42  CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND   GETTYSBURG. 

of  the  works  Howard  had  lost  and  the  capture  of  two  guns 
and  three  caissons  from  the  enemy.  It  is  said  that  in  this 
conflict  some  of  Sickles'  men,  in  consequence  of  the  thickets 
and  confusion,  finding  themselves  surrounded,  surrendered 
as  they  supposed  to  the  enemy,  but  to  their  delight  found 
themselves  in  Berry's  division,  among  their  old  comrades. 

Soon  after  this  fight  was  over  Mott's  brigade  of  the  Third 
Corps,  which  had  been  on  duty  at  the  Ford,  rejoined  the 
main  body. 

Both  sides  now  rested  on  their  arms  and  prepared  to  re 
new  the  struggle  at  daylight.  Hooker,  in  view  of  a  possible 
defeat,  directed  his  engineer  officers  to  lay  out  a  new  and 
stronger  line,  to  cover  his  bridges,  to  which  he  could  retreat 
in  case  of  necessity. 

At  sunset  the  First  Corps  went  into  bivouac  on  the  south 
side  of  United  States  Ford,  about  four  miles  and  a  half  from 
Chancellorsville.  The  men  were  glad  enough  to  rest  after 
their  tedious  march  on  a  hot  day,  loaded  down  with  eight 
days'  rations.  General  Keynolds  left  me  temporarily  in 
charge  of  the  corps,  while  he  rode  on  to  confer  with  Hooker. 
We  heard  afar  off  the  roar  of  the  battle  caused  by  Jackson's 
attack,  and  saw  the  evening  sky  reddened  with  the  fires  of 
combat,  but  knowing  Hooker  had  a  large  force,  we  felt  no 
anxiety  as  to  the  result,  and  took  it  for  granted  that  we  would 
not  be  wanted  until  the  next  day.  I  was  preparing  a  piece 
of  india-rubber  cloth  as  a  couch  when  I  saw  one  of  Reynolds' 
aids,  Captain  Wadsworth,  coming  dowrn  the  road  at  full 
speed.  He  brought  the  startling  news  that  the  Eleventh 
Corps  had  fled,  and  if  we  did  not  go  forward  at  once,  the 
army  would  be  hopelessly  defeated.  We  were  soon  on  the 
road,  somewhat  oppressed  by  the  news,  but  not  dismayed. 
We  marched  through  the  thickening  twilight  of  the  woods 
amid  a  silence  at  first  only  broken  by  the  plaintive  song  of 


ARRIVAL   OF  THE   FIRST   CORPS.  43 

the  whip-poor-will,  until  the  full  moon  rose  in  all  its  splen 
dor.  As  we  proceeded  we  came  upon  crowds  of  the  Eleventh 
Corps  fugitives  still  hastening  to  the  rear.  They  seemed 
wholly  disheartened.  We  halted  for  a  time,  in  order  that 
our  position  in  line  of  battle  might  be  selected,  and  then 
moved  on.  As  we  approached  the  field  a  midnight  battle 
commenced,  and  the  shells  seemed  to  burst  in  sparkles  in 
the  trees  above  our  heads,  but  not  near  enough  to  reach  us. 
It  was  Sickles  fighting  his  way  home  again.  When  we 
came  nearer  and  filed  to  the  right  to  take  position  on  the 
Elley's  Ford  road,  the  men  struck  up  John  Brown's  song,  and 
gave  the  chorus  with  a  will.  Their  cheerful  demeanor  and 
proud  bearing  renewed  the  confidence  of  the  army,  who  felt 
that  the  arrival  of  Keynolds'  corps,  with  its  historic  record, 
was  no  ordinary  reinforcement. 

We  were  now  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  other  forces,  on 
the  Elley's  Ford  road,  with  the  right  flank  thrown  back  be 
hind  Hunting  Creek. 

Hooker  was  very  much  discouraged  by  the  rout  of  the 
Eleventh  Corps.  An  occurrence  of  this  kind  always  has  a 
tendency  to  demoralize  an  army  and  render  it  less  trust 
worthy;  for  the  real  strength  of  an  armed  force  is  much 
more  in  opinion  than  it  is  in  numbers.  A  small  body  of  men, 
if  made  to  believe  the  enemy  are  giving  way,  will  do  and 
dare  anything  ;  but  when  they  think  the  struggle  is  hopeless, 
they  will  not  resist  even  a  weak  attack,  for  each  thinks  he  is 
to  be  sacrificed  to  save  the  rest.  Hence  Hooker  did  not  feel 
the  same  reliance  on  his  men  as  he  did  before  the  disaster. 
He  determined,  nevertheless,  to  continue  the  battle,  but  con 
tract  his  lines  by  bringing  them  nearer  to  Chancellorsville. 
The  real  key  of  the  battle-field  now  was  the  eminence  at 
Hazel  Grove.  So  long  as  we  held  it  the  enemy  could  not 
advance  without  presenting  his  right  flank  to  our  batteries. 


44  CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

and  if  they  obtained  possession  of  it  they  could  plant  guns 
which  would  enfilade  Slocuni's  line  and  fire  directly  into  our 
forces  below.  Birney's  division  at  this  time  was  posted  in 
advance  of  Best's  guns  on  the  left,  Berry  was  on  the  right, 
with  Williams'  division  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  behind  Birney, 
and  WMpple's  division  in  rear  of  Berry. 

The  position  of  Hazel  Grove  commanded  Chancellorsville, 
where  all  the  roads  meet,  and  which  it  was  vital  to  Hooker 
to  hold.  For  if  he  lost  that,  he  could  not  advance  in  any 
direction,  and  only  his  line  of  retreat  to  the  Ford  would  re 
main  open  to  him.  Pleasonton  spent  the  night  in  fortifying 
this  hill,  and  placed  forty  guns  in  position  there ;  but  it  was 
of  no  avail,  for  it  was  outside  of  the  new  line  Sickles'  was 
directed  to  occupy  at  daylight,  and  Hooker  was  not  aware  of 
its  importance.  A  request  was  sent  to  the  latter  to  obtain 
his  consent  to  hold  it,  but  he  was  asleep,  and  the  staff-officer 
in  charge,  who  had  had  no  experience  whatever  in  military 
matters,  positively  refused  to  awaken  him  until  daylight,  and 
then  it  was  too  late,  for  that  was  the  time  set  for  the  troops 
to  fall  back  to  the  new  line. 

At  9  P.M.  Hooker  sent  an  order  to  Sedgwick,  who  was  sup 
posed  to  be  at  Falmouth  and  to  have  26,000  men,  to  throw 
bridges  over,  cross,  drive  away  Early's  9,000,  who  heJd  the 
heights  of  Fredericksburg,  and  then  to  come  forward  on 
the  Plank  Eoad,  and  be  ready  at  daylight  on  the  3d  to  take 
Lee's  force  in  reverse,  while  Hooker  attacked  it  in  front. 

This  order  was  given  under  the  impression  that  Sedg 
wick  had  not  crossed  wTith  his  main  body,  but  only  with 
Howe's  division,  whereas  he  was  at  the  bridge  heads,  three* 
miles  below  Fredericksburg,  on  the  south  side  of  the  river. 
Hooker  probably  forgot  that  he  had  ordered  a  demonstration 
to  be  made  against  the  Bowling  Green  road  on  the  1st,  and 
that  Sedgwick  went  over  to  make  it. 


33ATTLE  O!K  TIIK 
THIRD    OF    MAY 

Federal  Lines    MM      Confederate  Lines 
SCALE  OF  MILES 


EL'bbELI,  &  STELTIIEKS 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE  BATTLE   OP   THE  THIRD   OF  MAY. 

THE  Eleventh  Corps  were  now  sent  to  the  extreme  left  of 
the  line  to  reorganize.  There  they  were  sheltered  behind 
the  strong  works  thrown  up  by  Humphreys'  division,  and 
were  not  so  liable  to  be  attacked. 

The  new  line  laid  out  by  Hooker's  order  was  on  a  low 
ridge  perpendicular  to  tho  Plank  Road,  and  opposite  and  at 
right  angles  to  the  right  of  Slocum's  front.  It  was  strongly 
supported  by  the  artillery  of  the  Third,  Twelfth,  and  part  of 
the  Eleventh  Corps,  massed  under  Captain  Best  on  the 
heights  at  Fairview,  in  the  rear  and  to  the  left.  Sickles  was 
ordered  to  fall  back  to  it  at  dawn  of  day,  Birney  to  lead  the 
way,  and  Whipple  (Graham's  brigade)  to  bring  up  the  rear. 
The  Plank  Eoad  ran  through  the  centre  of  the  position, 
Birney  being  on  the  left  and  Berry  on  the  right,  with  Whip- 
pie's  division  on  a  short  line  in  rear,  as  a  reserve.  French's 
division  of  Couch's  corps  was  posted  on  Berry's  right,  the 
other  division  (that  of  Hancock)  remained  between  Mott 
Kun  and  Chancellorsville. 

When  the  movement  commenced,  Whipple's  division  oc 
cupied  the  high  ground  at  Hazel  Grove,  facing  the  Plank 
Koad,  with  Graham's  brigade  on  the  left.  This  was  a  very 
aggressive  position,  since  it  took  every  column  that  advanced 
against  Sickles'  new  line,  directly  in  flank,  and  therefore  it 
was  indispensable  for  the  rebel  commander  to  capture  Hazel 


46  CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

Grove  before  he  advanced  against  the  main  body  of  the 
Third  Corps,  which  held  the  Plank  Road.  This  hill  was  not 
quite  so  high  as  that  at  Fairview,  but  our  artillery  on  it  had 
great  range,  and  the  post  should  have  been  maintained  at 
all  hazards.  The  cavalry  who  had  so  ably  defended  it  fell 
back,  in  obedience  to  orders,  to  the  Chancellorsville  House, 
to  support  the  batteries  in  that  vicinity,  and  I  think  one  re 
giment  was  sent  to  report  to  Sedgwick.  "Whipple  sent  off 
his  artillery,  and  ordered  his  left  under  Graham  to  com 
mence  the  movement,  which  was  covered  by  the  fire  of 
Huntingdon's  battery  on  the  right.  The  moment  the  enemy 
saw  that  Graham  was  retiring,  Archer's  brigade  of  A.  P. 
Hill's  division  charged,  attained  the  top  of  the  hill,  and  suc 
ceeded  in  capturing  four  guns.  Elated  by  his  success 
Archer  pressed  forward  against  Huntingdon's  battery,  but 
was  rudely  repulsed ;  for  Sickles  opened  on  him  also  with 
a  battery  from  Fairview.  He  managed  to  hold  the  four  guns 
until  Doles'  brigade  of  Rodes'  division  came  to  his  aid.  The 
two  took  the  hill,  for  Whipple  had  no  instructions  to  defend 
it,  and  he  retired  in  perfect  order  to  the  new  position  as 
signed  him.  Huntingdon's  battery,  supported  by  a  brigade 
sent  out  by  Sickles,  covered  the  retreat,  but  suffered  con 
siderable  loss  in  doing  so. 

Ward's  brigade  was  then  sent  to  the  right  and  Hayman's 
brigade  held  in  reserve. 

Stuart,  who  was  now  in  command  of  Jackson's  corps,  saw 
at  a  glance  the  immense  importance  of  this  capture,  and  did 
not  delay  a  moment  in  crowning  the  hill  with  thirty  pieces 
of  artillery,  which  soon  began  to  play  with  fatal  effect  upon  . 
our  troops  below  ;  upon  Chancellorsville ;  and  upon  the  crest 
occupied  by  Slocuni,  which  it  enfiladed,  and  as  McLaws'  bat 
teries  also  enfiladed  Slocum's  line  from  the  opposite  side,  it 
seems  almost  miraculous  that  he  was  able  to  hold  it  at  all. 


THE   BATTLE   OP   THE   THIRD   OF  MAY.  47 

Simultaneously  with  the  attack  against  Hazel  Grove  came 
a  fierce  onslaught  on  that  part  of  Sickles'  line  to  the  left  of 
the  road,  accompanied  by  fierce  yells  and  cries  of  "Remem 
ber  Jackson  !  "  a  watch-word  which  it  was  supposed  would 
excite  the  rebels  to  strenuous  efforts  to  avenge  the  fatal 
wound  of  their  great  leader.  It  was  handsomely  met  and 
driven  back  by  Mott's  brigade,  which  had  come  up  from  the 
Ford,  and  now  held  the  front  on  that  part  of  the  line.  A 
brilliant  counter-charge  by  the  Fifth  and  Seventh  New  Jer 
sey  captured  many  prisoners  and  colors. 

Sickles'  men  fought  with  great  determination,  but  being 
assailed  by  infantry  in  front  and  battered  almost  in  flank  by 
the  artillery  posted  at  Hazel  Grove,  the  line  was  manifestly 
untenable.  After  an  obstinate  contest  the  men  fell  back  to 
the  second  line,  which  was  but  partially  fortified,  and  soon 
after  to  the  third  line,  which  was  more  strongly  intrenched, 
and  which  they  held  to  the  close  of  the  fight. 

McGowan's,  Lane's,  and  Heth's  brigades  of  A.  P.  Hill's 
division  charged  resolutely  over  this  line  also;  but  they 
suffered  heavily  from  Best's  guns  at  Fairview,  and  were 
driven  back  by  Colonel  Franklin's'  and  Colonel  Bowman's 
brigades  of  Whipple's  division,  which  made  an  effective 
counter-charge.  Whipple's  other  brigade,  that  of  Graham, 
had  been  sent  to  relieve  one  of  Slocum's  brigades  on  the  left 
of  the  line,  which  was  out  of  ammunition.  It  held  its  posi 
tion  there  for  two  hours. 

While  this  attack  was  taking  place  on  the  left  of  the  road, 
Fender's  and  Thomas'  brigades,  also  of  Hill's  division, 
charged  over  the  works  on  the  right,  but  when  the  others 
retreated  they  were  left  without  support  and  were  compelled 
to  retire  also.  They  reformed,  however  ;  tried  it  again,  and 
once  more  succeeded  in  holding  temporary  possession  of 
part  of  the  line,  but  were  soon  driven  out  again. 


48     CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

French's  division  of  Couch's  corps  was  now  brought  up, 
and  Carroll's  brigade  struck  the  rebels  on  the  left,  and  doub 
led  them  back  on  the  centre,  capturing  a  great  many  prison 
ers  and  confusing  and  rendering  abortive  Hill's  attack  in 
front.  Hill  sent  for  his  reserves  to  come  up  and  three  rebel 
brigades  were  thrown  against  Carroll,  who  was  supported 
by  the  remainder  of  French's  division  and  a  brigade  from 
Humphreys'  division  of  Meade's  corps,  and  French's  flank 
movement  was  checked.  Then  another  front  attack  was 
organized  by  the  enemy,  under  cover  of  their  artillery  at 
Hazel  Grove,  and  Nichols',  Iverson's,  and  O'Neil's  brigades 
charged  over  everything,  even  up  to  Best's  batteries  at  Fair- 
view,  which  they  captured ;  but  our  men  rallied,  and  drove 
them  headlong  down  the  hill,  back  to  the  first  line  Sickles 
had  occupied  at  daylight.  It  was  a  combat  of  giants ;  a  tre 
mendous  struggle  between  patriotism  on  the  one  hand  and 
vengeance  on  the  other. 

French  now  tried  to  follow  up  this  advantage  by  again 
pressing  against  the  Confederate  left,  but  it  was  reinforced 
by  still  another  brigade,  and  he  could  make  no  progress. 

The  struggle  increased  in  violence.  The  rebels  were  de 
termined  to  break  through  the  lines,  and  our  men  were 
equally  determined  not  to  give  way.  Well  might  De  Trobri- 
and  style  it  "a  mad  and  desperate  battle."  Mahone  said 
afterward  :  "  The  Federals  fought  like  devils  at  Chancellors- 
ville."  Again  Eodes'  and  Hill's  divisions  renewed  the  at 
tempt  and  were  temporarily  successful,  and  again  was  the 
bleeding  remnant  of  their  forces  flung  back  in  disorder. 
Doles'  and  Ramseur's  brigades  of  Rodes'  division,  manage/1 
to  pass  up  the  ravine  to  the  right  of  Slocum's  works  and  gain 
his  right  and  rear,  but  were  unsupported  there,  and  Doles 
was  driven  out  by  a  concentrated  artillery  and  musketry  fire. 
Ramseur,  who  now  found  himself  directlv  on  Sickles'  left 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  THIRD  OP  MAY.      49 

flank,  succeeded  in  holding  on  until  the  old  Stonewall  bri 
gade  under  Paxton  came  to  his  aid,  and  then  they  carried 
Fail-view  again,  only  to  be  driven  out  as  the  others  had  been. 

The  battle  had  now  lasted  several  hours,  and  the  troops 
engaged,  as  well  as  the  artillery,  were  almost  out  of  ammu 
nition.  There  should  have  been  some  staff  officer  specially 
charged  with  this  subject,  but  there  seemed  to  be  no  one 
who  could  give  orders  in  relation  to  it. 

The  last  line  of  our  works  was  finally  taken  by  the  enemy, 
who  having  succeeded  in  driving  off  the  Third  Maryland  of 
the  Twelfth  Corps,  on  Berry's  left,  entered  near  the  road 
and  enfiladed  the  line  to  the  right  and  left.  Sickles  sent 
Ward's  brigade  to  take  the  place  of  the  Third  Maryland,  but 
it  did  r*ot  reach  the  position  assigned  it  in  time,  the  enemy 
being  already  in  possession.  In  attempting  to  remedy  this 
disaster,  Berry  was  killed,  and  his  successor,  General  Mott, 
was  wounded.  The  command  then  devolved  upon  General 
Revere,  who,  probably  considering  further  contest  hopeless, 
led  his  men  out  of  the  action  without  authority — an  offence 
for  which  he  was  subsequently  tried  and  dismissed  the  ser 
vice. 

As  the  cannon  cartridges  gave  out,  the  enemy  brought  up 
numerous  batteries,  under  Colonel  Carter,  in  close  proximity 
to  Fairview,  and  soon  overcame  all  resistance  in  that  direc 
tion,  driving  the  troops  and  guns  from  the  plain. 

Anderson  now  made  a  junction  with  Stuart,  and  their 
combined  efforts  drove  the  Third  Corps  and  Williams'  divi 
sion  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  back,  leaving  only  Geary  and 
Hancock  to  maintain  the  struggle.  Geary  was  without  sup 
port,  but  he  still  fought  on.  He  faced  two  regiments  west 
at  right  angles  to  his  original  line,  and  by  the  aid  of  his  ar 
tillery  held  on  for  an  hour  longer  ;  his  right  brigade  facing 
south,  west,  and  north. 
VI.— 3 


50  CHANCELLORSVILLE   AND  GETTYSBURG. 

The  Third  Corps  left  their  last  position  at  Chancellors- 
ville  slowly  and  sullenly.  Hayman's  brigade,  not  far  from 
the  Chancellorsville  House,  finding  the  enemy  a  good  deal 
disorganized,  and  coming  forward  in  a  languid  and  ineffi 
cient  manner,  turned — by  Sickles'  direction — and  charged, 
capturing  several  hundred  prisoners  and  several  colors,  and 
relieving  Graham,  who  was  now  holding  on  with  the  bayonet, 
from  a  most  perilous  flank  attack,  enabling  him  to  with 
draw  in  good  order.  Sickles  himself  was  soon  after  injured 
by  a  spent  shot  or  piece  of  shell,  which  struck  his  waist-belt. 
His  corps  and  French's  division  had  lost  5,000  out  of  22,000. 

Our  front  gradually  melted  away  and  passed  to  the  new 
line  in  rear  through  Humphreys'  division  of  the  Fifth  Corps, 
which  was  posted  about  half  a  mile  north  of  the  Chancellors 
ville  House  in  the  edge  of  the  thicket,  to  cover  the  retreat. 
At  last  only  indomitable  Hancock  remained,  fighting  Mc- 
Laws  with  his  front  line,  and  keeping  back  Stuart  and  Ander 
son  with  his  rear  line. 

The  enemy,  Jackson's  Corps,  showed  little  disposition  to 
follow  up  their  success.  The  fact  is,  these  veterans  were 
about  fought  out,  and  became  almost  inert.  They  did  not, 
at  the  last,  even  press  Hancock,  who  was  still  strong  in  ar 
tillery,  and  he  withdrew  his  main  body  in  good  order,  losing 
however,  the  Twenty-seventh  Connecticut  regiment,  which 
was  posted  at  the  apex  of  his  line  on  the  south,  and  was  not 
brought  back  in  time,  in  consequence  of  the  failure  of  a  sub 
ordinate  officer  to  carry  out  his  orders. 

Before  Hancock  left,  his  line  was  taken  in  reverse,  and  he 
was  obliged  to  throw  back  part  of  his  force  to  the  left  to  re 
sist  Anderson,  who  was  trying  to  force  the  passage  of  Mott 
Run.  The  line  in  that  direction  was  firmly  held  by  Colonel 
Miles  of  the  Sixty-first  New  York,  who  was  shot  through  the 
body  while  encouraging  his  men  to  defend  the  position. 


THE  BATTLE  OP  THE  THIRD  OF  MAY.      51 

Stuart's  command  had  lost  7,500  in  his  attack,  and  it  could 
hardly  have  resisted  a  fresh  force  if  it  had  been  thrown  in. 
General  William  Hays,  of  the  Second  Corps,  who  was  taken 
prisoner,  says  they  were  worn  out,  and  Rodes  admits  in  his 
report  that  Jackson's  veterans  clung  to  their  intrenchments, 
and  that  Ramseur  and  others  who  passed  them,  urged  them 
to  go  forward  in  vain. 

Before  the  close  of  the  action  Hooker  was  importuned  for 
reinforcements,  but  without  avail.  Perhaps  he  intended  to 
send  them,  for  about  this  time  he  rushed  out  and  made  a 
passionate  appeal  to  Geary's  men  to  charge  and  retake  the 
works  they  had  lost ;  promising  to  aid  them  by  throwing  in 
a  heavy  force  on  the  enemy's  left  flank.  At  this  appeal  the 
exhausted  troops  put  their  caps  on  their  bayonets,  waved 
them  aloft,  and  with  loud  cheers  charged  on  the  rebels  and 
drove  them  out  once  more  ;  but  sixty  guns  opened  upon  them 
at  close  range  with  terrible  effect ;  the  promised  reinforce 
ments  did  not  come ;  they  were  surrounded  with  ever  in 
creasing  enemies,  and  forced  to  give  up  everything  and  re 
treat.  Stuart  and  Anderson  then  formed  their  lines  on  the 
south  of  and  parallel  to  the  Plank  Road,  facing  north,  and 
began  to  fortify  the  position. 

Had  they  been  disposed  to  follow  up  the  retreat  closely 
they  would  have  been  unable  to  do  so,  for  now  a  new  and 
terrible  barrier  intervened ;  the  woods  on  each  side  of  the 
Plank  Road  had  been  set  on  fire  by  the  artillery  and  the 
wounded  and  dying  were  burning  in  the  flames  without  a 
possibility  of  rescuing  them.  Let  us  draw  a  veil  over  this 
scene,  for  it  is  pitiful  to  dwell  upon  it. 

There  was  no  further  change  in  Stuart's  line  until  the 
close  of  the  battle ;  but  Anderson's  division  was  soon  after 
detached  against  Sedgwick. 

The  new  line  thus  taken  up  by  the  Union  Army  was  a 


52     CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

semi-ellipse,  with  the  left  resting  on  the  Eappahannock  and 
the  right  on  the  Rapidan.  Its  centre  was  at  Bullock's  House, 
about  three-fourths  of  a  mile  north  of  Chancellorsville.  The 
approaches  were  well  guarded  with  artillery,  and  the  line 
partially  intrenched.  The  enemy  did  not  assail  it.  They 
made  a  reconnoissance  in  the  afternoon,  but  Weed's  artillery 
at  the  apex  of  the  line  was  too  strongly  posted  to  be  forced, 
and  Lee  soon  found  other  employment  for  his  troops,  for 
Sedgwick  was  approaching  to  attack  his  rear. 

In  the  history  of  lost  empires  we  almost  invariably  find 
that  the  cause  of  their  final  overthrow  on  the  battle-field 
may  be  traced  to  the  violation  of  one  military  principle, 
which  is  that  the  attempt  to  overpower  a  central  force  by  con 
verging  columns,  is  almost  always  fatal  to  the  assailants,  for  a 
force  in  the  centre,  by  virtue  of  its  position,  has  nearly  dou 
ble  the  strength  of  one  on  the  circumference.  Yet  this  is 
the  first  mistake  made  by  every  tyro  in  generalship.  A 
strong  blow  can  be  given  by  a  sledge-hammer,  but  if  we 
divide  it  into  twenty  small  hammers,  the  blows  will  neces 
sarily  be  scattering  and  uncertain.  Let  us  suppose  an  army 
holds  the  junction  of  six  roads.  It  seems  theoretically  plau 
sible  that  different  detachments  encircling  it,  by  all  attacking 
at  the  same  time,  must  confuse  and  overpower  it ;  but  in  prac 
tice  the  idea  is  rarely  realized,  for  no  two  routes  are  precisely 
alike,  the  columns  never  move  simultaneously,  and  there 
fore  never  arrive  at  the  same  time.  Some  of  this  is  due  to 
the  character  of  the  commanders.  One  man  is  full  of  dash, 
and  goes  forward  at  once ;  another  is  timid,  or  at  least  over^ 
cautious,  and  advances  slowly ;  a  third  stops  to  recall  some 
outlying  detachments,  or  to  make  elaborate  preparations. 
The  result  is,  the  outer  army  has  lost  its  strength  and  is  al 
ways  beaten  in  detail.  One  portion  is  sure  to  be  defeated 


THE   BATTLE   OF   THE   THIRD   OF  MAY.  53 

before  the  others  arrive.  We  shall  have  occasion  to  refer 
to  this  principle  again  in  reference  to  the  battle  of  Gettys 
burg.  The  history  of  our  own  war  shows  that  an  attack 
against  the  front  and  rear  of  a  force  is  not  necessarily  fatal. 
Baird's  division  at  Chickamauga  defended  itself  successfully 
against  an  assault  of  this  kind,  and  Hancock  faced  his  divi 
sion  both  ways  at  Chancellorsville  and  repelled  every  attempt 
to  force  his  position.  But  Hooker  thought  otherwise.  He 
felt  certain  that  if  Sedgwick  assailed  Lee  in  rear,  while  he 
advanced  in  front,  the  Confederate  army  was  doomed.  When 
the  time  came,  however,  to  carry  out  this  programme,  if  we 
may  use  a  homely  simile  borrowed  from  General  De  Peyster, 
Hooker  did  not  hold  up  his  end  of  the  log,  and  the  whole 
weight  fell  upon  Sedgwick. 

About  this  time  a  pillar  of  the  Chancellorsville  House  was 
struck  by  a  cannon-ball,  and  Hooker,  who  was  leaning  against 
it  at  the  moment,  was  prostrated  and  severely  injured.  He 
revived  in  a  few  minutes,  mounted  his  horse  and  rode  to  the 
rear,  but  it  was  some  time  before  he  turned  over  the  com 
mand  to  Couch,  who  was  second  in  rank.  After  this  stroke 
he  suffered  a  great  deal  from  paroxysms  of  pain,  and  was 
manifestly  unfit  to  give  orders,  although  he  soon  resumed  the 
command. 

The  historian  almost  refuses  to  chronicle  the  startling 
fact  that  37,000  men  were  kept  out  of  the  fight,  most  of 
whom  had  not  fired  a  shot,  and  all  of  whom  were  eager  to 
go  in.  The  whole  of  the  First  Corps  and  three-fourths  of 
the  Fifth  Corps  had  not  been  engaged.  These,  with  5,000 
of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  who  desired  to  retrieve  the  disaster 
of  the  previous  day  and  were  ready  to  advance,  made  a  new 
army,  which  had  it  been  used  against  Stuart's  tired  men 
would  necessarily  have  driven  them  off  the  field  ;  for  there 
were  but  26,000  of  them  when  the  fight  commenced.  To 


54  CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

make  the  matter  worse,  a  large  part  of  this  force — the  First 
and  Fifth  Corps — stood  with  arms  in  their  hands,  as  specta 
tors,  almost  directly  on  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy ;  so  that 
their  mere  advance  would  have  swept  everything  before  it. 
Hancock,  too,  says  that  his  men  were  fresh  enough  to  go 
forward  again. 

Couch  succeeded  to  the  command  after  Hooker  was 
wounded,  and  made  dispositions  for  the  final  stand  around 
the  Chancellorsville  House,  where  the  battle  lasted  some 
time  longer,  and  where  a  battery  of  the  Fifth  Corps  was 
sacrificed  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  troops.  He  did  not, 
however,  take  the  responsibility  of  renewing  the  contest 
with  fresh  troops,  perhaps  deterred  by  the  fact  that  Ander 
son's  and  McLaws'  divisions  had  now  effected  a  junction 
with  Stuart's  corps ;  so  that  the  chances  were  somewhat 
less  favorable  than  they  would  have  been  had  Sickles  and 
French  been  reinforced  before  the  junction  took  place.  He 
says,  at  the  close  of  the  action,  that  fifty  guns  posted  to  the 
right  and  front  of  the  Chancellorsville  House  would  have 
swept  the  enemy  away. 

I  think  Hooker  was  beset  with  the  idea  of  keeping  back  a 
large  portion  of  his  force  to  be  used  in  case  of  emergency. 
It  appears  from  a  statement  made  by  General  Alexander  S. 
Webb,  who  had  made  a  daring  personal  reconnoissance  of  the 
enemy's  movement,  that  he  was  present  when  Meade — acting 
on  his  (Webb's)  representations,  and  speaking  for  himself 
and  Reynolds — asked  Hooker's  permission  to  let  the  First 
and  Fifth  Corps  take  part  in  the  battle.  It  is  fair,  however, 
to  state  that  Hooker,  having  been  injured  and  in  great  pain, 
was  hardly  accountable  for  his  want  of  decision  at  this  time. 
Indeed,  General  Tremaine,  who  was  a  colonel  on  his  staff, 
says  Hooker  did  intend  to  use  his  surplus  force  as  soon  as 
the  enemy  were  utterly  exhausted.  President  Lincoln  seems 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  THIRD  OF  MAY.      57 

At  dawn  Newton  deployed  "Wheaton's  brigade  and  made  a 
demonstration  to  develop  the  enemy's  line.  As  the  fortified 
heights  commanded  the  Plank  Road  by  which  Sedgwick  was 
to  advance,  it  became  necessary  to  attack  immediately. 
The  plan  of  assault  which  was  devised  by  General  Newton, 
and  approved  by  General  Sedgwick,  was  to  attenuate  the 
rebel  force  by  attacking  it  on  a  wide  front,  so  that  it  could 
not  be  strong  anywhere,  and  to  use  the  bayonet  alone. 
Accordingly,  Gibbon  was  directed  to  advance  on  the  right 
to  turn  their  flank  there  if  possible,  while  Newton  was  to 
demonstrate  against  the  centre  and  Howe  to  act  against 
the  left.  Newton  deployed  Wheaton's  brigade,  opened  fire 
along  his  front  and  kept  the  enemy  employed  there,  but 
Gibbon  was  unable  to  advance  on  the  right,  because  a  canal 
and  a  railway  lay  between  him  and  the  rebels,  and  they 
had  taken  up  the  flooring  of  the  bridges  over  the  latter. 
Howe  did  not  succeed  any  better  on  the  left,  as  in  attempt 
ing  to  turn  the  first  line  of  works  he  encountered  the  fire  of 
a  second  line  in  rear  and  in  echelon  to  the  first,  which  took 
him  directly  in  flank,  so  that  the  combined  attack  was  a  fail 
ure.  A  concentrated  artillery  fire  was  brought  to  bear  on 
Gibbon,  Early  sent  Hays'  brigade  from  Marye's  Hill  to  meet 
him,  and  Wilcox's  brigade  came  up  from  Banks'  Ford  for 
the  same  purpose,  so  that,  being  unable  to  proceed,  he  was 
obliged  to  fall  back. 

It  was  now  10  A.M.  and  there  was  no  time  to  be  lost.  Gene 
ral  Warren,  who  was  in  camp  to  represent  Hooker,  urged  an 
immediate  assault.  This  advice  was  acceded  to,  and  Newton 
formed  three  columns  of  assault  in  the  centre,  and  Howe 
three  on  the  left. 

To  Colonel  Johns  of  the  Seventh  Massachusetts,  who  was 
a  graduate  of  West  Point,  was  assigned  the  direct  attack  on 
Marye's  Hill,  with  two  regiments  of  Eustis'  brigade,  while 
3* 


56  CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND   GETTYSBURG. 

mation  that  such  was  Reynolds'  wish,  he  would  not  have  hesi 
tated  a  moment,  for  his  reputation  for  dash  and  gallantry 
was  inferior  to  none  in  the  army. 

Sedgwick  being  on  the  south  side  of  the  river,  three  miles 
below  the  town,  was  farther  off  than  Hooker  supposed,  and 
did  not  meet  the  expectations  of  the  latter  by  brushing 
aside  Early's  9,000  men  from  the  fortified  heights,  and  com 
ing  on  in  time  to  thunder  on  Lee's  rear  at  daylight,  and  join 
hands  with  the  main  body  at  Chancellorsville. 

The  Sixth  Corps  started  soon  after  midnight  to  cany  out 
the  order.  General  John  Newton's  division  led  the  way, 
with  General  Shaler's  brigade  in  advance.  They  were  some 
what  delayed  by  a  false  alarm  in  rear,  and  by  the  enemy's 
pickets  in  front,  but  made  their  way  steadily  toward  Freder- 
icksburg.  When  they  reached  Hazel  Eun  they  found  a  con 
siderable  body  of  the  enemy  on  the  Bowling  Green  Eoad 
at  the  bridge  in  readiness  to  dispute  the  passage.  Colonel 
Hamblin,  who  was  in  charge  of  Newton's  skirmish  line,  left 
a  few  of  his  men  to  open  an  energetic  fire  in  front,  while  he 
assembled  the  others  and  made  a  charge  which  took  the 
bridge  and  secured  the  right  of  way.  The  command  reached 
Fredericksburg  about  3  A.M.  As  the  atmosphere  was  very 
hazy,  Newton  found  himself  almost  on  the  enemy  before  he 
knew  it ;  near  enough  in  fact  to  overhea-r  their  conversation. 
He  fell  back  quietly  to  the  town  and  occupied  the  streets 
which  were  not  swept  by  the  fire  from  the  works  above.  He 
then  waited  for  daylight  to  enable  him  to  reconnoitre  the 
position  in  his  front,  previous  to  making  an  attack ;  and  that 
wras  the  hour  Hooker  had  set  for  Sedgwick  to  join  him  in  at 
tacking  Lee  at  Chancellorsville. 

As  soon  as  it  was  light  Gibbon  laid  bridges,  crossed  over, 
and  reported  to  Sedgwick  with  his  division. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  THIRD  OF  MAY.      57 

At  dawn  Newton  deployed  Wheaton's  brigade  and  made  a 
demonstration  to  develop  the  enemy's  line.  As  the  fortified 
heights  commanded  the  Plank  Koad  by  which  Sedgwick  was 
to  advance,  it  became  necessary  to  attack  immediately. 
The  plan  of  assault  which  was  devised  by  General  Newton, 
and  approved  by  General  Sedgwick,  was  to  attenuate  the 
rebel  force  by  attacking  it  on  a  wide  front,  so  that  it  could 
not  be  strong  anywhere,  and  to  use  the  bayonet  alone. 
Accordingly,  Gibbon  was  directed  to  advance  on  the  right 
to  turn  their  flank  there  if  possible,  while  Newton  was  to 
demonstrate  against  the  centre  and  Howe  to  act  against 
the  left.  Newton  deployed  Wheaton's  brigade,  opened  fire 
along  his  front  and  kept  the  enemy  employed  there,  but 
Gibbon  was  unable  to  advance  on  the  right,  because  a  canal 
and  a  railway  lay  between  him  and  the  rebels,  and  they 
had  taken  up  the  flooring  of  the  bridges  over  the  latter. 
Howe  did  not  succeed  any  better  on  the  left,  as  in  attempt 
ing  to  turn  the  first  line  of  works  he  encountered  the  fire  of 
a  second  line  in  rear  and  in  echelon  to  the  first,  which  took 
him  directly  in  flank,  so  that  the  combined  attack  was  a  fail 
ure.  A  concentrated  artillery  fire  was  brought  to  bear  on 
Gibbon,  Early  sent  Hays'  brigade  from  Marye's  Hill  to  meet 
him,  and  Wilcox's  brigade  came  up  from  Banks'  Ford  for 
the  same  purpose,  so  that,  being  unable  to  proceed,  he  was 
obliged  to  fall  back. 

It  was  now  10  A.M.  and  there  was  no  time  to  be  lost.  Gene 
ral  Warren,  who  was  in  camp  to  represent  Hooker,  urged  an 
immediate  assault.  This  advice  was  acceded  to,  and  Newton 
formed  three  columns  of  assault  in  the  centre,  and  Howe 
three  on  the  left. 

To  Colonel  Johns  of  the  Seventh  Massachusetts,  who  was 
a  graduate  of  West  Point,  wras  assigned  the  direct  attack  on 
Marye's  Hill,  with  two  regiments  of  Eustis'  brigade,  while 
3* 


58  CHANCELLORSV1LLE   AND  GETTYSBURG. 

another  column,  consisting  of  Shaler's  brigade,  and  four  regi 
ments,  under  Colonel  Spear,  of  the  Sixty-first  Pennsylvania, 
was  directed  to  act  farther  to  the  right,  and  the  Light  Divi 
sion,  under  Colonel  Burnhain  of  the  Fifth  Massachusetts,  at 
tached  to  Newton's  command,  was  ordered  to  deploy  on  the 
left  against  the  intrenchments  at  the  base  of  the  hill. 
Spear's  column  was  broken  and  enfiladed  by  the  artillery— 
indeed  almost  literally  swept  away — and  Spear  himself  was 
killed.  Johns  had  the  most  difficult  task,  for  he  was  com 
pelled  to  advance  up  a  broken  stony  gulch  swept  by  two 
rebel  howitzers  above.  The  head  of  his  column  encoun 
tered  a  terrific  fire,  and  was  twice  broken,  but  he  rallied  it 
each  time.  Then  he  was  badly  wounded,  and  there  was  a  brief 
pause,  but  Colonel  Walsh  of  the  Thirty-sixth  New  York  ral 
lied  the  men  again,  and  they  kept  straight  on  over  the  works. 
Burnham  with  his  Light  Brigade  captured  the  intrenchments 
below,  which  had  been  so  fatal  to  our  troops  in  the  previous 
battle  of  Fredericksburg,  and  went  into  the  works  above  with 
the  others.  General  Shaler's  reserve  regiments  entered  on 
the  right  at  a  less  exposed  point,  where,  however,  the  cross 
fire  was  still  very  severe. 

Sedgwick,  Newton,  and  Shaler  rode  into  the  works  almost 
simultaneously  with  the  men. 

The  fortified  heights  on  the  right  of  Hazel  Bun  held  by 
Barksdale's  brigade,  being  now  occupied  by  our  troops, 
those  to  the  left  were  necessarily  taken  in  reverse,  and  there 
fore  Sedgwick  thought  it  useless  to  attack  them  in  front. 
Nevertheless,  Howe  earned  them  gallantly,  but  with  consid 
erable  loss  of  life. 

The  coveted  heights,  which  Burnside  had  been  unable  to 
take  with  his  whole  army,  were  in  our  possession,  together  with 
about  a  thousand  prisoners,  but  the  loss  of  the  Sixth  Corps 
was  severe,  for  nearly  a  thousand  men  were  killed,  wounded, 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  THIRD  OF  MAY.      59 

and  missing  in  less  than  five  minutes.  The  attack  was  over 
-so  soon  that  Early  did  not  get  back  Hays'  brigade,  which  had 
been  detached  to  oppose  Gibbon,  in  time  to  assist  in  the 
defence.  Newton  says  if  there  had  been  a  hundred  more 
men  on  Marye's  Hill  we  could  not  have  taken  it. 

The  rebel  force  was  now  divided,  and  thrown  off  toward 
Richmond  in  eccentric  directions. 

All  that  remained  for  Sedgwick  to  do  was  to  keep  straight 
on  the  Plank  Road  toward  Chancellorsville.  Had  he  done 
so  at  once  he  would  have  anticipated  the  enemy  in  taking 
possession  of  the  strong  position  of  Salem  Church,  and  per 
haps  have  captured  Wilcox's  and  Hays'  brigades.  But  it 
was  not  intended  by  Providence  that  we  should  win  this  bat 
tle,  which  had  been  commenced  by  a  boasting  proclamation 
of  what  was  to  be  accomplished  ;  and  obstacles  were  con 
stantly  occurring  of  the  most  unexpected  character.  After 
directing  Gibbon  to  hold  the  town  and  cover  the  bridges 
there,  Sedgwick,  instead  of  pushing  on,  halted  to  reform  his 
men,  and  sent  back  for  Brooks'  division,  which  was  still  at  its 
old  position  three  miles  below  Fredericksburg,  to  come  up 
and  take  the  advance.  It  was  full  3  P.M.  before  the  final  start 
was  made.  This  delay  gave  Hays  time  to  rejoin  Early  by 
making  a  detour  around  the  head  of  Sedgwick's  column,  and 
Wilcox  took  advantage  of  it  to  select  a  strong  position  at 
Guest's  House,  open  fire  with  his  artillery,  and  detain  Sedg 
wick  still  longer.  Wilcox  then  retreated  toward  the  river 
road,  but  finding  he  was  not  pursued,  and  that  Sedgwick 
was  advancing  with  great  caution,  he  turned  back  and  oc 
cupied  for  a  short  time  the  Toll  Gate,  half  a  mile  from 
Saleni  Church,  where  McLaws'  division  was  formed  with 
one  of  Anderson's  brigades  on  his  left.  When  Sedgwick 
advanced  Wilcox  fell  back  and  joined  the  main  body  at  the 
church. 


60     CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

The  other  brigades  of  Anderson's  were  sent  to  hold  the 
junction  of  the  Mine  road  and  the  River  road. 

When  the  pursuit  ceased,  Early  reassembled  his  command 
near  Cox's  house  and  made  immediate  arrangements  to  retake 
the  Fredericksburg  heights,  and  demonstrate  against  Sedg- 
wick's  rear. 

McLaws  formed  his  line  about  2  P.M.  in  the  strip  of  woods 
which  runs  along  the  low  ridge  at  Salem  Church  ;  two  bri 
gades  being  posted  on  each  side  of  the  road  about  three 
hundred  yards  back.  Wilcox's  brigade,  when  driven  in,  was 
directed  to  take  post  in  the  church  and  an  adjacent  school- 
house  which  were  used  as  citadels.  This  was  a  strong  posi 
tion,  for  the  rebels  were  sheltered  by  the  woods,  while  our 
troops  were  forced  to  advance  over  an  open  country,  cut  up 
by  ravines  parallel  to  McLaws'  front,  which  broke  up  their 
organization  to  some  extent,  and  destroyed  the  elan,  of  the 
attack.  After  a  brief  artillery  contest,  which  soon  ended,  as 
the  enemy  were  out  of  ammunition,  Brooks'  division  went 
forward  about  4  P.M.,  and  made  a  gallant  charge,  in  which 
Bartlett's  brigade,  aided  by  Williston's  battery,  captured  the 
buildings  and  drove  in  part  of  Wilcox's  line.  The  New 
Jersey  brigade  charged  at  the  same  time  on  his  right,  and 
Russell's  brigade  on  his  left.  Wilcox  placed  himself  at  the 
head  of  his  reserve  regiments,  and  aided  by  Semmes'  brigade, 
made  a  fierce  counter-charge.  The  combat  for  the  school- 
house  raged  with  great  fury,  each  party  breaking  the  other's 
line  and  being  broken  in  turn.  Finally,  after  much  despe 
rate  fighting,  Bartlett  was  obliged  to  yield  the  portion  of 
the  crest  he  had  held  which  was  a  key  to  the  position  ;  for 
as  he  was  not  strongly  and  promptly  reinforced,  as  he  should 
have  been,  his  withdrawal  from  the  church  and  school-house 
made  a  gap  which  forced  the  other  portions  of  the  line  to 


THE  BATTLE   OF   THE  THIRD   OP  MAY.  61 

retreat  to  avoid  being  taken  in  flank.  Brooks  was  therefore 
driven  back  to  the  shelter  of  the  guns  at  the  Toll  House. 
There  Newton's  division  came  up  and  formed  on  his  right 
and  part  of  Howe's  division  on  his  left. 

The  Union  artillery  was  well  served  and  destructive,  and 
as  Newton  had  arrived,  McLaws  found  his  farther  progress 
checked  and  was  glad  to  get  back  to  the  ridge.  Bartlett's 
attack  should  have  been  deferred  until  Newton's  division 
was  near  enough  to  support  it.  In  that  case  it  would  un 
doubtedly  have  succeeded. 

Sedgwick's  left  now  rested  on  a  point  nearly  a  mile  from 
Salem  Church,  while  his  right  under  Wheaton  was  some 
what  advanced. 

Up  to  this  time  the  fight  had  been  between  Brooks'  divi 
sion  and  McLaws'  mixed  command.  It  was  now  decided 
that  a  second  attempt  should  be  made  by  Newton's  division, 
but  Newton  states  that  the  design  was  abandoned  because 
Howe's  division,  which  was  to  support  him,  had  gone  into 
camp  v/ithout  orders,*  and  was  not  immediately  available. 
Before  new  arrangements  could  be  made  darkness  came  on, 
and  both  armies  bivouacked  on  the  ground  they  occupied. 
Brook's  division  in  the  assault  just  made  had  lost  1,500  inen, 
and  Sedgwick  no  longer  felt  confident  of  forcing  his  way 
alone  through  the  obstacles  that  beset  him.  Nevertheless, 
trusting  to  the  speedy  and  hearty  co-operation  of  Hooker,  he 
stood  ready  to  renew  the  attempt  on  the  morrow,  although 
he  foresaw  the  enemy  would  fortify  their  line  during  the 
night  and  make  it  truly  formidable. 

When  Wilcox  left  Banks'  Ford  to  aid  in  the  defence  of 
Salem  Church,  General  H.  W.  Benham  of  the  United  States 
Engineer  Corps,  who  commanded  an  engineer  brigade  there, 
threw  over  two  bridges  at  Scott's  Dam,  about  a  mile  below 
Banks'  Ford,  to  communicate  with  Sedgwick,  enable  him  to 


62 


CHANCELLORSV1LLE   AND   GETTYSBURG. 


retreat  in  case  of  disaster,  and  connect  his  headquarters  with 
those  of  Hooker  by  telegraph. 

Hooker  disapproved  the  laying  of  the  bridges,  which  he 
thought  superfluous,  as  Sedgwick's  orders  were  to  keep  on 
to  Chancellorsville.  Warren  took  advantage  of  this  new  and 
short  route  to  return  to  the  main  army,  in  order  to  give 
Hooker  information  as  to  Sedgwick's  position.  He  promised 
to  send  back  full  instructions  for  the  guidance  of  the  latter. 

As  soon  as  the  bridges  were  laid,  General  J.  T.  Owens  with 
his  brigade  of  the  Second  Corps,  which  had  been  guarding 
the  ford,  crossed  over  and  reported  to  Sedgwick. 


Sedgwick's  Position. 

Warren  found  Hooker  in  a  deep  sleep,  and  still  suffering 
from  the  concussion  that  took  place  in  the  morning.  He 
gathered  from  the  little  he  did  say,  that  Sedgwick  must 
rely  upon  himself,  and  not  upon  the  main  body  for  deliver 
ance,  and  he  so  informed  Sedgwick. 


CHAPTER 

MAY  FOURTH.— ATTACK  ON  SEDGWICK'S  FORCE. 

As  HOOKEB  seemed  disposed  to  be  inactive,  Lee  thought 
he  might  venture  to  still  further  augment  the  force  in  front 
of  Sedgwick,  with  a  view  to  either  capture  the  Sixth  Corps 
or  force  it  to  recross  the  river.  He  therefore  directed  Ander 
son  to  reinforce  McLaws  with  the  remainder  of  his  division, 
leaving  only  what  was  left  of  Jackson's  old  corps  to  con 
front  Hooker.  Anderson  had  gone  over  to  the  right,  opposite 
the  Eleventh  and  Twelfth  Corps,  and  had  opened  with  a 
battery  upon  the  wagon  trains  which  were  parked  in  that 
vicinity,  creating  quite  a  stampede,  until  his  guns  were 
driven  away  by  the  Twelfth  Corps.  In  this  skirmish,  Gen 
eral  Whipple,  commanding  the  Third  division  of  Sickles' 
corps,  was  killed.  In  the  meantime,  Early  had  retaken  the 
heights  of  Fredericksburg,  which  were  merely  held  by  a 
picket  guard  of  Gibbons'  division,  so  that,  when  Anderson 
arrived  and  took  post  on  the  right  of  McLaws,  parallel  to 
the  Plank  Eoad,  Sedgwick  found  himself  environed  on  three 
sides  by  the  enemy  ;  only  the  road  to  Banks'  Ford  remained 
open,  and  even  that  was  endangered  by  bands  of  rebels, 
who  roamed  about  in  rear  of  our  forces.  At  one  time  it  is 
said  they  could  have  captured  him  and  his  headquarters. 
Fortunately  the  tents  which  constituted  the  latter  were  of 
so  unpretending  a  character,  that  they  gave  no  indication  of 
being  tenanted  by  the  commanding  general. 


64     CHANCELLORS VILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

Hooker  had  resumed  the  command,  although  manifestly 
incapable  of  directing  affairs ;  for  the  concussion  must  have 
affected  his  brain.  At  all  events,  although  he  had  about 
thirty-seven  thousand  fresh  men,  ready  and  desirous  of  en 
tering  into  the  combat,  and  probably  only  had  about  seven 
teen  thousand  worn  out  men  in  front  of  him,  he  failed  to  do 
anything  to  relieve  Sedgwick's  force,  which  was  now  becom 
ing  seriously  compromised.  A  feeble  and  ineffectual  recon- 
noissance  was  indeed  attempted,  and  as  that  was  promptly 
resisted,  Hooker  gave  up  the  idea  of  any  advance,  and  left 
Sedgwick  to  get  out  of  the  difficulty  the  best  way  he  could. 
At  11  A.M.  Sedgwick  wrote,  stating  the  obstacles  which 
beset  him,  and  requesting  the  active  assistance  of  the 
main  army.  He  was  directed,  in  reply,  not  to  attack,  un 
less  the  main  body  at  Chancellorsville  did  the  same.  All 
remained  quiet  until  4  P.M.  The  Sixth  Corps  were  then 
formed  on  three  sides  of  a  square  inclosing  Banks'  Ford, 
with  the  flanks  resting  on  the  river.  Howe's  division  faced 
east  toward  Fredericksburg,  against  Early,  who  confronted 
him  in  that  direction,  and  his  left  stretched  out  to  Taylor's 
Hill  on  the  Eappahannock.  Newton's  division,  together 
with  Eussell's  brigade  of  Brooks'  division,  faced  McLaws 
on  the  west,  and  Brooks'  other  two  brigades — those  of 
Bartlett  and  Torbert — were  opposed  to  Anderson  on  the 
south.  The  entire  line  was  very  long  and  thin. 

Early  and  McLaws  had  been  skirmishing  on  their  fronts 
all  day,  but  it  was  6  P.M.  before  everything  was  in  readiness 
for  the  final  advance.  An  attempt  had,  however,  been  made 
by  Early  to  turn  Howe's  left  and  cut  Sedgwick  off  from  the 
river ;  but  it  was  promptly  met  and  the  enemy  were  re 
pulsed  with  a  loss  of  two  hundred  prisoners  and  a  battle- 
flag. 

Sedgwick  felt  his  position  to  be  a  precarious  one.     His 


ATTACK  ON  SEDGWICK'S  FORCE.        65 

line  was  six  miles  long,  and  he  had  but  about  twenty  thousand 
men  with  which  to  hold  it  against  twenty-five  thousand  of 
the  enemy.  He  thought,  too,  that  reinforcements  had  come 
up  from  Richmond  and  that  the  enemy's  force  far  exceeded 
his  own.  It  was  evident  he  could  not  recross  the  river  in 
broad  daylight  without  sacrificing  a  great  part  of  his  corps, 
and  he  determined  to  hold  on  until  night.  Benhani  took 
the  precaution  to  throw  over  a  third  bridge,  and  this  pru 
dent  measure,  in  Sedgwick's  opinion,  saved  his  command. 
Lee,  after  personally  reconnoitring  the  position,  gave  orders 
to  break  in  the  centre  of  the  Sixth  Corps  so  as  to  defeat  the 
two  wings,  throw  them  off  in  eccentric  directions,  and  scat 
ter  the  whole  force.  When  this  was  attempted,  Sedgwick 
detached  Wheaton's  brigade  from  Newton's  right,  and  sent 
it  to  reinforce  that  part  of  the  line.  At  6  P.M.  three  guns 
were  fired  as  a  signal  from  Alexander's  battery  and  the  Con 
federate  forces  pressed  forward  to  the  attack.  Newton's 
front  was  not  assailed,  and  the  right  of  Brooks'  division  easily 
repulsed  the  enemy  who  advanced  in  that  direction,  with  the 
fire  of  the  artillery  and  the  skirmish  line  alone. 

The  main  effort  of  the  evening  was  made  by  Early's  divi 
sion,  which  advanced  in  columns  of  battalions,  to  turn  Howe's 
left,  and  cut  that  flank  off  from  the  river.  Howe's  artillery, 
under  charge  of  Major  J.  Watts  de  Peyster,  a  mere  youth, 
was  admirably  posted  and  did  great  execution  on  these  heavy 
columns.  De  Peyster  himself  rode  out  and  established  a 
battery,  a  considerable  distance  in  advance  of  the  main  line, 
and  the  enemy  pressed  forward  eagerly  to  capture  it ;  after 
doing  so  they  were  suddenly  confronted  by  several  regiments 
in  ambush,  which  rose  up  and  delivered  a  fire  which  threw 
Hays'  and  Hokes'  brigades  into  great  confusimi,  and  caused 
them  to  make  a  precipitate  retreat.  An  attack  against 
Howe's  right  was  also  repulsed.  In  the  ardor  of  pursuit. 


66  CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND   GETTYSBURG. 

Howe  swung  that  flank  around  and  captured  the  Eighth 
Louisiana  Regiment,  but  in  doing  so,  he  exposed  his  rear  to 
Gordon,  who  came  down  a  ravine  behind  him,  so  that  he  was 
compelled  to  fall  back  and  take  up  a  new  line.  Howe  had 
carefully  selected  a  reserve  position  and  made  dispositions  to 
hold  it.  Fresh  assaults  on  his  left  finally  forced  General 
Neil  to  retreat  to  it  with  his  brigade.  The  enemy  followed 
him  up  promptly,  but  were  driven  back  in  disorder  by 
Grant's  Vermont  brigade,  two  regiments  of  Newton's  divi 
sion  and  Butler's  regular  battery  of  the  Second  United  States 
Artillery.  Newton  thinks  this  last  attack  on  Howe  was 
local  and  accidental,  for  as  the  other  divisions  were  not  as 
sailed,  a  concentrated  attack  on  Howe  would  have  destroyed 
him. 

Darkness  at  last  put  an  end  to  the  strife.  Newton,  being 
an  engineer  officer  by  profession,  had  previously  been  sent 
by  Sedgwick  to  select  a  new  line  to  cover  the  bridges,  and 
the  army  was  ordered  to  fall  back  there.  It  did  so  with 
out  confusion,  the  roads  having  been  carefully  picketed. 
Brooks  took  position  on  Newton's  left,  after  which  Howe's 
division,  whose  right  flank  for  a  time  had  been  "in  the  air," 
withdrew  also  an  hour  later  than  the  others,  and  prolonged 
the  line  to  the  left.  Howe  complained  that  he  was  deserted 
by  Sedgwick,  but  the  latter  appears  to  have  sent  Wheaton's 
brigade  and  other  reinforcements  to  aid  his  retreat.  The 
movement  to  the  rear  was  favored  by  the  darkness  and  a 
thick  fog,  which  settled  over  the  valleys,  but  did  not  extend 
to  the  high  ground.  As  Benham  and  Sedgwick,  who  were 
classmates  at  West  Point,  walked  on  the  slope  of  the  hill 
where  the  men  were  lying — the  crest  above  being  held 
by  thirty-four  guns  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river — Ben- 
ham  cautioned  Sedgwick  not  to  recross  under  any  circum 
stances  without  his  entire  command,  nor  without  Hooker's 


ATTACK  ON  SEDGWICK'S  FORCE.  67 

express  sanction,  advice  which  Sedgwick  was  wise  enough 
to  follow. 

The  enemy  did  not  assail  the  new  position  or  attempt  to 
interfere  with  the  crossing  which  soon  after  took  place. 
When  it  was  nearly  concluded,  an  order  canie  from  Hooker 
countermanding  it,  but  it  wras  then  too  late  to  return. 

Howe  thinks  Sedgwick  should  not  have  crossed,  as  the 
last  attack  on  the  left,  which  \vas  the  vital  point,  had  been 
repulsed.  This  may  be  so,  in  the  light  of  after-considera 
tion,  but  it  was  very  doubtful  at  the  time,  and  as  Sedgwick 
had  lost  a  fraction  under  five  thousand  men  in  these  opera 
tions,  and  was  acting  under  the  false  information  that  addi 
tional  forces  had  come  up  from  Eichmond,  he  felt  that  he 
had  fully  borne  his  share  of  the  burden,  and  that  it  was  bet 
ter  to  place  his  corps  beyond  the  risk  of  capture,  than  to  run 
the  chances  of  renewing  the  battle.  It  would,  undoubtedly, 
have  been  of  immense  advantage  to  the  cause  if  he  could 
have  continued  to  hold  Taylor's  Hill,  which  dominated  the 
country  round,  and  was  the  key  of  the  battle-field ;  for  in 
that  case  Hooker  might  have  withdrawn  from  Lee's  front  and 
joined  Sedgwick,  which  would  have  been  attaining  the  ob 
ject  for  which  our  main  army  left  Falmouth,  and  made  the 
turning  movement.  He  would  thus  have  gained  a  strategic 
if  not  a  tactical  victory ;  his  shortcomings  would  have  been 
forgotten,  and  he  would  have  been  regarded  as  one  of  the 
greatest  strategists  of  the  age.  Hooker,  however,  had  left  so 
many  things  undone,  that  it  is  by  no  means  certain  he  would 
have  carried  out  this  policy,  although  he  expressed  his  in 
tention  to  do  so.  Sedgwick's  movement,  in  my  opinion, 
added  another  example  to  the  evil  effects  of  converging 
columns  against  a  central  force. 

There  is  little  more  to  add  in  relation  to  Hooker's  opera 
tions.  On  the  night  of  the  4th,  he  called  a  council  of  war, 


68  CHANCE LLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

and  after  stating  the  situation  to  them,  absented  himself,  in 
order  that  they  might  have  full  liberty  to  discuss  the  subject. 
Eeynolds  was  exhausted,  and  went  to  sleep,  saying  that  his 
vote  would  be  the  same  as  that  of  Meade.  Meade  voted  to 
remain,  because  he  thought  it  would  be  impossible  to  cross  in 
presence  of  the  enemy.  Sickles  and  Couch  voted  to  retreat. 
Howard  voted  to  remain,  without  reference  to  the  situation  of 
the  army,  because  in  his  opinion  his  corps  had  behaved  badly, 
and  he  wished  to  retrieve  its  reputation.  Slocum  was  not 
present.  The  final  result  was  that  Hooker  determined  to 
cross,  although  the  majority  of  votes  were  against  it.  The 
votes  of  Meade  and  Howard,  however,  were  qualified  in  such  a 
way  as  to  give  the  impression  they  were  in  favor  of  a  retreat. 

Owing  to  a  sudden  rise  in  the  river  the  bridges  became 
too  short,  and  there  was  some  doubt  as  to  the  practicability 
of  passing  over  them,  but  by  taking  down  one,  and  piecing 
the  others  with  it,  the  difficulty  was  overcome  and  the  army 
retired,  without  being  followed  up,  under  cover  of  thirty- 
two  guns  posted  on  the  heights  on  the  opposite  bank. 
Meade's  corps  acted  as  rear  guard. 

Hooker  left  his  killed  and  wounded  behind,  and  had  lost 
14  guns  and  20,000  stand  of  arms. 

It  only  remains  to  give  a  brief  statement  of  the  operations 
of  Stoneman's  cavalry.  These  were  of  no  avail  as  regards 
the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  for  our  army  was  defeated  and 
in  full  retreat  before  Lee's  main  line  of  communication  with 
Eichmond  was  struck,  and  then  all  the  damage  was  repaired 
in  three  or  four  days.  There  seems  to  have  been  a  lack  of 
information  as  to  where  to  strike  ;  for  the  principal  depot  df 
the  rebel  army  was  at  Guiney's  station  on  the  Fredericks- 
burg  and  Richmond  Railroad.  The  supplies  there  were  but 
slightly  guarded,  and  could  easily  have  been  captured. 
Had  this  been  done,  Lee  would  have  been  seriously  em- 


ATTACK  ON  SEDGWICK'S  FORCE.         69 

barrassed,  notwithstanding  his  victory,  and  forced  to  fall 
back  to  obtain  subsistence. 

Stoneman,  upon  setting  out  on  the  expedition,  left  one 
division  of  4,000  men  under  Averell  to  do  the  fighting,  and 
dispose  of  any  force  that  might  attempt  to  interfere  with 
the  movements  of  the  main  body.  Averell  accordingly  fol 
lowed  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  two  regiments  to  Rapidan  Station,  and 
remained  there  skirmishing  on  the  1st  of  May.  His  antago 
nist  then  burned  the  bridge,  and  fell  back  on  Gordonsville. 
As  Averell  was  about  to  ford  the  river  and  follow,  he  re 
ceived  orders  from  Hooker  to  return ;  he  came  back  to 
Elley's  Ford  on  the  2d,  which  he  reached  at  half  past  ten  at 
night.  As  his  return  was  useless  and  unnecessary,  he  has 
been  severely  censured,  but  it  was  not  of  his  own  volition. 
Soon  after  Fitz  Hugh  Lee  made  a  dash  at  his  camp,  but 
was  repulsed.  On  the  3d  Averell  made  a  reconnoissance  on 
Hooker's  right,  with  a  view  to  attack  the  enemy  there,  but 
finding  the  country  impracticable  for  cavalry,  returned  to 
Elley's  Ford.  Hooker,  who  was  not  in  the  best  of  humor  at 
the  time,  became  dissatisfied  with  his  operations,  relieved 
him  from  command,  and  appointed  Pleasonton  to  take  his 
place. 

In  the  meantime,  the  main  body  under  Stoneman  pressed 
forward,  and  reached  Louisa  Court  House  early  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  2d.  Parties  wrere  at  once  ordered  out  to  destroy  the 
Virginia  Central  Railroad  above  and  below  that  point.  One 
of  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  regiments  drove  back  a  detachment  of 
Union  cavalry  which  was  moving  on  Gordonsville,  but  rein 
forcements  went  forward  and  Lee  was  driven  back  in  his 
turn. 

In  the  evening  Stoneman  made  his  headquarters  at  Thomp 
son's  Cross  Roads,  and  from  there  despatched  regiments  in 
different  directions  to  burn  and  destrov. 


70     CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

One  party  under  Colonel  Wyndham,  First  New  Jersey, 
was  engaged  all  day  on  the  3d  in  injuring  the  canal  at  Co 
lumbia,  and  in  attempts  to  blow  up  the  aqueduct  over  the 
Kivanna. 

Colonel  Kilpatrick  moved  with  his  regiment,  the  Second 
New  York,  across  the  country,  passing  within  two  miles  and 
a  half  of  Kichmond,  and  creating  great  consternation  there. 
He  struck  and  destroyed  a  portion  of  the  Fredericksburg  Rail 
road — Lee's  main  line  of  supply — on  the  4th,  at  Hungary 
Station,  ten  miles  from  Richmond,  and  burned  Meadow 
Bridge,  over  the  Chickahominy  at  the  railroad  crossing.  He 
then  turned  north  again,  crossed  the  Pamunkey,  and  ended 
his  long  ride  at  Gloucester  Point,  which  was  garrisoned  by 
our  troops. 

Another  regiment — the  Twelfth  Illinois,  under  Colonel 
Davis — went  to  Ashland  and  moved  up  and  down  the  rail 
road,  doing  a  good  deal  of  damage.  It  captured  a  train  full 
of  Confederate  wounded  and  paroled  them.  After  a  brief 
encounter  with  an  infantry  and  artillery  force  at  Tunstall's 
station,  it  also  turned  north,  and  made  its  way  over  the  Pa 
munkey  and  Mattapony  rivers  to  Gloucester  Point. 

Two  regiments,  the  First  Maine  and  First  Maryland,  under 
General  Gregg,  started  down  the  South  Anna  River,  burning 
bridges  over  common  roads  and  railroads.  After  destroying 
Hanover  Junction,  it  returned  to  headquarters. 

One  or  two  other  small  parties  were  sent  on  flying  excur 
sions  to  assist  in  the  work  of  demolition. 

On  the  5th,  Stoneman  started  to  return,  and  the  entire 
command  with  the  exception  of  that  portion  which  was, at 
Gloucester  Point,  recrossed  at  Kelly's  Ford  on  the  8th. 

The  losses  in  each  army  were  heavy.  An  extract  is  here 
given  from  the  official  reports,  but  it  is  said  the  Confederate 
statement  is  far  from  being  accurate. 


ATTACK  ON   SEDGWICK'S  FORCE. 


71 


LOSSES   AT   CHANCELLORSVILLE. 


UNION. 


Killed  and 
Wounded. 

Missing. 

Total. 

first  Corps  (Reynolds) 

193 

100 

292 

Second  Corps  (Couch) 

1  525 

500 

2C25 

Third  Corps  (Sickles) 

3  439 

600 

40£9 

Fifth  Corps  (Meade)  

399 

300 

G99 

Sixth  Corps  (Sedgwick)    

3,601 

1,000 

4601 

Eleventh  Corps  (  Howard)  

508 

2,000 

2,508 

Twelfth  Corps  (Slocum)  

2,383 

500 

2.883 

Cavalry,  etc  ... 

150 

150 

Total  .  . 

12.197 

5,000 

17.197 

CONFEDERATE. 


Killed  and 
Wounded. 

Missing. 

Total. 

Early's  Division       . 

851 

500 

1  351 

A   P  Hill's  Division 

2583 

5009 

3  C83 

Colston's  Division 

1  868 

450  9 

2  318 

Rodes'  Division 

2  178 

713 

2  891 

Anderson's  Division  

1,180 

210 

1,390 

McLaws'  Division 

1  379 

380 

1  75'.) 

Artillery  and  Cavalry  

227 

'227 

Total 

10  266 

2753 

13  019 

The  following  extract  from  Harpers'  "History  of  the 
Great  Eebellion  "  states  the  causes  of  Hooker's  defeat  in  a 
very  able  manner,  but  I  do  not  agree  with  the  author  in 
his  estimate  of  the  great  danger  Lee  ran  from  the  conver 
ging  columns  of  Sedgwick  and  Hooker.  It  is  true  Lee  tried 
the  same  system,  and  succeeded,  by  sending  Jackson  around 
to  attack  Hooker's  right,  but  the  success  was  due  solely  to 
the  utter  lack  of  all  preparation  on  the  part  of  Howard  to 
meet  the  emergency,  and  to  Hooker's  failure  to  make  use 


72     CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

of  the  ample  means  at  his  disposal  to  prevent  the  junction 
of  Stuart  and  Anderson. 

Mr.  Alden,  the  author  of  the  work  in  question,  says : 

There  was  not,  in  fact,  any  moment  between  Thursday  afternoon 
and  Tuesday  morning  when  success  was  not  wholly  within  the  grasp  of 
the  Union  army.  The  movement  by  which  Chancellorsville  was 
reached,  and  the  Confederate  position  rendered  worthless,  was  bril 
liantly  conceived  and  admirably  executed.  The  initial  error,  by  which 
alone  all  else  was  rendered  possible,  was  that  halt 1  at  Chancellorsville. 
Had  the  march  been  continued  for  an  hour  longer,  or  even  been  re 
sumed  early  in  the  following  morning,  the  army  would  have  got  clear 
of  the  Wilderness  without  meeting  any  great  opposing  force,  and  then 
it  would  have  been  in  a  position  where  its  great  superiority  of  numbers 
would  have  told.  *  The  rout  of  Howard's  corps  was  possible  only  from 
the  grossest  neglect  of  all  military  precautions.  Jackson,  after  a  toil 
some  march  of  ten  hours,  halted  for  three  hours  in  open  ground,  not  two 
miles  from  the  Union  lines.  A  single  picket,  sent  for  a  mile  up  a 
'broad  road  would  have  discovered  the  whole  movement  in  ample  time 
for  Howard  to  have  strengthened  his  position,  or  to  have  withdrawn 
from  it  without  loss.  The  blame  of  this  surprise  can  not,  however, 
fairly  be  laid  upon  Hooker.  He  had  a  right  to  presume  that  whoever 
was  in  command  there  would  have  so  picketed  his  lines  as  to  prevent 
the  possibility  of  being  surprised  in  broad  daylight.  But  even  as  it 
was,  the  disaster  to  the  Eleventh  Corps  should  have  had  no  serious  ef 
fect  upon  the  general  result.  That  was  fully  remedied  when  the  pur 
suit  was  checked.  On  Sunday  morning  Hooker  was  in  a  better  posi 
tion  than  he  had  been  on  the  evening  before.  He  had  lost  3,000  men 
and  had  been  strengthened  by  17,000,  and  now  had  78,000  to  oppose  to 
47,000.  The  Confederate  army  was  divided,  and  could  reunite  only  by 
winning  a  battle  or  by  a  day's  march.  The  only  thing  which  could  have 
lost  the  battle  of  that  day  was  the  abandonment  of  the  position  at 
Hazel  Grove,  for  from  this  alone  was  it  possible  to  enfilade  SlocunVs 
line.  But  surely  it  is  within  the  limits  of  military  forethought  that' a 
general  who  has  occupied  a  position  for  two  days  and  three  nights 
should  have  discovered  the  very  key  to  that  position,  when  it  lay  with- 


1  Recall  of  columns. 


ATTACK  OX  SEDGWICK'S   FORCE.  73 

in  a  mile  of  his  own  headquarters.  The  disabling  of  Hooker  could  not, 
indeed,  have  been  foreseen  ;  but  such  an  accident  might  happen  to  any 
commander  upon  any  field,  and  there  should  have  been  somewhere 
some  man  with  authority  to  have,  within  the  space  of  three  hours, 
brought  into  action  some  of  the  more  than  30,000  men  within  sound, 
and  almost  within  sight,  of  the  battle  then  raging.  How  the  hours 
from  Sunday  noon  till  Monday  night  were  wasted  has  been  shown. 
Hooker,  indeed,  reiterates  that  he  could  not  assail  the  Confederate 
lines  through  the  dense  forests.  But  Lee  broke  through  those  very 
woods,  on  Sunday,  and  was  minded  to  attempt  it  again  on  Wednesday, 
when  he  found  that  the  enemy  had  disappeared.  The  golden  oppor 
tunity  was  lost,  never  to  be  recovered,  and  the  Confederate  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  gained  a  new  lease  of  life. 

It  may  not  be  out  of  place,  as  indicating  the  kind  of  ser 
vice  in  which  we  were  engaged,  to  quote  the  following  letter, 
written  after  the  retreat : 

I  am  so  cut,  scratched,  and  bruised  that  I  can  hardly  hold  a  pen  in 
my  hand.  My  limbs  are  covered  with  swellings  from  the  bites  of  in 
sects  and  torn  from  forcing  my  way  through  briers  and  thorny  bushes  ; 
my  eyes  close  involuntarily  from  lack  of  sleep  and  excessive  fatigue. 
My  legs  are  cramped  from  so  much  riding,  and  I  have  not  yet  succeeded 
in  getting  rid  of  the  chill  caused  by  sleeping  on  the  wet  ground  in  the 
cold  rain.  My  clothes,  up  to  last  night,  had  not  been  taken  off  for  a 
week.  As  I  lay  down  every  night  with  my  boots  and  spurs  on,  my 
feet  are  very  much  swollen.  I  ought  to  be  in  bed  at  this  moment  in 
stead  of  attempting  to  write. 

The  others  must  have  suffered  in  the  same  way.  Warren 
especially,  as  a  medium  of  communication  between  Hooker 
and  Sedgwick,  made  almost  superhuman  exertions  to  do 
without  sleep  and  perform  the  important  duties  assigned 
him. 

Each  army  now  felt  the  need  of  rest  and  recuperation,  and 
no  military  movements  of  importance  took  place  for  several 
weeks.  Soon  after  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  Long- 
VI.— 4 


74  CHANCELLORSV1LLE   AND   GETTYSBURG. 

street's  two  divisions,  which  had  been  operating  in  front  of 
Suffolk,  rejoined  Lee  at  Fredericksburg.  That  portion  of 
Stoneman's  cavalry  which  had  taken  refuge  in  Gloucester 
Point  also  succeeded,  by  great  boldness  and  skilful  manoeu 
vring  on  the  part  of  Colonel  Kilpatrick,  in  outwitting  the 
enemy  and  getting  to  Urbanna,  after  crossing  Dragon  River, 
rebuilding  a  bridge  there,  and  repulsing  the  rebel  forces 
who  tried  to  prevent  them  from  reaching  the  Rappahannock. 
The  command,  when  it  arrived  at  Urbanna,  passed  over  on  the 
ferry-boat,  under  cover  of  a  gunboat  sent  there  for  that  pur 
pose,  and  rejoined  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  at  Falmouth, 
on  the  3d  of  June,  bringing  in  about  200  prisoners,  40  wag 
ons,  and  1,000  contrabands,  as  slaves  were  usually  styled  at 
that  time. 


CHAPTEK  IX. 

PREPARATIONS  TO  RENEW  THE  CONFLICT. 

THE  close  of  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville  found  the 
Union  army  still  strong  in  numbers,  defeated,  but  not  dis 
heartened,  and  ready,  as  soon  as  reinforcements  and  supplies 
arrived,  and  a  brief  period  of  rest  and  recuperation  ensued, 
to  take  the  field  again.  To  resist  the  effects  of  this  defeat 
and  recruit  our  armies  required,  however,  great  determina 
tion  and  serious  effort  on  the  part  of  the  Administration  ; 
for  a  large  and  powerful  party  still  clogged  and  impeded  its 
efforts,  and  were  allowed  full  liberty  to  chill  the  patriotism 
of  the  masses,  and  oppose,  with  tongue  and  pen  and  every 
species  of  indirection,  all  efficient  action  which  looked  to 
national  defence.  This  opposition  was  so  strong  and  active 
that  the  President  almost  preferred  the  risk  of  losing  an 
other  battle  to  the  commotion  which  would  be  excited  by 
attempts  to  enforce  the  draft  ;  for  hitherto  we  had  relied 
entirely  on  voluntary  enlistments  to  increase  our  strength  in 
the  field.  Men  are  chilled  by  disaster  and  do  not  readily 
enlist  after  a  defeat ;  yet  the  terms  of  service  of  thirty  thou 
sand  of  the  two  years  and  nine  months  men  were  expiring, 
and  something  had  to  be  done.  Our  army,  however,  at  the 
end  of  May  was  still  formidable  in  numbers,  and  too 
strongly  posted  to  be  effectually  assailed ;  especially  as  it 
had  full  and  free  communication  with  Washington  and  the 


7C>  CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

North,  and  could  be  assisted  in  case  of  need  by  the  loyal 
militia  of  the  free  States. 

The  rebels  had  obtained  a  triumph,  rather  than  a  sub 
stantial  victory,  at  Chancellorsville.  It  was  gained,  too, 
at  a  ruinous  expense  of  life,  and  when  the  battle  was  over 
they  found  themselves  too  weak  to  follow  up  our  retreat 
ing  forces.  While  the  whole  South  was  exulting,  their 
great  commander,  General  Lee,  was  profoundly  depressed. 
The  resources  of  the  Davis  Government  in  men  and  means 
were  limited,  and  it  was  evident  that  without  a  foreign  al 
liance,  prolonged  defensive  warfare  by  an  army  so  far  from 
its  base,  would  ultimately  exhaust  the  seceding  States,  with 
out  accomplishing  their  independence.  It  became  neces 
sary,  therefore,  for  General  Lee  to  choose  one  of  two  plans 
of  campaign  :  either  to  fall  back  on  the  centre  of  his  sup 
plies  at  Richmond,  and  stand  a  siege  there,  or  to  invade  the 
North.  By  retiring  on  Richmond  he  would  save  the  great 
labor  of  transporting  food  and  war  material  to  the  frontier, 
and  would  remove  the  Northern  army  still  further  from  its 
sources  of  supply  and  its  principal  depots.  One  circum 
stance,  however,  would  probably  in  any  event,  have  im 
pelled  him  to  take  the  bolder  course.  The  situation  in 
Vicksburg  was  becoming  alarming.  It  was  evident  the 
town  must  fall  and  with  its  surrender  the  Federal  fleet  would 
soon  regain  possession  of  the  Mississippi.  The  fall  of 
Vicksburg,  supplemented  by  the  retreat  of  Lee's  army  on 
Richmond,  would  dishearten  the  Southern  people,  and 
stimulate  the  North  to  renewed  efforts.  It  was  essential, 
therefore,  to  counterbalance  the  impending  disaster  in  the' 
West  by  some  brilliant  exploit  in  the  East. 

There  was  perhaps  another  reason  for  this  great  forward 
movement,  founded  on  the  relation  of  the  Confederacy  to  the 
principal  European  powers.  England  still  made  a  pretence 


PREPARATIONS  TO   RENEW  THE  CONFLICT.         77 

of  neutrality,  but  the  aristocracy  and  ruling  classes  sided 
with  the  South,  and  a  large  association  of  their  most  influen 
tial  men  was  established  at  Manchester  to  aid  the  slavehold- 
ing  oligarchy.  The  rebels  were  fighting  us  with  English 
guns  and  war  material,  furnished  by  blockade  runners ; 
while  English  Shenandoahs  and  Alabamas,  manned  by  Brit 
ish  seamen,  under  the  Confederate  flag,  burned  our  merchant 
vessels  and  swept  our  commercial  marine  from  the  ocean. 
The  French  Government  was  equally  hostile  to  us,  and  there 
was  hardly  a  kingdom  in  Europe  which  did  not  sympathize 
with  the  South,  allied  as  they  were  by  their  feudal  customs 
to  the  deplorable  system  of  Southern  slavery.  Russia  alone 
favored  our  cause,  and  stood  ready,  if  need  be,  to  assist  us 
with  her  fleet;  probably  more  from  antagonism  to  England 
and  France,  than  from  any  other  motive.  The  agents  of  the 
Confederate  Government  stated  in  their  official  despatches 
that  if  General  Lee  could  establish  his  army  firmly  on 
Northern  soil  England  would  at  once  acknowledge  the  in 
dependence  of  the  South ;  in  wrhich  case  ample  loans  could 
not  only  be  obtained  on  Southern  securities,  but  a  foreign 
alliance  might  be  formed,  and  perhaps  a  fleet  furnished  to 
re- open  the  Southern  ports. 

While  thus  elated  by  hopes  of  foreign  intervention,  the 
Confederate  spies  and  sympathizers  who  thronged  the  North 
greatly  encouraged  the  Davis  Government  by  their  glowing 
accounts  of  the  disaffection  there,  in  consequence  of  the 
heavy  taxation,  rendered  necessary  by  the  war,  and  by  the 
unpopularity  of  the  draft,  which  would  soon  have  to  be 
enforced  as  a  defensive  measure.  They  overrated  the  influ 
ence  of  the  Copperhead  or  anti-war  party,  and  prophesied 
that  a  rebel  invasion  would  be  followed  by  outbreaks  in 
the  principal  cities,  which  would  paralyze  every  effort  to  re 
inforce  the  Federal  forces  in  the  field. 


78  CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND   GETTYSBURG. 

These  reasons  would  have  been  quite  sufficient  of  them 
selves  to  induce  Lee  to  make  the  movement,  but  he  himself 
gives  an  additional  one.  He  hoped  by  this  advance  to  draw 
Hooker  out,  where  he  could  strike  him  a  decisive  blow,  and 
thus  ensure  the  permanent  triumph  of  the  Confederacy.  He 
was  weary  of  all  this  marching,  campaigning,  and  blood 
shed,  and  was  strongly  desirous  of  settling  the  whole  matter 
at  once.  Having  been  reinforced  after  the  battle  of  Chan- 
cellorsville  by  Longstreet's  two  divisions  and  a  large  body 
of  conscripts,  he  determined  to  advance.  On  May  31st,  his 
force,  according  to  rebel  statements,  amounted  to  88,754, 
of  which  68,352  were  ready  for  duty.  Eecruits,  too,  were 
constantly  coming  in  from  the  draft,  which  was  rigidly  en 
forced  in  the  Southern  States. 

Hooker  having  learned  from  his  spies  that  there  was  much 
talk  of  an  invasion,  wrote  to  the  President  on  May  28th,  that 
the  enemy  was  undoubtedly  about  to  make  a  movement  of 
some  kind.  On  June  3d,  McLaws'  and  Hood's  divisions 
of  Longstreet's  corps  started  for  the  general  rendezvous  at 
Culpeper.  A  change  in  the  encampment  on  the  opposite 
side  of  the  river  was  noted  by  the  vigilant  Union  commander, 
who  at  once  ordered  Sedgwick  to  lay  two  bridges  at  the  old 
crossing  place,  three  miles  below  Fredericksburg,  pass  over 
with  a  division,  and  press  the  enemy  to  ascertain  if  their 
main  body  was  still  there.  Fresh  indications  occurred  on 
the  4th,  for  Swell's  corps  followed  that  of  Longstreet.  The 
bridges  being  completed  on  the  5th,  Howe's  division  of  the 
Sixth  Corps  was  thrown  over  and  Hill's  corps  came  out  of 
their  intrenchments  to  meet  it.  Some  skirmishing  ensued, 
and  Sedgwick  reported,  as  his  opinion,  that  the  greater  por 
tion  of  the  enemy's  force  still  held  their  old  positions. 
Hooker,  however,  was  determined  to  be  prepared  for  all  con- 


PREPARATIONS  TO   RENEW  THE  CONFLICT.        79 

tingencies,  and  therefore,  on  the  same  day,  detached  the 
Fifth  Corps  to  be  in  readiness  to  meet  the  enemy  should 
they  attempt  to  force  a  passage  anywhere  between  United 
States  Ford  and  Banks'  Ford.  Resolved  to  obtain  certain 
information  at  all  hazards,  on  the  7th  of  June  he  ordered 
Pleasonton  to  make  a  forced  reconnoissance  writh  all  the 
available  cavalry  of  the  army,  in  the  direction  of  Cul- 
peper,  to  ascertain  whether  the  Confederate  forces  were 
really  concentrating  there,  with  a  view  to  an  invasion  of  the 
JSorth. 

Should  this  prove  to  be  the  case,  Hooker  desired  to  cross 
the  river,  to  envelop  and  destroy  Hill's  corps,  and  then  fol 
low  up  the  main  body  as  they  proceeded  northward,  thus 
intercepting  their  communications  with  Richmond.  The 
authorities  at  Washington,  however,  did  not  look  with  much 
equanimity  upon  the  possibility  of  finding  Lee's  army  inter 
posed  between  them  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  so  they 
refused  to  sanction  the  plan  and  it  was  abandoned. 

Nevertheless,  in  my  opinion  it  was  about  the  best  method 
that  could  have  been  devised  to  check  the  invasion,  provided 
Hooker  did  not  lose  his  water-base  ;  for  Lee  always  showed 
himself  very  sensitive  whenever  his  communications  with 
Richmond  was  threatened.  If  that  was  severed  no  more  am 
munition  or  military  supplies  would  reach  him.  The  amount 
of  cartridges  on  hand  was  necessarily  limited.  It  would  soon 
be  expended  in  constant  skirmishes  and  engagements,  and 
then  he  would  be  helpless  and  at  the  mercy  of  his  antagonist. 
Consequently,  the  moment  he  heard  that  a  portion  of  the 
Sixth  Corps  had  crossed  and  confronted  Hill,  he  directed 
Ewell  and  Longstreet  to  halt  at  Locust  Grove,  near  Chan- 
cellorsville,  and  be  in  readiness  to  return  to  Fredericksburg 
to  assist  Hill  in  case  there  was  any  danger  of  his  being  over 
powered.  Finding  Sedgwick's  advance  was  a  mere  recon- 


80  CHANCELLORSVILLE   AND   GETTYSBURG. 

noissance,  the  two  rebel  corps  resumed  their  inarch  to  Cul- 
pepper. 

Hooker  deemed  it  essential  to  success,  that  all  troops  con 
nected  with  the  theatre  of  invasion  should  be  placed  under 
his  command,  so  that  they  could  act  in  unison.  In  his  opin 
ion  most  of  their  strength  was  wasted  in  discordant  expedi 
tions,  wliich  were^useless  as  regards  the  general  result.  He 
referred  more  particularly  to  General  Dix's  command  at  Old 
Point  Comfort,  General  Heintzelman's  command  in  Washing 
ton,  and  General  Schenck's  troops  posted  at  Baltimore,  along 
the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  and  in  the  Valley  of  the 
Shenandoah.  This  request  was  reasonable  and  should  have 
been  granted.  Hooker's  demands,  however,  were  not  con 
sidered  favorably.  There  was  no  very  good  feeling  be 
tween  General  Halleck,  who  was  commander  of  the  army, 
and  himself,  and  as  he  felt  that  his  efforts  were  neither 
seconded  nor  approved  at  headquarters,  he  soon  after  re 
signed  the  command. 

The  main  body  of  the  Union  cavalry  at  this  time  was  at 
Warrenton  and  Catlett's  Station.  Hooker,  having  been  dis 
satisfied  with  the  result  of  the  cavalry  operations  during  the 
Chancellorsville  campaign,  had  displaced  Stoneman  in  favor 
of  Major-General  Alfred  Pleasonton. 


CHAPTEE  X. 

BATTLE  OP  BRANDY  STATION   (FLEETWOOD). 

THE  8th  of  June  was  a  day  of  preparation  on  both  sides. 
Pleasonton  was  engaged  in  collecting  his  troops  and  getting 
everything  in  readiness  to  beat  up  the  enemy's  quarters  the 
next  morning,  and  Stuart  was  preparing  to  cross  for  the  pur 
pose  of  either  making  a  raid  on  the  railroad,  as  Pleason 
ton  states,  or  to  take  up  a  position  to  guard  the  right  flank 
of  the  invading  force  as  it  passed  by  our  army.  Major  Mc- 
Clellan,  Stuart's  adjutant-general,  asserts  the  latter.  Pleas- 
onton's  information  was  founded  on  captured  despatches, 
and  on  interviews  held  by  some  of  our  officers  with  the  Con 
federates  under  a  flag  of  truce. 

The  four  batteries  of  Jones's  cavalry  brigade  moved 
down  near  the  river  opposite  Beverly  Ford  on  the  7th,  to 
cover  the  proposed  crossing.  They  were  imperfectly  sup 
ported  by  the  remainder  of  Stuart's  force.  Jones's  brigade 
was  posted  on  the  road  to  Beverly  Ford,  that  of  Fitz  Lee ' 
on  the  other  side  of  Hazel  Eiver ;  that  of  Eobertson  along 
the  Eappahannock  below  the  railroad  ;  that  of  W.  H.  F. 
Lee  on  the  road  to  Melford  Ford,  and  that  of  Hampton  in 
reserve,  near  Fleetwood  Hill — all  too  far  off  to  be  readily 
available.  In  fact,  the  batteries  were  entirely  unsuspicious 
of  danger,  although  they  were  a  quarter  of  a  mile  from  the 

1  A  familiar  abbreviation  for  Fitz  Hugh  Lee,  adopted  in  the  rebel  reports. 
4* 


82  CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

nearest  support  and  there  was  only  a  thin  line  of  pickets  be 
tween  their  guns  and  the  river. 

In  the  meantime  Pleasonton's  three  divisions,  "  stiffened11 
— to  use  one  of  Hooker's  expressions — by  two  brigades  of 
infantry,  stole  down  to  the  fords  and  lay  there  during  the 
night,  quietly,  and  without  fires,  ready  at  the  first  dawn  of 
day  to  spring  upon  their  too-confident  adversaries  and  give 
them  a  rude  awakening. 

Pleasonton  in  person  remained  with  Buford's  division — 
the  First — which  was  lying  near  Beverly  Ford  with  Ames's 
infantry  brigade. 

The  other  two  divisions,  the  Second,  under  Colonel  Duffie, 
and  the  Third,  under  General  Gregg — supported  by  Eussell's 
infantry  brigade,  were  in  bivouac  opposite  Kelly's  Ford. 

As  each  commander  is  apt  to  overstate  the  enemy's  force 
and  underrate  his  own,  it  is  not  always  easy  to  get  at  the 
facts.  Pleasonton  claims  that  the  rebels  had  about  twelve 
thousand  cavalry  and  twelve  guns.  Major  McClellan,  of 
Stuart's  staff,  puts  the  number  at  nine  thousand  three  hun 
dred  and  thirty -five  men,  on  paper,  and  twenty  guns ;  but 
states  there  were  nearly  three  thousand  absentees. 

General  Gregg  estimates  the  Union  cavalry  at  about  nine 
thousand  men  and  six  batteries,  but — as  will  be  seen  here 
after—a  third  of  this  force  was  detached  toward  Stevens- 
burg,  and  their  operations  had  little  or  no  effect  on  the  gen 
eral  result.  The  batteries  do  not  seem  to  have  been  brought 
forward  in  time  to  be  of  much  service. 

At  daybreak  Pleasonton's  troops  began  to  cross  ;  Buford's 
division  and  Ames's  infantry  at  Beverly  Ford ;  the  other  two, 
divisions,  under  Gregg  and  Duffie,  with  Russell's  infantry  at 
Kelly's  Ford,  six  miles  below.  Each  division  was  accompa 
nied  by  two  light  batteries. 

Pleasonton's  plan  was  founded  on  the  erroneous  suppo- 


BATTLE  OF  BRANDY  STATION  (FLEETWOOD).    83 

sition  that  the  enemy  were  at  Culpeper.  He  used  the  in 
fantry  to  keep  the  lines  of  retreat  open,  and  directed  the 
fcavalry  to  rendezvous  at  Brandy  Station.  They  were  to 
arrive  there  at  the  same  time,  and  attack  together.  Duffie's 
column  was  to  make  a  circuit  by  way  of  Stevensburg. 
Unfortunately,  Stuart  was  not  at  Culpeper,  but  at  Brandy 
Station  ;  that  is,  he  occupied  the  point  where  they  were 
to  rendezvous,  and  the  plan  therefore  appertained  prac 
tically  to  the  same  vicious  system  of  converging  columns 
against  a  central  force.  What  happened  may  be  briefly 
stated  as  follows  :  The  First  Division,  under  Buford,  came 
upon  the  enemy  between  Brandy  Station  and  Beverly  Ford. 
A  battle  ensued  at  St.  James's  Church,  and  as  their  whole 
force  confronted  him,  and  they  had  twenty  pieces  of  artil 
lery,  he  was  unable  to  break  their  line.  After  fighting 
some  hours  he  was  obliged  to  turn  back  with  a  portion  of 
his  command  to  repel  an  attempt  against  his  line  of  retreat. 
Gregg  next  appeared  upon  the  scene,  and  succeeded  in  get 
ting  in  Stuart's  rear  before  the  rebel  general  knew  he  was 
there.  Buford  having  gone  back  toward  Beverly  Ford,  as 
stated,  Gregg  in  his  turn,  fought  the  whole  of  Stuart's  force 
without  the  co-operation  of  either  Buford  or  Duffie.  It  can 
hardly  be  said  that  Duffie1  s  column  took  any  part  in  the 
action,  for  he  did  not  reach  Brandy  Station  until  late  in  the 
day.  And  then,  as  the  rebel  infantry  were  approaching, 
Pleasonton  ordered  a  retreat. 

For  the  future  instruction  of  the  reader  it  may  be  well  to 
state  that  every  cavalry  charge,  unless  supported  by  artillery 
or  infantry,  is  necessarily  repulsed  by  a  counter-charge  ;  for 
when  the  force  of  the  attack  is  spent,  the  men  who  make  it 
are  always  more  or  less  scattered,  and  therefore  unable  to 
contend  against  the  impetus  of  a  fresh  line  of  troops,  who 
come  against  them  at  full  speed  and  strike  in  mass. 


84     CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

Stuart's  headquarters  were  twice  taken  by  Gregg's  divi 
sion,  and  a  company  desk  captured  with  very  important  de 
spatches,  but  the  enemy  had  the  most  men,  and  most  artil 
lery  near  the  point  attacked,  and  therefore  always  regained, 
by  a  counter -charge,  the  ground  that  had  been  lost. 

Stuart  claims  to  have  repulsed  the  last  attack  of  Pleason- 
ton  against  Fleetwood  Hill,  and  to  have  taken  three  guns, 
besides  driving  our  cavalry  back  across  the  river. 

Pleasonton  claims  to  have  fully  accomplished  the  object 
of  his  reconnoissance,  to  have  gained  valuable  information 
which  enabled  Hooker  to  thwart  Lee's  plans  ;  and  to  have  so 
crippled  the  rebel  cavalry  that  its  efficiency  was  very  much 
impaired  for  the  remainder  of  the  campaign ;  so  that  Lee 
was  forced  to  take  the  indirect  route  of  the  valley,  instead 
of  the  direct  one  along  the  eastern  base  of  the  Blue  Eidge, 
behind  his  cavalry  as  a  screen ;  his  original  intention  having 
been  to  enter  Maryland  at  Poolesville  and  Monocacy. 


GETTYSBURG. 


GETTYSBURG. 


CHAPTER  I. 
THE  INVASION   OF  THE   NORTH. 

AN  invasion  of  the  North  being  considered  as  both  prac 
ticable  and  necessary,  it  only  remained  to  select  the  most 
available  route. 

There  was  no  object  in  passing  east  of  Hooker's  army,  and 
it  would  have  been  wholly  impracticable  to  do  so,  as  the 
wide  rivers  to  be  crossed  were  controlled  by  our  gunboats. 

To  attempt  to  cross  the  Eappahannock  to  the  west,  and  in 
the  immediate  vicinity  of  Fredericksburg,  would  have  been 
hazardous,  because  when  an  army  is  crossing,  the  portion 
which  is  over  is  liable  to  be  crushed  before  it  can  be  rein 
forced. 

It  would  seem  that  Lee's  first  intention  was  to  move  along 
the  eastern  base  of  the  Blue  Kidge  directly  toward  Washing 
ton.1  The  appearance  of  his  army  oh  Hooker's  flank  would 
be  a  kind  of  taunt  and  threat,  calculated  to  draw  the  latter 
out  of  his  shell,  and  induce  him  to  make  an  attack.  In  such  a 
case,  as  the  rebels  were  in  the  highest  spirits,  in  consequence 
of  their  recent  victory  at  Chancellorsville,  their  commander 
had  little  doubt  of  the  result.  This  plan  was  feasible 


See  map  facing  page  1. 


88     CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

enough,  provided  his  cavalry  could  beat  back  that  of  Pleas- 
onton  and  act  as  a  screen  to  conceal  his  movements.  This 
they  were  not  in  a  condition  to  do  after  the  battle  of  Brandy 
Station,  and  Lee  was  thus  forced  to  take  the  route  down 
the  Shenandoah  Valley,  which  had  many  advantages.  The 
mountain  wall  that  intervened  between  the  two  armies,  was 
a  sure  defence  against  our  forces,  for  it  was  covered  by  dense 
thickets,  and  the  roads  that  lead  through  the  gaps,  and 
the  gaps  themselves,  were  easy  to  fortify  and  hold  against 
a  superior  force.  If  Hooker  had  attempted  to  assail  these 
positions,  one  corps  could  have  held  him  in  check,  while  the 
other  two  captured  Washington. 

The  movement  also  favored  the  subsistence  of  the  troops, 
for  the  valley  being  a  rich  agricultural  region,  Lee  was  en 
abled  to  dispense  with  much  of  his  transportation  and  feed 
his  army  off  of  the  country. 

There  was  one  serious  obstacle,  however,  to  his  further 
progress  in  that  direction,  and  that  was  the  presence  of  a 
gallant  soldier,  Milroy,  with  a  very  considerable  Union  gar 
rison  intrenched  at  Winchester. 

It  was  essential  to  Lee's  advance  that  the  valley  should  be 
cleared  of  Union  troops,  otherwise  they  would  sally  forth 
after  he  passed  and  capture  his  convoys. 

With  this  object  in  view,  on  the  10th  Swell's  corps  passed 
through  Gaines's  Cross  Eoads,  and  halted  near  Flint  Hill  on 
their  way  to  Chester  Gap  and  Front  Eoyal. 

The  possibility  of  an  invasion  had  been  discussed  for  some 
days  in  Washington,  and  Halleck  had  come  to  the  conclusion 
that  it  was  better  to  withdraw  the  stores  and  amrnunitipn 
from  Winchester,  and  retain  the  post  there  merely  as  a  look 
out,  to  give  warning  of  the  enemy's  approach.  Accordingly, 
on  the  llth,  Milroy  received  orders  from  his  department 
commander,  General  Schenck,  to  send  his  armament  and 


THE  INVASION   OF   THE  NORTH.  89 

supplies  back  to  Harper's  Ferry.  Milroy  remonstrated,  say 
ing  that  he  could  hold  the  place  against  any  force  that  would 
probably  attack  him,  and  that  it  would  be  cruel  to  sacrifice 
the  Union  men  who  looked  to  him  for  protection. 

In  reply  to  this  Schenck  telegraphed  him  that  he  might 
remain,  but  must  be  in  readiness  to  retreat  whenever  cir 
cumstances  made  it  necessary. 

Milroy,  in  answer  to  another  inquiry,  reported  that  he 
could  move  in  six  hours. 

On  the  12th  he  sent  out  two  scouting  parties,  and  learned 
there  was  a  considerable  force  at  Cedarsville,  which  he 
thought  might  form  part  of  Stuart's  raid,  information  of 
which  had  been  communicated  to  him. 

He  could  not  believe  it  possible  that  an  entire  rebel  corps 
was  near  him,  for  he  supposed  Lee's  army  was  still  at  Fred- 
ericksburg.  His  superiors  had  not  informed  him,  as  they 
should  have  done  by  telegraph,  that  a  large  part  of  it  had 
moved  to  Culpeper.  He  thought  if  Lee  left  Hooker's  front 
at  Fredericksburg,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  would  follow 
and  he  would  receive  full  information  and  instructions. 
He  telegraphed  General  Schenck  late  that  night  for  specific 
orders,  whether  to  hold  his  post  or  to  retreat  on  Harper's 
Ferry,  stating  ther^  "-^w-prl  to  be  a  considerable  force  in 
front  of  him.  As  the  enemy  soon  ai^t^  ^  . 
never  received  any  answer.  He  sent  a  messenger  the  same 
night  to  notify  Colonel  McEeynolds,  at  Berryville,  that 
there  was  a  large  body  of  the  enemy  on  the  Front  Royal 
road,  and  directed  him  to  send  out  scouts  to  Millwood,  and 
keep  himself  advised  of  its  approach,  in  order  that  he  might 
prepare  to  fall  back  on  Winchester  the  moment  he  was  at 
tacked  by  superior  numbers. 

On  the  13th  Ewell  marched  with  two  divisions  directly  on 
Winchester,  while  he  sent  the  third — that  of  Rodes — to  take 


90  CHANCELLORSV1LLE   AND   GETTYSBURG. 

Berryville.  Thanks  to  the  timely  warning  McEeynolds 
had  received,  his  brigade  got  off  in  time,  his  rear  being  cov 
ered  by  Alexander's  battery  and  the  Sixth  Maryland  cavalry. 
These  detained  the  enemy  two  hours,  and  then  caught  up 
with  the  main  body.  Jenkins's  cavalry  came  upon  the  re 
treating  force  at  Opequan  Creek,  where  he  made  an  attack, 
which  was  promptly  repulsed  by  the  artillery  with  canister. 
After  this  there  was  no  further  molestation,  and  McEey- 
nolds's  command  reached  Winchester  at  10  P.M. — a  march 
of  thirty  miles. 

Soon  after  the  affair  at  the  Opequan,  Major  Morris,  with 
200  men,  was  attacked  at  Bunker  Hill,  an  outlying  post  of 
Winchester.  He  occupied  a  fortified  church,  but  moved 
out  to  meet  the  enemy,  under  the  impression  it  was  only  a 
small  raiding  party.  When  he  found  two  thousand  men  in 
line  of  battle  he  retreated,  fighting,  to  the  church  again. 
There,  as  the  doors  were  barricaded,  and  the  walls  loop- 
holed,  the  rebels  could  make  110  impression,  and  were 
obliged  to  fall  back  to  a  respectful  distance.  In  the  night 
Morris  managed  to  steal  away,  and  soon  rejoined  the  main 
body  at  Winchester. 

The  arrival  of  these  reinforcements  seriously  embarrassed 
Milroy ;  and  it  will  be  seen  hereafter  that  it  would  have 
been  much  better  for  all  concerned  if  they  had  retreated  to 
Harper's  Ferry  at  once.  They  acted,  however,  strictly  in 
obedience  to  orders. 

Kodes's  division,  after  the  taking  of  Berryville,  kept  on 
toward  Martinsburg,  and  bivouacked  at  a  place  called  Sum 
mit  Point.  * 

On  the  morning  of  the  13th  Milroy  had  sent  out  a  detach 
ment  under  General  Elliot  on  the  Strasburg  road,  and  an 
other  under  Colonel  Ely  on  the  Front  Eoyal  road,  to  recon 
noitre.  Elliott  found  no  enemy,  and  returned.  An  attempt 


THE   INVASION   OF  THE  NORTH.  91 

was  made  to  cut  him  off  from  the  town,  but  it  was  repulsed. 
His  troops  were  then  massed  on  the  south  side  behind  Mill 
Creek  and  a  mill-race  which  ran  parallel  to  it,  and  were  pro 
tected  by  stone  fences.  Colonel  Ely  had  a  brisk  artillery 
skirmish  with  Ewell's  advance,  and  then  fell  back  to  Win 
chester,  taking  post  at  the  junction  of  the  Front  Eoyal  and 
Strasburg  roads.  The  enemy  did  not  attempt  to  cross  the 
creek  that  night,  but  at  5  P.M.  they  advanced  and  captured 
a  picket-post  which  commanded  the  Strasburg  road,  but 
were  soon  driven  out. 

From  a  prisoner  captured  in  this  skirmish  Milroy  learned 
the  highly  important  intelligence  that  he  was  confronted  by 
Swell's  corps  and  that  Longstreet  was  rapidly  approaching. 

The  most  natural  course  under  the  circumstances  would 
have  been  for  him  to  retreat  at  once,  but  McEeynolds's  bri 
gade  had  just  arrived,  exhausted  by  their  forced  march, 
and  could  go  no  further,  without  some  hours'  rest.  To  move 
without  them  would  be  to  sacrifice  a  large  part  of  his  force. 
He  still  cherished  the  hope  that  Hooker's  army  would  follow 
Lee  up  closely  and  come  to  his  relief. 

Ewell  at  night  directed  Early's  division  to  attack  the 
works  on  the  north  and  west  of  the  town  at  daylight  the 
next  morning,  while  Johnson's  division  demonstrated  against 
the  east  and  southeast. 

Early  on  Sunday,  the  14th,  Milroy  sent  out  a  detachment 
to  see  if  the  enemy  had  established  themselves  on  the 
Pughtown  or  Komney  roads.  The  party  returned  about 
2  P.M.  and  reported  the  roads  clear,  but  soon  after  the  rebels 
came  in  great  force  from  that  direction,  so  that  Milroy's 
hopes  of  escaping  by  the  route  leading  to  the  northwest 
were  dissipated.  Immediately  west  of  Winchester,  and  par 
allel  with  Applebie  Eidge,  on  which  the  main  forts  were 
situated,  there  is  another  ridge  called  Flint  Eidge,  where 


92     CHANCELLORS VILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

rifle  pits  had  been  commenced  to  command  the  Pughtown 
and  Romney  roads.  These  were  held  by  one  regiment,  and 
part  of  another  under  Colonel  Keifer  of  the  One  Hundred 
and  Tenth  Ohio,  together  with  Battery  "  L  "  of  the  Fifth 
United  States  Artillery.  Early's  division  made  a  sudden 
attack  there,  preliminary  to  which  he  opened  fire  with  four 
batteries.  He  charged  into  these  rifle-pits  and  took  them,  but 
the  garrison  retreated  successfully,  under  cover  of  the  fire, 
from  the  main  works  above,  which  were  held  by  Elliot's  and 
McEeynolds's  brigades.  This  was  followed  by  an  artillery 
duel,  which  was  kept  up  until  8  P.M.  without  any  special 
results. 

Johnson's  division  at  daybreak  attacked  the  eastern  side 
of  the  town,  held  by  Colonel  Ely's  brigade,  but  was  gallantly 
met  and  repulsed  by  the  Eighth  Pennsylvania  and  Eighty- 
seventh  Pennsylvania.  These  two  regiments,  by  Milroy's 
order,  made  a  bold  charge  against  the  enemy  as  they  were 
retiring,  but  the  latter  were  so  suddenly  and  strongly  rein 
forced  that  the  two  regiments  were  glad  to  get  back  to  their 
shelter  in  the  fortified  suburbs.  They  were  followed  up 
however,  and  after  severe  fighting  Johnson  gained  possession 
of  part  of  the  town.  This  apparent  success  proved  of  no 
avail,  for  the  forts  above  shelled  him  out.  He  therefore  re 
tired  and  made  no  further  attempt  in  that  direction. 

Darkness  ended  the  struggle  for  the  day.  Johnson  then 
left  one  brigade  to  prevent  Milroy  from  escaping  toward 
the  east  and  went  off'  with  the  remainder  of  his  division  to 
form  across  the  Martinsburg  pike,  about  three  miles  north 
of  Winchester,  to  intercept  Milroy's  retreat  in  that  directiou. 

While  these  events  were  going  on  in  the  Valley,  Imbo- 
den's  cavalry  was  engaged  in  breaking  up  the  Baltimore  and 
Ohio  Railroad  near  Romney,  to  prevent  Milroy  from  receiv 
ing  any  reinforcements  from  the  west. 


THE  INVASION  OF  THE  NORTH.         93 

The  latter  now  found  himself  in  a  perilous  situation. 
His  cannon  ammunition  was  nearly  exhausted,  and  he  had 
but  one  day's  rations  for  his  men.  He  resolved  to  give  up 
all  further  attempts  to  defend  the  place,  to  abandon  his 
wagon  train  and  artillery,  and  to  force  his  way  through  the 
hostile  lines  that  night ;  taking  with  him  only  the  horses 
and  small  arms.  This  involved  his  leaving  also  his  sick  and 
wounded,  but  it  was  unavoidable.  He  ordered  all  the  guns 
spiked,  and  the  ammunition  thrown  into  the  cisterns. 

At  1  A.M.  on  the  15th,  he  moved  silently  out  through  a 
ravine  and  was  not  molested  until  he  struck  the  Martins- 
burg  road,  about  four  miles  from  the  town.  There  Elliot, 
who  was  in  the  advance  with  his  brigade,  met  a  rebel 
skirmish  line,  and  soon  ascertained  that  their  main  body 
were  formed,  partly  on  high  ground  in  a  woods  east  of  the 
road,  and  partly  in  an  open  field  east  of  and  adjoining  the 
woods.  The  enemy  were  in  effect  sheltered  by  a  stone  fence 
which  bordered  a  railroad  cut,  with  their  reserve  and 
artillery  principally  posted  on  elevated  ground  m  rear. 

The  only  thing  to  be  done  was  to  break  through  their 
lines  as  soon  as  possible.  It  was  now  about  3.30  A.M. 
Elliot,  whose  record  of  long,  careful,  and  brilliant  service  in 
the  regular  army  is  an  exemplary  one,  formed  line  of  battle 
with  his  three  regiments  and  fought  the  six  regiments  that 
held  the  road  for  about  an  hour  with  varied  success,  en 
countering  a  severe  artillery  fire  and  driving  back  their 
right  in  disorder  by  a  gallant  charge  of  the  One  Hundred 
and  Tenth  Ohio  and  One  Hundred  and  Twenty-second 
Ohio ;  but  unfortunately  their  left  held  firm,  in  spite  of  re 
peated  attacks  made  by  Colonel  Shawl  with  two  regiments, 
reinforced  by  two  more  and  by  part  of  Colonel  Ely's  bri 
gade.  Their  force  in  front,  too,  was  sustained  by  heavy  re 
serves  both  of  infantrv  and  ar!;illerv. 


94  CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

A  signal-gun  fired  at  Winchester  showed  that  the  enemy 
there  were  aware  of  the  flight  and  were  in  full  pursuit. 
The  main  road  being  blocked,  Milroy  determined  to  try 
another,  and  directed  the  troops  to  fall  back  a  short  distance 
and  turn  to  the  right.  Part  of  them  did  so,  but  the  greater 
number,  through  some  misunderstanding,  filed  to  the  left, 
and  took  the  road  to  Bath.  It  was  no  longer  possible  to 
reunite  the  two  columns  and  as  Milroy's  horse  was  shot 
under  him  about  this  time,  he  could  use  no  personal  exer 
tions  to  remedy  the  disorder.  A  portion  of  the  command 
who  were  not  pursued  reached  Harper's  Ferry  by  way  of 
Smithfield  late  in  the  afternoon.  Those  who  moved  out  on 
the  Bath  road  also  made  good  their  escape,  crossed  the 
Potomac  at  Hancock,  and  rallied  at  Bloody  Eun.  The 
greater  part  of  Colonel  Ely's  brigade,  and  Colonel  McEey- 
nolds's  brigade,  however,  were  captured.  Milroy  claims  to 
have  brought  off  5,000  men  of  the  garrison,  and  that  the 
2,000  paroled  by  Early,  consisted  principally  of  the  sick  and 
wounded.  Early  says  he  sent  108  officers  and  3,250  enlisted 
men  as  prisoners  to  Richmond.  Johnson,  who  intercepted 
the  retreat,  says  he  captured  2,300  prisoners,  175  horses,  and 
11  battle  flags. 

While  two-thirds  of  Swell's  corps  were  attacking  Win 
chester,  the  other  division  under  Eodes,  preceded  by  Jen 
kins's  brigade  of  cavalry,  pursued  McEeynolds's  wagon  train 
to  Martinsburg,  arriving  there  late  in  the  afternoon  of  the 
14th.  The  town  was  held  as  an  outlying  post  of  Harper's 
Ferry  by  a  small  detachment  of  all  arms  under  Colonel 
Tyler,  who  formed  his  men  in  line  of  battle  outside  of  the 
place  and  resisted  Eodes's  attack  until  darkness  set  in,  when 
his  infantry  escaped  to  Shepherdstown,  and  his  artillery  and 
cavalry  to  Williarnsport.  In  carrying  out  these  movements, 
however,  he  lost  five  guns  and  five  caissons.  He  passed  the 


THE  INVASION   OF   THE  NORTH.  95 

river  and  rejoined  the  main  body  at  Harper's  Ferry.  The 
latter  place  is  wholly  indefensible  against  an  enemy  holding 
the  hills  around  it.  It  is  like  fighting  at  the  bottom  of  a 
well.  General  Tyler  had  therefore  very  wisely  moved 
across  the  river  to  Maryland  Heights,  where  he  had  a 
strong  fortified  post.  From  that  commanding  eminence  he 
could  very  soon  shell  out  any  force  that  attempted  to  occupy 
the  town. 

The  Shenandoah  Valley  was  now  clear  of  Union  troops, 
and  soon  became  the  great  highway  of  the  invasion.  How 
ever  disastrous  Milroy's  defeat  may  be  considered  on  account 
of  the  losses  incurred,  it  was  not  without  its  compensation. 
The  detention  of  Swell's  force  there  gave  time  to  the  gen 
eral  Government  and  the  Governors  of  the  loyal  States  to 
raise  troops  and  organize  resistance,  and  it  awakened  the 
entire  North  to  the  necessity  of  immediate  action. 

Hooker,  having  learned  that  Ewell  had  passed  Sperryville, 
advanced  his  right  to  prevent  any  crossing  in  his  immediate 
vicinity,  and  confine  the  enemy  to  the  Valley  route.  He 
sent  the  Third  Corps  to  hold  the  fords  opposite  Culpeper, 
and  the  Fifth  Corps  to  guard  those  lower  down. 

On  the  13th  he  gave  up  his  position  opposite  Fredericks- 
burg,  and  started  north  toward  Washington,  giving  orders 
to  Sedgwick  to  recross  and  follow  on  to  Dumfries.  That 
night  the  First  Corps  reached  Bealeton,  and  the  Eleventh 
Catlett's  station.  Reynolds  was  placed  in  command  of  the 
left  wing  of  the  army  (the  First,  Third,  and  Eleventh  Corps) 
and  I  relieved  him  in  command  of  the  First  Corps.  The 
right  wing  (that  is  the  Second,  Fifth,  Twelfth  and  Sixth 
Corps)  was  accompanied  by  Hooker  in  person,  who  reached 
Dumfries  on  the  14th. 

As  soon  as  Hill  saw  Sedgwick  disappear  behind  the  Staf 
ford  hills,  he  broke  up  his  camp  and  started  for  Culpeper. 


96  CHANCELLORSVILLE   AND  GETTYSBURG. 

Some  changes  in  the  meantime  had  occurred  in  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  and  General  Hancock  was  assigned  to  the 
Second  Corps  instead  of  General  Couch,  who  had  been  sent 
to  organize  the  department  of  the  Susquehanna  at  Harris- 
burg,  Pennsylvania. 

The  teamsters  and  fugitives  from  Winchester,  making  for 
Chambersburg  in  all  haste,  told  the  inhabitants  of  the  towns 
through  which  they  passed  that  the  rebels  were  close  behind 
them,  and  created  the  wildest  excitement.  As  many  cases 
had  occurred  in  which  negroes  had  been  brutally  seized,  and 
sent  South  to  be  sold  as  slaves,  the  whole  colored  population 
took  to  the  woods  and  filled  up  the  roads  in  all  directions. 
The  appearance  of  Jenkins's  brigade,  who  crossed  at  "Wil- 
liamsport  on  the  14th  and  reached  Chambersburg  on  the 
15th,  added  to  the  alarm. 

Jenkins  was  at  the  head  of  2,000  cavalry,  and  soon  became 
a  terror  to  the  farmers  in  that  vicinity  by  his  heavy  exactions 
in  the  way  of  horses,  cattle,  grain,  etc.  It  must  be  confessed 
he  paid  for  what  he  took  in  Confederate  scrip,  but  as  this 
paper  money  was  not  worth  ten  cents  a  bushel,  there  was 
very  little  consolation  in  receiving  it.  His  followers  made 
it  a  legal  tender  at  the  stores  for  everything  they  wanted. 
Having  had  some  horses  stolen,  he  sternly  called  on  the  city 
authorities  to  pay  him  their  full  value.  They  did  so  with 
out  a  murmur — in  Confederate  money.  He  pocketed  it  with  a 
grim  smile,  evidently  appreciating  the  joke.  He  boasted 
greatly  of  his  humanity  and  his  respect  for  private  property, 
but  if  the  local  papers  are  to  be  believed,  it  must  be  chron 
icled  to  his  everlasting  disgrace  that  he  seized  a  great  many 
negroes,  who  were  tied  and  sent  South  as  slaves.  Black 
children  were  torn  from  their  mothers,  placed  in  front  of  his 
troops,  and  borne  off  to  Virginia  to  be  sold  for  the  benefit  of 
his  soldiers.  There  was  no  inhumanity  in  that,  he  thought, 


THE   INVASION   OF   THE   NORTH.  97 

for  it  was  one  of  the  sacred  rights  for  which  the  South  was 
contending. 

Prompt  measures  were  taken  by  all  the  Northern  States 
to  meet  the  emergency.  Mr.  Lincoln  called  on  the  Gov 
ernors  of  West  Virginia,  Maryland,  Pennsylvania,  and  New 
York  to  raise  120,000  men  for  temporary  service.  It  was 
easy  to  get  the  men,  but  difficult  to  arm  them,  as  nearly  all 
serviceable  muskets  were  already  in  possession  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  As  early  as  the  9th  two  new  departments 
had  been  created  for  Pennsylvania :  that  of  the  Monon- 
gahela,  with  headquarters  at  Pittsburg,  assigned  to  Major- 
General  W.  T.  H.  Brooks ;  and  that  of  the  Susquehanna,  with 
headquarters  at  Carlisle,  given  to  Major-General  Darius  N. 
Couch. 

On  the  15th  Ewell  reached  Williamsport  with  a  force 
estimated  at  twelve  thousand  men  and  sixteen  guns. 

Before  Couch  could  reach  Carlisle  it  was  already  occu 
pied  by  Jenkins's  cavalry,  and  the  terrified  farmers  of  that 
section  of  country  were  fleeing  in  crowds  across  the  Susque 
hanna,  driving  their  horses  and  cattle  before  them. 
VI.— 5 


CHAPTEE  H. 

HOOKER'S  PLANS— LONGSTREET  OCCUPIES  THE  GAPS 
IN  THE  BLUE  RIDGE— ALARM  IN  RICHMOND— HOOKER 
SUPERSEDED  BY  MEADE. 

A  SHOWER  of  telegrams  came  to  Hooker,  notifying  him.  of 
these  untoward  events,  and  demanding  protection ;  but  he 
simply  moved  one  step  toward  the  enemy.  On  the  15th  he 
had  three  corps — the  First,  Sixth,  and  Eleventh — grouped 
around  Centreville,  with  the  Third  Corps  at  Manassas,  and 
the  Second,  Fifth,  and  Twelfth  Corps  in  reserve  at  Fairfax 
Court  House.  The  left  flank  of  the  army  was  guarded  by 
Pleasonton's  cavalry,  posted  at  Warrenton.  Hooker  was  not 
to  be  drawn  away  from  the  defence  at  Washington  by  any 
clamorous  appeal  for  his  services  elsewhere  ;  his  plan  being 
to  move  parallel  to  Lee's  line  of  advance  and  strike  his 
communications  with  Richmond  at  the  first  favorable  op 
portunity.  He  obtained  some  reinforcements  at  this  time, 
Stannard's  Second  Vermont  brigade  being  assigned  to  my 
division  of  the  First  Corps,  and  Stahl's  cavalry  division, 
about  six  thousand  strong,  being  directed  to  report  to  Gen 
eral  Pleasonton  for  duty.  t 

As  Harrisburg  lay  directly  in  the  track  of  the  invading 
army,  Governor  Curtin  made  strenuous  efforts  to  collect  a 
force  there.  He  called  upon  all  able-bodied  citizens  to 
enroll  themselves,  and  complained  that  Philadelphia  failed 


HOOKER'S  PLANS.  99 

to  respond.  New  York  acted  promptly,  and  on  the  15th  two 
brigades  arrived  in  Philadelphia  on  their  way  to  the  front.  ' 

On  the  same  day  Longstreet,  having  been  relieved  by  Hill, 
left  Culpeper  with  his  corps  and  marched  directly  across 
the  country  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge  to  occupy  Ashby's 
and  Snicker's  Gaps.  Stuart's  cavalry  were  to  guard  his 
right  flank,  but  did  not  leave  until  the  next  day.  The  ob 
ject  of  Longstreet's  movement  was  to  tempt  Hooker  to 
abandon  his  strong  position  in  front  of  Washington  and 
march  against  the  Gaps,  in  which  case  it  was  hoped  some 
opportunity  might  occur  by  which  the  rebels  could  either 
crush  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  the  open  country  or 
possibly  outmanoeuvre  it,  so  as  to  intervene  between  it  and 
Washington ;  but  Hooker  remained  stationary. 

Bodes's  division  of  Swell's  corps  reached  Williarnsport  and 
remained  there  during  the  16th,  17th,  and  18th,  to  support 
Jenkins,  and  receive,  and  transmit  to  the  rear,  the  cattle, 
horses,  negroes,  and  provisions,  taken  by  him. 

The  commotion  created  by  the  approach  of  the  invader 
was  not  all  one-sided.  General  Dix,  who  commanded  at 
Fortress  Monroe,  received  orders  to  advance  on  Richmond, 
which  was  weakly  defended  at  this  time.  As  through  their 
manifold  offences  in  the  way  of  starving  our  prisoners,  etc  , 
the  rebel  President  and  his  cabinet  were  afraid  of  reprisals, 
there  was  great  dismay  at  the  weakness  of  the  garrison 
there,  and  bitter  denunciations  of  Lee  for  leaving  so  small 
a  force  behind.  The  Union  troops  for  this  counter-inva 
sion  were  landed  at  Yorktown  and  sent  on  to  the  White 
House.  General  Getty,  in  command  of  one  column  of  about 
seven  thousand  men,  moved  on  the  13th  as  far  as  Hanover 
Junction  to  destroy  the  bridge  over  the  North  and  South 
Anna,  and  as  much  of  the  railroad  as  possible,  in  order  to 
make  a  break  in  Lee's  communications.  At  the  same  time 


100          CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND   GETTYSBURG. 

General  Keys,  with  another  column  of  about  five  thousand 
men,  moved  from  the  White  House  to  secure  Bottom's 
Bridge  on  the  Chickahominy,  and  thus  leave  a  clear  road 
for  Getty's  column  to  advance  on  the  city.  The  Davis  Gov 
ernment,  however,  called  out  the  militia  and  concentrated 
enough  men  for  defence  by  weakening  the  garrisons  in 
South  Carolina  and  elsewhere;  but  there  is  no  doubt  the 
fright  at  one  time  was  so  serious  that  it  was  in  contempla 
tion  to  recall  Lee's  forces ;  especially  on  the  15th  of  June, 
when  it  was  learned  that  General  Keys's  column  was  at  New 
Kent  Court  House  within  fifteen  miles  of  the  city. 

On  the  16th  Stuart's  cavalry  left  the  Bappahannock — with 
the  exception  of  the  Fifteenth  Virginia,  which  remained 
with  Hill — and  bivouacked  at  Salem  with  Fitz  Lee's  brigade 
at  Piedmont.  Their  orders  were  to  keep  along  the  eastern 
base  of  the  Blue  Eidge,  and  guard  the  front  of  Longstreet's 
corps  in  the  Gaps. 

Our  own  cavalry  were  concentrated  at  Warrenton  and  Cat- 
lett's. 

On  the  17th  Fitz  Lee's  brigade  was  sent  forward  from 
Piedmont  to  Aldie,  via  Middleburg,  to  anticipate  our  troops 
in  holding  the  Gap  there  ;  it  being  considered  important  to 
occupy  the  Bull  Eun  range  of  mountains  as  a  screen  for 
Lee's  further  operations.  Fitz  Lee's  brigade  was  supported 
by  that  of  Eobertson  which  was  moved  to  Eectortown, 
where  it  was  also  available  as  a  reserve  to  W.  H.  F.  Lee's 
brigade  which  had  gone  forward  to  occupy  Thoroughfare 
Gap.  No  opposition  was  anticipated  in  the  latter  place, 
Pleasonton  having  moved  to  Centreville  with  his  main 
body.  Stuart  made  his  headquarters  at  Middleburg  on 
the  17th. 

Fitz  Lee  halted  near  Dover  to  close  up  his  command,  and 
sent  his  pickets  on  to  Aldie  Gap.  Pleasonton,  who  was  scout- 


HOOKER'S  PLANS.  101 

ing  in  the  vicinity,  had  no  orders  to  go  through  the  pass,  but 
felt  prompted  to  do  so  by  one  of  those  presentiments  which 
rarely  deceive.  He  pushed  on,  therefore,  with  Gregg's  divi 
sion  until  about  2.30  P.M.,  when  he  came  upon  the  rebel 
pickets,  who  fell  back  on  the  main  body.  The  latter  had 
made  a  march  of  forty  miles  to  reach  the  Gap,  and  Fitz 
Lee  chose  a  strong  position  on  a  hill  directly  west  of  Aldie, 
in  which  to  fight  a  defensive  battle.  His  line  covered  the 
road  to  Snicker's  Gap,  but  could  be  turned  by  the  road  to 
Middleburg  and  Ashby's  Gap. 

A  sanguinary  contest  ensued,  which,  including  the  pursuit, 
lasted  until  9  P.M.  The  rebel  front  was  strengthened  by  a 
ditch  and  a  line  of  hay-stacks.  After  fighting  for  three 
hours  the  battle  was  finally  decided  by  a  gallant  charge  of 
the  First  Maine  Cavalry,  who,  after  our  line  had  been  broken 
and  driven  back,  were  led  by  Kilpatrick  in  person,  against  a 
regiment  of  mounted  infantry  on  the  Ashby's  Gap  road, 
capturing  four  guns.  The  Harris  Light  Cavalry  had  been 
in  disfavor  for  having  failed  in  an  attack  at  Brandy  Station, 
but  on  the  present  occasion  they  redeemed  themselves,  made 
several  brilliant  charges,  and  greatly  contributed  to  the  suc 
cess  of  the  day. 

The  rebels  claim  to  have  taken  134  prisoners,  and  some 
flags  in  this  affair,  and  state  that  they  only  fell  back  to 
Middleburg  in  obedience  to  Stuart's  orders.  Ascertaining 
that  Colonel  Duffie  was  advancing  on  that  place  with  his  di 
vision,  Stuart  thought,  by  concentrating  his  entire  force 
there,  he  could  overwhelm  him.  This  may  account  for  the 
retreat,  but  it  is  very  certain  that  the  loss  of  the  pass  at  Aldie 
was  a  serious  blow  to  the  rebel  cause.  This,  supplemented 
by  Colonel  Duffle's  operations,  which  will  be  described  here 
after,  gave  Hooker  possession  of  Loudon  County,  and  threw 
the  invading  column  far  to  the  west.  If  the  enemy  had  sue- 


102          CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

ceeded  in  posting  forces  in  the  gaps  of  the  Bull  Kun  range 
of  mountains,  and  in  occupying  the  wooded  country  between 
Thoroughfare  Gap  and  Leesburg,  they  would  not  only  have 
hidden  all  their  own  movements  from  view,  but  would  have 
had  command  of  the  Potomac  from  Harper's  Ferry  to  within 
thirty  miles  of  Washington,  so  that  they  could  have  oper 
ated  on  either  side  of  the  river. 

While  Gregg's  division  were  thus  engaged,  Colonel  Duf- 
fie's  division  started  from  Centre ville  for  Middleburg,  by 
way  of  Thoroughfare  Gap,  but  finding  the  enemy  (W.  H.  F. 
Lee's  brigade)  were  already  in  the  Gap,  they  went  around 
through  Hopewell  Gap,  and  kept  on  to  Middleburg,  which 
Duffle  reached  about  9.30  A.M.  He  found  Stuart's  rear  guard 
or  escort  there,  and  drove  them  out.  Stuart  fell  back  to 
Sector's  Cross  Eoads,  and  sent  word  to  all  his  forces  to  con 
centrate  against  Duffie.  Duffie  barricaded  the  streets  of  the 
town  and  prepared  to  hold  it  until  reinforcements  could 
reach  him  from  Aldie,  not  being  aware  that  there  was  any 
impediment  in  that  direction.  At  7  P.M.  the  different  rebel 
brigades  advanced  011  him  from  the  direction  of  Aldie, 
Union,  and  Upperville.  By  sheltering  his  men  behind  stone 
walls  and  barricades,  he  repelled  several  assaults,  but  at 
last  was  driven  out,  and  compelled  to  retreat  by  the  road 
upon  which  he  had  advanced  in  the  morning,  and  which  was 
the  only  one  open  to  him.  He  fell  back  until  he  crossed 
Little  River,  picketed  the  stream  and  halted  there  to  get 
some  rest.  This  gave  time  to  the  enemy  to  surround  him, 
and  by  half  past  one  the  next  morning  all  the  roads  in  the 
neighborhood  were  full  of  cavalry ;  an  entire  brigade  beiiig 
formed  on  that  which  led  to  Aldie.  He  tried  to  force  his 
way  through  the  latter,  but  was  received  with  heavy  volleys 
on  both  flanks,  and  with  loud  calls  to  surrender.  He  di 
rected  Captain  Bixby,  who  commanded  his  advance,  to 


HOOKER'S  PLANS.  103 

charge  through  everything  in  front  of  him,  and  Bixby 
cleared  the  way  for  the  main  body,  which  at  last  gained  the 
junction  of  the  Aldie  road  with  that  which  leads  to  White 
Plains.  He  then  retreated  on  the  latter,  with  his  men  all 
intermixed  with  those  of  the  enemy  and  fighting  every  step 
of  the  way.  He  finally  disengaged  his  force  from  this 
in$lee  and  made  his  way  through  Hopewell  Gap  back  to 
Centre  ville. 

In  this  affair  at  Middleburg,  Stuart  states  that  he  was  un 
able  with  his  entire  force  to  drive  the  First  Rhode  Island 
regiment  from  a  position  it  had  chosen,  and  speaks  with  ad 
miration  of  the  gallantry  it  displayed. 

On  the  18th,  Stuart  took  post  outside  of  that  town  with 
Robertson  and  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  brigade.  Fitz  Lee's  brigade 
was  on  his  left  at  Union,  and  Jones's  brigade  was  ordered  up 
as  a  reserve. 

Pleasonton  moved  forward  with  all  his  available  force  and 
occupied  Middleburg  and  Philemont  on  the  road  to  Snick 
er's  Gap  ;  releasing  some  of  Duffie's  men  who  had  been  cap 
tured  the  day  before.  Gregg's  division  encountered  the 
enemy  a  short  distance  beyond  Middleburg  and  drove  them 
five  miles  in  the  direction  of  Ashby's  Gap.  There  was  no 
regular  line  formation,  but  the  Indian  mode  of  fighting  was 
adopted  on  both  sides,  by  taking  advantage  of  every  stone, 
fence,  bush,  or  hollow,  to  shelter  the  men.  Before  the 
action  was  over  Kilpatrick's  command  came  up  and  took  a 
prominent  part. 

Buford's  division,  which  had  advanced  beyond  Philemont 
on  the  Snicker's  Gap  road,  also  became  warmly  engaged. 
They  turned  the  left  flank  of  the  rebels  and  pressed  on  suc 
cessfully,  but  the  squadron  left  to  guard  the  bridge  over 
Goose  Creek  was  overpowered  by  numbers  and  the  bridge 
was  burned.  Part  of  Pleasonton's  force  made  a  reconnois- 


104    CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

sance  toward  WaiTenton  and  engaged  Hampton's  brigade 
there. 

On  the  19th  Pleasonton  held  the  positions  he  had  gained 
and  sent  back  for  an  infantry  support. 

As  there  were  indications  that  the  whole  of  Stuart's  cav 
alry  would  be  thrown  on  Gregg's  division  at  Upperville, 
Pleasonton  went  forward  with  his  entire  force  and  a  brigade 
of  infantry  to  support  it.  After  a  series  of  brilliant  engage 
ments  he  drove  Stuart  steadily  back  into  Ashby's  Gap, 
where  he  took  refuge  behind  Longstreet's  Corps,  a  portion 
of  which  came  up.  Pleasonton  then  returned  to  Upperville 
and  next  day  to  Aldie.  The  object  of  these  movements — to 
gain  possession  of  Loudon  County — having  been  attained, 
Hooker  was  wary,  and  did  not  propose  to  be  lured  away 
from  his  strong  position,  to  take  part  in  cavalry  battles  at  a 
distance  without  a  definite  object.  He  still  found  it  diffi 
cult  to  realize  that  Lee  would  still  further  lengthen  out  his 
long  line  from  Eichmond,  and  endanger  his  communica 
tions,  by  invading  Pennsylvania ;  and  he  therefore  waited 
for  further  developments.  Lee,  however,  impelled  by 
public  opinion  behind  him,  which  it  was  hardly  safe  to 
brave,  still  went  forward,  and  directed  Ewell  to  cross 
the  Potomac  with  his  main  body  and  Longstreet  to  fall 
back  behind  the  Shenandoah  to  act  in  conjunction  with 
Hill,  "who  had  relieved  Ewell  at  Winchester  on  the  17th, 
against  any  attempt  to  strike  the  rear  of  his  long  column. 
Like  Achilles  he  felt  that  he  was  only  vulnerable  in  his 
heel. 

Several  small  skirmishes  occurred  about  this  time  be-* 
tween  detachments  of  General  Schenck's  command,  which 
picketed  the  north  bank  of  the  Potomac,  and  bands  of  rebel 
partisans.  The  former  were  surprised  and  captured  in  two 
or  three  instances.  In  one  of  these  expeditions  a  locomotive 


HOOKER'S  PLANS.  105 

and  twenty-three  cars  were  disabled  on  the  Baltimore  and 
Ohio  Eailroad.  Imboden,  too,  who  occupied  Cumberland  on 
the  17th,  in  order  to  favor  the  general  plan  of  invasion,  tore 
up  some  miles  of  the  track  west  of  that  town,  with  a  view 
to  prevent  any  reinforcements  coming  from  that  direction. 

It  would  have  been  much  better  for  the  interests  of  the 
Southern  Confederacy  if  Lee,  instead  of  making  a  downright 
invasion  had  been  content  to  remain  in  the  Valley  and 
threaten  Hooker  with  two  corps,  while  he  used  the  third  to 
procure  unlimited  supplies  in  Pennsylvania,  and  to  sever  all 
connection  between  the  East  and  the  West,  by  breaking  up 
the  railroads  and  cutting  the  telegraph  wires.  Such  a  re 
sult,  however,  would  hardly  have  been  sufficient  to  meet  the 
expectations  of  the  Southern  people,  who  were  bent  upon 
nothing  else  than  the  entire  subjugation  of  the  North  and 
the  occupation  of  our  principal  cities. 

Pleasonton's  operations  having  cleared  the  way,  Hooker 
moved  forward  promptly  on  the  18th  to  occupy  the  gaps. 
The  Twelfth  Corps  were  sent  to  Leesburg,  the  Fifth  to 
Aldie,  and  the  Second  to  Thoroughfare  Gap.  The  other 
corps  formed  a  second  line  in  reserve.  This  covered  Wash 
ington  and  gave  Hooker  an  excellent  base  of  operations. 

In  answer  to  his  demand  for  reinforcements,  Crawford's 
division  of  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  and  Abercrombie's  divi 
sion  were  sent  to  him,  but  as  the  latter  was  just  going 
out  of  service  they  were  of  no  use.  Hooker  contended  that 
his  army  constituted  the  proper  defence  of  Washington  and 
that  it  was  not  necessary  to  keep  a  large  force  inactive 
there,  who  could  be  of  much  more  service  at  the  front. 
The  authorities  were  timid,  however,  did  not  see  the  force 
of  this  reasoning,  and  therefore  refused  to  place  Schenck's 
and  Heintzelman's  commands  under  his  orders. 

The  enemy  made  a  feeble  attempt  about  this  time  to 
5* 


106    CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

occupy  Harper's  Ferry,  but  were  promptly  shelled  out  by 
our  batteries  on  Maryland  Heights. 

Lee  having  failed,  on  account  of  the  discomfiture  of  his 
cavalry,  in  crossing  the  Potomac  at  Edwards's  Ferry,  was 
forced  either  to  remain  where  he  was  or  go  forward.  Im 
pelled  by  public  opinion  he  kept  on  his  way  up  the  Cum 
berland  Valley.  Hooker  being  very  desirous  of  keeping  the 
invasion  west  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  asked  Heintzelman  to  co 
operate  with  him  by  sending  the  2,000  men  which  seemed  to 
be  of  no  service  at  Poolesville  to  the  passes  of  South  Moun 
tain,  which  is  an  extension  of  the  same  range  ;  but  Heintzel 
man  said  those  passes  were  outside  of  his  jurisdiction,  and 
the  men  were  needed  in  Poolesville.  Hooker  replied  some 
what  angrily  that  he  would  try  and  do  without  the  men. 
The  two  generals  had  quarrelled,  and  there  was  not  the  best 
feeling  between  them. 

All  of  Swell's  corps  were  across  the  river  on  the  22d,  and 
Jenkins's  cavalry  pushed  on  to  Chambersburg.  He  was  or 
dered  to  remain  there  until  reinforced,  but  failed  to  do  so, 
as  Union  troops  were  approaching  from  the  direction  of  Car 
lisle. 

Longstreet  and  Hill  were  left  behind  to  prevent  Hooker 
from  striking  the  rear  of  this  long  column.  Hooker  still  re 
mained  quiescent,  engaged  in  trying  to  obtain  15,000  men  as 
reinforcements.  He  was  but  partially  successful,  for  as  soon 
as  the  New  York  regiments  reached  Baltimore,  Lockwood's 
brigade  of  Maryland  troops,  about  three  thousand,  was  or 
dered  to  join  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  was  assigned  to 
the  Twelfth  Corps. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  at  this  time  was  posted  as  fol 
lows:  the  Twelfth  Corps  at  Leesburg,  supported  by  the 
Eleventh  on  Goose  Creek,  between  Leesburg  and  Aldie ;  the 
Fifth  Corps  near  Aldie,  and  the  Second  at  the  next  pass 


HOOKER'S  PLANS.  107 

below,  both  supported  by  the  Third  Corps  at  Gum  Springs. 
The  First  Corps  was  behind  the  Eleventh  and  Twelfth  Corps, 
near  Guilford,  on  the  Loudon  and  Hampshire  Railroad. 
Our  cavalry,  which  had  left  Aldie,  covered  the  approaches  to 
Leesburg.  On  the  23d  they  had  a  sharp  engagement  at 
Dover,  on  the  road  from  Aldie  to  Leesburg,  with  part  of 
Stuart's  force,  who  beat  up  their  quarters,  but  they  drove  off 
their  assailants  without  much  difficulty. 

Lee  now,  with  a  prudent  regard  to  a  possible  defeat,  re 
quested  the  authorities  at  Eichmond  to  have  a  reserve  army 
under  Beauregard  assemble  at  Culpeper,  a  request  which 
was  looked  upon  by  Davis  as  one  quite  impossible  to  carry 
out,  owing  to  the  scarcity  of  troops,  and  the  necessity  of 
reinforcing  Johnson  in  the  West  and  Beauregard  in  the 
South. 

Two  of  Swell's  divisions,  those  of  Eodes  and  Johnson, 
reached  the  frightened  town  of  Chambersburg  on  the  23d. 
The  other,  under  Early,  took  the  road  to  York,  via  Gettys 
burg,  and  halted  on  that  day  at  Waynesborough. 

By  this  time  twenty  regiments  of  militia  were  on  their 
way  from  New  York  to  Baltimore  and  Harrisburg. 

Longstreet  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Williamsport,  and  Hill 
at  Shepherdstown,  on  the  24th.  Their  columns  united  at 
Hagerstown  the  next  day.  Thus  supported,  Ewell's  main 
body  resumed  its  march  to  Carlisle,  which  it  occupied  on 
the  27th  ;  gathering  large  supplies  there  and  along  the  road 
by  means  of  foraging  parties  sent  out  to  depredate  on  the 
farmers.  As  soon  as  they  reached  the  town,  Jenkins's  bri 
gade  left  for  Harrisburg. 

Hooker  having  now  satisfied  himself  that  the  Capital  was 
safe  from  a  coup-de-main,  and  that  the  main  body  of  the 
rebels  were  still  marching  up  the  Cumberland  Valley,  de 
termined  to  move  in  a  parallel  line  on  the  east  side  of  South 


108          CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

Mountain,  where  he  could  occupy  the  gaps  at  once,  in  case 
the  enemy  turned  east,  toward  Washington  and  Baltimore. 
To  carry  out  this  design  his  army  began  to  cross  the  Poto 
mac  at  Edwards's  Ferry  on  the  25th,  and  at  night  Keynolds's 
corps  was  in  front  and  Sickles's  corps  in  rear  of  Middletown, 
in  readiness  to  hold  either  Crampton's  or  Turner's  Gap. 
Howard's  corps  was  thrown  forward  to  Boonsborough. 

On  the  26th  Slocum's  corps  was  sent  to  Harper's  Ferry  to 
act  in  conjunction  with  the  garrison  there — supposed  to  be 
10,000  strong — against  the  enemy's  line  of  communication 
with  Kichrnond.  The  Second,  Fifth,  and  Sixth  Corps  were 
advanced  to  Frederick,  Md.,  as  a  support  to  the  First,  Third, 
and  Eleventh  Corps.  Gregg's  cavalry  division  remained  be 
hind  to  cover  the  crossing,  which  was  all  completed  the  next 
day,  after  which  they  too  marched  to  Frederick. 

On  the  25th,  Early,  leaving  his  division  at  Greenwood, 
went  to  Chambersburg  to  consult  Ewell,  who  gave  him 
definite  orders  to  occupy  York,  break  up  the  Central  Kail- 
road,  burn  the  bridge  over  the  Susquehanna  at  Wrightsville, 
and  afterward  rejoin  the  main  body  at  Carlisle. 

It  seems  strange  that  Lee  should  suppose  that  the  Union 
army  would  continue  inactive  all  this  time,  south  of  Wash 
ington,  where  it  was  only  confronted  by  Stuart's  cavalry, 
and  it  is  remarkable  to  find  him  so  totally  in  the  dark  with 
regard  to  Hooker's  movements.  It  lias  been  extensively  as 
sumed  by  rebel  writers  that  this  ignorance  was  caused  by 
the  injudicious  raid  made  by  Stuart,  who  thought  it  would 
be  a  great  benefit  to  the  Confederate  cause  if  he  could  ride 
entirely  around  the  Union  lines  and  rejoin  Lee's  advance  at, 
York.  He  had  made  several  of  these  circuits  during  his 
military  career,  and  had  gained  important  advantages  from 
them  in  the  way  of  breaking  up  communications,  capturing 
despatches,  etc.  It  is  thought  that  he  hoped  by  threaten- 


The  Country  from  the  Potomac  to  Harrisbuvg, 


110    CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

ing  Hooker's  rear  to  detain  him  and  delay  his  crossing  the 
river,  and  thus  give  time  to  Lee  to  capture  Harrisburg,  and 
perhaps  Philadelphia.  His  raid  on  this  occasion  was  un 
doubtedly  a  very  great  mistake.  Its  results  were  insignifi 
cant,  and  when,  after  running  the  greatest  risk  of  being  cut 
off,  he  did  rejoin  the  main  body,  his  men  were  exhausted, 
his  horses  broken  down,  and  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  was 
nearly  over.  As  cavalry  are  the  eyes  of  an  army,  it  has  been 
said  that  Stuart's  absence  on  this  occasion  prevented  Lee 
from  ascertaining  the  movements  and  position  of  Hooker's 
army.  Stuart  has  been  loudly  blamed  by  the  rebel 
chroniclers  for  leaving  the  main  body,  but  this  is  unjust, 
for  Lee  not  only  knew  of  the  movement,  but  approved  it. 
Besides,  Stuart  left  Robertson's  and  Jones's  brigades  behind, 
with  orders  to  follow  up  the  rear  of  the  Union  Army  until  it 
crossed  and  then  to  rejoin  the  main  body.  In  the  mean 
time  they  were  to  hold  the  gaps  in  the  Blue  Ridge,  for  fear 
Hooker  might  send  a  force  to  occupy  them.  These  two 
brigades,  with  Imboden's  brigade,  and  White's  battalion, 
made  quite  a  large  cavalry  force :  Imboden,  however,  was 
also  detached  to  break  up  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad 
to  prevent  forces  from  the  West  from  taking  Lee  in  rear  ; 
all  of  which  goes  to  show  how  sensitive  the  Confederate 
commander  was  in  regard  to  any  danger  threatening  his 
communications  with  Richmond. 

At  1  A.M  on  the  25th,  Stuart  started  on  his  expedition  and 
advanced  to  Haymarket,  where  he  unexpectedly  came  upon 
Hancock's  corps,  which  had  left  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and  was 
on  its  way  to  Gum  Springs.  He  opened  fire  against  them' 
but  was  soon  driven  off.  He  then  returned  to  Buckland  and 
Gainesville  ;  for  to  keep  on,  in  presence  of  our  troops,  would 
have  frustrated  the  object  of  his  expedition  by  indicating  its 
purpose. 


HOOKER'S  PLANS.  Ill 

This  was  the  day  in  which  Longstreet  and  Hill  united 
their  columns  at  Hagerstown.  Some  Union  spies  who 
counted  the  rebel  forces  as  they  passed  through  the  town 
made  their  number  to  be  91,000  infantry,  280  guns  and 
1,100  cavalry.  This  statement,  though  much  exaggerated, 
gained  great  credence  at  the  time,  and  added  to  the  excite 
ment  among  the  loyal  people  throughout  the  Northern 
States,  while  the  copperhead  element  were  proportionally 
active  and  jubilant. 

On  the  26th,  General  French  assumed  command  of  the 
garrison  at  Harper's  Ferry,  then  posted  at  Maryland 
Heights. 

On  the  same  day  the  Eichmond  Government  were  much 
alarmed  by  the  unexpected  appearance  of  Colonel  Spear's 
Eleventh  Pennsylvania  cavalry  within  eleven  miles  of  the 
city.  Spear  had  made  quite  a  successful  and  very  destruc 
tive  raid  on  the  railroads  and  other  lines  of  communication. 
He  made,  too,  a  very  important  capture  by  bringing  in  Gene 
ral  W.  H.  F.  Lee,  who  was  wounded  at  the  battle  of  Brandy 
Station,  and  who  was  a  son  of  General  Kobert  E.  Lee.  The 
Davis  Government  had  determined  to  hang  one  of  our 
captains  who  was  a  prisoner  in  Libby,  and  the  fact  that  a  son 
of  General  Robert  E.  Lee  was  in  our  power  prevented  them 
from  carrying  out  their  intention  for  fear  he  might  be  hung 
by  way  of  retaliation. 

Early's  division  of  Swell's  corps,  stopped  at  Gettysburg 
on  its  way  to  York.  The  other  two  divisions  kept  on  to 
ward  Carlisle. 

These  movements  at  once  caused  Governor  Curtin  of 
Pennsylvania  to  call  out  60,000  men  for  the  defence  of  the 
State.  They  were  styled  the  emergency  militia.  As  there 
was  little  else  than  shot-guns  for  them,  these  hasty  gather 
ings  did  not  promise  to  be  very  effective. 


112  CHANCELLORS VILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

The  Governor  still  complained  of  a  lack  of  zeal  in  Phila 
delphia.  The  people  there,  said  "  Isn't  this  awful ! "  but 
very  few  volunteered.  They  soon  awoke  from  their  apathy, 
however,  and  took  prompt  measures  to  defend  the  city. 

On  the  27th  the  commands  of  Longstreet  and  Hill 
reached  Chambersburg,  and  Swell's  two  divisions  occupied 
Carlisle,  while  Jenkins  pushed  on  to  Kingston,  within 
thirteen  miles  of  Harrisburg.  At  the  same  time  Early  wras 
engaged  in  wreaking  destruction  upon  the  Northern  Cen 
tral  Railroad,  and  by  night  he  entered  York.  About  the 
only  opposition  he  encountered  came  from  a  militia  regi 
ment  at  Gettysburg,  but  this  was  soon  driven  away. 

There  was  wild  commotion  throughout  the  North,  and 
people  began  to  feel  that  the  boast  of  the  Georgia  Senator 
Toombs,  that  he  would  call  the  roll  of  his  slaves  at  the  foot 
of  Bunker  Hill  Monument,  might  soon  be  realized.  The 
enemy  seemed  very  near  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  far 
away. 

On  the  same  day  Stuart  succeeded  with  great  difficulty  in 
crossing  the  Potomac  in  the  vicinity  of  Drainsville.  He 
found  our  troops  were  now  all  north  of  the  river,  so  that  one 
object  of  his  expedition— to  detain  them  on  the  south  side- 
had  failed. 

On  the  28th  he  resumed  his  march,  and  as  he  passed  close 
to  Washington  and  Baltimore,  he  created  considerable  ex 
citement  in  those  cities.  At  Eockville  he  came  upon  a 
large  train  full  of  supplies,  on  its  way  to  Frederick,  Mary 
land,  and  captured  it  with  its  slender  escort,  after  which  he 
kept  on  in  a  northerly  direction  through  Brookeville  and* 
Cookesville,  travelling  all  night. 

On  this  day  the  Adjutant-General  at  Richmond  tele 
graphed  for  troops  to  be  sent  there  at  once  from  the  Caro- 
linas  and  elsewhere,  for  he  estimated  the  Union  forces  at 


HOOKER'S  PLANS.  113 

the  White  House  at  thirty  thousand  men,  and  considered 
the  capital  to  be  in  great  danger.  Neither  Davis  nor  his 
cabinet  had  the  slightest  desire  to  have  any  successes  Lee 
might  obtain  at  the  North  supplemented  by  their  own  exe 
cution  at  the  South,  a  result  they  felt  was  not  wholly  im 
probable,  in  the  excited  state  of  public  feeling  at  that  time, 
if  the  city  should  be  taken. 

Lee,  ignorant  that  Hooker  was  following  him  up,  con 
tinued  his  aggressive  advance.  Early  took  prompt  meas 
ures  to  seize  the  bridge  over  the  Susquehanna  at  Wrights- 
ville.  If  successful,  he  intended  to  cross  over  and  amuse 
himself  by  destroying  all  direct  connection  between  Phila 
delphia  and  the  West,  by  railroad  and  telegraph.  This 
done,  he  proposed  to  march  along  the  north  side  of  the 
river,  capture  Harrisburg  and  rejoin  Ewell  at  Carlisle.  As 
Gordon's  brigade  approached  the  bridge,  after  driving  away 
some  militia,  they  found  it  in  flames,  the  Union  commander 
at  Columbia,  Colonel  Frick,  having  given  orders  for  its 
destruction.  Early  gained  some  compensation  for  his  fail 
ure  in  this  respect  by  levying  a  contribution  on  York  of  one- 
hundred  thousand  dollars  in  cash ;  two  hundred  barrels  of 
flour ;  thirty  thousand  bushels  of  corn  ;  one  thousand  pairs 
of  shoes,  etc. 

The  Union  army  still  remained  in  Frederick,  with  the 
left  wing  (three  corps)  under  Eeynolds  thrown  out  toward 
the  enemy,  the  Eleventh  Corps  under  Howard  at  Boons- 
borough,  the  First  Corps  under  my  command  at  Middletown, 
supported  by  the  Third  Corps  under  Birney,  two  or  three 
miles  in  rear,  with  Buford's  division  of  cavalry  holding  the 
passes  of  South  Mountain,  the  remainder  of  the  cavalry 
being  at  Frederick. 

Hooker  thought  it  useless  to  keep  a  garrison  of  10,000 
men  in  a  passive  attitude  at  Harper's  Ferry.  I  think  he 


114    CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

was  quite  right,  for  the  war  could  not  be  decided  by  the 
possession  of  military  posts  or  even  of  cities,  for  hostilities 
would  never  cease  until  one  army  or  the  other  was  de 
stroyed.  He  therefore  applied  to  Washington  for  permis 
sion  to  add  this  force  to  that  of  Slocum,  in  order  that  the 
two  might  act  directly  against  Lee's  communications  by 
following  up  his  rear  while  preserving  their  own  line  of  re 
treat.  Slocum  had  been  already  ordered  there,  for  this 
purpose,  but  Halleck  would  not  consent  that  the  garrison 
of  Harper's  Ferry  should  be  withdrawn  under  any  circum 
stances,  and  positively  refused  Hooker's  request.  Hooker 
then  considering  himself  thwarted  in  all  his  plans  by  the 
authorities  at  Washington,  offered  his  resignation.  It  was 
promptly  accepted,  and  Major-General  George  G.  Meade,  the 
late  commander  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  was  assigned  to  the 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  He  was  a  general 
of  fine  intellect,  of  great  personal  bravery,  and  had  had  a 
good  deal  of  experience  in  the  war  in  handling  troops,  but 
had  never  achieved  any  brilliant  success,  or  met  with  any 
serious  reverse. 

Upon  ascertaining  that  the  enemy  were  at  York  and  Car 
lisle,  Hooker  had  determined  to  throw  out  his  different 
corps  in  a  fan  shape  toward  the  Susquehanna,  and  advance 
in  that  direction  with  three  corps  on  the  left  to  defend  that 
flank,  in  case  Longstreet  and  Hill  should  turn  East,  instead 
of  keeping  on  toward  the  North.  At  the  same  time  it  was 
his  intention  to  have  Slocum  follow  up  Lee's  advance,  by 
keeping  in  his  rear,  to  capture  his  trains  and  couriers,  and 
to  cut  off  his  retreat  should  he  be  defeated. 

General  Meade's  first  order  was  for  all  the  troops  to 
concentrate  in  Frederick,  where  he  proposed  to  have  a 
grand  review,  but  at  the  urgent  remonstrance  of  General 
Butterfield,  who  had  been  Hooker's  Chief  of  Staff,  and  who 


HOOKER'S  PLANS.  115 

stated  that  this  delay  would  give  Lee  time  to  cross  the  Sus- 
quehanna,  and  capture  Harrisburg  and  Philadelphia, 
Hooker's  orders  were  allowed  to  stand,  with  some  excep 
tions.  Meade  appears  to  have  disapproved  all  movements 
against  Lee's  line  of  retreat,  for  he  ordered  Slocum  to  re 
join  the  main  army,  and  had  the  hardihood  to  break  up  the 
post  at  Harper's  Ferry,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  Hooker  had 
just  been  relieved  from  command  for  requesting  permission 
to  do  so.  The  bulk  of  the  garrison,  under  Major- General 
French,  was  directed  to  take  post  as  a  reserve  at  Frederick, 
when  our  forces  moved  forward.  The  general  idea  of  our 
advance  was  to  interpose  between  the  enemy  and  Philadel 
phia  if  he  went  north,  or  between  him  and  Baltimore  and 
Washington  in  case  he  turned  back.  The  orders  at  night 
were  for  Buf ord's  division  of  cavalry  to  take  post  on  the  left 
flank,  in  the  direction  of  Fairfield  ;  Gregg's  division  on  the 
right  flank  at  Westminster  ;  and  Kilpatrick's  division  in  ad 
vance  of  the  centre,  at  Littlestown,  the  different  corps  to 
be  posted  between  New  Windsor  and  Emmetsburg. 

Ewell's  corps,  as  stated,  were  at  Carlisle  and  York,  Lee 
and  Longstreet's  at  Chambersburg,  and  Hill's  corps  at 
Fayetteville. 

Lee  was  startled  to  learn  from  a  countryman  who  came 
in  on  the  28th  that  Hooker  was  at  Frederick,  and  not  south 
of  the  Potomac,  as  he  had  supposed.  He  saw  at  once  that 
his  communications  with  Bichmond,  about  which  he  was  so 
solicitous,  were  greatly  endangered,  for  the  Union  army 
could  be  formed  to  interpose  between  him  and  Williams- 
port,  and  still  keep  a  safe  line  of  retreat  open  to  Washing 
ton.  This  might  not  be  so  great  a  misfortune  to  the  ene 
my  as  regards  food  and  forage;  for  they  could  probably 
live  on  the  country  for  some  time,  by  making  predatory  ex 
cursions  in  different  directions,  but  when  it  came  to  obtain- 


116    CHANCELLORSV1LLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

ing  fresh  supplies  of  ammunition,  the  matter  would  become 
very  serious.  An  army  only  carries  a  limited  amount  of  this 
into  the  field  and  must  rely  upon  frequent  convoys  to  keep  up 
the  supply,  which  is  constantly  decreasing  from  the  partial 
engagements  and  skirmishes,  so  prevalent  in  a  hostile  coun 
try. 

The  wisdom  of  Hooker's  policy  in  desiring  to  assail  the 
rebel  communications  is  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that  Lee 
immediately  turned  back.  The  head  of  the  serpent  faced 
about  as  soon  as  its  tail  was  trodden  upon.  He  came  to 
the  conclusion  to  prevent  an  attack  against  his  rear  by 
threatening  Baltimore  with  his  whole  force.  This  would 
necessarily  cause  the  Union  army  to  march  farther  east  to 
confront  him,  and  thus  prevent  it  from  operating  in  heavy 
force  in  the  Cumberland  Valley.  Accordingly  on  the  night 
of  the  28th,  Lee  sent  expresses  to  all  his  corps  commanders 
to  concentrate  at  Gettysburg.  If  he  had  known  that  Meade 
was  about  to  withdraw  all  the  troops  acting  against  his  line 
of  retreat  he  would  probably  have  gone  on  and  taken  Har- 
risburg. 

As  the  new  commander  of  the  Union  army  was  a  favorite 
of  General  Halleck,  no  notice  was  taken  of  his  disregard  of 
instructions  in  detaching  the  garrison  of  Harper's  Ferry. 
General  Couch,  who  commanded  the  Department  of  the 
Susquehanna,  was  also  placed  under  his  orders,  a  favor 
which  had  been  denied  to  Hooker.  The  troubles  of  the 
latter  were  not  quite  over,  for  on  his  appearing  in  Washing 
ton  to  explain  his  action,  he  was  immediately  put  under 
arrest  for  visiting  the  Capital  without  his  (Halleck's)  per-' 
mission;  a  piece  of  petty  persecution  which  might  have 
been  spared  under  the  circumstances.  It  was,  however,  a 
short  and  easy  method  of  settling  all  complaints  that  were 
inconvenient  to  answer. 


CHAPTER  HI. 

STUART'S   RAID— THE    ENEMY    IX   FRONT     OF  HARRIS- 
BURG— MEADE'S  PLANS. 

AT  dawn  of  day  on  the  29th,  Stuart's  command,  after 
riding  all  night,  reached  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad 
and  commenced  disabling  it,  so  far  as  the  limited  time  at 
their  disposal  would  allow,  by  burning  a  bridge  at  Sykesville 
and  tearing  up  a  portion  of  the  track  at  Hood's  Mill.  They 
remained  at  the  latter  place  during  the  day  to  rest,  but 
started  again  in  the  afternoon,  and  reached  "Westminster 
about  5  P.M.  At  this  place  they  were  gallantly  attacked  by 
the  First  Delaware  Cavalry,  which  Stuart  says  was  driven  off 
after  hard  fighting  and  pursued  some  distance  toward  Balti 
more,  adding  very  much  to  the  panic  there.  At  night  the 
head  of  his  column  halted  at  Union  Mills,  half  way  between 
Westminster  and  Littlestown.  It  may  as  well  be  stated 
here  that  Stuart  found  himself  greatly  embarrassed  by  at 
tempting  to  hold  on  to  the  long  train  he  had  captured  at 
Rockville.  It  lengthened  out  his  column  to  such  an  extent 
that  it  became  difficult  to  defend  all  parts  of  the  line  with 
out  scattering  and  weakening  his  command.  As  Kilpatrick'a 
division  was  waiting  to  intercept  him  at  Littlestown,  this 
consideration  became  a  matter  of  considerable  importance. 
Gregg's  division  also  moved  in  the  morning  to  head  him  off 
at  Westminster,  but  owing  to  the  roads  being  very  much 
blocked  up  by  our  infantry  and  trains  marching  in  that  di- 


118    CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

rection,  Gregg  did  not  succeed  in  reaching  his  destination 
until  some  hours  after  Stuart  had  passed. 

At  night  two  brigades  of  BuforcVs  division  of  cavalry  cov 
ered  the  left  flank  of  the  Union  army  near  Fairfield,  with 
one  brigade  at  Mechanicstown.  The  First  and  Eleventh 
Corps  were  at  Emmetsburg,  the  Third  and  Twelfth  at  Mid- 
dleburg,  the  Fifth  Corps  at  Taneytown,  the  Second  Corps 
at  Uniontown,  and  the  Sixth  Corps  at  New  Windsor. 

The  advance  of  the  rebel  cavalry  under  Jenkins  were 
now  within  sight  of  Harrisburg,  and  skirmishing  only  foul- 
miles  from  the  town.  Jenkins's  object  was  to  make  a 
thorough  reconnoissance  in  order  to  ascertain  the  best 
positions  to  be  taken  for  an  attack.  There  was  a  perfect 
exodus  from  the  city.  All  business  was  suspended,  too,  in 
Philadelphia,  and  the  authorities  there  busied  themselves  in 
hastening  the  work  on  the  fortifications  in  the  suburbs  of 
the  city.  They  were  active  enough  now,  and  large  numbers 
were  enrolled.  Pleasonton,  who  was  under  general  orders 
to  guard  the  flank  nearest  the  enemy,  directed  Buford  on 
the  29th  to  occupy  Gettysburg  the  next  day,  and  hold  it 
until  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  came  to  his  relief.  He  real 
ized  the  importance  of  the  position  to  the  future  success  of 
our  arms. 

Hill's  corps  was  at  Fayetteville  on  the  29th,  but  one  divi 
sion,  that  of  Heth,  was  thrown  forward  on  that  day  to  Cash- 
town,  within  eight  miles  of  Gettysburg.  The  object  of  the 
movement  was  to  join  Ewell  at  York,  and  co-operate  with 
him  in  the  destruction  of  the  railroads  on  the  other  side  of 
the  Susquehanna,  etc.  This  plan,  as  I  have  already  stated^ 
was  suddenly  changed  on  the  evening  of  the  28th,  when  Lee 
found  his  communications  endangered,  and  now  all  the 
advanced  troops  under  his  command  turned  back  to  concen 
trate  at  Gettysburg.  Longstreet  left  Chambersburg  and 


STUART'S  RAID.  119 

marched  to  Fayetteville,  leaving  Pickett's  division  behind  to 
guard  the  trains.  Early  received  the  order  to  return  in 
the  afternoon  of  the  29th,  recalled  Gordon's  brigade  from 
Wrightsville,  and  made  preparations  to  start  the  next  morn 
ing.  Rodes's  and  Johnson's  divisions  left  Carlisle  and 
marched  on  Gettysburg ;  the  former  by  the  direct  route"; 
and  the  latter  by  way  of  Greenwood,  to  convoy  the  trains 
full  of  stolen  property. 

A  number  of  partisan  skirmishes  took  place  during  the 
day,  which  were  creditable  to  our  troops,  particularly  that  at 
McConnellsburg,  to  the  west  of  Chambersburg. 

The  raid  against  Eichmond  ended  by  the  return  of  Colonel 
Spear's  regiment  to  the  White  House.  Hooker  had  urged 
that  General  Dix  assume  command  of  all  his  available  troops, 
march  against  Kichmond,  and  plant  himself  firmly  on  Lee's 
line  of  communications,  but  his  recommendations  were 
slighted  by  Halleck.  There  was  much  disappointment  in 
the  North  at  this  failure  to  make  a  serious  attack  on  the 
rebel  capital,  for  it  was  generally  believed  that  it  might  have 
been  captured  by  a  coup  de  main. 

On  the  30th  General  Meade  advanced  his  army  still 
nearer  the  Susquehanna.  At  evening  his  extreme  left,  the 
First  Corps,  was  at  Marsh  Creek,  on  the  Emmetsburg  road, 
while  the  extreme  right,  the  Sixth  Corps,  was  away  off  at 
Westminster.  The  intermediate  corps  were  posted,  the 
Eleventh  at  Emmetsburg ;  the  Second  and  Third  at  Taney- 
town  ;  the  Fifth  at  Union  Mills,  and  the  Twelfth  at  Frizzel- 
burg.  General  French  moved  from  Harper's  Ferry  with  the 
bulk  of  the  garrison  and  occupied  Frederick.  The  First 
Corps  was  ordered  to  Gettysburg,  but  General  Eeynolds 
halted  it  at  Marsh  Creek,  as  the  enemy  were  reported  to  be 
coming  from  the  direction  of  Fairfield. 

Meade  now  resolved  to  take  up  a  defensive  position  on 


120          CHANCELLORSVILLE   AND  GETTYSBURG. 

Pipe  Creek.  He  threw  out  his  forces  as  before  in  a  fan 
shape,  but  any  corps  encountering  the  enemy  was  ex 
pected  to  fight  in  retreat  until  it  reached  the  new  line, 
where  all  the  corps  were  to  assemble.  This  line  as  laid  out 
was  a  long  one,  extending  from  Manchester  to  Middleburg, 
a  distance  of  about  twenty-five  miles.  Falling  back  to 
fight  again,  is  hardly  to  be  commended,  as  it  chills  the  ardor 
of  the  men  ;  nor  is  it  certain  that  Lee  would  have  attacked 
the  intrenchments  at  Pipe  Creek.  If  he  found  them  for 
midable  he  might  have  preferred  to  fight  on  the  defensive 
with  two  corps,  while  the  Third  Corps  took  Harrisburg,  and 
broke  up  the  railroad  lines  to  the  west,  or  marched  directly 
against  Philadelphia ;  or,  as  Pipe  Creek  did  not  interfere 
with  his  communications  in  any  way  he  might  have  chosen 
to  let  it  severely  alone,  and  have  kept  on  depredating  in 
Pennsylvania,  after  capturing  Harrisburg.  This  would  have 
forced  Meade  sooner  or  later  to  attack  him. 

On  the  night  of  the  30th  Ewell's  corps  had  reached 
Heidlersburg,  nine  miles  from  Gettysburg,  with  the  excep 
tion  of  Johnson's  division,  which  was  at  Greenwood. 
Eodes's  division  had  marched  direct  from  Carlisle  by  way 
of  Petersburg.  Longstreet  with  two  divisions  was  at  Fay- 
etteville  ;  the  other  division,  that  of  Pickett,  was  left  at 
Chambersburg  to  guard  the  trains.  Hill's  corps  had 
reached  Cashtown  and  Muminasburg,  except  Anderson's 
division,  which  was  still  back  at  the  mountain  pass  on  the 
Chambersburg  road. 

Stuart,  ascertaining  that  Early  was  no  longer  at  York,  and 
not  knowing  that  the  army  was  concentrating  on  Gettys 
burg,  turned  toward  Carlisle.  He  had  bivouacked  half  way 
between  Westminster  and  Littlestown,  but  having  ascer 
tained  that  Kilpatrick  was  waiting  for  him  at  the  latter 
place,  attempted  to  avoid  the  encounter  by  going  through 


STUART'S  RAID.  121 

cross  roads  to  Hanover.  He  found  our  cavalry  there  how 
ever,  and  charged  the  advance,  driving  them  back,  captur 
ing  some  prisoners  and  ambulances,  and  taking  the  town. 
The  main  body  under  Kilpatrick  soon  arrived  and  drove 
him  out  again.  He  claims  to  have  again  taken  the  town  by 
the  aid  of  Hampton's  brigade,  which  came  up  in  time  to 
reinforce  him.  After  the  battle  had  lasted  four  hours,  it 
was  finally  decided  in  our  favor  by  the  arrival  of  Ouster's 
brigade  from  Abbotsford.  Kilpatrick  then  advanced  with 
his  whole  force,  and  Stuart  gave  up  the  contest  and  re 
treated. 

Part  of  his  cavalry  also  attacked  the  Fifth  and  Sixth 
Michigan  regiments  at  Littlestown,  but  were  repulsed.  He 
then,  having  no  time  to  spare,  kept  on  his  way  toward  York 
to  find  the  army  lie  had  lost.  He  passed  within  seven  miles 
of  Ewell's  column  on  its  way  to  Gettysburg,  and  neither 
knew  the  other  was  near.  Had  they  effected  a  junction  it 
would  have  saved  the  rebel  cavalry  a  long,  fruitless,  and  ex 
hausting  march,  which  kept  them  out  of  the  battle  on  the 
first  day.  It  was  one  of  those  accidental  circumstances 
which  seemed  to  favor  us  in  this  campaign,  while  almost 
every  incident  at  Chancellorsville  was  against  us. 

Finding  Ewell  had  left  York,  Stuart  turned  and  marched 
on  Carlisle,  which  he  found  occupied  by  our  troops.  He  de 
manded  the  surrender  of  the  place  under  a  threat  of  bom 
bardment.  General  "W.  F.  Smith,  one  of  the  heroes  of  the 
Peninsula,  was  not  to  be  affected  by  menaces,  and  Stuart, 
whose  time  was  precious  and  who  had  no  ammunition  to 
spare,  turned  off  in  hopes  of  reaching  Gettysburg  in  time 
to  take  part  in  the  battle.  He  arrived  there  on  the  after 
noon  of  the  2d,  with  horses  and  men  worn  out  by  their  ex 
traordinary  exertions  ;  on  their  way  whole  regiments  slept  in 
the  saddle.  This  force  when  it  reached  the  field  found 
VI. -6 


122    CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

Robertson's,  Jones's,  and  Jenkins's  brigades,  and  White's 
battalion  ready  to  join  it. 

By  evening  Meade  was  fully  apprised,  by  telegrams  and 
Buford's  scouts,  that  the  enemy  were  concentrating  on 
Gettysburg.  He  knew  that  Reynolds  at  Marsh  Creek  was 
only  about  six  miles  from  Hill  at  Cashtown,  but  he  sent  no 
orders  that  night,  and  gave  no  indication  of  having  any  plan. 
He  simply  stated  that  the  enemy  were  marching  on  Gettys 
burg,  and  he  would  issue  orders  when  they  developed  their 
intentions.  Thus  the  opposing  forces  were  moving  in  direc 
tions  that  would  necessarily  bring  them  in  contact,  and  a 
right  or  a  retreat  was  inevitable,  for  one  or  both.  Rey 
nolds  had  the  true  spirit  of  a  soldier.  He  was  a  Pennsylva- 
nian,  and,  inflamed  at  seeing  the  devastation  of  his  native 
State,  was  most  desirous  of  getting  at  the  enemy  as  soon  as 
possible.  I  speak  from  my  own  knowledge,  for  I  was  his 
second  in  command,  and  he  told  me  at  Poolesville  soon  after 
crossing  the  river,  that  it  was  necessary  to  attack  the  enemy 
at  once,  to  prevent  his  plundering  the  whole  State.  As  he 
had  great  confidence  in  his  men,  it  was  not  difficult  to 
divine  what  his  decision  would  be.  He  determined  to  ad 
vance  and  hold  Gettysburg.  He  directed  the  Eleventh 
Corps  to  come  up  as  a  support  to  the  First,  and  he  recom 
mended,  but  did  not  order,  the  Third  Corps  to  do  the  same. 

Buford,  with  two  of  his  cavalry  brigades,  reached  the 
place  that  night,  but  not  without  considerable  difficulty.  He 
left  Fountaindale  Gap  early  in  the  morning  and  attempted 
to  move  directly  to  his  destination,  but  he  came  upon  Petti- 
grew's  brigade  of  Hill's  corps,  and  was  obliged  to  fall  back 
to  the  mountains  again.  Later  in  the  day  he  succeeded,  by 
going  around  by  way  of  Emmet sburg.  Before  evening  set 
in,  he  had  thrown  out  his  pickets  almost  to  Cashtown  and 
Hunterstown,  posting  Gamble's  brigade  across  the  Cham- 


STUART'S   RAID.  123 

bersburg  pike,  and  Devens's  brigade  across  the  Mummas- 
burg  road,  his  main  body  being  abont  a  mile  west  of  the 
town. 

While  these  great  movements  were  going  on,  some  minor 
affairs  showed  great  gallantry  on  the  part  of  partisan  officers. 
Captain  Ulric  Dahlgren  made  a  raid  upon  the  rebel  com 
munications,  capturing  some  guns  and  prisoners,  and  gain 
ing  very  important  information  which  will  be  referred  to 
hereafter. 

The  two  armies  now  about  to  contest  on  the  perilous 
ridges  of  Gettysburg  the  possession  of  the  Northern  States, 
and  the  ultimate  triumph  of  freedom  or  slavery,  were  in 
numbers  as  follows,  according  to  the  estimate  made  by  the 
Count  of  Paris,  who  is  an  impartial  observer,  and  who  has 
made  a  close  study  of  the  question : 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  under  General  Meacle,  82,000  men  and  300 
guns. 

The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  under  General  Lee,  73, 500  men  and 
190  guns. 

Stuart  had  11,100  cavalry  and  16  guns. 

Pleasonton  had  about  the  same  number  of  cavalry,  and  27  guns. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE    FIRST    DAY    OF    THE    BATTLE    OF    GETTYSBURG, 
WEDNESDAY,   JULY  1,    1863. 

ON  the  morning  of  the  1st  of  July,  General  Buford,  as 
stated,  held  the  ridges  to  the  west  of  Gettysburg,  with  his 
cavalry  division,  composed  of  Gamble's  and  Devens's  bri 
gades.  His  vedettes  wTere  thrown  far  out  toward  the  enemy 
to  give  timely  notice  of  any  movement,  for  he  was  determined 
to  prevent  the  rebels  from  entering  the  town  if  possible,  and 
knew  the  First  Corps  would  soon  be  up  to  support  him. 
The  enemy  were  not  aware  that  there  was  any  considerable 
force  in  the  vicinity,  and  in  the  morning  sent  forward  Heth's 
division  of  Hill's  corps  to  occupy  the  place,  anticipating  no 
difficulty  in  doing  so.  Buford  in  the  meantime  had  dis 
mounted  a  large  part  of  his  force,  had  strengthened  his  line 
of  skirmishers,  and  planted  his  batteries  at  the  most  com 
manding  points. 

General  Reynolds,  in  consequence  of  the  duties  devolving 
upon  him  as  commander  of  the  Left  Wing  of  the  army,  that 
is  of  the  First,  Third,  and  Eleventh  Corps,  had  turned  over 
the  command  of  the  First  Corps  to  me.  He  now  made  im 
mediate  dispositions  to  go  forward  to  assist  Buford. 

As  my  corps  was  largely  engaged  in  the  first  day's  opera 
tions,  I  must  be  excused  for  having  a  good  deal  to  say  in 
the  first  person  in  relation  to  them.  Reynolds  sent  for  me 
about  six  o'clock  in  the  morning,  read  to  me  the  various  des- 


FIRST   DAY   OF   BATTLE   OF  GETTYSBURG.        125 


12 


patches  he  had  received  from  Meade  and  Buford,  and  told 
me  he  should  go  forward  at  once  with  the  nearest  division — 
that  of  Wadsworth — to  aid  the  cavalry.  He  then  instructed 
me  to  draw  in  my  pickets,  assemble  the  artillery  and  the 
remainder  of  the  corps,  and  join  him  as  soon  as  possible. 
Having  given  these  orders  he  rode  off  at  the  head  of  the  col 
umn,  and  I  never  saw  him  again. 

The  position  of  the  two  armies  on  the  morning  of  the  1st 
of  July,  was  as  follows :  The  First  Corps  at  Marsh  Creek ; 
the    Second   and   Third   Corps   at   Taneytown;    the   latter 
being  under  orders 
to    march   to    Eni- 
metsburg,  to  relieve 
the  Eleventh  Corps, 
which  was  directed 
to    join    the    First 
Corps  at   Gettys 
burg  ;    the    Twelfth  o  Emmetsburg 

Corps  was  at  Two 
Taverns;  the  Fifth 
Corps  at  Hanover, 
and  the  Sixth  Corps 

about  thirty-five  miles  off  to  the  right  at  Manchester. 
Kilpatrick's  and  Gregg's  divisions  of  cavalry  were  also  at 
Hanover.  The  Confederate  army  was  advancing  on  Gettys 
burg  from  the  west  and  north.  The  concentration  of  their 
troops  and  the  dispersion  of  ours  are  indicated  on  the 
map. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  enemy  had  but  three 
corps,  while  the  Union  army  had  seven.  Each  of  their  corps 
represented  a  third,  and  each  of  ours  a  seventh,  of  our  total 
force.  The  same  ratio  extended  to  divisions  and  brigades. 

Heth's  division,  which  started  early  in  the  morning  to  oc- 


SCALE  OF  MILES 


126    CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

cupy  the  town,  soon  found  itself  confronted  by  Buford's 
skirmishers,  and  formed  line  of  battle  with  Archer's  and 
Davis's  brigades  in  front,  followed  by  those  of  Pettigrew 
and  Brockenborough.  At  9  A.M.  the  first  gun  was  heard. 
Buford  had  three  cannon-shots  fired  as  a  signal  for  his  skir 
mish  line  to  open  on  the  enemy,  and  the  battle  of  Gettys 
burg  began.1 

As  the  rebels  had  had  several  encounters  with  militia, 
who  were  easily  dispersed,  they  did  not  expect  to  meet  any 
serious  resistance  at  this  time,  and  advanced  confidently  and 
carelessly.  Buford  gave  way  slowly,  taking  advantage  of 
every  accident  of  ground  to  protract  the  struggle.  After  an 
hour's  fighting  he  felt  anxious,  and  went  up  into  the  steeple 
of  the  Theological  Seminary  from  which  a  wide  view  could 
be  obtained,  to  see  if  the  First  Corps  was  in  sight.  One  di 
vision  of  it  was  close  at  hand,  and  soon  Reynolds,  who  had 
preceded  it,  climbed  up  into  the  belfry  to  confer  with  him 
there,  and  examine  the  country  around.  Although  there  is 
no  positive  testimony  to  that  effect,  his  attention  was  doubt 
less  attracted  to  Cemetery  Eidge  in  his  rear,  as  it  was  one  of 
the  most  prominent  features  of  the  landscape.  An  aide  of 
General  Howard — presumably  Major  Hall  -  -soon  after  Rey 
nolds  descended  from  the  belfry,  came  up  to  ask  if  he  had 
any  instructions  with  regard  to  the  Eleventh  Corps.  Rey 
nolds,  in  reply,  directed  that  General  Howard  bring  his  corps 
forward  at  once  and  form  them  on  Cemetery  Hill  as  a  reserve. 
General  Howard  has  no  recollection  of  having  received  any 

1  Major  Kress,  of  General  Wadsworth's  staff,  entered  Gettysburg  about  this 
time  and  found  General  Buford  surrounded  by  his  staff  in  front  of  the  tavern 
there.  Buford  turned  to  him  and  said.  "  What  are  you  doing  here,  sir?  "  Kress 
replied  that  he  came  on  to  get  some  shoes  for  Wadsworth's  division.  Buford  told 
him  he  had  better  return  immediately  to  his  command.  Kress  said,  •'  Why, 
\vhat  is  the  matter,  general  ?  ''  At  that  moment  the  far  off  sound  of  a  single  gun 
was  heard,  and  Buford  replied,  as  he  mounted  his  horse  and  galloped  off, 
'<  Tlaat's  the  matter." 


FIRST   DAY   OF   BATTLE   OF   GETTYSBURG.        127 


such  orders,  but  as  he  did  get  orders  to  come  forward,  and 
as  his  corps  was  to  occupy  some  place  in  rear,  as  a  support 
to  the  First  Corps,  nothing  is  more  jxrobable  than  that  Gen 
eral  Reynolds  directed  him  to  go  there ;  for  its  military  ad 
vantages  were  obvious  enough  to  any  experienced  com 
mander.  Lieutenant  Rosengarten,  of  General  Eeynolds's 
staff,  states  positively  that  he  was  present  and  heard  the  or 
der  given  for  Howard  to  post  his  troops  on  Cemetery  Ridge. 
The  matter  is  of  some  moment,  as  the  position  in  question 
ultimately  gave  us  the  victory,  and  Howard  received  the 
thanks  of  Congress 
for  selecting  it.  It 
is  not  to  be  supposed 
that  either  Howard 
or  Rosengarten 
would  misstate  the 
matter.  It  is  quite 
probable  that  Rey 
nolds  chose  the  hill 
simply  as  a  position 
upon  which  his  force 
could  rally  if  driven  back,  and  Howard  selected  it  as  a 
suitable  battle-field  for  the  army.  It  has  since  been  uni 
versally  conceded  that  it  was  admirably  adapted  for  that 
purpose. 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  above  map,  that  there  are  two 
roads  coming  into  Gettysburg  from  the  west,  making  a 
considerable  angle  with  each  other.  Each  is  intersected 
by  ridges  running  north  and  south.  On  that  nearest  to 
the  town,  and  about  three-fourths  of  a  mile  from  the 
central  square,  there  is  a  large  brick  building,  which 
was  used  as  a  Lutheran  Theological  Seminary.  A  small 
stream  of  water  called  Willoughby's  Run  winds  between 


128    CHANCELLORSV1LLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

the  next  two  ridges.  The  battle  on  the  first  day  was  princi 
pally  fought  on  the  heights  on  each  side  of  this  stream. 

Buford  being  aware  that  Ewell's  corps  would  soon  be 
on  its  wray  from  Heidlersburg  to  the  field  of  battle  was 
obliged  to  form  line  facing  north  with  Devens's  brigade, 
and  leave  Gamble's  brigade  to  keep  back  the  overpowering 
weight  of  Hill's  corps  advancing  from  the  west. 

While  this  fighting  was  going  on,  and  Reynolds  and 
Wadsworth  were  presssing  to  the  front,  I  was  engaged  in 
withdrawing  the  pickets  and  assembling  the  other  two  divi 
sions,  together  with  the  corps  artillery.  As  soon  as  I  saAv 
that  my  orders  were  in  process  of  execution,  I  galloped  to 
the  front,  leaving  the  troops  to  follow,  and  caught  up  with 
Meredith's  brigade  of  Wadsworth's  division,  commonly 
called  "The  Iron  Brigade,"  just  as  it  was  going  into  action. 

In  the  meantime  the  enemy  approaching  from  the  west 
were  pressing  with  great  force  against  Buford's  slender  skir 
mish  line,  and  Reynolds  went  forward  with  Cutler's  brigade 
to  sustain  it.  He  skilfully  posted  Hall's  Second  Maine  bat 
tery  in  the  road,  and  threw  forward  two  regiments,  the  Four 
teenth  Brooklyn  and  Ninety-fifth  New  York,  a  short  distance 
in  advance  on  the  left.  At  the  same  time  he  directed  Gen 
eral  Wadsworth  to  place  the  remaining  three  regiments  of 
the  brigade,  the  One  Hundred  and  Forty-seventh  New  York, 
the  Seventy-sixth  New  York,  and  the  Fifty-sixth  Pennsyl 
vania  on  the  right  of  the  road.  When  this  formation  Avas 
completed  the  cavalry  brigade  under  Gamble,  which  had 
been  fighting  there,  withdrew  and  formed  in  column  on  the 
left  of  the  infantry,  but  the  other  cavalry  brigade  undfer 
Devens,  which  was  not  facing  in  that  direction,  still  held  its 
position,  awaiting  the  advance  of  Ewell's  corps  from  the 
north. 

As  Davis's  rebel  brigade  of  Heth's  division  fronting  Wads- 


FIRST  DAY  OP  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG.        129 

worth  were  hidden  behind  an  intervening  ridge,  Wads-worth 
did  not  see  them  at  first,  but  formed  his  three  regiments  per 
pendicularly  to  the  road,  without  a  reconnoissance.  The 
result  was  that  Davis  came  over  the  hill  almost  directly  on 
the  right  flank  of  this  line,  which  being  unable  to  defend  it 
self,  was  forced  back  and  directed  by  Wadsworth  to  take 
post  in  a  piece  of  woods  in  rear  on  Seminary  Ridge.  The  two 
regiments  on  the  right  accordingly  withdrew,  but  the  One 
Hundred  and  Forty-seventh  New  York,  which  was  next  to 
the  road,  did  not  receive  the  order,  as  their  Colonel  was 
shot  down  before  he  could  deliver  it.  They  were  at  once 
surrounded  and  very  much  cut  up  before  they  could  be  res 
cued  from  their  perilous  position. 

The  two  regiments  on  the  right,  which  were  forced  back, 
were  veterans,  conspicuous  for  gallantry  in  every  battle  in 
which  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  been  engaged  since  the 
Peninsula  campaign.  As  Wadsworth  withdrew  them  with 
out  notifying  Hall's  battery  in  the  road,  or  the  two  regiments 
posted  by  Reynolds  on  the  left,  both  became  exposed  to  a 
disastrous  flank  attack  on  the  right.  Hall  finding  a  cloud 
of  skirmishers  launched  against  his  battery  which  was  now 
without  support,  was  compelled  to  retreat  with  the  loss  of 
one  gun,  the  horses  of  which  had  all  been  killed.  The  non- 
military  reader  will  see  that  while  a  battery  can  keep  back 
masses  of  men  it  cannot  contend  with  a  line  of  skirmishers. 
To  resist  them  would  be  very  much  like  fighting  mosquitoes 
with  musket-balls.  The  two  regiments  posted  by  Reynolds, 
the  Fourteenth  Brooklyn  and  Ninety-fifth  New  York,  find 
ing  their  support  gone  on  the  right,  while  Archer's  rebel 
brigade  was  advancing  to  envelop  their  left,  fell  back  lei 
surely  under  Colonel  Fowler  of  the  Fourteenth  Brooklyn, 
who  assumed  command  of  both  as  the  ranking  officer  pres 
ent. 

6* 


130          CHANCE  LLORSVILLE   AND   GETTYSBURG. 

I  reached  the  field  just  as  the  attack  on  Cutler's  brigade 
was  going  on,  and  at  once  sent  my  adjutant-general,  Major 
Halstead,  and  young  Meredith  L.  Jones,  who  was  acting  as 
aide  on  my  staff,  to  General  Reynolds  to  ask  instructions. 
Under  the  impression  that  the  enemy's  columns  were  ap 
proaching  on  both  roads,  Reynolds  said,  "  Tell  Doubleday  I 
will  hold  on  to  this  road,"  referring  to  the  Chanibersburg 
road,  "and  he  must  hold  on  to  that  one;"  meaning  the 
road  to  Fail-field  or  Hagerstown.  At  the  same  time  he  sent 
Jones  back  at  full  speed  to  bring  up  a  battery. 

The  rebels,  however,  did  not  advance  on  the  Fail-field 
road  until  late  in  the  afternoon.  They  must  have  been  in  force 
upon  it  some  miles  back,  for  the  cavalry  so  reported,  and 
this  caused  me  during  the  entire  day  to  give  more  attention 
than  was  necessary  to  my  left,  as  I  feared  the  enemy  might 
separate  my  corps  from  the  Third  and  Eleventh  Corps  at 
Emmetsburg.  Such  a  movement  would  be  equivalent  to 
interposing  between  the  First  Corps  and  the  main  army.  The 
cavalry  probably  referred  to  Pettigrew's  brigade,  which  Bu- 
ford  met  early  in  the  morning, 

There  was  a  piece  of  woods  between  the  two  roads,  with 
open  ground  on  each  side.  It  seemed  to  me  this  was  the 
key  of  the  position,  for  if  this  woods  was  strongly  held,  the 
enemy  could  not  pass  on  either  road  without  being  taken 
in  flank  by  the  infantry,  and  in  front  by  the  cavalry.  I 
therefore  urged  the  men  as  they  filed  past  me  to  hold  it 
at  all  hazards.  Full  of  enthusiasm  and  the  memory  of  their 
past  achievements  they  said  to  me  proudly,  "If  ice  can't,  hold 
it,  where  will  you  find  the  men  who  can?" 

As  they  went  forward  under  command  of  Colonel  Morrow 
of  the  Twenty-fourth  Michigan  Volunteers,  a  brave  and  capa 
ble  soldier,  who,  when  a  mere  youth,  was  engaged  in  the 
Mexican  War,  I  rode  over  to  the  left  to  see  if  the  enemy's 


FIRST   DAY   OF   BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG.        131 

line  extended  beyond  ours,  and  if  there  would  be  any  at 
tempt  to  flank  our  troops  in  that  direction.  I  saw,  how 
ever,  only  a  few  skirmishers,  and  returned  to  organize  a  re 
serve.  I  knew  there  was  fighting  going  on  between  Cutler's 
brigade,  and  the  rebels  in  his  front,  but  as  General  Reynolds 
was  there  in  person,  I  only  attended  to  my  own  part  of  the 
line ;  and  halted  the  Sixth  Wisconsin  Regiment  as  it  was 
going  into  action  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  R.  R.  Dawes, 
and  the  Brigade  Guard  under  Captain  Glenn,  One  Hundred 
and  Forty-ninth  Pennsylvania,  to  post  them  in  the  open  space 
between  the  Seminary  and  the  woods,  as  a  reserve. 

It  is  proper  to  state  that  General  Meredith,  the  permanent 
commander  of  the  brigade,  was  wounded  as  he  was  coming 
up,  some  time  after  its  arrival,  by  a  shell  which  exploded  in 
front  of  his  horse.  Colonel  Morrow  of  the  Twenty-fourth 
Michigan  therefore  remained  in  command  during  the  clay. 

Both  parties  were  now  trying  to  obtain  possession  of  the 
woods.  Archer's  rebel  brigade,  preceded  by  a  skirmish  line, 
was  crossing  Willoughby's  Run  to  enter  them  on  one  side 
as  the  Iron  Brigade  went  in  on  the  other.  General  Reynolds 
was  on  horseback  in  the  edge  of  the  woods,  surrounded  by 
his  staff.  He  felt  some  anxiety  as  to  the  result,  and  turned 
his  head  frequently  to  see  if  our  troops'  would  be  up  in 
time.  While  looking  back  in  this  way,  a  rebel  sharpshooter 
shot  him  through  the  back  of  the  head,  the  bullet  coming 
out  near  the  eye.  He  fell  dead  in  an  instant  without  a 
word.  I  felt  the  great  loss  the  country  had  sustained  in  his 
death,  and  lamented  him  as  almost  a  life-long  companion, 
for  we  were  at  West  Point  together,  and  had  served  in  the 
same  regiment — the  old  Third  Artillery — upon  first  entering 
service,  along  with  our  present  Comman:ler-in-Chief,  Gen 
eral  Sherman,  and  General  George  H.  Thomas.  When  quite 
young  we  had  fought  in  the  same  battles  in  Mexico.  I  had 


132    CHANCELLORSVILLE  AXD  GETTYSBURG. 

little  time,  however,  to  indulge  in  these  recollections.  The 
situation  was  very  peculiar.  The  rebel  left  under  Davis 
had  driven  in  Cutler's  brigade  and  our  left  under  Morrow  had 
charged  into  the  woods,  preceded  by  the  Second  Wisconsin 
under  Colonel  Fairchild,  swept  suddenly  and  unexpectedly 
around  the  right  flank  of  Archer's  brigade,  and  captured  a 
large  part  of  it,  including  Archer  himself.  The  fact  is, 
the  enemy  were  careless  and  underrated  us,  thinking,  it  is 
said,  that  they  had  only  militia  to  contend  with.  The  Iron 
Brigade  had  a  different  head-gear  from  the  rest  of  the  army 
and  were  recognized  at  once  by  their  old  antagonists.  Some 

of  the  latter  were  heard  to  exclaim  "  There  are  those  d d 

black-hatted  fellows  again  !  'Taint  no  militia.  It's  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac." 

Having  captured  Archer  and  his  men,  many  of  the  Iron 
Brigade  kept  on  beyond  Willoughby's  Eun,  and  formed  on 
the  heights  on  the  opposite  side. 

The  command  now  devolved  upon  me,  with  its  great  respon 
sibilities.  The  disaster  on  the  right  required  immediate  at 
tention,  for  the  enemy,  with  loud  yells,  were  pursuing  Cut 
ler's  brigade  toward  the  town.  I  at  once  ordered  my  reserve 
under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Dawes  to  advance  against  their 
flank.  If  they  faced  Dawes,  I  reasoned  that  they  would  present 
their  other  flank  to  Cutler's  men,  so  that  I  felt  quite  conn- 
dent  of  the  result.  In  war,  however,  unexpected  changes  are 
constantly  occurring.  Cutler's  brigade  had  been  withdrawn 
by  order  of  General  Wadsworth,  without  my  knowledge,  to 
the  suburbs  of  Gettysburg.  Fortunately,  Fowler's  two  regi 
ments  came  on  to  join  Dawes,  who  went  forward  with  great 
spirit,  but  who  was  altogether  too  weak  to  assail  so  large  a 
force.  As  he  approached,  the  rebels  ceased  to  pursue  Cut 
ler,  and  rushed  into  the  railroad  cut  to  obtain  the  shelter  of 
the  grading.  They  made  a  fierce  and  obstinate  resistance, 


FIRST  DAY   OF  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG.        133 


but,  while  Fowler  confronted  them  above,  Dawes  brought  a 
gun  to  enfilade  their  position,  and  formed  his  men  across 
the  cut,  by  Fowler's  order,  to  fire  through  it.  The  rebels 
could  not  resist  this ;  the  greater  number  gave  themselves 
up  as  prisoners,  and  the  others  scattered  over  the  country 
and  escaped. 

This  success  relieved  the  One  Hundred  and  Forty-seventh 
New  York,  which,  as  I  stated,  was  surrounded  when  Cutler 
fell  back,  and  it  also  enabled  us  to  regain  the  gun  which 
Hall  had  been  obliged  to  abandon. 

The  enemy  having  vanished  from  our  immediate  front, 
I  withdrew  the  Iron 
Brigade  from  its  ad 
vanced  position  be 
yond  the  creek,  re 
formed  the  line  on 
the  ridge  where  Gen 
eral  Eeynolds  had 
originally  placed  it, 
and  awaited  a  fresh 
attack,  or  orders  from 
General  Meade.  The 
two  regiments  of  Cutler's  brigade  were  brought  back  from 
the  town,  and,  notwithstanding  the  check  they  had  received, 
they  fought  with  great  gallantry  throughout  the  three  days' 
battle  that  ensued. 

There  was  now  a  lull  in  the  combat.  I  was  waiting  for 
the  remainder  of  the  First  Corps  to  come  up,  and  Heth  was 
reorganizing  his  shattered  front  line,  and  preparing  to 
bring  his  two  other  brigades  forward.  The  remnant  of 
Archer's  brigade  was  placed  on  the  right,  and  made  to 
face  south  against  Buford's  cavalry,  which,  it  was  feared, 
might  attack  that  flank.  What  was  left  of  Davis's  brigade 


134          CHANCE LLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

was  sent  to  the  extreme  left  of  the  line,  and  Pegram's  artil 
lery  was  brought  forward  and  posted  on  the  high  ground 
west  of  Willoughby's  Eun. 

Thus  prepared,  and  with  Fender's  strong  division  in 
rear,  ready  to  cover  his  retreat  if  defeated,  or  to  follow 
up  his  success  if  victorious,  Heth  advanced  to  renew  the 
attack. 

As  I  had  but  four  weak  infantry  brigades  at  this  time 
against  eight  large  brigades  which  were  about  to  assail  my 
line,  I  would  have  been  justified  in  falling  back,  but  I  deter 
mined  to  hold  on  to  the  position  until  ordered  to  leave  it.  I 
did  not  believe  in  the  system,  so  prevalent  at  that  time,  of 
avoiding  the  enemy.  I  quite  agreed  with  Reynolds  that  it 
was  best  to  meet  him  as  soon  as  possible,  for  the  rebellion,  if 
reduced  to  a  war  of  positions,  would  never  end  so  long  as  the 
main  army  of  the  Confederates  was  left  in  a  condition  to  take 
the  field.  A  retreat,  too,  has  a  bad  effect  on  the  men.  It 
gives  them  the  impression  that  their  generals  think  them  too 
weak  to  contend  with  the  enemy.  I  was  not  aware,  at  this 
time,  that  Howard  was  on  the  ground,  for  he  had  given  me 
no  indication  of  his  presence,  but  I  knew  that  General 
Meade  was  at  Taneytown ;  and  as,  on  the  previous  evening, 
he  had  informed  General  Reynolds  that  the  enemy's  army 
were  concentrating  on  Gettysburg,  I  thought  it  probable  he 
would  ride  to  the  front  to  see  for  himself  what  was  going 
on,  and  issue  definite  orders  of  some  kind.  As  Gettysburg- 
covered  the  great  roads  from  Chambersburg  to  York,  Balti 
more,  and  Washington,  and  as  its  possession  by  Lee  would 
materially  shorten  and  strengthen  his  line  of  retreat,  I  was  in" 
favor  of  making  great  sacrifices  to  hold  it. 

While  we  were  thus  temporarily  successful,  having  cap 
tured  or  dispersed  all  the  forces  in  our  immediate  front,  a 
very  misleading  despatch  was  sent  to  General  Meade  by  Gen- 


FIRST   DAY   OF   BATTLE   OF   GETTYSBURG.        135 

eral  Howard.  It  seems  that  General  Howard  had  reached 
Gettysburg  in  advance  of  his  corps,  just  after  the  two  regi 
ments  of  Cutler's  brigade,  which  had  been  outflanked,  fell 
back  to  the  town  by  General  Wads  worth's  order.  Upon 
witnessing  this  retreat,  which  was  somewhat  disorderly,  Gen 
eral  Howard  hastened  to  send  a  special  messenger  to  General 
Meade  with  the  baleful  intelligence  that  the  First  Corps  had 
fled  from  the  field  at  the  first  contact  with  the  enemy,  thus 
magnifying  a  forced  retreat  of  two  regiments,  acting  under 
orders,  into  the  flight  of  an  entire  corps,  two-thirds  of  which 
had  not  yet  reached  the  field.  It  is  unnecessary  to  say  that 
this  astounding  news  created  the  greatest  feeling  against  the 
corps,  who  were  loudly  cursed  for  their  supposed  lack  of  spirit 
and  patriotism. 

About  11  A.M.  the  remainder  of  the  First  Corps  came  up, 
together  with  Cooper's,  Stewart's,  Reynolds's,  and  Stevens's 
batteries.  By  this  time  the  enemy's  artillery  had  been 
posted  on  every  commanding  position  to  the  west  of  us, 
several  of  their  batteries  firing  down  the  Chambersburg 
pike.  I  was  very  desirous  to  hold  this  road,  as  it  was  in  the 
centre  of  the  enemy's  line,  who  were  advancing  on  each  side 
of  it,  and  Calef — exposed  as  his  battery  was — fired  over  the 
crest  of  ground  where  he  was  posted,  and  notwithstanding 
the  storm  of  missiles  that  assailed  him,  held  his  own  hand 
somely,  and  inflicted  great  damage  on  his  adversaries.  He 
was  soon  after  relieved  by  Reynolds's  Battery  "L"  of  the 
Second  New  York,  which  was  sustained  by  Colonel  Eoy 
Stone's  brigade  of  Pennsylvania  troops,  which  I  ordered 
there  for  that  purpose.  Stone  formed  his  men  on  the  left  of 
the  pike,  behind  a  ridge  running  north  and  south,  and  par 
tially  sheltered  them  by  a  stone  fence,  some  distance  in 
advance,  from  which  he  had  driven  the  rebel  skirmish  line, 
after  an  obstinate  contest. 


130 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 


It  was  a  hot  place  for  troops  ;  for  the  whole  position  was 
alive  with  bursting  shells,  but  the  men  went  forward  in  fine 
spirits  and,  under  the  impression  that  the  place  was  to  bo 
held  at  all  hazards,  they  cried  out,  "  }\re  have  come  to  stay  /" 
The  battle  afterward  became  so  severe  that  the  greater 
portion  did  stay,  laying  down  their  lives  there  for  the  cause 
they  loved  so  well.  Morrow's  brigade  remained  in  the  woods 
where  Eeynolds  was  killed,  and  Biddle's  brigade  was  posted 
on  its  left  in  the  open  ground  along  the  crest  of  the  same 
ridge,  with  Cooper's  battery  in  the  interval.  Cutler's  brigade 

took  up  its  for 
mer  position  on 
the  right  of  the 
road.  Having 
disposed  of 
Wadsworth's  di 
vision  and  my 
o  w  n  division, 
which  was  now 
under  command 
o  f  Brigadier- 
General  R  o  w- 
ley,  I  directed 

General  Robinson's  division  to  remain  in  reserve  at  the 
Seminary,  and  to  throw  up  a  small  semicircular  rail  intrencli- 
ment  in  the  grove  in  front  of  the  building.  Toward  the  close 
of  the  action  this  defence,  weak  and  imperfect  as  it  was, 
proved  to  be  of  great  service. 

The  accompanying  map  shows  the  position  of  troops  and 
batteries  at  this  time. 

It  will  be  seen  that  Heth's  division  is  formed  on  the  west 
ern  ridge  which  bounds  Willoughby's  Run  and  along  a  cross 
road  which  intersects  the  Chambersburg  road  at  right  angles. 


FIRST   DAY   OF  BATTLE   OF   GETTYSBURG.        137 

Fender's  division,  posted  in  rear  as  a  support  to  Heth,  was 
formed  in  the  following  order  by  brigades  :  Thomas,  Lane, 
Scale,  and  McGowan  (under  Perrin)  ;  the  first  named  on  the 
rebel  left  and  Perrin  on  the  right.  To  sustain  Heth's 
advance  and  crush  out  all  opposition,  both  Pegram's  and 
Mclntosh's  artillery  were  posted  on  the  crest  of  the  ridge 
west  of  the  Hun. 

While  this  was  going  on,  General  Howard,  who  was  await 
ing  the  arrival  of  his  corps,  had  climbed  into  the  steeple  of 
the  seminary  to  obtain  a  view  of  the  surrounding  country. 
At  11.30  A.M  he  learned  that  General  Eeynolds  was  killed, 
and  that  the  command  of  the  three  corps  (the  First, 
Eleventh,  and  Third)  constituting  the  Left  Wing  of  the 
army  devolved  upon  him  by  virtue  of  his  rank.  He  saw 
that  the  First  Corps  was  contending  against  large  odds  and 
sent  back  for  the  Eleventh  Corps  to  come  up  at  double- 
quick.  Upon  assuming  command  of  the  Left  Wing  ho 
turned  over  his  own  corps  to  Major-General  Carl  Schurz, 
who  then  gave  up  the  command  of  his  division  to  General 
Barlow.  Howard  notified  General  Meade  of  Keynolds's 
death,  but  forgot  to  take  back  or  modify  the  false  state 
ment  he  had  .made  about  the  First  Corps,  now  engaged  be 
fore  his  eyes,  in  a  most  desperate  contest  with  a  largely 
superior  force ;  so  that  General  Meade  was  still  left  under 
the  impression  that  the  First  Corps  had  fled  from  the 
field. 

Howard  also  sent  a  request  to  Slocum,  who  was  at  Two 
Taverns,  only  about  five  miles  from  Gettysburg,  to  come 
forward,  but  Slocum  declined,  without  orders  from  Meade. 
He  probably  thought  if  any  one  commander  could  assume 
the  direction  of  other  corps,  he  might  antagonize  the  plans 
of  the  General-in-Chief. 

Upon  receiving  the  news  of  the  death  of  General  Eeynolds 


138          CHANCELLORSVILLE   AND   GETTYSBURG. 

and  the  supposed  flight  of  the  First  Corps,  General  Meade 
superseded  Howard  by  sending  bis  junior  officer,  General 
Hancock,  to  assume  command  of  the  field  and  rally  the  First 
Corps — who  needed  no  rallying,  as  they  were  all  fighting  in 
line  of  battle.  He  also  ordered  General  John  Newton  of  the 
Sixth  Corps  to  take  command  of  the  First  Corps. 

The  head  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  reached  Gettysburg  at 
12.45  P.M.,  and  the  rear  at  1.45  P.M.  Schimmelpfennig's 
division  led  the  way,  followed  by  that  of  Barlow.  The  two 
were  directed  to  prolong  the  line  of  the  First  Corps  to  the 
right  along  Seminary  Ridge.  The  remaining  division,  that 
of  Steinwehr,  with  the  reserve  artillery  under  Major  Osborne, 
were  ordered  to  occupy  Cemetery  Hill,  in  rear  of  Gettysburg, 
as  a  reserve  to  the  entire  line.  Before  this  disposition  could 
be  carried  out,  however,  Buford  rode  up  to  me  with  the  in 
formation  that  his  scouts  reported  the  advance  of  Ewell's 
corps  from  Heidlersburg  directly  on  my  right  flank.  I  sent 
a  staff  officer  to  communicate  this  intelligence  to  General 
Howard,  with  a  message  that  I  would  endeavor  to  hold  my 
ground  against  A.  P.  Hill's  corps  if  he  could,  by  means  of 
the  Eleventh  Corps,  keep  Ewell  from  attacking  my  right. 
He*accordingly  directed  the  Eleventh  Corps  to  change  front 
to  meet  Ewell.  As  it  did  so,  Devins's  cavalry  brigade  fell 
back  and  took  up  a  position  to  the  right  and  rear  of  this  line 
just  south  of  the  railroad  bridge. 

The  concentration  of  Bodes's  and  Early's  divisions — the 
one  from  Carlisle  and  the  other  from  York — took  place  with 
great  exactness ;  both  arriving  in  sight  of  Gettysburg  at  the 
same  time.  The  other  division,  that  of  Johnson,  took  ft 
longer  route  from  Carlisle  by  way  of  Greenwood,  to  escort 
the  trains,  and  did  not  reach  the  battle-field  until  sunset. 
Anderson's  division  of  Hill's  corps  was  also  back  at  the  pass 
in  the  mountains  on  the  Charnbersburg  road.  It  had  halted 


FIRST  DAY  OF  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG.        139 

to  allow  Johnson  to  pass,  and  then  followed  him  to  Gettys 
burg,  reaching  there  about  dusk. 

The  first  indication  I  had  that  Ewell  had  arrived,  and  was 
taking  part  in  the  battle,  came  from  a  battery  posted  on  an 
eminence  called  Oak  Hill,  almost  directly  in  the  prolonga 
tion  of  my  line,  and  about  a  mile  north  of  Colonel  Stone's 
position.  This  opened  fire  about  1.30-p.M.,  and  rendered 
new  dispositions  necessary ;  for  Howard  had  not  guarded 
my  right  flank  as  proposed,  and  indeed  soon  had  more  than 
he  could  do  to  maintain  his  line.  When  the  guns  referred 
to  opened  fire,  Wadsworth,  without  waiting  for  orders,  threw 
Cutler's  brigade  back  into  the  woods  on  Seminary  Eidge, 
north  of  the  railroad  grading  ;  a  movement  I  sanctioned  as 
necessary.  Morrow's  brigade  was  concealed  from  the  view 
of  the  enemy,  in  the  woods  where  Eeynolds  fell,  and  Biddle's 
brigade,  by  my  order,  changed  front  to  the  north.  It  could 
do  so  with  impunity,  as  it  was  behind  a  ridge  which  con 
cealed  its  left  flank  from  Hill's  corps,  and  was  further  pro 
tected  in  that  direction  by  two  companies  of  the  Twentieth 
New  York  State  Militia,  who  occupied  a  house  and  barn  in 
advance,  sent  there  by  the  colonel  of  that  regiment,  Theo 
dore  B.  Gates,  whose  skill  and  energy  were  of  great  service 
to  me  during  the  battle. 

It  would  of  course  have  been  impossible  to  hold  the  line 
if  Hill  attacked  on  the  west  and  Ewell  assailed  me  at  the 
same  time  on  the  north  ;  but  I  occupied  the  central  position, 
and  their  converging  columns  did  not  strike  together  until 
the  grand  final  advance  at  the  close  of  the  day,  and  there 
fore  I  was  able  to  resist  several  of  their  isolated  attacks  be 
fore  the  last  crash  came. 

Stone's  brigade  in  the  centre  had  a  difficult  angle  to  de 
fend,  but  was  partially  sheltered  by  a  ridge  on  the  west. 
His  position  was  in  truth  the  key-point  of  the  first  day's 


140    CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

battle,  for  it  overlooked  the  field,  and  its  possession  by  the 
enemy  would .  cut  our  force  in  two,  enfilade  Morrow's  and 
Biddle's  brigades,  and  compel  a  hasty  retreat. 

After  Hall's  battery  was  driven  back,  General  Wadsworth 
borrowed  Calef 's  regular  battery  from  the  cavalry,  and  posted 
it  in  the  same  place  Hall  had  occupied — that  is,  on  the  right 
of  Stone.  When  the  remainder  of  the  division  came  up, 
Captain  Reynolds's  Battery  "L"  of  the  First  New  York  Ar 
tillery,  as  already  stated,  was  sent  to  relieve  Calef,  and  assist 
Stone  by  keeping  down  the  fire  of  two  rebel  batteries  on  the 
ridge  to  the  west,  but  when  Swell's  artillery  also  opened, 
the  cross  fire  became  too  severe.  Calef  was  withdrawn,  and 
Reynolds,  though  severely  wounded,  formed  his  battery 
parallel  to  the  road,  with  his  left  sheltered  by  the  wooded 
ridge.  The  rebel  batteries  soon  after  ceased  firing  for  the 
time  being,  and  at  Wadsworth's  request,  Colonel  Wain- 
wright,  Chief  of  Artillery  to  the  First  Corps,  posted  a  sec 
tion  of  Reynolds's  battery,  under  Lieutenant  Wilbur,  on 
Seminary  Ridge,  south  of  the  railroad  cut ;  Stewart's  Battery 
"B"  Fourth  United  States  being  on  a  line  north  of  the  cut. 
Cooper's  battery  was  directed  to  meet  Swell's  attack  from 
the  north,  and  Stevens's  Fifth  Maine  battery  was  retained 
behind  the  Seminary  in  reserve. 

Barlow's  division  on  the  right  and  Schimmelpfennig's  on 
the  left,  formed  somewhat  hastily  against  Ewell,  whose  line 
of  battle  faced  south.  Barlow  rested  his  right  on  a  wooded 
knoll,  constituting  part  of  the  western  bank  of  Rock  Creek. 
As  there  was  an  open  country  to  the  east  he  considered  that 
flank  secure,  for  no  enemy  was  in  sight  there,  and  if  they 
came  from  that  direction,  there  would  be  time  to  make  fresh 
dispositions.  After  the  formation  there  was  an  interval  of 
a  quarter  of  a  mile  between  their  left  and  the  First  Corps, 
which  might  have  been  avoided  by  placing  the  two  divisions 


FIRST  DAY   OF   BATTLE  OF   GETTYSBURG.         141 

farther  apart.  This  was  a  serious  thing  to  me,  for  the  at 
tempt  to  fill  this  interval  and  prevent  the  enemy  from  pene 
trating  there,  lengthened  and  weakened  my  line,  and  used  up 
my  reserves.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  Eleventh  Corps  were 
too  far  out.  It  would  have 'been  better,  in  my  opinion,  if  its 
left  had  been  echeloned  in  rear  of  the  right  of  the  First 
Corps,  and  its  right  had  rested  on  the  strong  brick  buildings 
with  stone  foundations  at  the  Almshouse.  The  enemy  then 
could  not  have  turned  the  right  without  compromising  the 
safety  of  the  turning  column  and  endangering  his  communi 
cations  ;  a  movement  he  would  hardly  like  to  make,  especially 
as  he  did  not  know  what  troops  might  be  coming  up.  Still 
they  had  a  preponderating  force,  and  as  their  whole  aimy 
was  concentrating  on  Gettysburg,  it  was  not  possible  to  keep 
them  back  for  any  great  length  of  time  unless  the  First  and 
Eleventh  Corps  were  heavily  reinforced.  The  position  of 
our  forces  and  those  of  the  enemy,  will  be  best  understood 
by  a  reference  to  the  map  on  page  125. 

About  2  P.M.,  after  the  Eleventh  Corps  line  was  formed, 
General  Howard  rode  over,  inspected,  and  approved  it.  He 
also  examined  my  position  and  gave  orders,  in  case  I  was 
forced  to  retreat,  to  fall  back  to  Cemetery  Hill.  I  think 
this  was  the  first  and  only  order  I  received  from  him  during 
the  day. 

Rodes's  division  of  five  brigades  was  formed  across  Semi 
nary  Ridge,  facing  south,  with  Iverson  on  the  right,  support 
ed  by  Daniels  and  O'Xeil  in  the  centre,  and  Dole  on  the  left, 
Ramseur  being  in  reserve.  Iverson  was  sent  to  attack  the 
First  Corps  on  Seminary  Ridge,  and  O'Neil  and  Dole  went  for 
ward  about  2.45  P.M.,  to  keep  back  the  Eleventh  Corps.  When 
the  two  latter  became  fairly  engaged  in  front,  about  3. 30  P.M., 
Early  came  up  with  his  whole  division  and  struck  the  Union 
right.  This  decided  the  battle  in  favor  of  the  enemy. 


112    CHANCELLORSVILLK  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

Barlow  had  advanced  with  Von  Gilsa's  brigade,  had  driven 
back  Ewell's  skirmish  line,  and  with  the  aid  of  Wilkinson's 
battery  was  preparing  to  hold  the  Carlisle  road.  He  was 
not  aware  that  Early  was  approaching,  and  saw  Dole's  ad 
vance  with  pleasure,  for  he  felt  confident  he  could  swing  his 
right  around  and  envelop  Dole's  left ;  a  manoeuvre  which 
could  hardly  fail  to  be  successful. 

Schimmelpfennig  now  threw  forward  Von  Amberg's  bri 
gade  to  intervene  between  O'Neil  and  Dole,  and  to  strike  the 
right  flank  of  the  latter;  but  Dole  avoided  the  blow  by  a 
rapid  change  of  front.  This  necessarily  exposed  his  left  to 
Barlow,  who  could  not  take  advantage  of  it  as  he  was  un 
expectedly  assailed  by  Early's  division  on  his  own  right, 
which  was  enveloped,  and  in  great  danger.  His  men  fought 
gallantly,  and  Gordon,  who  attacked  them,  says,  made  stern 
resistance  until  the  rebels  were  within  fifty  paces  of  them. 
As  Barlow  was  shot  down,  and  their  right  flank  enveloped, 
they  were  forced  to  retreat  to  the  town.  This  isolated  Von 
Amberg's  brigade,  and  Dole  claims*  to  have  captured  the 
greater  portion  of  it. 

The  retrograde  movement  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  neces 
sarily  exposed  the  right  flank  of  the  First  to  attacks  from 
O'Neil  and  Eamseur. 

Howard  sent  forward  Ouster's  brigade,  of  Steinwehr's 
division,  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  Eleventh  Corps ;  but 
its  force  was  too  small  to  be  effective ;  its  flanks  were  soon 
turned  by  Hays's  and  Hokes's  brigades,  of  Early's  division, 
and  it  was  forced  back  with  the  rest. 

We  will  now  go  back  to  the  First  Corps  and  describe 
what  took  place  there  while  these  events  were  transpiring. 

When  the  wide  interval  between  the  First  and  Eleventh 
Corps  was  brought  to  my  notice  by  Colonel  Bankhead  of 
my  staff,  I  detached  Baxter's  brigade  of  Robinson's  division 


FIRST   DAY   OF   BATTLE   OF    GETTYSBURG.        143 

to  fill  it.  This  brigade  moved  promptly,  and  took  post  on 
Cutler's  right,  but  before  it  could  form  across  the  interven 
ing  space,  O'Neil's  brigade  assailed  its  right  flank,  and 
subsequently  its  left,  and  Baxter  was  forced  to  change 
front  alternately,  to  meet  these  attacks.  He  repulsed 
O'Neil,  but  found  his  left  flank  again  exposed  to  an  attack 
from  Iverson,  who  was  advancing  in  that  direction.  He 
now  went  forward  and  took  shelter  behind  a  stone  fence  on 
the  Mummasburg  road,  which  protected  his  right  flank, 
while  an  angle  in  the  fence  which  turned  in  a  southwesterly 
direction  covered  his  front.  As  his  men  lay  down  behind 
the  fence,  Iverson's  brigade  came  very  close  up,  not  know 
ing  our  troops  were  there.  Baxter's  men  sprang  to  their 
feet  and  delivered  a  most  deadly  volley  at  very  short  range, 
which  left  500  of  Iverson's  men  dead  and  wounded,  and  so 
demoralized  them,  that  all  gave  themselves  up  as  prison 
ers.  One  regiment,  however,  after  stopping  our  firing  by- 
pitting  up  a  white  flag,  slipped  away  and  escaped.  This 
destructive  effect  was  not  caused  by  Baxter  alone,  for  he 
was  aided  by  Cutler's  brigade,  which  was  thrown  forward  on 
Iverson's  right  flank,  by  the  fire  of  our  batteries,  and  the 
distant  fire  from  Stone's  brigade.  So  long  as  the  latter 
held  his  position,  his  line,  with  that  of  Cutler  and  Robin- 
son's  division,  constituted  a  demi-bastion  and  curtain,  and 
every  force  that  entered  the  angle  suffered  severely.  Rodes 
in  his  report  speaks  of  it  as  "a  murderous  enfilade,  and  re 
verse  fire,  to  which,  in  addition  to  the  direct  fire  it  encoun 
tered,  Daniels's  brigade  had  been  subject  to  from  the  time 
it  commenced  its  final  advance." 

While  Iverson  was  making  his  attack,  Rodes  sent  one  of 
his  reserve  brigades — the  one  just  referred  to,  that  of  Dan 
iels — against  Stone.  This  joined  Da  vis's  brigade  of  Hill's 
corps,  and  the  two  charged  on  Stone's  three  little  regiments. 


144          CHANCELLORS VILLE  AXD   GETTYSBURG. 

Stone  threw  forward  one  of  these — the  One  Hundred  and 
Forty-ninth  Pennsylvania,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Dwight, 
to  the  railroad  cut,  where  they  were  partially  sheltered. 
Colonel  Dana's  regiment,  the  One  Hundred  and  Forty-third 
Pennsylvania  was  poshed  on  the  road  in  rear  of  Dwight  and 
to  the  right.  "When  I  saw  this  movement  I  thought  it  a 
very  bold  one,  but  its  results  were  satisfactory.  Two  vol 
leys  and  a  bayonet  charge  by  Dwight  drove  Daniels  back 
for  the  time  being.1  In  this  attack  Colonel  Stone  was 
severely  wounded,  and  the  command  of  his  brigade  de 
volved  upon  Colonel  Wister  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Fif 
tieth  Pennsylvania. 

This  attack  should  have  been  simultaneous  with  one  from 
the  nearest  troops  of  Hill's  corps,  but  the  latter  were  lying 
down  in  a  sheltered  position,  and  Daniels  urged  them  in 
vain  to  go  forward. 

Not  being  able  to  force  his  way  in  front  on  account  of 
D wight's  position  in  the  railroad  cut,  Daniels  brought 
artillery  to  enfilade  it,  and  threw  the  Thirty-second  North 
Carolina  across  it.  The  cut  being  no  longer  tenable,  Dwight 
retreated  to  the  road  and  formed  on  Dana's  left. 

Daniels  had  been  originally  ordered  to  protect  Iverson's 
right,  but  Iverson  swung  his  right  around  without  notifying 
Daniels,  and  thus  dislocated  the  line. 

Ramseur  now  came  forward  to  aid  Iverson,  and  I  sent 
Paul's  brigade  of  Robinson's  division,  which  was  accom- 

1  Dwight  was  a  hard  fighter,  and  not  averse  to  plain  speaking.  Once,  when 
Secretary  of  War  Stanton  had  determined  to  grant  no  more  passes  to  go  down  to 
the'army,  Dwight  applied  for  permission  for  an  old  man  to  visit  his  dying  son.  Th'e 
request  was  refused  ;  whereupon  Dwight  said  :  "  My  name  is  Dwight.,  Walton 
Dwiyfit,  Lieutenant-Colonel  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Forty-ninth  Regiment  of 
Pennsylvania  Volunteers.  You  can  ditmisss  me  from  the  service  a.s  noon  a.v  you 
like,  but  lam  going  to  tell  you  what  I  think  of  y>u?  and  he  expressed  himself 
in  terms  far  from  complimentary  ;  whereupon  Stanton  rescinded(  the  order  and 
gave  him  the  pass. 


FIRST   DAY   OF   BATTLE   OF   GETTYSBURG.        145 

panied  by  Robinson  in  person,  to  assist  Baxter,  and  if  possi 
ble,  to  fill  the  interval  between  the  First  and  Eleventh 
Corps,  for  I  feared  the  enemy  would  penetrate  there  and 
turn  my  right  flank. 

When  Paul's  brigade  arrived,  Baxter,  being  out  of  ammu 
nition,  withdrew,  and  formed  in  the  woods  behind  Stewart's 
battery  to  refill  his  cartridge-boxes. 

General  Howard  has  stated  that  the  interval  referred  to 
was  filled  by  Dilger's  and  Wheeler's  batteries  of  the 
Eleventh  Corps,  but  a  glance  at  the  official  map  will  show 
that,  before  Paul's  advance,  these  batteries  were  several  hun 
dred  yards  distant  from  the  First  Corps. 

Another  attack  was  now  made  from  the  north  and  west 
by  both  Daniels's  and  Davis's  brigades.  Colonel  Wister 
faced  his  own  regiment,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Huide- 
koper,  to  the  west,  and  the  other  two  regiments  to  the 
north.  The  enemy  were  again  repulsed  by  two  volleys  and 
a  gallant  bayonet  charge,  led  by  Huidekoper,  who  lost 
an  arm  in  the  fight.  Colonel  Wister  being  shot  through  the 
face  the  command  devolved  upon  Colonel  Dana,  another 
veteran  of  the  Mexican  war. 

There  had  been  a  great  lack  of  co-ordination  in  these  as 
saults,  for  they  were  independent  movements,  each  repulsed 
in  its  turn.  The  last  attack,  however,  against  Wister  was  ex 
tended  by  Brockenborough's  and  Pettigrew's  brigades  to 
Morrow's  front  in  the  woods,  but  Morrow  held  on  firmly  to 
his  position. 

I  now  sent  my  last  reserve,  the  One  Hundred  and  Fifty- 
first  Pennsylvania,  to  take  post  between  Stone's  and  Bid- 
die's  brigades,  to  be  in  readiness  to  reinforce  either. 

So  far  I  had  done  all  that  was  possible  to  defend  my  front, 
but  circumstances  were  becoming  desperate.  My  line  was 
very  thin  and  weak,  and  my  last  reserve  had  been  thrown  in. 
VI?— 7 


146    CHANCELLORRVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

As  we  had  positive  information  that  the  entire  rebel  army  was 
coming  on,  it  was  evident  enough  that  we  could  not  contend 
any  longer,  unless  some  other  corps  came  to  our  assistance. 
I  therefore  sent  my  adjutant,  General  Halstead,  to  request 
General  Howard  either  to  reinforce  me  from  Steinwehr's  di 
vision,  or  order  me  to  retreat,  as  it  was  impossible  for  me  to 
remain  where  I  was  in  the  face  of  the  constantly  increasing 
forces  which  were  approaching  from  the  west.  Howard, 
with  something  of  the  incredulity  which  had  been  so  inaus 
picious  to  us  at  Chancellorsville,  insisted  that  Halstead  mis 
took  rail  fences  for  troops  in  the  distance.  The  lorgnettes 
of  his  staff  finally  convinced  him  of  his  error ;  he  still,  how 
ever,  refused  to  order  me  to  retire,  but  sent  Halstead  off 
to  find  Buford's  cavalry,  and  order  it  to  report  to  me.  The 
First  Corps  had  suffered  severely  in  these  encounters,  but 
by  this  additional  delay,  and  the  overwhelming  odds  against 
us,  it  was  almost  totally  sacrificed.  General  Wadsworth  re 
ported  half  of  his  men  were  killed  or  wounded,  and  Rowley's 
division  suffered  in  the  same  proportion.  Stone  reported 
two-thirds  of  his  brigade  had  fallen.  Hardly  a  field  officer 
remained  unhurt.  After  five  color-bearers  of  the  Twenty- 
fourth  Michigan  Volunteers  had  fallen,  Colonel  Morrow 
took  the  flag  in  his  own  hands,  but  was  immediately  pros 
trated.  A  private  then  seized  it,  and,  although  mortally 
wounded,  still  held  it  firmly  in  his  grasp.  Buford  was  in  a 
distant  part  of  the  field,  with  Devins's  brigade,  covering 
the  retreat  of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  and  already  had  all  he 
could  attend  to.  He  expressed  himself  in  pretty  round 
terms  at  the  idea  that  he  could  keep  back  Hill's  entire  corps 
with  Gamble's  cavalry  brigade  alone. 

As  Howard  seemed  to  have  little  or  no  confidence  in  his 
troops  on  Cemetery  Hill,  he  was  perhaps  justified  in  retaining 
them  in  line  there  for  the  moral  effect  they  would  produce. 


FIRST   DAY   OP   BATTLE   OF   GETTYSBURG.         147 

About  the  time  the  Eleventh  Corps  gave  way  on  the 
right,  the  Confederate  forces  made  their  final  advance  in 
double  lines,  backed  by  strong  reserves,  and  it  was  impos 
sible  for  the  few  men  left  in  the  First  Corps  to  keep  them 
back,  especially  as  Fender's  large  division  overlapped  our 
left  for  a  quarter  of  a  mile ;  Robinson's  right  was  turned, 
and  General  Paul  was  shot  through  both  eyes  in  the  effort 
to  stem  the  tide.  They  could  not  contend  against  Ramseur 
in  front,  and  O'Neil  on  the  flank,  at  the  same  time. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  became  a  pretty  serious 
question  how  to  extricate  the  First  Corps  and  save  its  artil 
lery  before  it  was  entirely  surrounded  and  captured. 

Biddle,  Morrow,  and  Dana  were  all  forced  back  from  the 
ridge  they  had  defended  so  long,  which  bordered  "Wil- 
loughby's  Run.  Each  brigade  was  flanked,  and  Stone's 
men  under  Dana  were  assailed  in  front  and  on  both  flanks. 
Yet  even  then  Daniels  speaks  of  the  severe  fighting  which 
took  place  before  he  could  win  the  position. 

AYliat  was  left  of  the  First  Corps  after  all  this  slaughter 
rallied  on  Seminary  Ridge.  Many  of  the  men  entered  a 
semi-circular  rail  entrenchment  which  I  had  caused  to  be 
thrown  up  early  in  the  day,  and  held  that  for  a  time  by 
lying  down  and  firing  over  the  pile  of  rails.  The  enemy 
were  now  closing  in  on  us  from  the  south,  west,  and  north, 
and  still  no  orders  came  to  retreat.  Buford  arrived  about 
this  time,  and  perceiving  that  Perrin's  brigade  in  swinging 
around  to  envelop  our  left  exposed  its  right  flank,  I  di 
rected  him  to  charge.  He  reconnoitered  the  position  they 
held,  but  did  not  carry  out  the  order ;  I  do  not  know  why. 
It  was  said  afterward  he  found  the  fences  to  be  an  impedi 
ment  ;  but  he  rendered  essential  service  by  dismounting  his 
men  and  throwing  them  into  a  grove  south  of  the  Fairfield 
road,  where  they  opened  a  severe  fire,  which  checked  the 


148    CHANCELLORS VILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

rebel  advance  and  prevented  them  from  cutting  us  off  from 
our  direct  line  of  retreat  to  Cemetery  Hill. 

The  first  long  line  that  came  on  from  the  west  was  swept 
away  by  our  artillery,  which  fired  with  very  destructive  effect, 
taking  the  rebel  line  en  ecliarpe. 

Although  the  Confederates  advanced  in  such  force,  our 
men  still  made  strong  resistance  around  the  Seminary,  and 
by  the  aid  of  our  artillery,  which  was  most  effective,  beat 
back  and  almost  destroyed  the  first  line  of  Scales's  brigade, 
wounding  both  Scales  and  Fender.  The  former  states  that 
he  arrived  within  seventy-five  feet  of  the  guns,  and  adds  : 
"  Here  the  fire  was  most  severe.  Every  field  officer  but  one 
was  killed  or  wounded.  The  brigade  halted  in  some  confu 
sion  to  return  this  fire."  My  Adjutant-Generals  Baird  and 
Hal  tead,  and  my  aids  Lee,  Marten,  Jones,  and  Lambdin 
had  hot  work  carrying  orders  at  this  time,  and  it  is  a  marvel 
that  any  of  them  survived  the  storm  of  bullets  that  swept 
the  field. 

Robinson  was  forced  back  toward  the  Seminary,  but 
Lalted  notwithstanding  the  pressure  upon  him,  and  formed 
line  to  save  Stewart's  battery  north  of  the  railroad  cut, 
which  had  remained  too  long,  and  was  in  danger  of  being 
captured. 

Cutler's  brigade  in  the  meantime  had  formed  behind  the 
railroad  grading  to  face  the  men  who  were  pursuing  the 
Eleventh  Corps.  This  show  of  force  had  a  happy  effect, 
for  it  caused  the  enemy  in  that  direction  to  halt  and  throw 
out  a  skirmish  line,  and  the  delay  enabled  the  artillery  soon 
after  to  pass  through  the  interval  between  Cutler  on  the 
north  and  Buford's  cavalry  on  the  south. 

As  the  enemy  were  closing  in  upon  us  and  crashes  of 
musketry  came  from  my  right  and  left,  I  had  little  hope  of 
saving  my  guns,  but  I  threw  my  headquarters  guard,  under 


FIRST  DAY  OF  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG.        149 

Captain  Glenn  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Forty-ninth  Penn 
sylvania,  into  the  Seminary  and  kept  the  right  of  Scales's 
brigade  back  twenty  minutes  longer,  while  their  left  was 
held  by  Baxter's  brigade  of  Robinson's  division,  enabling 
the  few  remaining  troops,  ambulances,  and  artillery  to  re- 
troat  in  comparative  safety.  It  became  necessary,  however, 
to  abandon  one  gun  of  Captain  Eeynolds's  battery,  as  several 
of  the  horses  were  shot  and  there  was  no  time  to  disengage 
them  from  the  piece.  Three  broken  and  damaged  caisson 
bodies  were  also  left  behind.  The  danger  at  this  time  came 
principally  from  Hokes's  and  Hays's  brigades,  which  were 
making  their  way  into  the  town  on  the  eastern  side,  threat 
ening  to  cut  us  off  from  Cemetery  Hill.  The  troops  in  front 
of  the  Seminary  were  stayed  by  the  firm,  attitude  of  Buford's 
cavalry,  and  made  a  bend  in  their  line,  apparently  with  a 
view  to  form  square. 

I  waited  until  the  artillery  had  gone  and  then  rode  back 
to  the  town  with  my  staff.  As  we  passed  through  the 
streets,  pale  and  frightened  women  came  out  and  offered  us 
coffee  and  food,  and  implored  us  not  to  abandon  them. 

Colonel  Livingston  of  my  staff,  who  had  been  sent  on  a 
message,  came  back  to  the  Seminary,  not  knowing  that  we 
had  left.  He  says  the  enemy  were  advancing  toward  the 
crest  very  cautiously,  evidently  under  the  impression  there 
was  an  ambuscade  waiting  for  them  there.  They  were  also 
forming  against  cavalry. 

On  the  way  I  must  have  met  an  aide  that  Howard  says  he 
sent  to  me  with  orders  to  retreat,  but  I  do  not  remember 
receiving  any  message  of  the  kind. 

I  observe  that  Howard  in  his  account  of  the  battle  claims 
to  have  handled  the  First  and  Eleventh  Corps  from  11  A.M. 
until  4  P.M.,  but  at  11  A.M.  his  corps  was  away  back  on  the 
road,  and  did  not  arrive  until  about  1  P.M. 


150          CHANCELLORSVILLE   AJS'D  GETTYSBURG. 

The  map  previously  given  on  page  125  demonstrates  that 
we  were  a  mere  advance  guard  of  the  army,  and  shows  the 
impossibility  of  our  defending  Gettysburg  for  any  length  of 
time. 

The  First  Corps  was  broken  and  defeated,  but  not  dis 
mayed.  There  were  but  few  left,  but  they  showed  the  true 
spirit  of  soldiers.  They  walked  leisurely  from  the  Seminary 
to  the  town,  and  did  not  run.  I  remember  seeing  Hall's 
battery  and  the  Sixth  Wisconsin  regiment  halt  from  time  to 
time  to  face  the  enemy,  and  fire  down  the  streets.  Both 
Doles  and  Ramsey  claim  to  have  had  sharp  encounters 
there.  Many  of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  and  part  of  Robinson's 
division,  which  had  been  far  out,  lost  their  way,  and  were 
captured  in  the  attempt  to  reach  Steinwehr's  division  on 
Cemetery  Hill,  which  was  the  rallying  point. 

When  I  arrived  there  I  found  General  Howard,  surrounded 
by  his  staff,  awaiting  us  at  the  main  gate  of  the  cemetery. 
He  made  arrangements  to  hold  the  road  which  led  up  from 
the  town,  and  which  diverged  to  Baltimore  and  Taneytown, 
by  directing  me  to  post  the  First  Corps  on  the  left  in  the 
cemetery,  while  he  assembled  the  Eleventh  Corps  on  the 
right.  Soon  after  he  rode  over  to  ask  me,  in  case  his  men 
(Steinwehr's  division)  deserted  their  guns,  to  be  in  readiness 
to  defend  them.  General  Schurz  about  this  time  was 
busily  engaged  in  rallying  his  men,  and  did  all  that  was 
possible  to  encourage  them  to  form  line  again.  I  under 
stood  they  were  told  that  Sigel  had  arrived  and  assumed 
command,  a  fiction  thought  justifiable  under  the  circum 
stances.  It  seemed  to  me  that  the  discredit  that  attached 'to 
them  after  Chancellorsville  had  in  a  measure  injured  their 
morale  and  esprit-de-corps,  for  they  were  rallied  with  great 
difficulty. 

About  4.30  P.M.  General  Hancock  arrived  with  orders  from 


FIRST   DAY   OF   BATTLE   OF   GETTYSBURG.        151 

General  Meade  to  supersede  Howard.  Congress  had  passed 
a  law  authorizing  the  President  to  put  any  general  over  any 
other  superior  in  rank  if,  in  his  judgment,  the  good  of  the 
service  demanded  it,  and  General  Meade  now  assumed  this 
power  in  the  name  of  the  President.  Owing  to  the  false 
despatch  Howard  had  sent  early  in  the  day,  Meade  was 
under  the  impression  that  the  First  Corps  had  fled  without 
fighting,  and  Hancock  had  orders  to  rally  them.  More 
than  half  the  corps  now  lay  dead  and  wounded  on  the  field, 
and  hardly  a  field  officer  had  escaped. 

Howard  refused  to  submit  to  Hancock's  assumption  of  au 
thority,  and  quite  a  scene  occurred.  He  said,  "  Why,  Hancock, 
you  cannot  give  any  orders  here !  I  am  in  command,  and  I 
rank  you  ! "  Hancock  replied  that  he  was  sent  by  order  of 
General  Meade,  but  Howard  said  he  should  refuse  to  acknowl 
edge  his  authority.  Hancock  then  said  he  would  go  back 
to  headquarters  and  report,  but  Howard  asked  him  to  re 
main  and  help  him  organize  the  troops.  Hancock  then  rode 
over  to  me,  perhaps  a  little  doubtful  whether  I  would  join 
Howard  in  not  recognizing  his  right  to  command.  As  he 
ranked  me,  and  I  had  the  greatest  confidence  in  his  ability, 
I  was  happy  to  serve  under  him.  He  said,  "  General  Double- 
day,  I  command  this  field,  and  I  wish  you  to  send  a  regiment 
over  to  that  hill,"  pointing  to  Gulp's  Hill.  I  answered : 
"My  corps  have  been  fighting,  General,  since  ten  o'clock, 
and  they  have  been  all  cut  to  pieces."  He  replied :  "  I  know 
that,  sir,  but  this  is  a  great  emergency,  and  every  one  must 
do  all  he  can."  He  rode  over  again  soon  after,  and  asked  if  I 
had  sent  the  regiment.  I  replied  :  "My  regiments  are  now 
reduced  to  the  size  of  companies.  I  have  sent  a  brigade 
under  General  Wadsworth." 

Hancock  was  much  pleased  with  the  ridge  we  were  on,  as 
a  defensive  position,  and  considered  it  admirably  adapted 


152    CHAXCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

for  a  battle-field.  Its  gentle  slopes  for  artillery,  its  stone 
fences  and  rocky  boulders  to  shelter  infantry,  and  its  rugged 
but  commanding  eminences  on  either  flank,  where  far-reach 
ing  batteries  could  be  posted,  were  great  advantages.  It 
covered  the  principal  roads  to  Washington  and  Baltimore, 
and  its  convex  shape,  enabling  troops  to  reinforce  with 
celerity  any  point  of  the  line  from  the  centre,  or  by  moving 
along  the  chord  of  the  arc,  was  probably  the  cause  of  our 
final  success.  The  enemy,  on  the  contrary,  having  a  con 
cave  order  of  battle,  was  obliged  to  move  troops  much 
longer  distances  to  support  any  part  of  his  line,  and  could 
not  communicate  orders  rapidly,  nor  could  the  different 
corps  co-operate  promptly  with  each  other.  It  was  Han_ 
cock's  recommendation  that  caused  Meade  to  concentrate 
his  army  on  this  ridge,  but  Howard  received  the  thanks  of 
Congress  for  selecting  the  position.  He,  doubtless,  did  see 
its  advantages,  and  recommended  it  to  Hancock.  The  latter 
immediately  took  measures  to  hold  it  as  a  battle-ground  for 
the  army,  while  Howard  merely  used  the  cemetery  as  a 
rallying  point  for  his  defeated  troops.  Hancock  occupied 
all  the  prominent  points,  and  disposed  the  little  cavalry  and 
infantry  he  had  in  such  a  way  as  to  impress  the  enemy  with 
the  idea  that  heavy  reinforcements  had  come  up.  By  occu 
pying  Gulp's  Hill,  on  the  right,  with  Wadsworth's  brigade, 
and  posting  the  cavalry  on  the  left  to  take  up  a  good  deal 
of  space,  he  made  a  show  of  strength  not  warranted  by  the 
facts.  Both  Hill  and  Ewell  had  received  some  stunning 
blows  during  the  day,  and  were  disposed  to  be  cautious. 
They,  therefore,  did  not  press  forward  and  take  the  heights, 
as  they  could  easily  have  done  at  this  time,  but  not  so 
readily  after  an  hour's  delay,  for  then  Sickles's  corps  from 
Emmetsburg,  and  Slocum's  corps  from  Two  Taverns,  began 
to  approach  the  position.  The  two  rebel  divisions  of  Ander- 


FIRST   DAY   OF   BATTLE   OF   GETTYSBURG.         153 

son  and  Johnson,  however,  arrived  about  dusk,  which  would 
have  still  given  the  enemy  a  great  numerical  superiority. 

General  Lee  reached  the  field  before  Hancock  came,  and 
watched  the  retreat  of  the  First  and  Eleventh  Corps,  and 
Hancock's  movements  and  dispositions  through  his  field- 
glass.  He  was  not  deceived  by  this  show  of  force,  and  sent 
a  recommendation — not  an  order — to  Ewell  to  follow  us  up  ; 
but  Ewell,  in  the  exercise  of  his  discretion  as  a  corps  com 
mander,  did  not  do  so.  He  had  lost  3,000  men,  and  both  he 
and  Hill  were  under  orders  not  to  bring  on  a  general  engage 
ment.  In  fact  they  had  had  all  the  fighting  they  desired  for 
the  time  being.  Colonel  Campbell  Brown,  of  Swell's  staff, 
states  that  the  latter  was  preparing  to  move  forward  against 
the  height,  when  a  false  report  induced  him  to  send  Gordon's 
brigade  to  reinforce  Smith's  brigade  on  his  extreme  left,  to 
meet  a  supposed  Union  advance  in  that  direction. 

The  absence  of  these  two  brigades  decided  him  to  wait 
for  the  arrival  of  Johnson's  division  before  taking  further 
action.  When  the  latter  came  up,  Slocum  and  Sickles  were 
on  the  ground,  and  the  opportunity  for  a  successful  attack 
had  passed. 

In  sending  Hancock  forward  with  such  ample  powers, 
Meade  virtually  appointed  him  commander-in-chief  for  the 
time  being,  for  he  was  authorized  to  say  where  we  would 
fight,  and  when,  and  how.  In  the  present  instance,  in  ac 
cordance  with  his  recommendation,  orders  were  immediately 
sent  out  for  the  army  to  concentrate  on  Cemetery  Eidge. 
Two-thirds  of  the  Third  Corps,  and  all  of  the  Twelfth  came 
up,  and  by  six  o'clock  the  position  became  tolerably  secure. 
Stannard's  Second  Vermont  brigade  also  arrived,  and  as 
they  formed  part  of  my  command,  reported  to  me  for  duty  ; 
a  very  welcome  reinforcement  to  my  shattered  division. 

Sickles  had  taken  the  responsibility  of  joining  us  without 

7* 


154    CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

orders,  knowing  that  we  were  hard  pressed.  His  command 
prolonged  the  line  of  the  First  Corps  to  the  left.  Slocum's 
Corps — the  Twelfth — was  posted,  as  a  reserve,  also  on  the 
left. 

Hancock  now  relinquished  the  command  of  the  field  to 
Slocum  and  rode  back  to  Taneytown  to  confer  with  Meade 
and  explain  his  reasons  for  choosing  the  battle-field. 

Longstreet's  corps  soon  arrived  and  joined  Ewell  and 
Hill;  so  that  the  whole  rebel  army  was  ready  to  act 
against  us  the  next  morning,  with  the  exception  of  Pickett's 
division. 

At  the  close  of  the  day  General  John  Newton  rode  up  and 
took  charge  of  the  First  Corps  by  order  of  General  Meade, 
and  I  resumed  the  command  of  my  division.  Several  inci 
dents  occurred  during  the  severe  struggle  of  the  first  day 
which  are  worthy  of  record. 

Colonel  Wheelock  of  the  Ninety-seventh  New  York  was 
cut  off  during  the  retreat  of  Eobinson's  division,  and  took 
refuge  in  a  house.  A  rebel  lieutenant  entered  and  called 
upon  him.  to  surrender  his  sword.  This  he  declined  to  do, 
whereupon  the  lieutenant  called  in  several  of  his  men, 
formed  them  in  line,  took  out  his  watch  and  said  to  the  col 
onel,  "You  are  an  old  gray-headed  man,  and  I  dislike  to 
kill  you,  but  if  you  don't  give  up  that  sword  in  five  minutes, 
I  shall  order  these  men  to  blow  your  brains  out."  When 
the  time  was  up  the  Colonel  still  refused  to  surrender.  A 
sudden  tumult  at  the  door,  caused  by  some  prisoners  at 
tempting  to  escape,  called  the  lieutenant  off  for  a  moment. 
When  he  returned  the  colonel  had  given  his  sword  to  a  girl 
in  the  house  wTho  had  asked  him  for  it,  and  she  secreted  it 
between  two  mattresses.  He  was  then  marched  to  the 
rear,  but  being  negligently  guarded,  escaped  the  same  night 
and  returned  to  his  regiment. 


FIRST  DAY   OF   BATTLE   OF   GETTYSBURG.        155 

Another  occurrence  recalls  Browning's  celebrated  poem 
of  "  An  Incident  at  Eatisbon."  An  officer  of  the  Sixth  Wis 
consin  approached  Lieutenant-Colonel  Dawes,  the  com 
mander  of  the  regiment,  after  the  sharp  fight  in  the  rail 
road  cut.  The  colonel  supposed,  from  the  firm  and  erect 
attitude  of  the  man,  that  he  came  to  report  for  orders  of 
some  kind  ;  but  the  compressed  lips  told  a  different  story. 
With  a  great  effort  the  officer  said,  "  Tell  them  at  home  I  died 
like  a  man  and  a  soldier."  He  threw  open  his  breast,  dis 
played  a  ghastly  wound,  and  dropped  dead  at  the  colonel's 
feet. 

Another  incident  was  related  to  me  at  the  time,  but 
owing  to  our  hurried  movements  and  the  vicissitudes  of 
the  battle,  I  have  never  had  an  opportunity  to  verify  it.  It 
was  said  that  during  the  retreat  of  the  artillery  one  piece  of 
Stewart's  battery  did  not  limber  up  as  soon  as  the  others. 
A  rebel  officer  rushed  forward,  placed  his  hand  upon  it, 
and  presenting  a  pistol  at  the  back  of  the  cannoneer,  di 
rected  him  not  to  drive  off  with  the  piece.  The  latter  did 
so,  however,  received  the  ball  in  his  body,  caught  up  with 
the  battery  and  then  fell  dead. 

We  lay  on  our  arms  that  night  among  the  tombs  at  the 
Cemetery,  so  suggestive  of  the  shortness  of  life  and  the 
nothingness  of  fame  ;  but  the  men  were  little  disposed  to 
moralize  on  themes  like  these  and  were  too  much  exhausted 
to  think  of  anything  but  much-needed  rest. 


CHAPTER  V. 

BATTLE   OF   GETTYSBURG— THE  SECOND  DAY. 

THE  ridge  upon  which  the  Union  forces  were  now  assem 
bling  has  already  been  partially  described.  In  two  places 
it  sunk  away  into  intervening  valleys.  One  between  Gulps 
Hill  and  Cemetery  Hill ;  the  other  lay  for  several  hundred 
yards  north  of  Little  Eound  Top,  as  the  lesser  of  the  two 
eminences  on  the  left  was  called  to  distinguish  it  from  the 
higher  peak  called  Round  Top. 

At  1  A.M.  Meade  arrived  from  Taneytown.  When  I  saw 
him,  soon  after  daylight,  he  seemed  utterly  worn  out  and 
hollow-eyed.  Anxiety  and  want  of  sleep  were  evidently 
telling  upon  him.  At  dawn  he  commenced  forming  his  line 
by  concentrating  his  forces  on  the  right  with  a  view  to  de 
scend  into  the  plain  and  attack  Lee's  left,  and  the  Twelfth 
Corps  were  sent  to  Wadsworth's  right  to  take  part  in  the 
movement.  It  seems  to  me  that  this  would  have  been  a 
very  hazardous  enterprise,  and  I  am  not  surprised  that 
both  Slocum  and  Warren  reported  against  it.  The  Fifth 
and  Sixth  Corps  would  necessarily  be  very  much  fatigued 
after  making  a  forced  march.  To  put  them  in  at  once,  and 
direct  them  to  drive  a  superior  force  of  Lee's  veterans  ottt 
of  a  town  where  every  house  would  have  been  loop-holed, 
and  every  street  barricaded,  would  hardly  have  been  judi 
cious.  If  we  had  succeeded  in  doing  so,  it  would  simply 
have  reversed  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  for  the  Confederate 


BATTLE   OF   GETTYSBURG— SECOND   DAY.          157 

army  would  have  fought  behind  Seminary  Ridge,  and  we 
would  have  been  exposed  in  the  plain  below.  Nor  do  I 
think  it  would  have  been  wise  strategy  to  turn  their  left, 
and  drive  them  between  us  and  Washington,  for  it  would 
have  enabled  them  to  threaten  the  capital,  strengthen  and 
shorten  their  line  of  retreat,  and  endanger  our  communica 
tions  at  the  same  time.  It  is  an  open  secret  that  Meade 
at  that  time  disapproved  of  the  battle-ground  Hancock  had 
selected. 

Warren  and  Slocum  having  reported  an  attack  against 
Lee's  left  as  un advisable,  Meade  began  to  post  troops  on  our 
left,  with  a  view  to  attack  the  enemy's  right.  This,  in  my 
opinion,  would  have  been  much  more  sensible.  Lee,  how 
ever,  solved  the  problem  for  him,  and,  fortunately  for  us, 
forced  him  to  remain  on  the  defensive,  by  ordering  an  assault 
against  each  extremity  of  the  Union  line. 

There  has  been  much  discussion  and  a  good  deal  of 
crimination  and  recrimination  among  the  rebel  generals 
engaged  as  to  which  of  them  lost  the  battle  of  Gettysburg. 

I  have  already  alluded  to  the  fact  that  universal  experi 
ence  demonstrates  that  columns  converging  on  a  central 
force  almost  invariably  fail  in  their  object  and  are  beaten 
in  detail.  Gettysburg  seems  to  me  a  striking  exemplifica 
tion  of  this  ;  repeated  columns  of  assault  launched  by  Lee 
against  our  lines  came  up  in  succession  and  were  defeated 
before  the  other  parts  of  his  army  could  arrive  in  time  to 
sustain  the  attack.  It  realized  the  old  fable.  The  peasant 
could  not  break  the  bundle  of  fagots,  but  he  could  break 
one  at  a  time  until  all  were  gone. 

Lee's  concave  form  of  battle  was  a  great  disadvantage,  for 
it  took  him  three  times  as  long  as  it  did  us  to  communicate 
with  different  parts  of  his  line,  and  concentrate  troops. 
His  couriers  who  carried  orders  and  the  reinforcements  he 


158          CHAXCELLORSVILLE  AND   GETTYSBURG. 

sent  moved  on  the  circumference  and  ours  on  the  chord  of 
the  arc. 

The  two  armies  were  about  a  mile  apart.  The  Confed 
erates — Longstreet  and  Hill — occupied  Seminary  Eidge, 
which  runs  parallel  to  Cemetery  Eidge,  upon  which  our 
forces  were  posted.  Ewell's  corps,  on  the  rebel  left,  held 
the  town,  Hill  the  centre,  and  Longstreet  the  right. 

Lee  could  easily  have  manoeuvred  Meade  out  of  his 
strong  position  on  the  heights,  and  should  have  done  so. 
When  he  determined  to  attack,  he  should  have  commenced 
at  daybreak,  for  all  his  force  was  up  except  Pickett's  divi 
sion  ;  while  two  corps  of  the  Union  army,  the  Fifth  and 
Sixth,  were  still  far  away,  and  two  brigades  of  the  Third 
Corps  were  also  absent. 

The  latter  were  marching  on  the  Emmetsburg  road,  and 
as  that  was  controlled  by  the  enemy,  Sickles  felt  anxious  for 
the  safety  of  his  men  and  trains,  and  requested  that  the 
cavalry  be  sent  to  escort  them  in.  This  was  not  done,  how 
ever.  The  trains  were  warned  off  the  road,  and  the  two  bri 
gades  were,  fortunately,  not  molested. 

There  has  been  a  great  deal  of  bitter  discussion  between 
Longstreet,  Fitz  Lee,  Early,  Wilcox,  and  others  as  to 
whether  Lee  did  or  did  not  order  an  attack  to  take  place  at 
9  A.M.,  and  as  to  whether  Longstreet  was  dilatory,  and  to 
blame  for  not  making  it.  When  a  battle  is  lost  there  is  al 
ways  an  inquest,  and  a  natural  desire  on  the  part  of  each 
general  to  lay  the  blame  on  somebody  else's  shoulders. 
Longstreet  waited  until  noon  for  Law's  brigade  to  come  up, 
and  afterward  there  was  a  good  deal  of  marching  and 
countermarching  to  avoid  being  seen  by  our  troops.  There 
was  undoubtedly  too  much  delay.  The  fact  is,  Longstreet 
saw  we  had  a  strong  position  and  was  not  well  pleased  at 
the  duty  assigned  him,  for  he  thought  it  more  than  probable 


BATTLE  OF   GETTYSBURG— SECOND   DAY.          159 

his  attempt  would  fail.  He  had  urged  Lee  to  take  up  a 
position  where  Meade  would  be  forced  to  attack  him,  and 
was  not  in  very  good  humor  to  find  his  advice  disregarded. 
The  rebel  commander,  however,  finding  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  in  front  of  him,  having  unbounded  confidence  in 
his  troops,  and  elated  by  the  success  of  the  first  day's  fight, 
believed  he  could  gain  a  great  victory  then  and  there,  and 
end  the  war,  and  determined  to  attempt  it.  He  was  sick  of 
these  endless  delays  and  constant  sacrifices,  and  'hoped  one 
strong  sword-thrust  would  slay  his  opponent,  and  enable  the 
South  to  crown  herself  queen  of  the  North  American  con 
tinent. 

By  9  A.M.  our  skirmish  line,  in  front  of  the  Peach  Orchard, 
was  actively  engaged  with  that  of  the  enemy,  who  were 
making  a  reconnoissance  toward  the  Emmetsburg  road. 
No  serious  affair,  however,  occurred  for  some  hours.  Meade, 
as  stated,  was  forming  his  lines  on  the  right  of  the  position 
he  afterward  occupied.  The  Fifth  Corps,  which  came  up 
about  1  P.M.  was  posted,  as  a  reserve,  south  of  the  Twelfth 
Corps,  with  a  view  to  the  attack  which  has  already  been 
referred  to.  About  2  P.M.  the  Sixth  Corps  began  to  arrive 
from  its  long  and  toilsome  march  of  thirty-four  miles,  and 
its  tired  troops  were  placed  on  the  Taneytown  road  in  the 
rear  of  Round  Top,  to  reinforce  the  other  corps  in  case  our 
troops  made  an  attack  on  the  left.  Lee,  however,  did  not 
wait  for  Meade  to  advance  against  him,  but  boldly  directed 
that  each  flank  of  the  Union  army  should  be  assailed  at  the 
same  time,  while  constant  demonstrations  against  our  centre 
were  to  be  kept  up,  to  prevent  either  wing  from  being  rein 
forced.  It  was  another  attempt  to  converge  columns  with 
an  interval  of  several  miles  between  them  upon  a  central 
force,  and,  like  almost  all  such  enterprises,  failed  from  want 
of  proper  co-operation  in  the  different  fractions  of  his  line. 


160 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG, 


GETTYSBURG.—  Final  Attack  of  the  First  Day,  and  Battle  of  the  Second  Day.1 


1  The  first  day's  battle  is  represented  north  of  the  Fairfield  and  Hanover  roads.     The 
second  day's  battle  south  of  the  same  roads. 


BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG— SECOND   DAY.         161 

REFERENCES  TO  THE  FIRST  DAY'S  BATTLE. 

Union  Troops,  miM. 

MAJOB-GENERAL  O.  O.  HOWARD  commanding  the  First  and  Eleventh  Corps. 

FIRST  CORPS. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  ABNER  DOCBLEDAT  commanding. 
FIRST  DIVISION — MAJOR-GE>ERAL  JAMES  S.  WADSWORTH  commanding. 
a.  First  Brigade.     Colonel  Henry  A.  Morrow,  24th  Michigan. 
6.  Second  brigade.     Brigadier- G enural  Ly sunder  Cutler. 

SECOND  DIVISION — MAJOR-GENERAL  JOHN  C.  ROBINSON. 

c.  First  Brigade.    Brigadier- General  Gabriel  R.  Paul. 

d.  Second  Brigade.     Brigadier-General  Henry  Baxter. 

THIRD  DIVISION — BRIGADIER-GENERAL  THOS.  A.  ROWLEY. 

e.  First  Brigade.     Colonel  Chapman  Biddle,  121st  Pennsylvania. 
/.  Second  Brigade.     Colonel  Roy  Stone,  149th  Penn&ylvania. 

ELEVENTH    CORPS. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  CARL  SCHURZ  commanding. 

FIRST  DIVISION — BRIGADIER-GENERAL  F.  C.  BARLOW  commanding. 
g.  First  Brigade.     Colonel  Von  Gilsa. 
h.  Second  Brigade.     Brigadier-General  Adelbert  Ames. 

SECOND  DIVISION— BRIGADIER-GENERAL  ALEXANDER  SCHIMMELPFENNIO. 
k.  First  Brigade.     Colonel  Von  Arnsberg. 
I.    Second  Brigade.     Colonel  Kryzanowski. 
m.  Ouster's  Brigade,  of  Steinwehr's  Division. 


Confederate  Troops,  c=> . 

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  A.  P.  HILL  commanding  Third  Corps. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  HENRY  HETH  commanding  Division. 

1.  Archer's  Brigade.  3.  Brockenborongh's  Brigade. 

2.  Davis's  Brigade.  4.  Pettigrew's  Brigade. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  W.  D.  TENDER  commanding  Division. 

6.  McGowan's  Brigade.  8.  Thomas's  Brigade. 

7.  Scales's  Brigade.  9.  Lane's  Brigade. 

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  BENJ.  EWELL  commanding  Second  Corps. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  R.  E.  RODES  commanding  Division. 

10.  Daniel's  Brigade.  12.  Iverson's  Brigade. 

11.  Rarnseur's  Brigade.  13.  O'Neil's  Brigade. 

14.  Dole's  Brigade. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY  commanding  Division. 
15.  Gordon's  Brigade.  17.  Hoke's  Brigade. 

10.  Hays's  Brigade.  18.  Smith's  Brigade. 


162    CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

Longstreet's  attack  was  over  before  Ewell  came  into  action, 
and  although  Ewell  succeeded  in  temporarily  establishing 
himself  on  our  extreme  right,  it  was  due  to  an  unfortunate 
order  given  by  General  Meade,  by  which  the  force  in  that 
part  of  the  field  was  withdrawn  just  as  Ewell  advanced 
against  it.  But  we  are  anticipating  our  narrative. 

Hood,  who  commanded  the  division  on  the  right  of  Long- 
street's  corps,  complains  that  he  was  not  allowed  to  go  past 
Kound  Top  and  flank  us  on  the  south,  as  he  might  have 
done,  but  was  required  by  his  orders  to  break  in  at  the 
Peach  Orchard  and  drive  Sickles's  line  along  the  Enimets- 
burg  road  toward  Cemetery  Hill ;  but  it  seems  to  me,  as  lie 
started  late  in  the  afternoon,  if  he  had  made  the  detour 
which  would  have  been  necessary  in  order  to  attack  us  on 
the  south,  he  would  have  met  Sedgwick  in  front,  while 
Sickles  and  Sykes  might  have  interposed  to  cut  him  off 
from  the  main  body. 

Before  describing  Long-street's  attack  we  will  give  the 
final  disposition  made  by  General  Meade  when  it  became 
necessary  to  fight  a  defensive  battle.  The  ridge  was  nearly 
in  the  shape  of  a  horseshoe.  The  Twelfth  Corps  was  on  the 
extreme  right ;  next  came  one  division  of  the  First  Corps  on 
Gulps  Hill,  then  the  Eleventh  Corps  on  Cemetery  Hill,  with 
two  divisions  of  the  First  Corps  at  the  base ;  next  the 
Second  Corps  ;  then  the  Third,  and  the  Fifth  Corps  on  the 
extreme  left,  the  Sixth  Corps  being  posted  in  rear  of  Eound 
Top  as  a  general  reserve  to  the  army.  Sickles,  however, 
denies  that  any  position  was  ever  marked  out  for  him.  He 
was  expected  to  prolong  Hancock's  line  to  the  left,  but  did 
not  do  so  for  the  following  reasons  :  First,  because  the 
ground  was  low,  and  second,  on  account  of  the  commanding 
position  of  the  Emmetsburg  road,  which  ran  along  a  cross 
ridge  oblique  to  the  front  of  the  line  assigned  him,  and 


BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG— SECOND  DAY. 


163 


which  afforded  the  enemy  an  excellent  position  for  their 
artillery ;  third,  because  the  ground  between  the  valley  he 
was  expected  to  occupy,  and  the  Emmetsburg  road  consti 
tuted  a  minor  ridge,  very  much  broken  and  full  of  rocks  and 
trees,  which  afforded  excellent  cover  for  an  enemy  operating 
in  his  immediate  front.  He  had  previously  held  an  inter 
view  with  General  Meade  and  asked  that  an  experienced 
staff  officer  be  sent  with  him  to  assist  in  locating  a  suitable 
position  for  his  corps.  At  his  request,  General  Hunt,  the 
Chief  of  Artillery,  was  sent  for  that  purpose.  They  rode  out 
to  the  ridge  and  Sickles  directed  that  his  troops  should  be 
posted  along  that  road,  with  his 
centre  at  the  Peach  Orchard, 
which  was  about  a  mile  from 
and  nearly  opposite  to  Little 
Bound  Top;  his  right  wing, 
under  Humphreys,  extending 
along  the  road,  while  his  left 
wing,  under  Birney,  made  a 
right  angle  at  the  Peach  Or 
chard  with  the  other  part  of 

the  line,  and  bent  around,  so  as  to  cover  the  front  of  Little 
Round  Top  at  the  base.  The  disadvantages  of  this  position 
are  obvious  enough.  It  is  impossible  for  any  force  to  hold 
its  ground  when  attacked  at  once  on  both  sides  wrhich  con 
stitute  the  right  angle.  The  diagram  shows  that  the  force  A 
will  have  both  its  lines  a1  and  a2  enfiladed  by  batteries  at  bl 
b~,  and  must  yield.  The  ground,  however,  may  be  such  that 
the  enemy  cannot  plant  his  guns  at  bl  or  i2 ;  but  under  any 
circumstances  it  is  a  weak  formation  and  the  enemy  easily 
penetrate  the  an^le.  When  that  is  the  case,  and  it  was  so 
in  the  present  instance — each  side  constituting  the  angle  is 
taken  in  flank,  and  the  position  is  no  longer  tenable. 


164    CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

If  one  side  of  the  right  angle  lies  behind  a  ridge  where  it 
cannot  be  enfiladed,  a  temporary  formation  of  this  kind  is 
sometimes  permissible. 

Sickles  claimed  that  he  acted  with  the  implied  sanction  of 
General  Meade,  who,  however,  censured  the  movement  after 
ward.  As  soon  as  Sickles  took  position,  General  Buford's 
division  of  cavalry  was  sent  to  the  rear  at  Westminster,  to 
guard  the  trains  there  ;  and  Kilpatrick's  division  was  ordered 
to  Hunterstown  to  attack  the  rebel  left. 

Sykes's  corps — the  Fifth — came  up  from  the  right  about 
5  P.M.,  soon  after  Longstreet's  attack  on  Sickles  was  fairly 
under  way,  and  formed  along  the  outer  base  of  Little  Round 
Top,  with  Crawford's  Pennsylvania  reserves  at  their  right 
and  front. 

There  had  been  a  Council  of  War,  or  Conference  of  Corps 
Commanders,  called  at  Meade's  headquarters,  and  it  was  uni 
versally  agreed  to  remain  and  hold  the  position.  As  the 
Third  Corps,  in  answer  to  the  guns  of  Clark's  battery,  was 
suddenly  assailed  by  a  terrible  concentrated  artillery  fire, 
General  Sickles  rode  back  to  his  command  and  General 
Meade  went  with  him.  The  latter  objected  to  Sickles's 
line,  but  thought  it  was  then  too  late  to  change  it. 

The  severe  artillery  fire  which  opened  against  the  two 
sides  of  the  angle  at  the  Peach  Orchard  was  a  prelude  to  a 
furious  attack  against  Ward's  brigade  on  the  left.  This  at 
tack  soon  extended  to  the  Peach  Orchard.  The  fight  be 
came  very  hot  against  Birney's  division  from  the  left  to  the 
centre,  but  the  troops  on  the  right  of  the  centre — Hum- 
phreys's  division — were  not  at  first  actively  engaged,  and' 
Humphrey  reinforced  Birney  with  one  of  his  brigades,  and 
subsequently  with  a  regiment. 

The  battle  which  now  raged  among  these  trees,  rocks,  and 
ravines  was  so  complicated  that  it  is  hard  to  follow  and  dif- 


BATTLE  OF   GETTYSBURG— SECOND   DAY. 


1G5 


ficult  to  describe  the  movements  of  the  contestants.  Some 
idea  of  it  can  probably  be  gained  by  an  examination  of  the 
following  diagram  : 

It  will  be  seen  that  a  long  line  of  rebel  batteries  bears 
upon  A,  and  that  one  of  them  was  brought  up  to  enfilade 


Diagram  of  the  Attack  on  Sickles  and  Sykos. 

the  side  AB.  The  angle  at  A,  attacked  by  Barksdale  on  the 
north  and  Kershaw  on  the  west,  was  broken  in.  In  conse 
quence  of  this,  several  batteries  on  the  line  EF  were  sacri 
ficed,  and  Wofford's  brigade  soon  came  forward  and  took 
the  position  DE. 


1G6    CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

The  Confederate  line  being  very  long,  and  overlapping 
Ward's  brigade  on  the  left,  the  latter  was  forced  back,  and 
the  exulting  rebels  advanced  to  seize  Little  Kound  Top. 
They  attacked  the  force  there  with  great  fury,  assailing 
it  in  front  and  rear,  but  they  were  ultimately  repulsed,  and 
finally  took  up  the  line  GL.  Two  divisions  of  the  Fifth  Corps 
and  one  of  the  Second  Corps  were  sent  in,  one  after  the 
other,  to  drive  back  the  strong  rebel  force  posted  from  D  to 
G,  but  each  one  had  a  bitter  contest  in  front,  and  was  flanked 
by  the  rebel  line  at  DE,  so  that  ultimately  all  were  obliged 
to  retreat,  although  each  performed  prodigies  of  valor.  In 
deed,  Brooks's  brigade  charged  almost  up  to  the  enemy's  line 
of  batteries,  HI.  The  rebels  gained  the  position  LG,  con 
fronting  our  main  line  and  close  to  it ;  but  a  fine  charge 
made  by  Crawford's  division  of  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves, 
drove  them  farther  back,  and  as  part  of  the  Sixth  Corps 
came  up  and  formed  to  support  Crawford,  the  rebels  gave 
up  the  contest  for  the  night  as  regards  this  part  of  the  field. 

The  attack  against  Humphreys's  division  which  followed 
the  breaking  in  of  the  angle  at  A  will  be  described  further 
on.  The  general  result  was  that  Sickles's  entire  line,  to 
gether  with  the  reinforcements  sent  in  at  different  times 
to  sustain  it,  were  all  forced  back  to  the  ridge  which 
was  our  main  line  of  battle,  with  the  exception  of  Craw 
ford's  division  which  maintained  a  somewhat  advanced 
position. 

The  details  of  this  contest  are  full  of  incident,  and  too 
important  to  be  wholly  omitted. 

About  3.30  P.M.  the  rebels  commenced  the  movement 
against  our  left,  by  sending  a  flanking  force  from  Hood's 
division,  formed  in  two  lines,  around  to  attack  Sickles's  left, 
held  by  General  J.  Hobart  Ward's  brigade,  which  occupied 
the  open  ground  covering  the  approaches  to  Little  Kound 


BATTLE  OP  GETTYSBURG— SECOND  DAY.    1C7 

Top,  Ward's  line  passing  in  front  of  the  mountain,  and  his 
flank  resting  on  a  rocky  depression  in  the  ground  called  the 
Devil's  Den.  The  right  extended  to  the  minor  spur  or 
wooded  ridge  beyond  the  wheat-field.  The  engagement 
was  furious ;  commencing  on  the  rebel  right,  it  extended  to 
the  left,  until  it  reached  the  Peach  Orchard,  where  it  be 
came  especially  violent.  This  central  point  of  Sickles's  line 
was  held  by  eight  regiments  of  Birney's  and  Humphreys's 
divisions.  Birney's  two  brigades,  commanded  by  Graham 
and  De  Trobriand,  held  on  bravely,  for  the  men  who 
fought  with  Kearny  in  the  Peninsula  were  not  easily  driven  ; 
but  the  line  was  too  attenuated  to  resist  the  shock  very 
long,  and  reinforcements  became  absolutely  necessary  to 
sustain  that  unlucky  angle  at  the  Peach  Orchard.  Sickles 
had  authority  to  call  on  Sykes,  whose  corps  was  resting 
from  a  long  and  fatiguing  march,  but  the  latter  wished 
his  men  to  get  their  coffee  and  be  refreshed  before  send 
ing  them  in ;  and  as  those  who  are  fighting  almost  always 
exaggerate  the  necessity  for  immediate  reinforcements, 
Sykes  thought  Sickles  could  hold  on  a  while  longer,  and 
did  not  respond  to  the  call  for  three-quarters  of  an 
hour. 

It  would  seem  that  Lee  supposed  that  Meade's  main  line 
of  battle  was  on  the  Emmetsburg  pike,  and  that  the  flank 
rested  on  the  Peach  Orchard,  for  he  ordered  Longstreet  to 
form  Hood's  division  perpendicular  to  that  road,  whereas 
Sickles  occupied  an  advanced  line,  and  Sykes  the  main  line 
in  rear.  McLaws  says  that  Lee  thought  turning  the  Peach 
Orchard  was  turning  the  Union  left.  With  this  idea,  he 
directed  Longstreet  to  form  across  the  Emmetsburg  road, 
and  push  our  troops  toward  Cemetery  Hill.  Kershaw,  after 
De  Trobriand  was  driven  from  the  minor  ridge,  reported 
to  Longstreet  that  he  could  not  cariy  out  these  orders 


168    CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

without  exposing  his  right  flank  to  an  attack  from  Sykes's 
Corps. 

Ward  fought  bravely  against  Benning's  and  Anderson's 
brigades  on  the  left,  driving  back  two  attacks  of  the  latter, 
but  his  line  was  long  and  weak,  and  the  enemy  overlapped 
it  by  the  front  of  nearly  two  brigades.  Being  concealed 
from  view,  from  the  nature  of  the  ground  they  could  con 
centrate  against  any  point  with  impunity.  He  attempted  to 
strengthen  his  force  at  the  Devil's  Den  by  detaching  the 
Ninety-ninth  Pennsylvania  from  his  right,  and,  although  De 
Trobriand  had  no  troops  to  spare,  he  was  directed  by  Gen 
eral  Birney  to  send  the  Fortieth  New  York,  under  Colonel 
Egan,  to  reinforce  that  flank.  Egan  arrived  too  late  to  per 
form  the  duty  assigned  him,  as  Ward  had  been  already 
driven  back,  but  not  too  late  to  make  a  gallant  charge  upon 
the  rebel  advance. 

The  fighting  soon  extended  to  the  Peach  Orchard,  but  as 
it  commenced  on  the  left,  we  will  describe  that  part  of  the 
engagement  first. 

General  Warren,  who  was  on  Meade's  staff  as  Chief  En 
gineer,  had  ridden  about  this  time  to  the  signal  station  on 
Little  Bound  Top,  to  get  a  better  view  of  the  field.  He  saw 
the  long  line  of  the  enemy  approaching,  and  about  to  over 
lap  Ward's  left,  and  perceived  that  unless  prompt  succor  ar 
rived  Little  Bound  Top  would  fall  into  their  hands.  Once 
in  their  possession  they  would  flank  our  whole  line  and  post 
guns  there  to  drive  our  troops  from  the  ridge  ;  so  that  this 
eminence  was  in  reality  the  key  of  the  battle-field,  and  must 
be  held  at  all  hazards.  He  saw  Barnes's  division,  which 
Sykes  had  ordered  forward,  formed  for  a  charge,  and  about 
to  go  to  the  relief  of  De  Trobriand,  who  held  the  centre  of 
Birney's  line,  and  who  was  sorely  beset.  Without  losing  a 
moment  he  rode  down  the  slope,  over  to  Barnes,  took  the 


BATTLE   OF   GETTYSBURG— SECOND   DAY.  109 

responsibility  of  detaching  Vincent's  brigade  and  hurried 
it  back  to  take  post  on  Little  Round  Top.  He  then  sent 
a  staff  officer  to  inform  General  Meade  of  what  he  had  done 
and  to  represent  the  immense  importance  of  holding  this 
commanding  point. 

The  victorious  column  of  the  enemy  was  subjected  to  the 
fire  of  a  battery  on  Little  Round  Top,  and  to  another  far 
ther  to  the  right,  but  it  kept  on,  went  around  Ward's  bri 
gade  and  rushed  eagerly  up  the  ravine  between  the  two 
Round  Tops  to  seize  Little  Round  Top  which  seemed  to  be 
defenceless.  Vincent's  brigade  rapidly  formed  on  the  crest 
of  a  small  spur  which  juts  out  from  the  hill,  and  not  having 
time  to  load,  advanced  with  the  bayonet,  in  time  to  save  the 
height.  The  contest  soon  became  furious  and  the  rocks 
were  alive  with  musketry.  General  Vincent  sent  word  to 
Barnes  that  the  enemy  were  on  him  in  overwhelming  num 
bers,  and  Hazlett's  regular  battery,  supported  by  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York  under  Colonel  .O'Rorke 
of  Weed's  brigade,  was  sent  as  a  reinforcement.  The  bat 
tery  was  dragged  with  great  labor  to  the  crest  of  Little 
Round  Top,  and  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  were 
posted  on  the  slope  on  Vincent's  right.  They  came  upon 
the  field  just  as  the  rebels,  after  failing  to  penetrate  the 
centre,  had  driven  back  the  right.  In  advancing  to  this 
exposed  position,  Colonel  O'Rorke,  a  brilliant  young  of 
ficer  who  had  just  graduated  at  the  head  of  his  class  at 
West  Point,  was  killed  and  his  men  thrown  into  some 
confusion,  but  Vincent  rallied  the  line  and  repulsed  the 
assault.  In  doing  so  he  exposed  himself  very  much  and 
was  soon  killed  by  a  rebel  sharpshooter.  General  Weed, 
who  was  on  the  crest  with  the  battery,  was  mortally 
wounded  in  the  same  way,  and  as  Hazlett  leaned  over  to 
hear  his  last  message,  a  fatal  bullet  struck  him  also  and  he 
VT.— 8 


170          CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

dropped  dead  on  the  body  of  his  chief.  Colonel  Rice  of 
the  Forty -fourth  New  York  now  took  command  in  place  of 
Vincent.  The  enemy  having  been  foiled  at  the  centre  and 
right,  stole  around  through  the  woods  and  turned  the  left 
of  the  line,  but  Chamberlain's  regiment — the  Twentieth 
Maine — was  folded  back  by  him,  around  the  rear  of  the  moun 
tain,  to  resist  the  attack.  The  rebels  came  on  like  wolves, 
with  deafening  yells,  and  forced  Chamberlain's  men  over 
the  crest,  but  they  rallied  and  drove  their  assailants  back  in 
their  turn.  This  was  twice  repeated  and  then  a  brigade  of 
the  Pennsylvania  Reserves  and  one  of  the  Fifth  Corps  dashed 
over  the  hill.  The  Twentieth  Maine  made  a  grand  final 
charge  and  drove  the  rebels  from  the  valley  between  the 
Round  Tops,  capturing  a  large  number  of  prisoners.  Not  a 
moment  too  soon,  for  Chamberlain  had  lost  a  third  of  his 
command  and  was  entirely  out  of  ammunition.  Vincent's 
men  in  this  affair  took  two  colonels,  fifteen  officers,  and  five 
hundred  men  prisoners,  and  a  thousand  stand  of  arms.  Hill 
in  his  official  report  says  "Hood's  right  was  held  as  in  a 
vise." 

We  will  now  return  to  the  Peach  Orchard.  In  answer  to 
a  shot  from  Clark's  battery  a  long  line  of  guns  opened  from 
the  eleven  batteries  opposite.  Graham's  infantry  were  par 
tially  sheltered  from  this  iron  hail,  but  the  three  batteries 
with  him  in  the  beginning,  which  were  soon  reinforced  by 
four  more  from  the  reserve  artillery,  under  Major  McGil- 
very,  were  very  much  cut  up  ;  and  at  last  it  became  neces 
sary  to  sacrifice  one  of  them — that  of  Bigelow — to  enable 
the  others  to  retire  to  a  new  line  in  rear.  Graham  s'till 
held  the  Peach  Orchard,  although  he  was  assailed  on  two 
fronts,  by  Barksdale's  brigade  on  the  north  and  Kershaw's 
brigade  on  the  west.  A  battery  was  brought  forward  to  en 
filade  Sickles's  line  on  the  Emmetsburg  road,  and  under 


BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG-SECOND  DAY.          171 

cover  of  its  fire  Barksdale  carried  the  position,  but  was 
mortally  wounded  in  doing  so.1  Sickles  lost  a  leg  about  this 
time  (5.30  P.M.),  and  Graham,  who  was  also  badly  wounded, 
fell  into  the  enemy's  hands.  The  command  of  the  Third 
Corps  now  devolved  upon  General  Birney. 

The  batteries  under  Major  McGilvery,  which  lined  the 
cross  road  below  the  Peach  Orchard,  were  very  effective,  but 
were  very  much  shattered.  Kershaw  captured  them  at  one 
time  but  was  driven  off  temporarily  by  a  gallant  charge  of 
the  One  Hundred  and  Forty-first  Pennsylvania  of  Graham's 
brigade,  who  retook  the  guns,  which  were  then  brought  off 
by  hand.  Bigelow  was  ordered  by  Major  McGilvery  to  sac 
rifice  his  battery  to  give  the  others  time  to  form  a  new  line. 
He  fought  with  fixed  prolong?,  until  the  enemy  were  within 
six  feet  of  him,  and  then  retired  with  the  loss  of  three  offi 
cers  and  twenty-eight  men.  Phillips's  battery,  which  ad 
joined  his,  had  a  similar  experience.  McLaws  bears  testi 
mony  to  the  admirable  manner  with  which  this  artillery  was 
served.  He  says  one  shell  killed  and  wounded  thirty  men, 
out  of  a  company  of  thirty- seven. 

The  capture  of  the  Peach  Orchard  necessarily  brought  the 
enemy  directly  on  Humphreys's  left  flank  and  De  Trobriand's 
right.  The  disaster  then  became  irremediable,  because 
every  force  thrown  in  after  this  period,  had  to  contend  with 
a  direct  fire  in  front,  and  an  enfilading  fire  from  the  right. 

While  the  Peach  Orchard  was  assailed,  several  combats 
took  place  in  the  vicinity,  which  had  a  general  relation  to 
the  defence  of  Sickles's  line.  A  little  stream  runs  through  a 
ravine  parallel  to  the  cross  road,  and  about  five  hundred  yards 


1  Barksdale  soon  after  was  brought  into  my  lines  and  died  like  a  brave  man,  with 
dignity  and  res'gnation.  I  had  known  him  as  an  officer  of  volunteers  in  the  Mexi 
can  war.  Asa  member  of  Congress  he  was  very  influential  in  bringing  on  the  Re 
bel  lion. 


172          CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

south  of  it,  and  then  turns  abruptly  to  the  south  at  the  cor 
ner  of  a  wheat-field,  passing  through  a  rocky  wooded  coun 
try,  to  empty  in  Plum  Kun.  De  Trobriand  held  the  north 
bank  of  this  stream  with  a  very  insufficient  force — a  front  of 
two  regiments — and  his  contest  with  Semmes's  brigade  in 
front  and  Kershaw's  brigade,  which  was  trying  to  penetrate 
into  the  Peach  Orchard,  on  his  right,  was  at  very  close  range 
and  very  destructive.  At  the  same  time  as  Ward's  left  was 
turned  and  driven  back  the  enemy  came  in  on  the  left  and 
rear  of  De  Trobriand,  and  occupied  the  wheat-field.  Barnes' 
division  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  composed  of  Sweitzer's  and  Til- 
ton's  brigades,  soon  came  to  his  assistance.  The  former,  by 
wheeling  to  the  left  and  retaining  several  lines,  kept  up  the 
fight  successfully  against  the  enemy  who  came  up  the  ra 
vine,  but  the  latter  was  flanked  and  obliged  to  give  way. 
De  Trobriand's  two  regiments  in  front,  after  a  most  deter 
mined  fight,  were  forced  back  across  the  wheat-field.  There 
Birney  used  them  as  a  basis  of  a  new  line,  brought  up  two 
fresh  regiments,  charged  through  the  wheat-field,  and  drove 
the  enemy  back  to  the  stone  fence  which  bounded  it. 

Caldwell's  division  of  Hancock's  corps  now  came  on  to  re 
new  the  contest.  Caldwell  formed  his  men  with  the  bri 
gades  of  Cross  and  Kelly  in  front,  and  those  of  Zook  and 
Brooke  in  rear.  In  the  advance  Colonel  Cross  was  killed, 
and  the  front  line  being  enfiladed  in  both  directions,  was 
soon  so  cut  up  that  the  rear  line  came  forward  in  its  place, 
Zook  was  killed,  but  Brooke  made  a  splendid  charge,  turn 
ing  Kershaw's  right  and  driving  Semmes  back  through  the 
supporting  batteries.  Sweitzer's  brigade  then  came  up  a 
second  time  to  aid  Brooks,  but  it  was  useless,  for  there  was 
still  another  line  of  batteries  beyond,  and  as  the  Peach 
Orchard  by  this  time  was  in  possession  of  the  enemy,  Brooke's 
advanced  position  was  really  a  disadvantage,  for  both  his 


BATTLE   OF   GETTYSBURG— SECOND   DAY.          173 

flanks  were  turned.  Senimes's  brigade,  together  with  parts 
of  Benning's  and  Anderson's  brigades,  rallied  behind  a  stone 
wall,  again  came  forward,  and  succeeded  in  retaking  the 
knoll  and  the  batteries  they  had  lost.  Caldwell,  under  cover 
of  our  artillery,  extricated  his  division  with  heavy  loss,  for 
both  Zook's  and  Kelly's  brigades  were  completely  sur 
rounded. 

Then  Ayres,1  who  had  been  at  the  turning-point  of  so  many 
battles,  went  in  with  his  fine  division  of  regulars,  commanded 
by  Day  and  Burbank,  officers  of  courage  and  long  experience 
in  warfare.  He  struck  the  enemy  in  flank  who  were  pursuing 
Caldwell,  and  who  would  have  renewed  the  attack  on  Little 
Round  Top,  doubled  them  up,  and  drove  them  back  to  the 
position  Caldwell  had  left ;  but  his  line,  from  the  nature  of 
things,  was  untenable,  for  a  whole  brigade  with  ample  sup 
ports  had  formed  on  his  right  rear,  so  that  nothing  remained 
but  to  face  about  and  fight  his  way  home  again.  This  was 
accomplished  with  the  tremendous  loss  of  fifty  per  cent,  of 
his  command  in  killed  and  wounded.  His  return  was  aided 
by  the  artillery  on  Little  Round  Top,  and  by  the  advance  of 
part  of  the  Sixth  Corps. 

The  enemy,  Wofford's,  Kershaw's,  and  Anderson's  brigades, 
now  swarmed  in  the  front  of  our  main  line  between  the 
wheat-field  and  Little  Round  Top. 

General  S.  Wiley  Crawford,  who  commanded  a  division 
composed  of  two  brigades  of  the  Pennsylvania  Reserve 
Corps,  was  ordered  to  drive  them  farther  back.  This  or 
ganization,  which  at  one  time  I  had  the  honor  to  command, 
were  veterans  of  the  Peninsula,  and  were  among  the  most 
dauntless  men  in  the  army.  Crawford  called  upon  them 

1  General  Ayres,  whose  service  in  the  war  commenced  with  the  first  Bull  Run, 
and  ended  at  Appomattox,  may  almost  be  called  an  impersonation  of  the  Arrry  of 
the  Potomac,  as  he  took  part  in  nearly  all  its  battles  and  minor  engagements. 


174    CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

to  defend  the  soil  of  their  native  State,  and  headed  a  charge 
made  by  McCandless's  brigade  with  the  colors  of  one  of  the 
regiments  in  his  hand.  The  men  went  forward  with  an  im 
petus  nothing  could  withstand.  The  enemy  took  shelter 
behind  a  stone  fence  on  the  hither  side  of  the  wheat-field, 
but  McCandless  stormed  the  position,  drove  them  beyond  the 
field,  and  then,  as  it  was  getting  dark,  both  sides  rested  on 
their  arms. 

The  other  brigade  of  Crawford's  division — that  of  Fisher 
— had  previously  been  sent  to  reinforce  Vincent  in  his  des 
perate  struggle  on  the  slope  of  Little  Round  Top.  The 
enemy  retired  before  it,  so  that  it  was  not  engaged,  and  it 
then  took  possession  of  the  main  Round  Top  on  the  left  of 
Little  Round  Top  and  fortified  it. 

As  Crawford  charged,  two  brigades  of  Sedgwick's  division, 
those  of  Kevins  and  Wheaton,  formed  on  the  right  and 
below  Little  Round  Top.  The  sight  of  the  firm  front  pre 
sented  by  these  fresh  troops  thoroughly  discouraged  Long- 
street,  who  went  forward  to  reconnoitre,  and  he  gave  up  all 
attempts  at  making  any  farther  advance. 

The  enemy  at  night  took  post  at  the  western  base  of  the 
ridge,  and  held  a  fortified  line  as  far  north  as  the  Devil's 
Den,  in  which  rocky  cavern  they  took  shelter. 

It  remains  now  to  describe  the  effect  of  the  loss  of  the 
Peach  Orchard  and  the  wounding  of  Sickles  and  Graham — 
which  took  place  soon  after — upon  the  fate  of  Humphreys's 
division,  posted  on  the  right  along  the  Emmetsburg  road. 
When  Sickles  lost  his  leg,  Birney  assumed  command  of  the 
corps,  and  ordered  Humphreys  to  move  his  left  wing  bads 
to  form  a  new  oblique  line  to  the  ridge,  in  connection  with 
Birney's  division.  Humphreys,  up  to  the  loss  of  the  Peach 
Orchard,  had  not  been  actively  engaged,  as  the  enemy  had 
merely  demonstrated  along  his  front;  but  now  he  was 


.  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG-SECOND  DAY.          175 

obliged,  while  executing  the  difficult  manoeuvre  of  a  change 
of  front  to  rear,  to  contend  with  Barksdale's  brigade  of  Mc- 
Laws's  division  on  his  left  at  the  Peach  Orchard,  and  enfilad 
ing  batteries  there  also,  while  his  entire  front  was  called 
upon  to  repel  a  most  determined  assault  from  Anderson's 
division,  which  hitherto  had  not  been  engaged,  and  which 
now  pressed  with  great  force  on  his  right,  which  still  clung 
to  the  road.  Four  regiments  were  thrown  in  by  Hancock  to 
support  that  part  of  the  line,  but  the  attack  was  so  sudden 
and  violent  that  they  only  had  time  to  fire  a  few  volleys 
before  Humphreys  received  orders  to  give  up  his  advanced 
position  and  fall  back  to  the  ridge  itself.  There  he  turned 
at  bay.  Hancock,  who  had  been  placed  in  command  of  the 
First,  Second,  and  Third  Corps,  was  indefatigable  in  his 
vigilance  and  personal  supervision,  "  patching  the  line " 
wherever  the  enemy  was  likely  to  break  through.  His 
activity  and  foresight  probably  preserved  the  ridge  from 
capture.  Toward  the  last  Meade  brought  forward  Lock- 
wood's  Maryland  brigade  from  the  right  and  sent  them  in  to 
cover  Sickles's  retreat.  Humphreys  was  followed  up  by  the 
brigades  of  Wilcox,  Perry,  and  Wright— about  the  best  fight 
ing  material  in  the  rebel  army.  Perry  was  driven  back  by 
the  fire  of  our  main  line,  and  as  his  brigade  was  between  the 
other  two,  his  retreat  left  each  of  them  in  a  measure  unsup 
ported  on  the  flanks.  Posey's  and  Mahone's  brigades  were  to 
advance  as  soon  as  the  others  became  actively  engaged,  but 
failed  to  do  so,  and  therefore  Pender,  who  was  to  follow 
after  them,  did  not  move  forward.  Hence  the  great  effort 
of  Wilcox  and  Wright,  which  would  have  been  ruinous  to 
us  if  followed  up,  was  fruitless  of  results.  Both  were  re 
pulsed  for  lack  of  support,  but  Wright  actually  reached  the 
crest  with  his  Georgians  and  turned  a  gun,  whose  cannon 
eers  had  been  shot,  upon  Webb's  brigade  of  the  Second 


176    CHAXCELLORSV1LLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

Corps.  Webb  gave  them  two  staggering  volleys  from  be 
hind  a  fence,  and  went  forward  with  two  regiments.  He 
charged,,  regained  the  lost  piece,  and  turned  it  upon  them. 
Wright,  finding  himself  entirely  isolated  in  this  advanced 
position,  went  back  again  to  the  main  line,  and  Wilcox  did 
the  same.  On  this  occasion  Wright  did  what  Lee  failed  to 
accomplish  the  next  day  at  such  a  heavy  expense  of  life, 
far  lie  pierced  our  centre,  and  held  it  for  a  short  time,  and 
had  the  movement  been  properly  supported  and  energetically 
followed  up,  it  might  have  been  fatal  to  our  army,  and 
would  most  certainly  have  resulted  in  a  disastrous  retreat. 
It  was  but  another  illustration  of  the  difficulty  of  success 
fully  converging  columns  against  a  central  force.  Lee's 
divisions  seemed  never  to  strike  at  the  hour  appointed. 
Each  came  forward  separately,  and  was  beaten  for  lack  of 
support. 

Wright  attained  the  crest  and  Wilcox  was  almost  on  a 
line  with  him.  The  latter  was  closely  followed  up  and 
nearly  surrounded,  for  troops  rushed  in  on  him  from  all 
sides.  He  lost  very  heavily  in  extricating  himself  from  his 
advanced  position.  Wilcox  claims  to  have  captured  tempo 
rarily  twenty  guns  and  Wright  eight. 

As  they  approached  the  ridge  a  Union  battery  limbered 
up  and  galloped  off.  The  last  gun  was  delayed  and  the 
cannoneer,  with  a  long  line  of  muskets  pointing  at  him  with 
in  a  few  feet,  deliberately  drove  off  the  field.  The  Geor 
gians  manifested  their  admiration  for  his  bravery  by  crying 
out  "Don't  shoot,"  and  not  a  musket  was  fired  at  him.1  I 
regret  that  I  have  not  been  able  to  ascertain  the  man's  nama 


1  As  it  is  well  to  verify  these  incidents,  I  desire  to  state  that  this  is  a  reminis 
cence  of  Dr.  J.  Robie  Wood,  of  New  York,  a  Georgian,  and  nephew  of  Wendell 
Phillips,  who  was  in  the  charge  with  Wright.  Wood  fell  struck  by  six  bullets, 
but  recovered. 


BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG— SECOND  DAY.          177 

In  the  morning  General  Tidball,  who  was  attached  to  the 
cavalry  as  Chief  of  Artillery,  rode  along  the  entire  crest  from 
Little  Kound  Top  to  Gulps  Hill  to  make  himself  familiar 
with  the  lines.  As  he  passed  my  headquarters  he  noticed 
some  new  troops,  the  Second  Vermont  brigade  under  Gen 
eral  Stannard,  which  formed  part  of  my  command.  They 
were  a  fine-looking  body  of  men,  and  were  drawn  up 
in  close  column  by  division,  ready  to  go  to  any  part  of  the 
field  at  a  moment's  notice.  After  inquiring  to  what  corps 
they  belonged  he  passed  over  to  the  right.  On  his  return 
late  in  the  day  he  saw  Sickles's  whole  line  driven  in  and 
found  Wright's  rebel  brigade  established  on  the  crest 
barring  his  way  back.  He  rode  rapidly  over  to  Meade's 
headquarters  and  found  the  general  walking  up  and  down 
the  room,  apparently  quite  unconscious  of  the  movements 
which  might  have  been  discerned  by  riding  to  the  top  of  the 
hill,  and  which  should  have  been  reported  to  him  by  some 
one  of  his  staff.  Tidball  said,  "  General,  I  am  very  sorry  to 
see  that  the  enemy  have  pierced  our  centre."  Meade  ex 
pressed  surprise  at  the  information  and  said,  "  Why,  where 
is  Sedgwick?"  Tidball  replied,  "I  do  not  know,  but  if 
you  need  troops,  I  saw  a  fine  body  of  Vermonters  a  short 
distance  from  here,  belonging  to  the  First  Corps,  who  are 
available."  Meade  then  directed  him  to  take  an  order  to 
Newton  and  put  the  men  in  at  once  ;  the  order  was  com 
municated  to  me  and  I  went  with  my  division  at  double 
quick  to  the  point  indicated.  There  we  pursued  Wright's 
force  as  it  retired,  and  retook,  at  Hancock's  instigation,  four 
guns  taken  by  Wright  earlier  in  the  action.  When  these 
were  brought  in  I  sent  out  two  regiments,  who  followed  the 
enemy  up  nearly  to  their  lines  and  retook  two  more  guns. 
I  have  been  thus  particular  in  narrating  this  incident  as 
Stannard's  Vermont  brigade  contributed  greatly  to  the 
8* 


178    CHANCELLORS VILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

victory  of  the  next  day  and  it  is  worthy  of  record  to  state 
how  they  came  to  be  located  in  that  part  of  the  field. 

It  is  claimed  that  unless  Sickles  had  taken  up  this 
advanced  position  Hood's  division  would  have  turned  our 
left,  have  forced  us  from  the  shelter  of  the  ridge,  and  prob 
ably  have  intervened  between  us  and  Washington.  The 
movement,  disastrous  in  some  respects,  was  propitious  as 
regards  its  general  results,  for  the  enemy  had  wasted  all 
their  strength  and  valor  in  gaining  the  Emmetsburg  road, 
which  after  all  was  of  no  particular  benefit  to  them.  They 
were  still  outside  our  main  line.  They  pierced  the  latter  it 
is  true,  but  the  gallant  men  who  at  such  heavy  expense  of 
life  and  limb  stood  triumphantly  on  that  crest  were  obliged 
to  retire  because  the  divisions  which  should  have  supported 
them  remained  inactive.  I  must  be  excused  for  thinking 
that  the  damaging  resistance  these  supports  encountered  on 
the  first  day  from  the  men  of  my  command  exerted  a  be 
numbing  influence  on  the  second  day. 

It  is  said,  that  Hood  being  wounded,  Long-street  led  the 
last  advance  against  Little  Bound  Top  in  person,  but  when 
he  saw  Sedgwick's  corps  coming  into  line  he  gave  up  the 
idea  of  capturing  the  heights  as  impracticable.  This  emi 
nence  should  have  been  the  first  point  held  and  fortified  by 
us  early  in  the  day,  as  it  was  the  key  of  the  field,  but  no 
special  orders  were  given  concerning  it,  and  nothing  but 
Warren's  activity  and  foresight  saved  it  from  falling  into  the 
hands  of  the  enemy. 

Meade  was  considerably  startled  by  the  fact  that  the 
enemy  had  pierced  our  centre.  He  at  once  sent  for  Pleas- 
onton  and  gave  him  orders  to  collect  his  cavalry  with  a  view 
to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  army.  Indeed,  in  an  article  on 
the  "  Secret  History  of  Gettysburg,"  published  in  the 
"  Southern  Historical  Papers,"  by  Colonel  Palfrey,  of  the 


BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG— SECOND  DAY.          179 

Confederate  army,  he  states  that  the  movement  to  the  rear 
actually  commenced,  and  that  Swell's  pickets  heard  and 
reported  that  artillery  was  passing  in  that  direction.  After 
a  short  time  the  noise  of  the  wheels  ceased.  He  also  says 
that  in  a  conversation  he  had  with  Colonel  Ulric  Dahlgren 
of  our  cavalry,  who  had  lost  a  leg,  and  was  a  prisoner  in 
Richmond,  he  was  told  that  while  the  battle  of  Gettysburg 
was  going  on  he  (Dahlgren)  captured  a  Confederate  scout 
with  a  despatch  from  Jefferson  Davis  to  General  Lee,  in 
which  the  former  wrote  of  the  exposed  condition  of  Rich 
mond  owing  to  the  presence  of  a  large  Union  force  at  City 
Point.  Dahlgren  said  a  retreat  had  been  ordered,  but  when 
Meade  read  this  despatch,  he  looked  upon  it  as  a  sign  in 
dicating  the  weakness  of  the  enemy,  and  perhaps  thinking 
it  would  not  do  to  supplement  the  probable  capture  of  Rich 
mond  by  a  retreat  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  counter 
manded  the  order.  General  Butterfield,  chief  of  staff,  testi 
fies  that  he  made  out  an  order  of  retreat.  It  was  afterward 
claimed  that  it  wras  merely  a  precautionary  measure,  in  case 
the  army  was  hopelessly  defeated.  Sedgwick,  who  wTas  high 
in  the  confidence  of  General  Meade,  however,  told  one  of  his 
division  commanders  that  it  was  decided  that  the  army  was 
to  retreat  on  Westminster. 

Although  it  was  General  Lee's  intention  that  both  flanks 
of  the  Union  army  should  be  assailed  at  the  same  time, 
while  the  intermediate  forces  made  demonstrations  against 
the  centre,  Ewell  did  not  move  to  attack  the  right  of  our 
line  at  Gulps  Hill  until  Longstreet's  assault  on  the  left  had 
failed.  Longstreet  attributes  it  to  the  fact  that  Ewell  had 
broken  his  line  of  battle  by  detaching  two  brigades  up  the 
York  road  on  some  duty.  There  is  always  some  reason 
why  columns  never  converge  in  time.  Johnson's  division, 
which  had  been  posted  on  the  extreme  left  of  the  rebel  army 


180          CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

and  had  not  been  engaged,  made  their  way,  sheltered  by  the 
ravine  of  Eock  Creek,  to  assail  the  right  at  Gulps  Hill,  held 
by  Wadsworth's  division  of  the  First  Corps,  and  that  part  of 
the  line  still  farther  to  the  right  where  Geary's  division  of 
the  Twelfth  Corps  was  posted. 

In  his  desire  to  reinforce  the  Fifth  Corps  at  the  close  of 
the  conflict  with  Longstreet,  General  Meade  made  the  sad 
mistake  of  ordering  the  Twelfth  Corps  to  abandon  its  posi 
tion  on  the  right  and  report  to  General  Sykes  for  duty  on 
the  left.  General  Slocum,  sensible  that  this  would  be  a 
suicidal  movement,  reported  that  the  enemy  were  advancing 
on  his  front,  and  begged  permission  to  keep  Geary's  division 
there  to  defend  the  position.  General  Meade  finally  allowed 
him  to  retain  Greene's  brigade,  and  no  more,  and  thus  it 
happened  that  Swell's  troops,  rinding  the  works  on  the  ex 
treme  right  of  our  line  defenceless,  had  nothing  to  do  but 
walk  in  and  occupy  them.  If  Meade  was  determined  to 
detach  this  large  force,  there  seems  no  good  reason  why  two 
of  Sedgwick's  brigades  should  not  have  been  sent  to  take 
its  place,  but  nothing  was  done. 

Johnson's  division,  as  it  came  on,  deployed  and  crossed 
Eock  Creek  about  half  an  hour  before  sunset.  It  suffered 
so  severely  from  our  artillery,  that  one  brigade,  that  of 
Jones,  fell  back  in  disorder,  its  commander  being  wounded. 
The  other,  however,  advanced  against  Wadsworth,  and 
Greene  on  his  right ;  but  as  these  generals  had  their  fronts 
well  fortified,  the  attack  was  easily  repulsed.  Nevertheless, 
the  left  of  Johnson's  line,  not  being  opposed,  took  posses 
sion  of  Geary's  works  about  9  P.M.,  and  thus  endangered  our 
communications. 

Gregg's  division  of  cavalry  which  was  posted  east  of 
Slocum's  position  saw  this  movement  of  Johnson.  Gregg 
opened  fire  on  the  column  with  his  artillery  and  sent  out  his 


BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG— SECOND  DAY.    181 

men  dismounted  to  skirmish  on  tile  flank  of  the  enemy. 
Johnson  detached  Walker's  brigade  to  meet  him,  and  the 
contest  continued  until  after  dark.  Greene,  in  the  mean 
time,  swung  his  right  around  on  the  edge  of  a  ravine,  per 
pendicular  to  the  main  line  and  fortified  it,  to  avoid  being 
flanked.  He  was  an  accomplished  soldier  and  engineer,  hav 
ing  graduated  second  in  his  class  at  West  Point,  and  knew 
exactly  what  ought  to  be  done  and  how  to  do  it.  He 
held  on  strongly,  and  as  it  was  dark,  and  the  enemy  did  not 
exactly  know  where  they  were,  or  where  our  troops  were 
posted,  they  waited  until  daylight  before  taking  any  fur 
ther  action.  Yet  they  were  now  but  a  short  distance  from 
General  Meade's  headquarters,  and  within  easy  reach  of  our 
reserve  artillery.  A  night  attack  on  the  rear  of  our  army, 
in  conjunction  with  an  advance  from  the  opposite  side  on 
Hancock's  front,  would  have  thrown  us  into  great  confu 
sion  and  must  have  succeeded. 

During  the  night  Ewell  sent  Smith's  brigade  to  reinforce 
Johnson.  Geary,  after  all,  did  not  reach  Little  Bound  Top 
or  report  to  Sykes,  and  if  he  had  done  so,  his  troops  would 
have  been  of  no  use,  as  the  battle  was  over  in  that  part  of 
the  field.  There  was  a  mystery  about  his  movements 
which  needs  to  be  cleared  up. 

To  supplement  this  attack  on  the  extreme  right,  and  pre 
vent  reinforcements  from  being  sent  there,  Early's  division 
was  directed  to  carry  Cemetery  Hill  by  storm.  Before  it  ad 
vanced,  a  vigorous  artillery  fire  was  opened  from  four  rebel 
batteries  on  Benner's  Hill,  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  assault, 
but  our  batteries  on  Cemetery  Hill,  which  were  partially 
sheltered  by  earthworks,  replied  and  soon  silenced  those 
of  the  enemy.  Then  Early's  infantry  moved  forth,  Hays's 
brigade  on  the  right,  Hoke's  brigade  on  the  left,  under 
Colonel  Avery,  and  Gordon's  brigade  in  reserve.  It  was 


182          CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND   GETTYSBURG. 

supposed  Johnson's  division  would  protect  Early's  left  flank, 
while  Rodes's  and  Fender's  divisions  would  come  forward  in 
(time  to  prevent  any  attack  against  his  right.  The  enemy 
first  struck  Von  Gilsa's  brigade,  which  was  posted  behind  a 
stone  fence  at  the  foot  of  the  lull.  Still  farther  to  its  left,  at 
the  base  of  the  hill,  was  Ames's  brigade,  both  enclosing 
Rickett's  and  Weidrick's  batteries  on  higher  ground  above. 
Stuart's,  Reynolds's  and  Stevens's  batteries,  which  had  been 
a  good  deal  cut  up  on  the  first  day,  were  now  brought 
to  bear  on  the  approaching  enemy.  Colonel  Wainwright, 
Chief  of  Artillery  to  the  First  Corps,  gave  them  orders  not 
to  attempt  to  retreat  if  attacked,  but  to  fight  the  guns  to 
the  last.  The  enemy  advanced  up  the  ravine  which  was 
specially  commanded  by  Stevens's  battery.  Weidrick,  Rick- 
etts,  and  Stevens  played  upon  the  approaching  line  energeti 
cally.  The  rebel  left  and  centre  fell  back,  but  the  right 
managed  to  obtain  shelter  from  houses  and  undulating 
ground,  and  came  on  impetuously,  charging  over  Von 
Gilsa's  brigade,  and  driving  it  up  the  hill,  through  the 
batteries.  In  doing  so  Hays  says  the  darkness  and  smoke 
saved  his  men  from  a  terrible  slaughter.  Weidrick's  bat 
tery  was  captured,  and  two  of  Ricketts's  guns  were  spiked. 
The  enemy,  in  making  this  movement,  exposed  their  left 
flank  to  Stevens's  battery,  which  poured  a  terrible  fire  of 
double  canister  into  their  ranks.  The  Thirty-third  Massa 
chusetts  also  opened  a  most  effective  oblique  fire.  The  bat 
teries  were  penetrated  but  would  not  surrender.  Dearer 
than  life  itself  to  the  cannoneer  is  the  gun  he  serves,  and 
these  brave  men  fought  hand  to  hand  with  handspikes, 
rammer,  staves,  arid  even  stones.  They  shouted,  "  Death  on 
the  soil  of  our  native  State  rather  than  lose  our  guns."  Han 
cock,  all  this  time  should  have  been  kept  busy  on  his  own 
front  repelling  an  attack  from  Rodes  and  Fender,  but  as 


BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG— SECOND  DAY.  183 

they  did  not  come  forward,  and  as  he  felt  that  there  was 
great  danger  that  Howard  would  lose  Cemetery  Hill  and  his 
own  right  be  turned,  he  sent  Can-oil's  brigade  to  the  rescue. 
Carroll  was  joined  by  the  One  Hundred  and  Sixth  Pennsyl 
vania  and  some  reinforcements  from  Schurz's  division.  For 
a  few  minutes,  Hays  says,  there  was  an  ominous  silence 
and  then  the  tramp  of  our  infantry  was  heard.  They  came 
over  the  hill  and  went  in  with  a  cheer.  The  enemy,  find 
ing  they  were  about  to  be  overwhelmed,  retreated,  as 
no  one  came  to  their  assistance.  When  they  fell  back 
our  guns  opened  a  very  destructive  fire.  It  is  said  that 
out  of  1,750  men  of  the  organization  known  as  "The  Louis 
iana  Tigers,"  only  150  returned.  Hays  attributes  his  defeat 
to  the  fact  that  Gordon  was  not  up  in  time  to  support 
him. 

The  failure  to  carry  the  Hill  isolated  Johnson's  divi 
sion  on  our  extreme  right.  As  it  could  only  be  reached 
by  a  long  circuit  it  was  not  easy  for  Lee  to  maintain 
it  there,  without  unduly  weakening  other  parts  of  his 
line.  That  Eodes's  division  did  not  reach  Cemetery 
Hill  in  time  to  co-operate  with  Early 's  attack  was  not 
owing  to  any  lack  of  zeal  or  activity  on  the  part  of  that 
energetic  officer.  He  was  obliged  to  move  out  of  Gettys 
burg  by  the  flank,  then  change  front  and  advance  double 
the  distance  Early  had  to  traverse,  and  by  the  time  he 
had  done  so  Early  had  made  the  attack  and  had  been  re 
pulsed. 

The  day  closed  with  the  rebels  defeated  on  our  left,  but 
victorious  on  our  right.  Fortunately  for  us,  this  incited 
Lee  to  continue  his  efforts.  He  could  not  bear  to  retreat 
after  his  heavy  losses,  and  acknowledge  that  he  was  beaten. 
He  resolved  to  reinforce  Johnson's  division,  now  in  rear  of  our 
right,  and  fling  Pickett's  troops,  the  elite  of  his  army,  who 


181          CHAXCELLORSVILLE  AND   GETTYSBURG. 

had  not  been  engaged,  against  our  centre.  He  hoped  a 
simultaneous  attack  made  by  Pickett  in  front  and  Johnson 
in  rear,  would  yet  win  those  heights  and  scatter  the  Union 
army  to  the  winds.  Kilpatrick,  who  had  been  resting  the 
tired  men  and  horses  of  his  cavalry  division  at  Abbots- 
ford  after  the  conflict  at  Hanover,  went  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  2d  to  circle  around  and  attack  the  left  and  rear  of  the 
enemy  by  way  of  Hunterstown.  This  plan  was  foiled,  how 
ever,  by  the  sudden  arrival  of  Stuart's  cavalry  from  its  long 
march.  They  reached  that  part  of  the  field  about  4  P.M. 
After  a  fierce  combat,  in  which  Farnsworth's  and  Ouster's  bri 
gades  and  Estes's  squadron  were  principally  engaged  against 
Hampton's  brigade  supported  by  the  main  body,  darkness 
put  an  end  to  the  fight.  Kilpatrick  then  turned  back  and 
bivouacked  at  Two  Taverns  for  the  night. 

Gregg's  division  of  cavalry  left  Hanover  at  noon  and  took 
post  opposite  and  about  three  miles  east  of  Slocum's  Corps  on 
the  right.  There,  as  stated,  he  saw  Johnson's  division  mov 
ing  to  the  attack  and  after  throwing  some  shells  into  their 
ranks  deployed  his  own  skirmish  line  and  advanced  against 
the  one  they  threw  out  to  meet  him.  At  10  P.M.  he  withdrew 
and  took  post  on  the  Baltimore  pike  where  it  crosses  Cress 
Kun,  near  Eock  Creek.  By  so  doing  he  guarded  the  right 
and  rear  of  the  army  from  any  demonstration  by  Stuart's 
cavalry. 

At  night  a  council  of  war  was  held,  in  which  it  was  unan 
imously  voted  to  stay  and  fight  it  out.  Meade  was  dis 
pleased  with  the  result,  and  although  he  acquiesced  in  the 
decision,  he  said  angrily,  "  Have  it  your  own  way,  gen 
tlemen,  but  Gettysburg  is  no  place  to  fight  a  battle  in." 
The  fact  that  a  portion  of  the  enemy  actually  prolonged  cm- 
line  on  the  right  and  that  our  centre  had  been  pierced  dur- 


BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG— SECOND  DAY.     185 

ing  the  day,  made  him  feel  far  from  confident.  He  thought 
it  better  to  retreat  with  what  he  had,  than  run  the  risk  of 
losing  all.1 

1  Since  the  above  was  written,  the  discussion  has  been  renewed  in  the  public 
prints  as  to  whether  General  Meade  did  or  did  not  intend  to  leave  the  field.  So 
far  as  the  drawing  up  of  an  order  of  retreat  is  concerned,  it  was  undoubtedly 
right  and  proper  to  do  so,  for  it  is  the  duty  of  a  general  to  be  prepared  for  every 
emergency.  It  is  easy  to  criticise,  and  say  what  should  have  been  done,  sifter  a 
battle  has  been  fought,  after  the  position  of  troops  is  all  laid  down  on  the  maps, 
and  the  plans  of  ever/  commander  explained  in  official  reports;  but  amid  the 
doubt  and  confusion  of  actual  combat,  where  there  has  been  great  loss  of  men 
and  material,  it  is  not  always  so  easy  to  decide.  On  the  night  of  the  2d  the  state 
of  affairs  was  disheartening.  In  the  combats  of  the  preceding  days,  the  First, 
Third,  and  Eleventh  Corps  had  been  almost  annihilated  ;  the  Fifth  Corps  and  a 
great  part  of  the  Second  were  shattered,  and  only  the  Sixth  Corps  and  Twelfth 
Corps  were  comparatively  fresh.  It  was  possible  therefore  that  the  enemy  might 
gain  some  great  success  the  next  day,  which  would  stimulate  them  to  extra  exer 
tions,  and  diminish  the  spirit  of  otir  men  in  the  same  proportion.  In  such  a  case  it 
was  not  improbable  that  the  army  might  be  destroyed  as  an  organization,  and  there 
is  a  vast  difference  between  a  destroyed  army  and  a  defeated  army.  By  retiring 
while  it  was  yet  in  his  power  to  do  so,  General  Meade  felt  that  he  would  insure 
the  safety  of  our  principal  cities,  for  the  enemy  were  too  exhausted  to  pursue; 
and  being  out  of  ammunition,  and  far  from  their  base  of  supplies,  were  not  in  a 
condition  to  do  much  further  damage,  or  act  very  energetically.  Whereas  our 
troops  could  soon  be  largely  reinforced  from  the  draft  which  had  just  been  estab 
lished,  and,  being  in  the  centre  of  their  resources,  could  be  supplied  with  all  that 
was  necessary  for  renewed  effort. 

There  can  be  no  question  that,  at  the  Council  referred  to,  General  Meade  did 
desire  to  retreat. 

It  has  also  been  stated  that  both  General  Gibbon  and  General  Newton  objected 
to  our  position  at  Gettysburg,  but  this  is  an  error.  They  merely  recommended 
some  additional  precautions  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  turning  our  left  at  Round 
Top,  and  thus  intervening  between  us  and  Washington.  Hancock,  in  giving  his 
vote,  said  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  retreated  too  often,  and  he  was  in  favor 
of  remaining  now  to  fight  it  out. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  THIRD  DAY— JOHNSON'S  DIVISION 
DRIVEN  OUT. 

AT  dawn  on  the  3d  the  enemy  opened  on  us  with  artillery, 
but  the  firing  had  no  definite  purpose,  and  after  some  hours 
it  gradually  slackened. 

The  principal  interest  early  in  the  day  necessarily  cen 
tred  on  the  right,  where  Johnson's  position  not  only  en 
dangered  the  safety  of  the  army,  but  compromised  our  re 
treat.  It  was  therefore  essential  to  drive  him  out  as  soon  as 
possible.  To  this  end  batteries  were  established  during  the 
night  on  all  the  prominent  points  in  that  vicinity.  Geary 
had  returned  with  his  division  about  midnight,  and  was  not 
a  little  astonished  to  find  the  rebels  established  in  the 
works  he  had  left.  He  determined  to  contest  possession 
with  them  at  daylight.  In  the  meantime  he  joined  Greene 
and  formed  part  of  his  line  perpendicular  to  our  main  line  of 
battle,  and  part  fronting  the  enemy. 

On  the  other  hand,  Ewell,  having  obtained  a  foothold, 
swore  he  would  not  be  driven  out,  and  hastened  to  reinforce 
Johnson  with  Daniels's  and  O'Neill's  brigades  from  Eodes's 
division.  , 

As  soon  as  objects  could  be  discerned  in  the  early  gray  of 
the  morning  our  artillery  opened  fire.  As  Johnson,  on  ac.- 
count  of  the  steep  declivities  and  other  obstacles,  had  not 
been  able  to  bring  any  artillery  with  him,  he  could  not  reply. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  THIRD  DAY.  187 

It  would  not  do  to  remain  quiet  under  this  fire,  and  he  de 
termined  to  charge,  in  hopes  of  winning  a  better  position  on 
higher  ground.  His  men — the  old  Stonewall  brigade  lead 
ing — rushed  bravely  forward,  but  were  as  gallantly  met  by 
Kane's  brigade  of  Geary's  division  and  a  close  and  severe 
struggle  ensued  for  four  hours  among  the  trees  and  'rocks. 
Euger's  division  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  came  up  and  formed 
on  the  rebel  left,  taking  them  in  flank  and  threatening  them 
in  reverse.  Indeed,  as  the  rest  of  our  line  were  not  en 
gaged,  there  was  plenty  of  support  for  Geary.  Shaler's  and 
Wheaton's  brigades  and  other  troops  were  sent  him  as  a 
reserve  force. 

At  about  11  A.M.,  finding  the  contest  hopeless,  and  his 
retreat  threatened  by  a  force  sent  down  to  Eock  Creek, 
Johnson  yielded  slowly  and  reluctantly  to  a  charge  made 
by  Geary's  division,  gave  up  the  position  and  withdrew  to 
Eock  Creek,  where  he  remained  until  night. 

Our  line  was  once  more  intact.  All  that  the  enemy  had 
gained  by  dogged  determination  and  desperate  bravery  was 
lost  from  a  lack  of  co-ordination,  caused  perhaps  by  the 
great  difficulty  of  communicating  orders  over  this  long  con 
cave  line  where  every  route  was  swept  by  our  fire. 

Lee  had  now  attacked  both  flanks  of  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac  without  having  been  able  to  establish  himself  perma 
nently  on  either.  Notwithstanding  the  repulse  of  the  pre 
vious  day  he  was  very  desirous  of  turning  the  left,  for  once 
well  posted  there  he  could  secure  his  own  retreat  while 
interposing  between  Meade  and  Washington.  He  rode  over 
with  Longstreet  to  that  end  of  the  line  to  see  what  could  be 
done.  General  Wofford,  who  commanded  a  brigade  of 
McLaws's  division,  writes  in  a  recent  letter  to  General  Craw 
ford,  United  States  Army,  as  follows  :  "  Lee  and  Longstreet 
came  to  my  brigade  Friday  morning  before,  the  artillery 


188    CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

opened  fire.  I  told  him  that  the  afternoon  before,  I  nearly 
reached  the  crest.  He  asked  if  I  could  not  go  there  now. 
I  replied,  "No,  General,  I  think  not."  He  said  quickly, 
"  Why  not?"  "  Because,"  I  said,  "General,  the  enemy  have 
had  all  night  to  intrench  and  reinforce.  I  had  been  pur 
suing  a  broken  enemy  and  the  situation  was  now  very 
different." 

Having  failed  at  each  extremity,  it  only  remained  to  Lee 
to  retreat,  or  attack  the  centre.  Such  high  expectations 
had  been  formed  in  the  Southern  States  in  regard  to  his 
conquest  of  the  North  that  he  determined  to  make  another 
effort.  He  still  had  Pickett's  division,  the  flower  of  Vir 
ginia,  which  had  not  been  engaged,  and  which  was  full  of 
enthusiasm.  He  resolved  to  launch  them  against  our  centre, 
supported  on  either  flank  by  the  advance  of  the  main  por 
tion  of  the  army.  He  had  hoped  that  Johnson's  division 
would  have  been  able  to  maintain  its  position  on  the  right, 
so  that  the  Union  centre  could  be  assailed  in  front  and  rear 
at  the  same  time,  but  Johnson  having  been  driven  out,  it 
was  necessary  to  trust  to  Pickett  alone,  or  abandon  the 
whole  enterprise  and  return  to  Virginia. 

Everything  was  quiet  up  to  1  P.M.,  as  the  enemy  were  mass 
ing  their  batteries  and  concentrating  their  forces  preparatory 
to  the  grand  charge — the  supreme  effort — which  was  to  de 
termine  the  fate  of  the  campaign,  and  to  settle  the  point 
whether  freedom  or  slavery  was  to  rule  the  Northern  States. 

It  seems  to  me  there  was  some  lack  of  judgment  in  the 
preparations.  Heth's  division,  now  under  Pettigrew,  which 
had  been  so  severely  handled  on  the  first  day,  and  which 
was  composed  in  a  great  measure  of  new  troops,  was  desig 
nated  to  support  Pickett's  left  and  join  in  the  attack  at  close 
quarters.  Wilcox,  too,  who  one  would  think  had  been 
pretty  well  fought  out  the  day  before,  in  his  desperate  en- 


THE   BATTLE   OF   THE   THIRD   DAY.  180 

terprise  of  attempting  to  crown  the  crest,  was  directed  to 
support  the  right  flank  of  the  attack.  Wright's  brigade  was 
formed  in  rear,  and  Fender's  on  the  left  of  Pettigrew,  but 
there  was  a  long  distance  between  Wilcox  and  Longstreet's 
forces  on  the  right. 

At  1  P.M.,  a  signal  gun  was  fired  and  one  hundred  and  fif 
teen  guns  opened  against  Hancock's  command,  consisting  of 
the  First  Corps  under  Newton,  the  Second  Corps  under  Gib 
bon,  the  Third  Corps  under  Birney,  and  against  the  Eleventh 
Corps  under  Howard.  The  object  of  this  heavy  artillery  fire 
was  to  break  up  our  lines  and  prepare  the  way  for  Pickett's 
charge.  The  exigencies  of  the  battle  had  caused  the  First 
Corps  to  be  divided,  Wadsworth's  division  being  on  the  right 
at  Gulps  Hill,  Robinson  on  Gibbon's  right,  and  my  own  di 
vision  intervening  between  Caldwell  on  the  left  and  Gibbon 
on  the  right.  The  convex  shape  of  our  line  did  not  give  us 
as  much  space  as  that  of  the  enemy,  but  General  Hunt, 
Chief  of  Artillery,  promptly  posted  eighty  guns  along  the 
crest — as  many  as  it  would  hold — to  answer  the  fire,  and 
the  batteries  on  both  sides  suffered  severely  in  the  two 
hours'  cannonade.  Not  less  than  eleven  caissons  were 
blown  up  and  destroyed ;  one  quite  near  me.  When  the 
smoke  went  up  from  these  explosions  rebel  yells  of  exulta 
tion  could  be  heard  along  a  line  of  several  miles.  At  3  P.M. 
General  Hunt  ordered  our  artillery  fire  to  cease,,  in  order  to 
cool  the  guns,  and  to  preserve  some  rounds  for  the  contest 
at  close  quarters,  which  he  foresaw  would  soon  take  place. 

My  own  men  did  not  suffer  a  great  deal  from  this  cannon 
ade,  as  I  sheltered  them  as  much  as  possible  under  the  crest 
of  the  hill,  and  behind  rocks,  trees,  and  stone  fences. 

The  cessation  of  our  fire  gave  the  enemy  the  idea  they 
had  silenced  our  batteries,  and  Pickett  at  once  moved 
forward,  to  break  the  left  centre  of  the  Union  line  and 


190    CHAXCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

occupy  the  crest  of  the  ridge.1  The  other  forces  on  his 
right  and  left  were  expected  to  move  up  and  enlarge  the 
opening  thus  made,  so  that  finally,  the  two  wings  of  the 
Union  Army  would  be  permanently  separated,  and  flung  off 
by  this  entering  wedge  in  eccentric  directions. 

This  great  column  of  attack,  it  was  supposed,  numbered 
about  seventeen  thousand  men,  but  the  rebel  writers  have  a 
peculiar  arithmetic  by  which  they  always  cipher  down  their 
forces  to  nothing.  Even  on  the  left,  on  the  preceding  day, 
when  our  troops  in  front  of  Little  Round  Top  were  assailed 
by  a  line  a  mile  and  a  half  long,  they  figure  it  almost  out  of 
existence.  The  force  that  now  advanced  would  have  been 
larger  still  had  it  not  been  for  a  spirited  attack  by  Kilpat- 
rick  against  the  left  of  Longstreet's  corps,  detaining  some 
troops  there  which  otherwise  might  have  co-operated  in  the 
grand  assault  against  our  centre. 

It  necessarily  took  the  rebels  some  time  to  form  and 
cross  the  intervening  space,  and  Hunt  took  advantage  of  the 
opportunity  to  withdraw  the  batteries  that  had  been  most 
injured,  sending  others  in  their  place  from  the  reserve 
artillery,  which  had  not  been  engaged.  He  also  replenished 
the  ammunition  boxes,  and  stood  ready  to  receive  the  foe  as 
he  came  forward — first  with  solid  shot,  next  with  shell,  and 
lastly,  when  he  came  to  close  quarters,  with  canister. 

General  Meade's  headquarters  was  in  the  centre  of  this 
cannonade,  and  as  the  balls  were  flying  very  thickly  there, 
and  killing  the  horses  of  his  staff,  he  found  it  necessary  tem 
porarily  to  abandon  the  place.  Where  nothing  is  to  be 
gained  by  exposure  it  is  sound  sense  to  shelter  men  and 
officers  as  much  as  possible.  He  rode  over  to  Power's  Hill, 

1  The  attack  was  so  important,  so  momentous  and  so  contrary  to  Longstreet's 
judgment,  that  when  Pickett  asked  for  orders  to  advance  he  gave  no  reply,  and 
Pickett  said  proudly,  "  I  shall  go  forward,  sir  !  " 


THE   BATTLE  OF   THE  THIRD   DAY. 


191 


made  his  headquarters  with  General  Slocum,  and  when  the 
firing  ceased  rode  back  again.      During  his  absence   the 


Diagram  of  the  Attack  on  the  Left  Centre,  July  3d. 

charge  took  place.  He  has  stated  that  it  was  his  inten 
tion  to  throw  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps  on  the  flanks  of  the 
attacking  force,  but  no  orders  to  this  effect  were  issued, 


192          CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

and  it  is  questionable  whether  such  an  arrangement  would 
have  been  a  good  one.  It  would  have  disgarnished  the  left, 
where  Longstreet  wras  still  strong  in  numbers,  and  in  form 
ing  perpendicular  to  our  line  of  battle  the  two  corps  would 
necessarily  have  exposed  their  own  outer  flanks  to  attack. 
Indeed,  the  rebels  had  provided  for  just  such  a  contingency, 
by  posting  "Wilcox's  brigade  and  Perry's  brigade  under  Col 
onel  Lang  on  the  right,  and  Fender's  division,  now  under 
Trimble,  on  the  left,  both  in  rear  of  the  charging  column 
under  Pickett  and  Pettigrew.  Owing  to  a  mistake  or  mis 
understanding,  this  disposition,  however,  did  not  turn  out 
well  for  the  enemy.  It  was  not  intended  by  Providence  that 
the  Northern  States  should  pass  under  the  iron  rule  of  the 
slave  power,  and  on  this  occasion  every  plan  made  by  Lee 
was  thwarted  in  the  most  unexpected  manner. 
^  The  distance  to  be  traversed  by  Pickett's  column  was 
about  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the  wroods  where  they  started, 
to  the  crest  of  the  ridge  they  desired  to  attain.  They  suf 
fered  severely  from  our  artillery,  which  opened  on  them 
with  solid  shot  as  soon  as  they  came  in  sight ;  when  half 
way  across  the  plain  they  were  vigorously  shelled ;  double 
canisters  were  reserved  for  their  nearer  approach. 

At  first  the  direction  of  their  march  appeared  to  be 
directly  toward  my  division.  "When  within  five  hundred 
yards  of  us,  however,  Pickett  halted  and  changed  direction 
obliquely  about  forty-five  degrees,  so  that  the  attack  passed 
ine  and  struck  Gibbon's  division  on  my  right.  Just  here 
one  of  those  providential  circumstances  occurred  which 
favored  us  so  much,  for  Wilcox  and  Lang,  who  guarded 
Pickett's  right  flank,  did  not  follow  his  oblique  movement, 
but  kept  on  straight  to  the  front,  so  that  soon  there  was  a 
wide  interval  between  their  troops  and  the  main  body,  leav 
ing  Pickett's  right  fully  uncovered. 


THE   BATTLE   OF   THE  THIRD   DAY.  193 

The  rebels  came  on  magnificently.  As  fast  as  the  shot 
and  shell  tore  through  their  lines  they  closed  up  the  gaps 
and  pressed  forward.  When  they  reached  the  Emmetsburg 
road  the  canister  began  to  make  fearful  chasms  in  their 
ranks.  They  also  suffered  severely  from  a  battery  posted  on 
Little  Bound  Top,  which  enfiladed  their  line.  One  shell 
killed  and  wounded  ten  men.  Gibbon  had  directed  his 
command  to  reserve  their  fire  until  the  enemy  were  near 
enough  to  make  it  very  effective.  Pickett's  advance  dashed 
up  to  the  fence  occupied  by  Hays's  brigade  of  the  Second  Corps 
in  front  of  our  main  line ;  then  the  musketry  blazed  forth 
with  deadly  effect,  and  Pettigrew's  men  began  to  waver  on  the 
left  and  fall  behind ;  for  the  nature  of  the  ground  was  such 
that  they  were  more  exposed  than  other  portions  of  the  line. 

Before  the  first  line  of  rebels  reached  the  fence  it  war; 
obliged  to  pass  a  demi-brigade  under  Colonel  Theodore  B. 
Gates  of  the  Twentieth  New  York  State  Militia  and  a  Ver 
mont  brigade  under  General  Stannard,  both  belonging  to 
my  command,  and  holding  my  front  line  parallel  to  that  of 
the  enemy  and  some  distance  below  the  crest,  in  advance  of 
the  main  line  of  battle.  When  Pickett's  right  became  ex 
posed  in  consequence  of  the  divergence  of  Wilcox's  com 
mand,  Stannard  seized  the  opportunity  to  make  a  flank 
attack,  and  while  his  left  regiment,  the  Fourteenth,  poured 
in  a  heavy  oblique  fire,  he  changed  front  with  his  two  right 
regiments,  the  Thirteenth  and  Sixteenth,  which  brought 
them  perpendicular  to  the  rebel  line  of  march.  In  cases 
of  this  kind  when  struck  directly  on  the  flank,  troops  are 
quite  unable  to  defend  themselves,  and  Kemper's  brigade 
crowded  in  toward  the  centre  to  avoid  Stannard's  ener 
getic  and  deadly  attack.  They  were  closely  followed  up 
by  Gates's  command,  who  continued  to  fire  into  them  at 
close  range.  This  caused  many  to  surrender,  others  to  re- 
VI.— 9 


194    CHAXCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

treat  outright,  and  others  simply  to  crowd  together.  Never 
theless,  the  next  brigade — that  of  Armistead — united  to  Gar- 
nett's  brigade,  pressed  on,  overpowered  Hays's  brigade  of 
the  Second  Corps,  and  drove  it  from  its  advanced  po 
sition  at  the  fence,  back  through  the  batteries  on  the  crest, 
and  in  spite  of  death-dealing  bolts  on  all  sides,  Pickett  de 
termined  to  break  Gibbon's  line  and  captiire  his  guns. 

Although  Webb's  front  was  the  focus  of  the  concentrated 
artillery  fire,  and  he  had  already  lost  fifty  men  and  some 
valuable  officers,  his  line  remained  firm  and  unshaken.  It  de 
volved  upon  him  now  to  meet  the  great  charge  which  was  to 
decide  the  fate  of  the  day.  It  would  have  been  difficult  to 
find  a  man  better  fitted  for  such  an  emergency.  He  was 
nerved  to  great  deeds  by  the  memory  of  his  ancestors,  who 
in  former  days  had  rendered  distinguished  services  to  the 
Eepublic,  and  felt  that  the  results  of  the  whole  war  might 
depend  upon  his  holding  his  position.  His  men  were  equally 
resolute.  Cushing's  battery,  "  B,"  Fourth  United  States  Ar 
tillery,  which  had  been  posted  on  his  left,  and  Brown's 
Rhode  Island  Battery  on  liis  right,  were  both  practically  de 
stroyed  by  the  cannonade.  The  horses  were  prostrated,  every 
officer  but  one  was  struck,  and  Gushing  had  but  one  ser 
viceable  gun  left. 

As  Pickett's  advance  came  very  close  to  the  first  line, 
young  Gushing,  mortally  wounded,  holding  on  to  his  intes 
tines  with  one  hand,  ran  his  only  gun  down  to  the  fence 
with  the  other,  and  said:  "  Webb,  I  will  give  tit  em  one  more. 
shot!"  At  the  moment  of  the  last  discharge  he  called  out, 
"  Good-by! "  and  fell  dead  at  the  post  of  duty. 

Webb  sent  for  fresh  batteries  to  replace  the  two  that 
were  disabled,  and  Wheeler's  First  New  York  Independent 
Battery  came  up  just  before  the  attack,  and  took  the  place 
of  Cushing's  battery  on  the  left. 


THE   BATTLE   OF   THE  THIRD   DAY.  195 

Armistead  pressed  forward,  leaped  the  fence,  waving  his 
sword  with  his  hat  on  it,  followed  by  about  a  hundred  of 
his  men,  several  of  whom  carried  battle-flags.  He  shouted, 
"Give  them  the  cold  steel  boys  !"  and  laid  his  hands  upon 
one  of  the  guns.  The  battery  for  a  few  minutes  was  in  his 
possession,  and  the  rebel  flag  flew  triumphantly  over  our 
line.  But  Webb  was  at  the  front,  very  near  Armistead,  ani 
mating  and  encouraging  his  men.  He  led  the  Seventy- 
second  Pennsylvania  regiment  against  the  enemy,  and  posted 
a  line  of  wounded  men  in  rear  to  drive  back  or  shoot  every 
man  that  deserted  his  duty.  A  portion  of  the  Seventy-first 
Pennsylvania,  behind  a  stone  wall  on  the  right,  threw  in  a 
deadly  flanking  fire,  while  a  great  part  of  the  Sixty -ninth 
Pennsylvania  and  the  remainder  of  the  Seventy-first  made 
stern  resistance  from  a  copse  of  trees  on  the  left,  near  where 
the  enemy  had  broken  the  line,  and  where  our  men  were  shot 
with  the  rebel  muskets  touching  their  breasts. 

Then  came  a  splendid  charge  of  two  regiments,  led  by 
Colonel  Hall,  which  passed  completely  through  Webb's 
line,  and  engaged  the  enemy  in  a  hand-to-hand  conflict.1 
Armistead  was  shot  down  by  the  side  of  the  gun  he  had 
taken.  It  is  said  he  had  fought  on  our  side  in  the  first  bat 
tle  at  Bull  Run,  but  had  been  seduced  by  Southern  affilia 
tions  to  join  in  the  rebellion ;  and  now,  dying  in  the  effort 
to  extend  the  area  of  slavery  over  the  free  States,  he  saw 
with  a  clearer  vision  that  he  had  been  engaged  in  an  unholy 
cause,  and  said  to  one  of  our  officers  who  leaned  over  him : 
"  Tell  Hancock  I  have  wronged  him  and  have  wronged  my 
country." 


1  Colonel  Norman  J.  Hall,  commanding  a  brigade  in  Hancock's  corps,  who 
rendered  this  great  service,  was  one  of  the  garrison  who  defended  Fort  Snmter 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  At  that  time  he  was  the  Second  Lieutenant  of 
my  company. 


196    CHANCZLLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

Both  Gibbon  and  Webb  were  wounded,  and  the  loss  in 
officers  and  men  was  very  heavy ;  two  rebel  brigadier-gen 
erals  were  killed,  and  more  prisoners  were  taken  than  twice 
Webb's  brigade  ;  6  battle-flags,  and  1,463  muskets  were  also 
gathered  in. 

My  command  being  a  little  to  the  left,  I  witnessed  this 
scene,  and,  after  it  was  over,  sent  out  stretcher-bearers  at 
tached  to  the  ambulance  train,  and  had  numbers  of  wound 
ed  Confederates  brought  in  and  cared  for.  I  was  told  that 
there  was  one  man  among  these  whose  conversation  seemed 
to  indicate  that  he  was  a  general  officer.  I  sent  to  ascertain 
his  rank,  but  he  replied  :  "  Tell  General  Doubleday  in  a  few 
minutes  I  shall  be  where  there  is  no  rank."  He  expired 
soon  after,  and  I  never  learned  his  name. 

The  rebels  did  not  seem  to  appreciate  my  humanity  in 
sending  out  to  bring  in  their  wounded,  for  they  opened  a 
savage  fire  against  the  stretcher-bearers.  One  shell  burst 
among  us,  a  piece  of  it  knocked  me  over  on  my  horse's  neck, 
and  wounded  Lieutenant  Cowdry  of  my  staff. 

When  Pickett — the  great  leader — looked  around  the  top 
of  the  ridge  he  had  temporarily  gained,  he  saw  it  was  im 
possible  to  hold  the  position.  Troops  were  rushing  in  on 
him  from  all  sides.  The  Second  Corps  were  engaged  in  a 
furious  assault  on  his  front.  His  men  were  fighting  with 
clubbed  muskets,  and  even  banner  staves  were  intertwined 
in  a  fierce  and  hopeless  struggle.  My  division  of  the  First 
Corps  were  on  his  right  flank,  giving  deadly  blows  there,  and 
the  Third  Corps  were  closing  up  to  attack.  Pettigrew's 
forces  on  his  left  had  given  way,  and  a  heavy  skirmish  line 
began  to  accumulate  on  that  flank.  He  saw  his  men  surren 
dering  in  masses,  and,  with  a  heart  full  of  anguish,  ordered 
a  retreat.  Death  had  been  busy  on  all  sides,  and  few  indeed 
now  remained  of  that  maft-nificent  column  which  had  ad- 


THE  BATTLE   OF   THE  THIRD   DAY.  197 

vanced  so  proudly,  led  by  the  Ney  of  the  rebel  army,  and 
these  few  fell  back  in  disorder,  and  without  organization, 
behind  Wright's  brigade,  which  had  been  sent  forward  to 
cover  the  retreat.  At  first,  however,  when  struck  by  Stan- 
nard  on  the  flank,  and  when  Pickett's  charge  was  spent, 
they  rallied  in  a  little  slashing,  where  a  grove  had  been 
cut  down  by  our  troops  to  leave  an  opening  for  our  artillery. 
There  two  regiments  of  Eowley's  brigade  of  my  division, 
the  One  Hundred  and  Fifty-first  Pennsylvania  and  the  Twen 
tieth  New  York  State  Militia,  under  Colonel  Theodore  B. 
Gates,  of  the  latter  regiment,  made  a  gallant  charge,  and 
drove  them  out.  Pettigrew's  division,  it  is  said,  lost  2,000 
prisoners  and  15  battle-flags  on  the  left. 

While  this  severe  contest  was  going  on  in  front  of  Webb, 
Wilcox  deployed  his  command  and  opened  a  feeble  fire 
against  Caldwell's  division  on  my  left.  Stannard  repeated 
the  manoeuvre  which  had  been  so  successful  against  Kem- 
per's  brigade  by  detaching  the  Fourteenth  and  Sixteenth 
Vermont  to  take  Wilcox  in  flank.  Wilcox  thus  attacked  on 
his  right,  while  a  long  row  of  batteries  tore  the  front  of  his 
line  to  pieces  with  canister,  could  gain  no  foothold.  He 
found  himself  exposed  to  a  tremendous  cross  fire,  and  was 
obliged  to  retreat,  but  a  great  portion  of  his  command  were 
brought  in  as  prisoners  by  Stannard '  and  battle-flags  were 
gathered  in  sheaves. 

A  portion  of  Longstreet's  corps,  Benning's,  Eobertson's, 
and  Law's  brigades,  advanced  against  the  two  Bound  Tops 
to  prevent  reinforcements  from  being  sent  from  that  vicinity 
to  meet  Pickett's  charge.  Kilpatrick  interfered  with  this 


1  As  Stannard's  brigade  were  new  troops,  and  had  been  stationed  near  Wash 
ington,  the  men  had  dubbed  them  The  Paper  Collar  Brigade,  because  some  of 
them  were  seen  wearing  paper  collars,  but  after  this  fight  the  term  was  never 
again  applied  to  them. 


198    CHAXCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

programme,  however,  for  about  2  P.M.  he  made  his  appear 
ance  on  our  left  with  Farnsworth's  brigade  and  Merritt's 
brigade  of  regulars,  accompanied  with  Graham's  and  Elder's 
batteries  of  the  regular  army,  to  attack  the  rebel  right,  with 
a  view  to  reach  their  ammunition  trains,  which  were  in  that 
vicinity.  The  rebels  say  his  men  came  on  yelling  like  de 
mons.  Having  driven  back  the  skirmishers  who  guarded  that 
flank,  Merritt  deployed  on  the  left  and  soon  became  en 
gaged  there  with  Anderson's  Georgia  brigade,  which  was 
supported  by  two  batteries.  On  the  right  Farnsworth,  with 
the  First  Vermont  regiment  of  his  brigade,  leaped  a  fence, 
and  advanced  until  he  came  to  a  second  stone  fence,  where 
he  was  checked  by  an  attack  on  his  right  flank  from  the 
Fourth  Alabama  regiment  of  Law's  brigade,  which  came  back 
for  that  purpose  from  a  demonstration  it  was  making  against 
Kound  Top.  Farnsworth  then  turned  and  leaping  another 
fence  in  a  storm  of  shot  and  shell,  made  a  gallant  attempt  to 
capture  Backman's  battery,  but  was  unable  to  do  so,  as  it 
was  promptly  supported  by  the  Ninth  Georgia  regiment  of 
Anderson's  brigade.  Farnsworth  was  killed  in  this  charge, 
and  the  First  Vermont  found  itself  enclosed  in  a  field,  with 
high  fences  on  all  sides,  behind  which  masses  of  infantry 
were  constantly  rising  up  and  firing.  The  regiment  was  all 
broken  up  and  forced  to  retire  in  detachments.  Kilpatrick 
after  fighting  some  time  longer  without  making  much  prog 
ress,  fell  back  on  account  of  the  constant  reinforcements 
that  were  augmenting  the  force  opposed  to  him.  Although 
he  had  not  succeeded  in  capturing  the  ammunition  train, 
he  had  made  a  valuable  diversion  on  the  left,  which  doubt 
less  prevented  the  enemy  from  assailing  Eound  Top  with 
vigor,  or  detaching  a  force  to  aid  Pickett. 

The  Confederate  General  Benning  states  that  the  prompt 
action  of  General  Law  in  posting  the  artillery  in  the  road 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  THIRD  DAY.  199 

and  the  Seventh  and  Ninth  Georgia  regiments  on  each  side, 
was  all  that  saved  the  train  from  capture.  "  There  was 
nothing  else  to  save  it."  He  also  says  two-thirds  of  Pick- 
ett's  command  were  killed,  wounded,  or  captured.  Every 
brigade  commander  and  every  field  officer  except  one  fell. 
Lee  and  Longstreet  had  seen  from  the  edge  of  the  woods, 
with  great  exultation,  the  blue  flag  of  Virginia  waving  over 
the  crest  occupied  by  the  Union  troops.  It  seemed  the  har 
binger  of  great  success  to  Lee.  He  thought  the  Union  army 
was  conquered  at  last.  The  long  struggle  was  over,  and 
peace  would  soon -come,  accompanied  by  the  acknowledg 
ment  of  the  independence  of  the  Southern  Confederacy.  It 
was  but  a  passing  dream  ;  the  flag  receded,  and  soon  the  plain 
was  covered  with  fugitives  malting  their  way  to  the  rear. 
Then,  anticipating  an  immediate  pursuit,  he  used  every 
effort  to  rally  men  and  officers,  and  made  strenuous  efforts 
to  get  his  artillery  in  position  to  be  effective. 

The  Confederate  General  A.  E.  "Wright  criticises  this  at 
tack  and  very  justly  says,  "  The  difficulty  was  not  so  much 
in  reaching  Cemetery  Ridge  or  taking  it.  My  brigade  did 
so  on  the  afternoon  of  the  2d,  but  the  trouble  was  to  hold 
it,  for  the  whole  Federal  army  was  massed  in  a  sort  of  horse 
shoe,  and  could  rapidly  reinforce  the  point  to  any  extent ; 
while  the  long  enveloping  Confederate  line  could  not  sup 
port  promptly  enough."  This  agrees  with  what  I  have  said 
in  relation  to  the  convex  and  concave  orders  of  battle. 

General  Gibbon  had  sent  Lieutenant  Haskell  of  his  staff 
to  Power's  Hill  to  notify  General  Meade  that  the  charge  was 
coming.  As  Meade  approached  his  old  headquarters  he 
heard  firing  on  the  crest  above,  and  went  up  to  ascertain 
the  cause.  He  found  the  charge  had  been  repulsed  and 
ejaculated  "  Thank  God  1 " 

When  Lee  learned  that  Johnson  had  yielded  his  position 


200    CHANCELLORSVILLE  AKD  GETTYSBURG. 

on  the  right,  and  therefore  could  not  co-operate  with  Pick- 
ett's  advance,  he  sent  Stuart's  cavalry  around  to  accomplish 
the  same  object  by  attacking  the  right  and  rear  of  our  army. 
Howard  saw  the  rebel  cavalry  moving  off  in  that  direction, 
and  David  McM.  Gregg,  whose  division  was  near  White's 
Creek  where  it  crosses  the  Baltimore  pike,  received  orders 
about  noon  to  guard  Slocum's  right  and  rear. 

Ouster  had  already  been  contending  with  his  brigade 
against  portions  of  the  enemy's  force  in  that  direction,  when 
Gregg  sent  forward  Mclntosh's  brigade  to  relieve  him,  and 
followed  soon  after  with  J.  Irviii  Gregg's  brigade.  Custer 
was  under  orders  to  join  Kilpatrick's  command,  to  which  he 
belonged,  but  the  exigencies  of  the  battle  soon  forced  Gregg 
to  detain  him.  Mclntosh,  having  taken  the  place  of  Cus 
ter,  pushed  forward  to  develop  the  enemy's  line,  which  he 
found  very  strongly  posted,  the  artillery  being  on  a  com 
manding  ridge  which  overlooked  the  whole  country,  and 
covered  by  dismounted  cavalry  in  woods,  buildings,  and 
behind  fences  below.  Mclntosh  became  warmly  engaged 
and  sent  back  for  Kandol's  battery  to  act  against  the  rebel 
guns  on  the  crest,  and  drive  the  enemy  out  of  the  buildings. 
The  guns  above  were  silenced  by  Pennington's  and  Ran- 
dol's  batteries,  and  the  force  below  driven  out  of  the  houses 
by  Lieutenant  Chester's  section  of  the  latter.  The  build 
ings  and  fences  were  then  occupied  by  our  troops.  The 
enemy  attempted  to  regain  them  by  a  charge  against  Mcln 
tosh's  right  flank,  but  were  repulsed.  In  the  meantime 
Gregg  came  up  with  the  other  brigade,  and  assumed  com 
mand  of  the  field.  The  battle  now  became  warm,  for  AV.  H'. 
F.  Lee's  brigade,  under  Chambliss,  advanced  to  support  the 
skirmish  line,  and  the  First  New  Jersey,  being  out  of  ammu 
nition,  was  charged  and  routed  by  the  First  Virginia.  The 
Seventh  Michigan,  a  new  regiment  which  came  up  to  sup- 


THE   BATTLE   OF   THE   THIRD  DAY.  201 

port  it,  was  also  driven  in  ;  for  the  enemy's  dismounted  line 
reinforced  the  First  Virginia.  The  latter  regiment,  which 
had  held  on  with  desperate  tenacity,  although  attacked  on 
both  flanks,  was  at  last  compelled  to  fall  back  by  an  attack 
made  by  part  of  the  Fifth  Michigan.  The  contending  forces 
were  now  pretty  well  exhausted  when,  to  the  dismay  of  our 
men.  a  fresh  brigade  under  Wade  Hampton,  which  Stuart 
had  kept  in  reserve,  made  its  appearance,  and  new  and 
desperate  exertions  were  required  to  stem  its  progress. 
There  was  little  time  to  organize  an  attack,  but  every  sabre 
that  could  be  brought  forward  was  used.  As  Hampton 
came  on,  our  artillery  under  Pennington  and  Eandol  made 
terrible  gaps  in  his  ranks.  Chester's  section  kept  firing 
canister  until  the  rebels  were  within  fifty  yards  of  him. 
The  enemy  were  temporarily  stopped  by  a  desperate  charge 
on  their  flank,  made  by  only  sixteen  men  under  Captains 
Treichal  and  Rogers,  accompanied  by  Captain  Newhall  of 
Mclntosh's  staff.  This  little  band  of  heroes  were  every  one 
disabled  or  killed,  but  they  succeeded  in  delaying  the  ene 
my,  who  were  already  shattered  by  the  canister  from  Ches 
ter's  guns,  until  Glister  wras  able  to  bring  up  the  First  Michi 
gan  and  lead  them  to  the  charge,  shouting  "  Come  on,  you 
wolverines !  "  Every  available  sabre  was  thrown  in.  General 
Mclntosh  and  his  staff  and  orderlies  charged  into  the  melee 
as  individuals.  Hampton  and  Fitz  Lee  headed  the  enemy, 
and  Custer  our  troops.  Lieutenant  Colonel  W.  Brooke- 
Rawle,  the  historian  of  the  conflict,  who  was  present,  says, 
"  For  minutes,  which  seemed  like  hours,  amid  the  clashing 
of  the  sabres,  the  rattle  of  the  small  arms,  the  frenzied  im 
precations,  the  demands  to  surrender,  the  undaunted  replies, 
and  the  appeals  for  mercy,  the  Confederate  column  stood  its 
ground."  A  fresh  squadron  was  brought  up  under  Captain 
Hart  of  the  First  New  Jersey,  and  the  enemy  at  last  gave 
9* 


202    CHAXCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

sides  still  confronted  each  other,  but  the  battle  was  over,  for 
Pickett's  charge  had  failed,  and  there  was  no  longer  any 
object  in  continuing  the  contest. 

Stuart  was  undoubtedly  baffled  and  the  object  of  his  ex 
pedition  frustrated,  yet  he  stated  in  his  official  report  that 
he  was  in  a  position  to  intercept  the  Union  retreat  in  case 
Pickett  had  been  successful. 

At  night  he  retreated  to  regain  his  communications  with 
Ewell's  left. 

This  battle  being  off  of  the  official  maps  has  hardly  been 
alluded  to  in  the  various  histories  which  have  been  written  ; 
but  its  results  were  important  and  deserve  to  be  commemo 
rated. 

When  Pickett's  charge  wras  repulsed,  and  the  whole  plain 
covered  with  fugitives,  we  all  expected  that  Wellington's 
command  at  Waterloo  of  "  Up,  guards,  and  at  them  ! ''  would 
be  repeated,  and  that  a  grand  counter-charge  would  be 
made.  But  General  Meade  had  made  no  arrangements  to 
give  a  return  thrust.  It  seems  to  me  he  should  have  posted 
the  Sixth  and  part  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  in  rear  of  Gibbon's 
division  the  moment  Pickett's  infantry  were  seen  emerging 
from  the  woods,  a  mile  and  a  half  off.  If  they  broke  through 
our  centre  these  corps  would  have  been  there  to  receive 
them,  and  if  they  failed  to  pierce  our  line  and  retreated,  the 
two  corps  could  have  followed  them  up  promptly  before 
they  had  time  to  rally  and  reorganize.  An  advance  by 
Sykes  would  have  kept  Long-street  in  position.  In  all 
probability  we  would  have  cut  the  enemy's  army  in  two, 
and  captured  the  long  line  of  batteries  opposite  us,  which 
were  but  slightly  guarded.  Hancock,  lying  wounded  in  an 
ambulance,  wrote  to  Meade,  recommending  that  this  be 
done.  Meade,  it  is  true,  recognized  in  some  sort  the  good 
effects  of  a  counter  blow ;  but  to  be  effective  the  movement 


THE   BATTLE  OF   THE   THIRD   DAY.  203 

should  have  been  prepared  beforehand.  It  was  too  late  to 
commence  making  preparations  for  an  advance  when  some 
time  had  elapsed  and  when  Lee  had  rallied  his  troops  and 
had  made  all  his  arrangements  to  resist  an  assault.  It  was 
ascertained  afterward  that  he  had  twenty  rounds  of  am 
munition  left  per  gun,  but  it  was  not  evenly  distributed  and 
some  batteries  in  front  had  fired  away  all  their  cartridges. 
A  counter- charge  under  such  circumstances  is  considered  al 
most  imperative  in  war,  for  the  beaten  army,  running  and 
dismayed,  cannot,  in  the  nature  of  things,  resist  with  much 
spirit ;  whereas  the  pursuers,  highly  elated  by  their  success, 
and  with  the  prospect  of  ending  the  contest,  fight  with  more 
energy  and  bravery.  Kodes  says  the  Union  forces  were  so 
long  in  occupying  the  town  and  in  coming  forward  after  the 
repulse  of  the  enemy  that  it  was  generally  thought  they  had 
retreated.  Meade  rode  leisurely  over  to  the  Fifth  Corps  on 
the  left,  and  told  Sykes  to  send  out  and  see  if  the  enemy  in 
his  front  was  firm  and  holding  on  to  their  position.  A  bri 
gade  preceded  by  skirmishers  was  accordingly  sent  forward, 
but  as  Longstreet's  troops  were  well  fortified,  they  resisted 
the  advance,  and  Meade — finding  some  hours  had  elapsed 
and  that  Lee  had  closed  up  his  lines  and  was  fortifying 
against  him — gave  up  all  idea  of  a  counter-attack. 


CHAPTER  VH. 

GENERAL   RETREAT    OF    THE    ENEMY— CRITICISMS   OF 
DISTINGUISHED  CONFEDERATE  OFFICERS. 

LEE  was  greatly  dispirited  at  Pickett's  failure,  but  worked 
with  untiring  energy  to  repair  the  disaster. 

There  was  an  interval  of  full  a  mile  between  Hill  and 
Longstreet,  and  the  plain  was  swarming  with  fugitives  mak 
ing  their  way  back  in  disorder.  He  hastened  to  get  ready 
to  resist  the  counter-charge,  which  he  thought  was  inevit 
able,  and  to  plant  batteries  behind  which  the  fugitives 
could  rally.  He  also  made  great  personal  exertions  to  re 
assure  and  reassemble  the  detachments  that  came  in.  He 
did  not  for  a  moment  imagine  that  Meade  would  fail  to 
take  advantage  of  this  golden  opportunity  to  crush  the 
Army  of  Virginia  and  end  the  war. 

The  most  distinguished  rebel  officers  admit  the  great 
danger  they  were  in  at  this  time,  and  express  their  surprise 
that  they  were  not  followed  up. 

The  fact  is,  Meade  had  no  idea  of  leaving  the  ridge.  I 
conversed  the  next  morning  with  a  corps  commander  who 
had  just  left  him.  He  said  :  "  Meade  says  he  thinks  he 
can  hold  out  for  part  of  another  day  here,  if  they  attack 
him." 

This  language  satisfied  me  that  Meade  would  not  go  for 
ward  if  he  could  avoid  it,  and  would  not  impede  in  any  way 
the  rebel  retreat  across  the  Potomac.  Lee  began  to  make 


GENERAL   RETREAT   OF   THE  ENEMY.  205 

preparations  at  once  and  started  his  trains  on  the  morning  of 
the  4th.  By  night  Rodes's  division,  which  followed  them, 
was  in  bivouac  two  miles  west  of  Fairfield.  It  was  a  diffi 
cult  task  to  retreat  burdened  with  4,000  prisoners,  and  a 
train  fifteen  miles  long,  in  the  presence  of  a  victorious 
enemy,  but  it  was  successfully  accomplished  as  regards  his 
main  body.  The  roads,  too,  were  bad  and  much  cut  up  by 
the  rain. 

AVhile  standing  on  Little  Round  Top  Meade  was  annoyed 
at  the  fire  of  a  rebel  battery  posted  on  an  eminence  beyond 
the  wheat-field,  about  a  thousand  yards  distant.  He  inquired 
what  troops  those  were  stationed  along  the  stone  fence 
which  bounded  the  hither  side  of  the  wheat-field.  Upon 
ascertaining  that  it  was  Crawford's  division  of  the  Fifth 
Corps,  he  directed  that  they  be  sent  forward  to  clear  the 
woods  in  front  of  rebel  skirmishers,  who  were  very  annoying, 
and  to  drive  away  the  battery,  but  not  to  get  into  a  figlit  that 
would  bring  on  a  general  engagement.  As  Crawford  unmasked 
from  the  stone  fence  the  battery  opened  fire  on  his  right. 
He  sent  Colonel  Ent's  regiment,  deployed  as  skirmishers, 
against  the  guns,  which  retired  as  Ent  approached.  Mc- 
Candless,  who  went  forward  with  his  brigade,  moved  too  far 
to  the  right,  and  Crawford  ordered  him  to  change  front  and 
advance  toward  Round  Top.  He  did  so  and  struck  a  rebel 
brigade  in  flank  which  was  behind  a  temporary  breastwork 
of  rails,  sods,  etc.  When  this  brigade  saw  a  Union  force 
apparently  approaching  from  their  own  lines  to  attack  them 
in  flank,  they  retreated  in  confusion,  after  a  short  resistance, 
and  this  disorder  extended  during  the  retreat  to  a  reserve 
brigade  posted  on  the  low  ground  in  their  rear.  Their 
flight  did  not  cease  until  they  reached  Homer's  woods,  half  a 
mile  distant,  where  they  immediately  intrenched  themselves. 
These  brigades  belonged  to  Hood's  division,  then  under  Law. 


206          CHANCELLORSV1LLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

Longstreet  says,  "When  this  (Pickett's)  charge  failed,  I 
expected  that,  of  course,  the  enemy  would  throw  himself 
against  our  shattered  ranks  and  try  to  crush  us.  I  sent  my 
staff  officers  to  the  rear  to  assist  in  rallying  the  troops,  and 
hurried  to  our  line  of  batteries  as  the  only  support  that  I 
could  give  them."  ..."  I  knew  if  the  army  was  to  be 
saved  these  batteries  must  check  the  enemy."  .  .  .  "For 
unaccountable  reasons  the  enemy  did  not  pursue  his  ad 
vantage." 

Longstreet  always  spoke  of  his  own  men  as  invincible, 
and  stated  that  on  the  2d  they  did  the  best  three  hours' 
fighting  that  ever  was  done,  but  Crawford's '  attack  seemed 
to  show  that  they  too  were  shaken  by  the  defeat  of  Pickett's 
grand  charge. 

In  regard  to  the  great  benefit  we  would  have  derived  from 
a  pursuit,  it  may  not  be  out  of  place  to  give  the  opinion  of 
a  few  more  prominent  Confederate  officers. 

Colonel  Alexander,  Chief  of  Longstreet's  artillery,  says  in 
a  communication  to  the  "  Southern  Historical  Papers  :  " 

I  have  always  believed  that  the  enemy  here  lost  the  greatest  oppor 
tunity  they  ever  had  of  routing  Lee's  army  by  a  prompt  offensive. 
They  occupied  a  line  shaped  somewhat  like  a  horseshoe.  I  suppose  the 
greatest  diameter  of  this  horseshoe  was  not  more  than  one  mile,  and  the 
ground  within  was  entirely  sheltered  from  our  observation  and  fire, 
with  communications  by  signals  all  over  it,  and  they  could  concentrate 
their  whole  force  at  any  point  and  in  a  very  short  time  without  our 
knowledge.  Our  line  was  an  enveloping  semi-circle,  over  four  miles  in 
development,  and  communication  from  flank  to  flank,  even  by  courier, 
was  difficult,  the  country  being  well  cleared  and  exposed  to  the  enemy's 
view  and  fire,  the  roads  all  running  at  right  angles  to  our  lines,  and, 
some  of  them  at  least,  broad  turnpikes  where  the  enemy's  guns  could 

1  Crawford  was  also  one  of  those  who  took  a  prominent  part  in  the  defence  of 
Fort  Sumter,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  We  each  commanded  detachments  of 
artillery  on  that  occasion. 


GENERAL  RETREAT  OF  THE  ENEMY.      207 

rake  for  two  miles.  Is  it  necessary  now  to  add  any  statement  as  to  the 
supei  iority  of  the  Federal  force,  or  the  exhausted  and  shattered  condi 
tion  of  the  Confederates  for  a  space  of  at  least  a  mile  in  their  very 
centre,  to  show  that  a  great  opportunity  was  thrown  away  ?  1  think 
General  Lee  himself  was  quite  apprehensive  the  enemy  would  riposte, 
and  that  it  was  that  apprehension  which  brought  him  alone  out  to  my 
guns,  where  he  could  observe  all  the  indications. 

General  Trimble,  who  commanded  a  division  of  Hill's 
corps,  which  supported  Pickett  in  his  advance,  says,  "  By  all 
the  rules  of  warfare  the  Federal  troops  should  (as  I  expected 
they  would)  have  marched  against  our  shattered  columns 
and  sought  to  cover  our  army  with  an  overwhelming  defeat. " 

Colonel  Simms,  who  commanded  Semmes's  Georgia  brigade 
in  the  fight  with  Crawford  just  referred  to,  writes  to  the  latter, 
"  There  was  much  confusion  in  our  army  so  far  as  my  obser 
vation  extended,  and  I  think  we  would  have  made  but  feeble 
resistance,  if  you  had  pressed  on,  on  the  evening  of  the  3d." 
*  General  Meade,  however,  overcome  by  the  great  responsi 
bilities  of  his  position,  still  clung  to  the  ridge,  and  fearful  of 
a  possible  disaster  would  not  take  the  risk  of  making  an  ad 
vance.  And  yet  if  he  could  have  succeeded  in  crushing 
Lee's  army  then  and  there,  he  would  have  saved  two  years 
of  war  with  its  immense  loss  of  life  and  countless  evils.  He 
might  at  least  have  thrown  in  Sedgwick's  corps,  which  had 
not  been  actively  engaged  in  the  battle,  for  even  if  it  was 
repulsed  the  blows  it  gave  would  leave  the  enemy  little  in 
clination  to  again  assail  the  heights. 

At  6.30  p.  M.  the  firing  ceased  on  the  part  of  the  enemy, 
and  although  they  retained  their  position  the  next  day,  the 
battle  of  Gettysburg  was  virtually  at  an  end. 

The  town  was  still  full  of  our  wounded,  and  many  of  our 
surgeons,  with  rare  courage,  remained  there  to  take  charge 
of  them,  for  it  required  some  nerve  to  run  the  risk  of  being 


203     CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

sent  to  Libby  prison  when  the  fight  was  over,  a  catastrophe 
which  has  often  happened  to  our  medical  officers.  Among 
the  rest,  the  chief  surgeons  of  the  First  Corps,  Doctor  Theo 
dore  Heard  and  Doctor  Thomas  H.  Bache,  refused  to  leave 
their  patients,  and  in  consequence  of  the  hasty  retreat  of 
the  enemy  were  fortunately  not  carried  off. 

After  the  battle  Meade  had  not  the  slightest  desire  to 
recommence  the  struggle.  It  is  a  military  maxim  that  to  a 
flying  enemy  must  be  given  a  wall  of  steel  or  a  bridge  of 
gold.  In  the  present  instance  it  was  unmistakably  the 
bridge  of  gold  that  was  presented.  -  It  was  hard  to  convince 
him  that  Lee  was  actually  gone,  and  at  first  he  thought  it 
might  be  a  device  to  draw  the  Union  army  from  its  strong 
position  on  the  heights. 

Our  cavalry  were  sent  out  on  the  4th  to  ascertain  where 
the  enemy  were,  and  what  they  were  doing.  General  Birney 
threw  forward  a  reconnoitering  party  and  opened  fire  with 
a  battery  on  a  column  making  their  way  toward  Fairfield, 
but  he  was  checked  at  once  and  directed  on  no  account  to 
bring  on  a  battle.  On  the  5th,  as  it  was  certain  the  enemy 
were  retreating,  Sedgwick  received  orders  to  follow  up 
the  rear  of  the  rebel  column.  He  marched  eight  miles  to 
Fairfield  Pass.  There  Early,  who  was  in  command  of  the 
rear  guard,  was  endeavoring  to  save  the  trains,  which  were 
heaped  up  in  great  confusion.  Sedgwick,  after  a  distant 
cannonade,  reported  the  position  too  strong  to  be  forced.  It 
was  a  plain,  two  miles  wide,  surrounded  by  hills,  and  it 
would  not  have  been  difficult  to  take  it,  but  Sedgwick  knew 
Meade  favored  the  "bridge  of  gold"  policy,  and  was  not 
disposed  to  thwart  the  wishes  of  his  chief.  In  my  opinion 
Sedgwick  should  have  made  an  energetic  attack,  and  Meade 
should  have  supported  it  with  his  whole  army,  for  our  cav 
alry  were  making  great  havoc  in  the  enemy's  trains  in  rear ; 


GENERAL  RETREAT  OF  THE  ENEMY.      209 

and  if  Lee,  instead  of  turning  on  Kilpatrick,  had  been  forced 
to  form  line  against  Meade,  the  cavalry,  which  was  between 
him  and  his  convoys  of  ammunition,  in  all  probability 
might  have  captured  the  latter  and  ended  the  war.  Stuart, 
it  is  true,  was  following  up  Kilpatrick,  but  he  took  an  in 
direct  route  and  was  nearly  a  day  behind.  I  do  not  see 
why  the  force  which  was  now  promptly  detached  from  the 
garrisons  of  Washington  and  Baltimore  and  sent  to  Har 
per's  Ferry  could  not  have  formed  on  the  Virginia  side  of 
the  Potomac  opposite  Williarnsport,  and  with  the  co-opera 
tion  of  General  Meade  have  cut  off  the  ammunition  of 
which  Lee  stood  so  much  in  need.  As  the  river  had  risen 
and  an  expedition  sent  out  by  General  French  from  Fred 
erick  had  destroyed  the  bridge  at  Falling  Waters,  everything 
seemed  to  favor  such  a  plan.  The  moment  it  was  ascer 
tained  that  Lee  was  cut  off  from  Richmond  and  short  of 
ammunition  the  whole  North  would  have  turned  out  and 
made  a  second  Saratoga  of  it.  As  it  was,  he  had  but  few 
rounds  for  his  cannon,  and  our  artillery  could  have  opened 
a  destructive  fire  on  him  from  a  distance  without  exposing 
our  infantry.  It  was  worth  the  effort  and  there  was  little 
or  no  danger  in  attempting  it.  Meade  had  Sedgwick's 
fresh  corps  and  was  reinforced  by  a  division  of  11,000  men 
under  General  W.  F.  Smith  (Baldy  Smith).  French's  divi 
sion  of  4,000  at  Frederick,  and  troops  from  Washington  and 
Baltimore  were  also  available  to  assist  in  striking  the  final 
blow7.  The  Twelfth  Corps  was  also  available,  as  Slocum 
volunteered  to  join  in  the  pursuit.  Meade,  however,  de 
layed  moving  at  all  until  Lee  had  reached  Hagerstown  and 
then  took  a  route  that  was  almost  twice  as  long  as  that 
adopted  by  the  enemy.  Lee  marched  day  and  night  to 
avoid  pursuit,  and  when  the  river  rose  and  his  bridge  was 
gone,  so  that  he  was  unable  to  cross,  he  gained  six  days 


210    CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

in  which  to  choose  a  position,  fortify  it,  and  renew  his  sup 
ply  of  ammunition  before  Meade  made  his  appearance. 

In  consequence  of  repeated  orders  from  President  Lin 
coln  to  attack  the  enemy,  Meade  went  forward  and  con 
fronted  Lee  on  the  12th.  He  spent  that  day  and  the  next 
in  making  reconnoissances  and  resolved  to  attack  on  the  14tli ; 
but  Lee  left  during  the  night,  and  by  8  A.M.  the  entire  army 
of  the  enemy  were  once  more  on  Virginia  soil. 

The  Union  loss  in  this  campaign  is  estimated  by  the 
Count  of  Paris,  who  is  an  impartial  observer,  at  2,834 
killed,  13,709  wounded,  and  6,643  missing;  total,  23,186. 

The  rebel  loss  he  puts  at  2,665  killed,  12,599  wounded, 
7,464  missing  ;  total,  22,728. 

Among  the  killed  in  the  battle  on  the  rebel  side  were 
Generals  Armistead,  Barksdale,  Garnett,  Pender,  and 
Semrnes ;  and  Pettigrew  during  the  retreat. 

Among  the  wounded  were  Generals  G.  T.  Anderson, 
Hampton,  Jenkins,  J.  M.  Jones,  Kemper,  and  Scales. 

Archer  was  captured  on  the  first  day. 

Among  the  killed  on  the  Union  side  were  Major  General 
Eeynolds  and  Brigadier-Generals  Vincent,  Weed,  and  Zook. 

Among  the  wounded  were  Major-Generals  Sickles  (losing 
a  leg),  Hancock,  Doubleday,  Gibbon,  Barlow,  Warren,  and 
Butterfield,  and  Brigadier-Generals  Graham,  Paul  (losing 
both  eyes),  Barnes,  Brooke,  and  Webb. 


APPENDIX  A. 

Roster  of  the  Federal  Army  engaged  in  the  Battle  of 
Gettysburg,  Wednesday,  Thursday,  and  Friday,  July 
1st,  2d,  and  3d,  1863. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  GEO.  GOKDON  MEADE,  COMMANDING. 

STAFF. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  DANIEL  BTJTTERFIELD,  Chief  of  Staff. 
BRIG.-GENERAL  M.  R.  PATRICK,  Provost  Marshal-General. 

"  SETH  WILLIAMS,  Adjutant-General. 

"          EDMUND  SCHRIVER,  Inspector-General. 

"  RUFUS  INGALLS,  Quartermaster-General. 

COLONEL  HENRY  F.  CLARKE,  Chief  Commis'y  of  Subsistence. 
MAJOR  JONATHAN  LETTERMAN,  Surgeon,  Chief  of  Medical 

Department. 

BRIG.-GENERAL  G.  K.  WARREN,  Chief  Engineer. 
MAJOR  D.  W.  FLAGLER,  Chief  Ordnance  Officer. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  ALFRED  PLEASONTON,  Chief  of   Cavalry. 
BRIG.-GENERAL  HENRY  J.  HUNT,  Chief  of  Artillery. 
CAPTAIN  L.  B.  NORTON,  Chief  Signal  Officer. 


MAJOR-GENERAL  JOHN  F.  REYNOLDS,1  Commanding  the 
First,  Third,  and  Eleventh  Corps  on  Ju)y  1st. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  HENRY  W.  SLOCUM,  Commanding  the  Right 
Wing  on  July  2d  and  July  3d. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  W.  S.  HANCOCK,  Commanding  the  Left  Cen 
tre  ou  July  2d  and  July  3d. 


He  was  killed  and  succeeded  by  Major-General  O.  O.  Howard. 


212          CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

FIRST  CORPS. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  JOHN  F.  REYNOLDS,  PERMANENT  COMMANDER. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  ABNER  DOUBLEDAY,  Commanding  on  July  1st. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  JOHN  NEWTON,  Commanding  July  2d  arid' 3d. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER- GENERAL,  JAMES  S.  WADSWORTH  COMMANDING. 

Firnt  Brigade.— (1)  Brigadier-General  SOLOMON  MEREDITH  (wounded) ;  (2) 
Colonel  HEVRY  A.  MORR  >w  (wounded) ;  (8)  Colonel  W.  W.  ROBINSON.  2d  Wis- 
cousin.  Colonel  Lucius  Fairchihl  (wounded),  Lieut. -Colonel  George  H.  Stevens 
(wounded).  Major  John  Mansfield  (wounded),  Captain  Geo.  H.  Otis;  6th  Wis 
consin,  Lieut. -Colonel  R.  R.  Dawes ;  7th  Wisconsin,  Colonel  W.  W.  Robinson; 
24th  Michigan,  Colonel  Henry  A.  Morrow  (wounded).  Lieut.-Colonel  Mark  Flani- 
gan  (wounded),  Major  Edwin  B.  Wright  (wounded),  Captain  Albert  M.  Edwards  : 
19th  Indiana,  Colonel  Samuel  Williams. 

Second  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  LYSANDER  CUTLER  Commanding.  7th 
Indiana.  Major  Ira  G.  Grover ;  56th  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  J.  W.  Hoffman  :  7(ith 
New  York,  Major  Andrew  J.  Grover  (killed),  Captain  John  E.  Cook  ;  95th  New 
York.  Colonel  George  H.  Biddle  (wounded),  Major  Edward  Pye  ;  K7th  New  York, 
Lieut.-Colonel  F.  C.  Miller  (wounded),  Major  George  Harney;  14th  Brooklyn, 
Colonel  E.  B.  Fowler. 

SECOND   DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JOHN  C.  ROBINSON  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  GABRIEL  R.  PAUL  Commanding  (wounded); 
Colonel  S.  H.  LEONARD;  Colonel  RICHARD  COULTER.  16th  Maine,  Culonel 
Charles  W.  Tilden  (captured),  Lieut.-Colonel  N.  E.  Welch,  Major  Arch.  D.  Lea- 
vitt;  13th  Massachusetts,  Colonel  S.  H.  Leonard  (wounded);  94th  New  York, 
Colonel  A.  R.  Root  (wounded).  Major  S.  H.  Moffat  ;  104th  New  York,  Colonel  Gil 
bert  G.  Prey;  107th  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  T.  F.  McCoy  (wounded).  Lieut.-Colo 
nel  James  McThompson  (wounded),  Captain  E.  D.  Roath  ;  llth  Pennsylvania, 
Colonel  Richard  S.  Coulter.  Captain  J.  J.  Bierer.1 

Second  Brigade.— Brigadier-General  HENRY  BAXTER  Commanding.  12th  Mas 
sachusetts,  Colonel  James  L.  Bates ;  83d  New  York,  Lieut.-Colonel  Joseph  R. 
Moesch  ;  97th  New  York,  Colonel  Charles  Wheelock  ;  88th  Pennsylvania,  Major 
Benezet  F.  Faust,  Captain  E.  Y.  Patterson  ;  UUth  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  Peter 
Lyle. 

THIRD   DIVISION. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  ABNER  DOUBLEDAY  PERMANENT  COMMANDER  on  July  2d 

and  3d. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  THOMAS  A.  ROWLEY,  July  1st. 

First  Brigade.—  Brigadier- General  THOMAS  A.  ROWLEY,  July  2d  and  3d  ;  Colonel 
CHAPMAN  BIDDLE,  July  1st.  121st  Pennsylvania.  Colonel  Chapman  Biddle,  Major 
Alexander  Biddle;  142d  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  Robert  P.  Camming?  (killed), 
Lieut -Colonel  A.  B.  McCalmont":  151st  Pennsylvania.  Lieut.-Colonel  George  F. 
McFarland  (lost  a  leg),  Captain  Walter  L.  Owens;  2Uth  New  York  S.  M.,  Colonel 
Theodore  B.  Gates. 

Second  Brigade. — (1)  Colonel  ROY  STONE  Commanding  (wounded) :  (2)  Colonel 
LANGHORNE  WISTER  (wounded) ;  (•])  Colonel  EDMUND  L.  DANA.  143d  Pennsyl 
vania,  Colonel  Edmund  L.  Dana,  Major  John  D.  Musser;  149th  Pennsylvania, 
Lieut.-Colonel  Walton  Dwight  (wounded),  Captain  A.  J.  Sofield  (killed).  Captain 
John  Irvin  ;  150th  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  Langhorne  Wister  (wounded),  Lieut.- 
Colonel  H.  S.  Huiedekoper  (wounded),  M;ijor  Thomas  Chamberlain  (wounded), 
Capt.  C.  C.  Widdis  (wounded),  Captain  G.  W.  Jones. 


1  The  Eleventh  Pennsylvania  wa-  transferred  from  the  Second  3rigade. 


APPENDIX   A.  218 

Third  Brigade. — Brigadier- General  GEO.  J.  STANNARD  Commanding  (wounded). 
12th  Vern  onf,  Colonel  Asa  P.  Blunt  (not  engaged) ;  Kkh  Vermont".  Colonel  Francis 
V.  Randall;  14th  Vermont,  Colonel  William  T.  Nichols;  15th  Vermont.  Colonel 
Redfield  Proctor  (not  engaged)  :  16th  Vermont,  Colonel  Wheelock  G.  Veazey. 

Artillery  Brigade.— Colonel  CHARLES  S.  WAINWFIGHT  Commanding.  2d 
Maine.  Captain  Jarnes  A.  Hall ;  5th  Maine,  G.  T.  Stevens:  Battery  B.  l>t  Penn 
sylvania,  Captain  J.  H.  Couper ;  Battery  B.  4th  United  S:ates.  Lieutenant  James 
Stewart:  Battery  L,  1st  New  York,  Captain  J.  A.  Reynolds. 

[NOT''1. — Tidball's  Battery  of  the  Second  United  States  Artillery,  under  Lieu 
tenant  John  H.  Calef,  also  fought  in  line  with  the  First  Corps.  Lieutenant  Benj. 
W.  Wilbor.  and  Lieutenant  George  Breck,  of  Captain  Reynolds'-  battery,  and 
Lieutenant  James  Davison,  of  Stewart's  Battery,  commanded  sections  which 
were  detached  at  times.] 

SECOND  CORPS. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  WINFIELD  S.    HANCOCK,   PERMANENT   COM 
MANDER  (wounded). 

MAJOR-GENERAL  JOHN  GIBBON  (wounded). 
BKIGADIER-GENERAL  JOHN  C.  CALDWELL. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JOHN  C.  CALDWELL. 
COLONEL  JOHN  R    BROOKE  (wounded). 

First  Brigade,— Colonel  EDWARD  E.  CRO=?S  (killed);  Colonel  H.  B.  McKEEN. 
5th  New  Hampshire,  Colonel  E.  E.  Cross,  Lietit.-Colonel  C.  E.  Hapgood  ;  lilst 
New  York,  Lieut.-Colonel  Oscar  K.  Broad y  ;  81st  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  H.  Boyd 
McKeen.  Lieut.-Colonel  Amos  Stroho  ;  148th  Pennsylvania,  Lieut.-Colonel  Robert 
McFarland. 

Serond  B'  igade.— Colonel  PATRICK  KELLY  Commanding.  28th  Massachusetts, 
Colonel  Richard  Byrnes ;  6M  New  York,  L  eut.- Colonel  R.  C.  Bentley  (wounded), 
Captain  Thoa.  Touhy ;  69th  New  York,  Captain  Richard  Maroney  (wounded), 
Lieutenant  James  J.  Smith  ;  88th  New  York.  Colonel  Patrick  Kelly.  Captain  Den 
nis  F.  Burke :  116th  Pennsylvania,  Major  St.  Glair  A.  Mulholland. 

Third  Brincta*,.—  Brigadier-General  S.  K.  ZOOK  Commanding  (killed) :  Lieut.- 
Colonel  JOHN  FRAZER.  52d  New  York.  Lieut.-Colonel  Charles  G.  Freudenberg 
(wounded),  Capt;iin  Wm.  Scherrer:  57th  New  York,  Lieut.-Colonel  Alfred  B. 
Chapman  :  66th  New  York,  Colonel  Orlando  W.  Morris  (wounded),  Lieut.  Colonel 
John  S.  Hammcll  (wounded) ;  Major  Peter  Nelson  ;  14Gth  Pennsylvania,  Colonel 
Richard  P.  Roberts  (kilU-d),  Lieut.-Colonel  John  Frazer. 

Fouith  Brigade. — Colonel  JOHN  R.  BROOKE  Commanding  (wounded).  2?th 
Connecticut.  Lieut.-Colonel  Henry  C.  Merwin  (killed),  Major  James  H.  Coburn  ; 
64th  New  York.  Colonel  Daniel  G.  Bingham  :  53d  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  J.  R. 
Bmoke.  Lieut.-Colonel  liichard  McMich&el :  145th  Pennsylvania.  Colonel  Hirnm 
L.  Brown  (wounded).  Captain  John  W.  Reynolds  (wounded),  Captain  Moses  W. 
Oliver ;  2d  Delaware,  Colonel  William  P.  Bailey. 

SECOND   DIVISION. 

B  RTG  A  THER- GENERAL  JOHN  GIBBON.  PERMANENT  COMMANDER  (wounded). 
BRIGADIER  GENERAL  WILLIAM  HARROW. 

Firnt  Brigade — Brigadier-General  WILLIAM  HARROW  Commanding:  Colonel 
FRANCIS  E.' HEATH.  19th  Maine,  Colonel  F.  E.  Heath,  Lieut. -Colonel"  Henry  W. 
Cunningham  :  15th  Massachusetts,  Colonel  George  H.  Ward  (killed),  Lieut.-Colonel 
George  C.  Joslin  :  8'^d  New  York,  Colonel  Henry  W.  Huston  (killed),  Captain  John 
Darrow  :  1st  Minnesota.  Colonel  William  Colvill  (wounded),  Captain  N.  S.  Mes- 
sick  (ki  led),  Captain  Wilson  B.  Farrell,  Captain  Louis  Muller  Captain  Joseph 
Periam,  Captain  Henry  C.  Coates. 


214    OHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

Second  Brigade.— Brigadier-General  ALEX.  S.WEBB  Commanding  (wounded). 
69th  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  Dennis  O.  Kane  (killed),  Lieut.-Colonel  M.  Tschudy 
(killed).  Major  James  Duffy  (wounded),  Captain  Wm.  Davis;  71st  Pennsylvania, 
Lieut. -Colonel  Richard  Perm  Smith  ;  72d  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  De  Witt  C.  Bax 
ter  :  lU6th  Pennsylvania.  Lieut.-Colonel  Theo.  Hesser. 

Third  Brigade. — Colonel  NORMAN  J.  HALL  Commanding.  19th  Massachusetts, 
Colonel  Arthur  F.  Deverenx  :  20th  Massachusetts,  Colonel  Paul  J  Revere  (killed), 
Captain  H.  L.  Abbott  (wounded)  :  42d  New  York.  Colonel  James  E.  Mallon  :  59th 
New  York,  Lieut.-Colonel  Max  A.  Thoman  (killed):  7th  Michigan,  Colonel  N.  J. 
Hall,  Lieut.-Colonel  Amos  E.  Steele  (killed),  Major  S.  W.  Curtis. 

Unattached. — Andrew  Sharpshooters. 

THIRD   DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  ALEXANDER  HAYS  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade. — Colonel  SAMUEL  S.  CARROLL,  Commanding.  4th  Ohio.  Lieut.- 
Colonel  James  H.  Godman.  Lieut.-Colonel  L.  W.  Carpenter:  8th  Ohio,  Colonel  S. 
S.  Carroll.  Lieut.-Colouel  Franklin  Sawyer;  14th  Indiana,  Colonel  John  Coons; 
7th  West  Virginia,  Colonel  Joseph  Snyder. 

Second  Brigade. — Colonel  THOMAS  A.  SMYTH  Commanding  (wounded)  ;  Lieut.- 
Colonel  F.  E  PIERCE.  14th  Connecticut,  Major  John  T.  Ellis  ;  10th  New  York 
(battalion).  Major  Geo.  F.  Hopper:  108th  New  York,  Colonel  Charles  J.  Powers: 
12th  New  Jersey,  Major  John  T.  Hill;  1st  Delaware,  Colonel  Thomas  A.  Smyth; 
Lieut.-Colonel  Edward  P.  Harris,  Captain  M.  B.  Ellgood  (killed),  Lieutenant  \Vm. 
Smith  (killed). 

Third  Brigade. — Colonel  GEORGE  L.  WILLARD  Commanding  (killed) ;  Colonel 
ELIAKIM  SHERRILL  (killed) ;  Lieut.-Colonel  JAMES  M.  BULL.  39th  New  York, 
Lieut.-Colonel  James  G.  Hughes:  lllth  New  York,  Colonel  Clinton  D.  McDougall 
(wounded),  Lieut.-Colonel  Isaac  M.  Lusk,  Captain  A.  P.  Seeley;  125th  New  York. 
Colonel  G.  L.  Willard  (killed).  Lieut.-Colonel  Levi  Crandali ;  126th  New  York, 
Colonel  E.  Sherrill  (killed) ;  Lieut. -Colonel  J.  M.  Bull. 

Artillery  Brigade.— Captain  J.  G.  HAZARD  Commanding.  Battery  B,  1st  New 
York,  Captain  James  McK.  Roity  (killed)  :  Battery  A.  1st  Rhode  Island,  Lieu 
tenant  William  A.  Arnold  ;  Battery  B.  1st  Rhode  Island,  Lieutenant  T.  Fred. 
Brown  (wounded) :  Battery  I.  1st  United  States.  Lieutenant  G.  A.  Woodruff 
(killed) ;  Battery  A,  4th  United  States,  Lieutenant  A.  H.  Cushing  (killed). 

[NOTE. — Battery  C,  4th  United  States.  Lieutenant  E.  Thomas,  was  in  the  line 
of  the  Second  Corps  on  July  3d.  Some  of  the  batteries  were  so  nearly  demolished 
that  there  was  no  officer  to  assume  command  at  the  close  of  the  battle.] 

Cavalry  Squadron. — Captain  RILET  JOHNSON  Commanding.  D  and  K.  6th 
New  York. 


THIRD  CORPS. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  DANIEL  E.  SICKLES  COMMANDING  (wounded). 
MAJOR-GENERAL  DAVID  B.  BIRNEY. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  DAVID  B.  BIRNEY  PERMANENT  COMMANDER. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  J.  H.  H.  WARD. 

First  Brigade.— Brigadier-General  C.  K.  GRAHAM  Commanding  (wounded,  cap 
tured)  :  Colonel  ANDREW  H.  TIPPIN.  57th  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  Peter  Sides, 
Lieut.-Colonel  Wm.  P.  Neeper  (wounded).  Captain  A.  H.  Nelson;  63d  Pennsyl 
vania,  Lieut  -Colonel  John  A.  Danks ;  H8th  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  A.  H.  Tippin, 
all  the  Field  Officers  wounded:  105th  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  Calvin  A.  Craig: 


APPENDIX   A.  215 

114th  Pennsylvania,  Lieut.-Colonel  Frederick  K.  C.ivada  (captured) ;  141st  Penn 
sylvania,  Colonel  Henry  J.  Madill,  Captain  E.  R.  Brown.1 

[NOTE. — The  Second  New  Hampshire,  Third  Maine,  and  Seventh  and  Eighth 
New  Jersey  also  formed  part  of  Graham's  line  on  the  2d.] 

Second  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  J.  H.  H.  WARD  Commanding;  Colonel 
H.  BERDAN.  1st  U.  S.  Sharpshooters,  Colonel  H.  Berdan,  Lieut.- Colonel  C. 
Trapp ;  2d  U.  S.  Sharpshooters,  Major  H.  H.  Stoughton  ;  3d  Maine,  Colonel  M. 
B.  Lakeman  (capture!),  Captain  William  C.  Morgan  ;  4th  Maine,  Colonel  Elijah 
Walker  (killed),  Major  Ebenezer  Whitcombe  (wounded).  Captain  Edwin  Libby  ; 
2!)th  Indiana,  Colonel  John  Wheeler  (killed),  Lieut.-Colonel  William  C.  L.  Taylor  : 
99th  Pennsylvania,  Major  John  W.  Moore:  Sfith  New  York,  Lieut. -Coiond  Benja 
min  Higgins;  134th  New  York,  Colonel  A.  Van  Horn  Ellis  (killed),  Lieut.-Col  ,u  1 
Francis  M.  Cumrnings. 

Third  Brigade. — Colonel  PHILIP  R.  DE  TROBRIANP,  Commanding.  3d  Michi 
gan,  Colonel  Byron  R.  Pierce  (wounded),  Lieut.-Colonel  E.  S.  Pierce:  5th  Michi 
gan,  Lieut.-Colonel  John  Pultord  (wounded).  Major  S.  S.  Matthews ;  40th  New 
York,  Colonel  Thomas  W.  Egan  ;  17th  Maine,  Lieut.-Colonel  Charles  B.  Merrill  ; 
110th  Pennsylvania,  Lieut-Colonel  David  M.  Jones  (wounded),  Major  Isaac  Rogers. 

SECOND   DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  ANDREW  A.  HUMPHREYS  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade.— Brigadier-General  JOSEPH  B.  CARR  Commanding.  1st  Mas 
sachusetts.  Colonel  N.  B.  McLaughlin  ;  llth  Massachusetts,  Lieut.-Colonel  Porter 
D.  Tripp ;  16th  Massachusetts,  Lieut.-Colonel  Waldo  Merriam ;  2(>th  Pennsyl 
vania,  Captain  Geo.  W.  Tomlinson  (wounded).  C<iptain  Henry  Goodfellow  ;  llth 
New  Jersey,  Colonel  Robert  McAllister  (wounded),  Major  Philip  J.  Kearny 
(killed),  Captain  Wm.  B.  Dunning;  84th  Pennsylvania  (not  engaged),  Lieut-. 
Colonel  Milton  Opp  ;  12th  New  Hampshire,  Captain  J.  F.  Langley. 

Second  Brigade — Colonel  WILLIAM  R.  BREWSTER  Commanding.  70th  New 
York  (1st  Excelsior),  Major  Daniel  Mahen  :  71st  New  York  (2d  Excelsior),  Colonel 
Henry  L.  Potter;  72d  New  York  (3d  Excelsior),  Colonel  Wm.  O.  Stevens  (killed), 
Lieut.-Colonel  John  S.  Austin  ;  73d  New  York  (4th  Excelsior),  Colonel  William 
R.  Brewster,  Major  M.  W.  Burns  ;  74th  New  York  (5th  Excelsior),  Lieut.-Colonel 
Thomas  Holt :  120th  New  York,  Lieut.-Colonel  Cornelius  D.  Westbrook  (wounded), 
Major  J.  R.  Tappen,  Captain  A.  L.  Lockwood. 

Third  Brigade. — Colonel  GEORGE  C.  BURLING  Commanding.  5th  New  Jersey. 
Colonel  William  J.  Sewall  (wounded).  Captain  Virgel  M.  Healey  (wounded),  Cap 
tain  T.  C.  Godfrey,  Captain  H.  H.  Woolsey ;  6th  New  Jersey,  Colonel  George  C. 
Burling.  Lieut.-Colonel  S.  R.  Gilkyson  ;  7th  New  Jersey,  Colonel  L.  R.  Francine 
(killed),  Lieut.-Colonel  Francis  Price;  8th  New  Jersey,  Colonel  John  Ramsey 
(wounded),  Captain  John  G.  Langston  ;  115th  Pennsylvania,  Lieut.-Colonel  John 
P.  Dunne ;  2d  New  Hampshire,  Colonel  Edward  L. 'Bailey  (wounded),  Major  Saml. 
P.  Sayles  (wounded). 

Artillery  Brigade.  —Captain  GEORGE  E.  RANDOLPH  Commanding.  Battery  E. 
1st  Rhode  Island,  Lieutenant  John  K.  Bucklyn  (wounded),  Lieutenant  Benj. 
Freeborn  ;  Battery  B,  1st  New  Jersey,  Captain  A.  J.  Clark ;  Battery  D.  1st  New 
Jersey,  Captain  Geo.  T.  Woodbury ;  Battery  K,  4th  U.  S..  Lieutenant  F.  W. 
Seeiey  (wounded),  Lieutenant  Robt.  James ;  4th  New  York,  Captain  Jamea  E. 
Smith. 

FIFTH  CORPS. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  GEORGE  SYKES  COMMANDING. 

FIRST   DIVISION. 

BRIGADIER  GENERAL  JAMES  BARNES  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade. — Colonel  W.  S.  TILTON  Commanding.  18th  Massachusetts, 
Colonel  Joseph  Hayes;  22d  Massachusetts,  Colonel  William  S.  Tilton,  Lieut.- 

i  Colonel  Madill  commanded  the  114th  and  141st  Pennsylvania. 


216          CHAXCELLORSVILLE   AND   GETTYSBURG. 

Colonel  Thomas  Sherman,  Jr.;  118th  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  Charles  M.  Prevost; 
1st  Michigan,  Coloiu-1  Ira  C.  Abbot  (wounded),  Lieut. -Colonel  W.  A.  Throop. 

Ser  and  Brigade. — Colonel  J.  B.  SWEITZER  Commanding.  9th  Massncrmsettp. 
Colonel  Patrick  R.  Guiney  ;  32d  Massachuse  ts.  Colonel  George  L.  I'rescotr  (killed), 
Lieiit. -Colonel  Luther  Stephensun  (wounded),  Mnjor  J.  Cushing  Edmunds:  4th 
Michigan.  Colonel  Hamson  H.  Jeffords  (killed),  Lieut. -<  olonel  George  W.  Lom 
bard  ;  62d  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  J.  B.  Sweitzer,  Lieut.-Colonel  James  C.  Hull. 

Third  Briynde.  —  Colonel  STRONG  VINCENT  Commanding  (killed) ;  Colonel  JAMES 
C.  RICE.  20th  Maine,  Colonel  Joshua  L.  Chamberlain:  44th  New  York.  Colonel 
James  C.  Rice.  Lieut.-Colonel  Freeman  Conner;  b3d  Pennsylvania.  Major  Wil 
liam  H.  Lamont,  Captain  O.  E.  Woodward ;  16th  Michigan,  Lieut.-Colonel  N.  E. 
Welch. 

SECOND   DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  ROMAYN  B.  AYRES  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade.— Colonel  HANNIBAL  DAY,  fith  U.  S.  Infantry,  Commanding. 
81  U.  S.  Infantry,  Captain  H.  W.  Freed  ley  (wounded),  Cnpt;iin  Richard  G.  Lay; 
4th  U.  S.  Infantry,  Captain  J.  W.  Adams;  (>ih  U.  S.  Infantry,  Captain  Levi  C. 
Bootes;  12th  U.  S.  Infantry,  Captain  Thomas  S.  Dunn;  14th  U.  S.  Infantry, 
Major  G.  R.  Giddings. 

Second  Brigade. — Colonel  SIDNEY  BURBANK,  2d  TJ.  S.  Infantry.  Commanding. 
2d  U.  S.  Infantry.  Major  A.  T.  Lee  (wounded).  Captain  S.  A.  McKce ;  7th  U.  S. 
Infantry,  Captain  D.  P.  Hancock  :  10th  U.  S.  Infantry.  Captain  William  Clinton  ; 
llih  U.  S.  Infantry,  Major  De  L.  Floyd  Jones;  17th  "U.  S.  Infantry,  Lieut.-Colo 
nel  Durrell  Green. 

Third  Brigade.— Brigadier-General  S.  H.  WEED  (killed) :  Colonel  KENNER 
GARRARD.  140th  New.Yoric,  Colonel  Patrick  H.  O'Roike  (killed).  Lieut.-Colonel 
Louis  Ernst :  146th  New  York,  Colonel  K.  Garrard,  Lieut.-Colonel  David  T.  Jen 
kins ;  91st  Pennsylvania,  Lieut.-Colonel  Joseph  H.  Sinex  ;  155th  Pennsylvania, 
Lieut.-Coionel  John  H.  Cain. 

THIRD   DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  S.  WILEY  CRAWFORD  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade. — Colonel  WILLIAM  MCCANDLESS.  Commanding.  1st  Pennsyl 
vania  Reserves,  Colonel  William  Cooper  Talley :  2d  Penns\  Ivania  Reserves. 
Colonel  William  McCandles*,  Lieut.-Colonel  Patrick  McDonough  ;  fith  Pennsyl 
vania  Reserves,  Colonel  Wellington  H.  Ent ;  llth  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  Colonel 
S.M.Jackson:  1st  Rifles  (Bucktails),  Colonel  Charles  J.  Taylor  (killed),  Lieut,  - 
Colonel  A.  E,  Niles  (wounded).  Major  William  R.  Hartshorne. 
.  Second  Brigade. — Colonel  JOSEPH  W.  FISHER  Commanding.  5th  Pennsylvania 
Reserves,  Colonel  J.  W.  Fisher,  Lieut.-Colonel  George  Dare  ;  9th  Pennsylvania 
Reserves,  Colonel  Robert  Anderson  ;  10th  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  Colonel  Adon 
J.  Warner  ;  12th  Pennsylvania  Reserves.  Colonel  M.  D.  Harden. 

Artillery  Brigade.— Captain  A.  P.  MARTIN  Commanding.  Battery  D.  5th 
United  States,  Lieutenant  Charles  E.  Hazlett  (killed).  Lieutenant  B.  F.  Kitten-, 
house;  Battery  I.  5>h  United  States,  Lieutenant  Leonard  Martin:  Battery  C, 
1st  New  York.  Captain  Albert  Barnes :  Battery  L,  1st  C  hio,  Captain  N.  C.  Gibbs ; 
Battery  C,  Massachusetts,  Captain  A.  P.  Man  in. 

Pruvost  Guard. — Captain  H.  W.  RYDER.     Companies  E  and  D,  12th  New  York. 


SIXTH  CORPS. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  JOHN  SEDGWICK. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  H.  G.  WRIGHT  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade. — Brisradicr-General  A.  T.  A.  TORBERT  Commanding.  1st  New 
Jersey,  Lieut.-Coionel  William  Henry.  Jr.  ;  2d  New  Jersey,  Colonel  Samuel  L. 
Buck":  3d  New  Jersey,  Colonel  Henry  W.  Brown ;  l£th  New  Jersey,  Colonel  Wil 
liam  H.  Penrose. 


APPENDIX   A.  217 

Second  Brigade.—  Brigadier- General  J.  J.  BARTLETT  Commanding.  5th  Maine, 
Colonel  Clark  S.  Edwards ;  121st  New  York,  Colonel  Emory  Upton  ;  95th  Penn 
sylvania,  Lieut.-Colonel  Edward  Carroll;  Ottth  Pennsylvania,  Lieut. -Colonel  Wil 
liam  H.  Lessig. 

Third  Brigade.—  Brigadier- General  D.  A.  RUSSELL  Commanding.  6th  Maine, 
Colonel  Hiram  Burnham  :  49th  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  William  H.  Irvin ;  119rh 
Pennsylvania,  Colonel  P.  C.  Ellmaker;  5th  Wisconsin,  Colonel  Thomas  S.  Allen. 

SECOND   DIVISION. 
BRIGA-DIER  GENERAL  A.  P.  HOWE  COMMANDING. 

Second  Brigade. — Colonel  L.  A.  GRANT  Commanding.  2d  Vermont,  Colonel  J. 
H.  Walbridge ;  3d  Vermont,  Colonel  T.  O.  Seaver ;  4th  Vermont,  Colonel  E.  H. 
Stoughton  ;  5th  Vermont,  Lieut.-Colonel  John  R.  Lewis  ;  6th  Vermont,  Lieut.- 
Colonel  Elisha  L.  Barney. 

Third  Brigade  — Brigadier-General  T.  A.  NEILL  Commanding.  7th  Maine, 
Lieut. -Colonel  Seldon  Conner;  49th  New  York.  Colonel  D.  D.  Bidwell :  77th 
New  York,  Colonel  J.  B.  McKean  :  43d  New  York,  Colonel  B.  F.  Baker;  61st 
Pennsylvania,  Major  Geo.  W.  Dawson. 

THIRD   DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  FRANK  WHEATON  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  ALEXANDER  SHALEK  Commanding.  65th 
New  York,  Colonel  J.  E.  Hamblin  ;  67th  New  York.  Colonel  Nelson  Cro<s  ;  122d 
New  York.  Lieut.-Colonel  A.  W.  Dwight ;  23d  Pennsylvania,  Lieut. -Colonel  John 
F.  Glenn  ;  82d  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  Isaac  Bassett. 

Second  Brigade. — Colonel  H.  L.  EUSTIS  Commanding.  7th  Massachusetts, 
L'eut. -Colonel  Franklin  P.  Harlow ;  10th  Massachusetts.  Lieut.-Colonel  Jefford 
M.  Decker ;  37th  Massachusetts,  Colonel  Timothy  Ingraham  ;  2d  Rhode  Island, 
Lieut.-Colonel  A.  W.  Corliss. 

Third  Brigade.— Colonel  DAVID  I.  NEVIN  Commanding.  62d  New  York,  Colo 
nel  D.  I.  Nevin,  Lieut.-Colonel  Theo.  B.  Hamilton  ;  102d  Pennsylvania,1  Colonel 
John  W.  Patterson  ;  93d  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  James  M.  McCarter ;  98th  Penn 
sylvania,  Major  John  B.  Kohler  ;  139th  Pennsylvania,  Lieut.-Colonel  William  H. 
Moody. 

Arti'lery  Brigade. — Colonel  C.  H.  TOMPKINS  Commanding.  Battery  A,  1st 
Massachusetts.  C iptain  W.  H.  McCartney;  Battery  D,  2d  United  States,  Lieu 
tenant  E.  B.  Williston  ;  Battery  F,  5th  United  States,  Lieutenant  Leonard  Martin  : 
Battery  G,  2d  United  States,  Lieutenant  John  H.  Butler  ;  Battery  C.  1st  Rhode 
Island,  Captain  Richard  Waterman  ;  Battery  G,  1st  Rhode  Island.  Captain  George 
W.  Adams;  1st  New  York,  Captain  Andrew  Cowan  ;  3d  New  York,  Captain  Wil 
liam  A.  Harn. 

Qavalry  Detachment. — Captain  WILLIAM  L.  CRAFT  Commanding.  H,  1st 
Pennsylvania  ;  L,  1st  New  Jersey. 

ELEVENTH  CORPS. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  OLIVER  O.  HOWARD  PERMANENT  COMMANDER. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  CARL  SCHURZ,  July  1st. 
FIRST   DIVISION. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  FRANCIS  C.  BARLOW  COMMANDING  (wounded). 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  ADELBERT  AMES. 

First  Brigade. — Colonel  LEOPOLD  VON  GILSA  Commanding.  41st  New  York. 
Colonel  L.  Von  Gilsa.  Lieut.-Colonel  D.  Von  Einsiede! :  54th  New  York,  Colonel 
Eugene  A.  Kezley  ;  68th  New  York,  Colonel  Gotthilf  Bourny  de  Ivernois ;  153d 
Pennsylvania,  Colonel  Charles  Glanz. 


1  Not  engaged. 

VI.— 10. 


218    OHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

Second  Eiignde.— Brigadier-General  ADELBERT  AMES  Commanding :  Colonel 
ANDREW  L.  HARRIS.  17th  Connecticut,  Lient.-Colonel  Douglass  Fowler  (killc-dj, 
Major  A.  G.  Brady  (wounded);  25th  Ohio,  Lieut-Colonel  Jeremiah  Williams 
(captured),  Lieutenant  William  Maloney  (wounded).  Lieutenant  Israel  White; 
75th  Ohio.  Colonel  Andrew  L.  Harris  (wounded),  Lieut.-Colonel  Ben  Morgan 
(wounded),  Major  Charles  \V.  Friend  ;  lU7th  Ohio,  Captain  John  M.  Lutz. 

SECOND   DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  A.  VON  STEINWEHR  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade.-  Colonel  CHARLES  R.  COSTER  Commanding.  27th  Pennsylvania, 
Lieut.-Coloiiel  Lorenz  Cantador :  73d  Pennsylvania,  Captain  Daniel  F.  Kelly ; 
134th  New  York,  Colonel  Charles  R.  Coster,  Lieut.-Colonel  Allan  H.  Jackson ; 
154th  New  York,  Colonel  Patrick  H.  Jones. 

Second  Brigade.— Colonel  ORLANDO  SMITH  Commanding.  33d  Massachusetts, 
Lieut.-Colonel  Adin  B.  Underwood;  136th  New  York,  Colonel  James  Wood,  Jr.  ; 
55th  Ohio,  Colonel  Charles  B.  Gambee  ;  73d  Ohio,Colonel  Orlando  Smith,  Lieut.- 
Colonel  Richard  Long. 

THIRD   DIVISION. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  CARL  SCHURZ  PERMANENT  COMMANDER. 
BKIGADIEB-GENEBAL  ALEXANDER  SCHIMMELPFENNIG  Commanding  on 
July  1st. 

First  Brigade.— Brigadier-General  A.  VON  SCHIMMELPFENNIG  Commanding 
(captured) :  Colonel  GEORGE  VON  ARNSBURG.  45th  New  York,  Colonel  G.  Von 
Arnsburg,  Lieut.-Colonel  Adolphus  Dobke  :  157th  New  York,  Colonel  Philip  P. 
Brown,  Jr.  ;  74th  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  Adolph  Von  Hartung  (wounded),  Lieut.- 
Colonel  Von  Mitzel  (captured).  Major  Gustav  Schleiter  ;  61st  Ohio,  Colonel  S.  J. 
McGroarty ;  82d  Illinois,  Colonel  J.  Hecker. 

Second  Brigade. — Colonel  WALDIMIR  KRYZANOWSKI  Commanding.  58th  New 
York,  Colonel  W.  Kryzanowski,  Lieut.-Colonel  August  Otto,  Captain  Emil 
Koemg,  Lieut.-Colonel  Frederick  Gellman:  119th  New  York,  Colonel  John  T. 
Lockman,  Lieut.-Colonel  James  C.  Rogers;  75th  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  Francis 
Mahler  (wounded).  Major  August  Ledig ;  82d  Ohio,  Colonel  James  S.  Robinson 
(wounded).  Lieut.-Colonel  D.  Thomson;  26th  Wisconsin,  Colonel  Wm.  H.  Jacobs. 

Artillery  Brigade.— Major  THOMAS  W.  OSBORN  Commanding.  Battery  I,  1st 
New  York,  Captain  Michael  Wiedrick  ;  Battery  I,  1st  Ohio.  Captain  Hubert  Dil- 
ger  ;  Battery  K,  1st  Ohio.  Captain  Lewis  HecKman  ;  Battery  G,  4th  United  States. 
Lieutenant  Bayard  Wilkeson  (killed),  Lieutenant  E.  A.  Bancroft;  13th  New 
York,  Lieutenant  William  Wheeler. 

TWELFTH  CORPS. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  ALPHEUS  S.  WILLIAMS  COMMANDING. 

FIRST   DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER  GENERAL  THOMAS  H.  RUGER  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade.— Colonel  ARCHIBALD  L.  McDouGALL  Commanding.  5th  Con 
necticut,  Colonel  Warren  Wr.  Packer:  2()th  Connecticut,  Lieut.-Colonel  William 
B.  Wooster;  123d  New  York,  Colonel  A.  L.  McDougall.  Lieut.-Colonel  James  <\ 
Rogers;  145th  New  York,  Colonel  E.  L.  Price  :  46th  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  James 
L.  Selfridge ;  3d  Maryland.  Colonel  J.  M.  Sndsburg. 

Second  Brigade.1 — Brigadier-General  HENRY  H.  LOCKWOOD  Commanding. 
150th  New  York,  Colonel  John  H.  Ketcham  :  1st  Maryland  (P.  H.  B.),  Colonel 
William  P.  Maulsby  ;  1st  Maryland  (E.  S.),  Colonel  James  Wallace. 


1  Unassigned  during  progress  of  battle;  afterward  attached  io  First  Division 
as  Second  Brigade. 


APPENDIX   A.  219 

Third  Brigade. — Colonel  SILAS  COLCROVE  Commanding.  2d  Massachusetts, 
Colonel  Charles  R.  Mudge  (killed),  Lieut.-Colonel  Charles  F.  Morse;  107th  New 
York,  Colonel  Miron  M.  Crane ;  13th  New  Jersey,  Colonel  Ezra  A.  Carman 
(wounded),  Lieut.-Colonel  John  R.  Fesler ;  27th  Indiana,  Colonel  Silas  Col- 
grove,  Lieut.-Colonel  John  II.  Fesler;  3d  Wisconsin,  Lieut.-Colonel  Martin  Flood. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JOHN  W.  GEARY,  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade.— Colonel  CHARLES  CANDY  Commanding.  28th  Pennsylvania, 
Captain  John  Flynn  ;  147th  Pennsylvania.  Lieut.-Colonel  Ario  Pardee,  Jr.  ;  5th 
Oh:o.  Colonel  John  H.  Patrick;  7ih  Ohio, '  Colonel  William  R.  Creighton  ;  29th 
Ohio,  Captain  W.  F.  Stevens  (wounded),  Captain  Ed.  Hays ;  66th  Ohio,  Colonel 
C.  Candy,  L;eut.-Colonel  Eugene  Powell. 

Second  tiriflade. — (1)  Colonel  GEORGE  A.  COBHAM,  JR.  ;  (2)  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  THOMAS  L.  KANE.  29th  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  William  Rickards ;  109th 
Pennsylvania,  Captain  Fred.  L.  Gimher ;  lllth  Pennsylvania,  Lieut. -Colonel 
Th  >mas  M.  Walker,  Lieut.-Colonel  Frank  J.  Osgood. 

Third  Brigade.— Brigadier-General  GEORGE  S.  GREENE  Commanding.  60th 
New  York,  Colonel  Abel  Godard ;  78th  New  York,  Lieut.-Colonel  Herbert  Von 
Hammerstein  :  102ci  New  York,  Lieut.-Colonel  James  C.  Lane  (wounded) ;  137th 
New  York,  Colonel  David  Ireland  ;  149th  New  York,  Colonel  Henry  A.  Barnum, 
Lieut.-Colonel  Charles  B.  Randall. 

ArtVl-ry  Brigade.— Lieutenant  EDWARD  D.  MUHLENBERG  Commanding.  Bat 
tery  F,  4th  United  States,  Lieutenant  E.  D.  Muhlenbort',  Lieutenant  S.  T.  Rugg ; 
Battery  K,  5th  United  States.  Lieutenant  D.  H.  Kinsie;  Battery  M,  let  New 
York,  Lieutenant  Charles  E.  Winegar  ;  Knap's  Pennsylvania  Battery,  Lieutenant 
Charles  Atwell. 

Headquarter  Gua rd.— Battalion  10th  Maine. 

CAVALRY  CORPS. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  ALFRED  PLEASONTON  COMMANDING. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JOHN  BUFORD  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade. — Colonel  WILLIAM  GAMBLE  Commanding.  8th  New  York,  Colo 
nel  Benjamin  F.  Davis;  8th  Illinois,  Colonel  William  Gamble,  Lieut.-Colonel  D. 
R.  Clendenin  :  two  squadrons  12th  Illinois,  Colonel  Amos  Voss  ;  three  squadrons 
3d  Indiana,  Colonel  George  H.  Chapman. 

Second  Brigade.— Colonel  THOMAS  C.  DEVIN  Commanding.  6th  New  York, 
Colonel  Thomas  C.  Devin.  Lieut.-Colonel  William  H.  Crocker  ;  9th  New  York, 
Colonel  William  Sackett ;  17th  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  J.  H.  Kellogg  ;  3d  Virg  nia 
(detachment). 

Reserve  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  WESLEY  MERRITT  Commanding.  1st 
United  States,  Captain  R.  S.  C.  Lord  ;  2d  United  States,  Captain  T.  F.  Roden- 
bough  ;  5th  United  States,  Captain  J.  W.  Mas  >n ;  6th  United  States,  Major  S. 
H.  Starr  (wounded),  Captain  G.  C.  Cram  ;  6th  Pennsylvania,  Major  James  H. 
Hazeltine. 

SECOND   DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  D.  McM.  GREGG  COMMANDING. 

(HEADQUARTER  GUARD— Company  A,  1st  Ohio.) 

First  Brigade. — Colonel  J.  B.  MC!NTOSH  Commanding.  1st  New  Jersey,  Major 
M.  H.  Beaumont;  1st  Pennsylvania.  Colonel  John  P.  Tayior;  3d  Pennsylvania, 
Lieut.-Colonel  Edward  S.  Jones:  1st  Maryland,  Lieut.-Colonel  James  M.  Deems; 
1st,  Massachusetts  at  Headquarters  Sixth  Corps. 


220    CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

Second  Brigade.1 — Colonel  PENNOCK  HUET  Commanding.  2d  New  York,  4th 
New  York,  8th  Pennsylvania,  6th  Ohio. 

Third  Brigade.— Colonel  J.  I.  GREGG  Commanding.  1st  Maine,  Colonel  Charles 
H.  Smith  ;  10th  New  York,  Major  W.  A.  Avery ;  4th  Pennsylvania,  Lieut.-Colonel 
W.  E.  Doster ;  16th  Pennsylvania,  Lieut.-Colonel  John  K.  Robison. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JUDSON  KILPATRICK  COMMANDING. 
(HEADQUARTER  GUARD — Company  C,  1st  Ohio.) 

First  Brigade.— (\)  Brigadier-General  E.  J.  FARNSWORTH;  (2)  Colonel  X.  P. 
RICHMOND.  5th  New  York,  Major  John  Hammond  :  18th  Pennsylvania,  Lieut.- 
Colonel  William  P.  Brinton ;  1st  Vermont,  Colonel  Edward  D.  Sawyer ;  1st  West 
Virginia,  Colonel  H.  P.  Richmond. 

Second  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  GEORGE  A.  CUSTER  Commanding.  1st 
Michigan,  Colonel  Charles  H.  Town  ;  5th  Michigan.  Colonel  Russell  A.  Alger ; 
6th  Michigan,  Colonel  George  Gray ;  7th  Michigan,  Colonel  Wm.  D.  Mann. 

HORSE  ARTILLERY.* 

Firnt  Brigade.—  Captain  JOHN  M.  ROBERTSON  Commanding.  Batteries  B  and 
L.  2d  United  States,  Lieutenant  Edw.  Heaton  ;  Battery  M,  2d  United  States,  Lieu 
tenant  A.  C.  M.  Pennington;  Battery  E,  4th  United  State?,  Lieutenant  S.  S. 
Elder;  6th  New  York.  Lieutenant  Jos.  W.  Martin  ;  9th  Michigan,  Captain  J.  J, 
Daniels  ;  3d  United  States,  Lieutenant  William  D.  Fuller. 

Second  Brigade.- -Captain  JOHN  C.  TIDBALL  Commanding.  Batteries  G  and 
E,  1st  United  States,  Captain  A.  M.  Randol ;  Battery  K,  1st  United  States,  Cap 
tain  Wm.  M.  Graham :  Battery  A,  2d  United  States,"  Lieutenant  John  H.  Calef : 
Battery  C,  3d  United  States. 

ARTILLERY  RESERVE. 

(1)  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  R.  O.  TYLER  (disabled). 

(2)  CAPTAIN  JOHN  M.  ROBERTSON. 

First  Regular  Brigade. — Captain  D.  R.  RANSOM  Commanding  (wounded).  Bat 
tery  H,  1st  United  States,  Lieutenant  C.  P.  Eakin  (wounded) ;  Batteries  F  and  K, 
3d  United  States,  Lieutenant  J.  C.  Turnbull  ;  Battery  C,  4th  United  States, 
Lieutenant  Evan  Thomas  ;  Battery  C,  5th  United  States,  Lieutenant  G.  V.  Weir. 

First  Volunteer  Brigade. — Lieut.-Colonel  F.  MCGTLVERT  Commanding.  15th 
New  York.  Captain  Patrick  Hart ;  Batteries  F  and  G,  Pennsylvania,  Ciiptain  R. 
B.  Ricketts ;  5th  Massachusetts,  Captain  C.  A.  Phillips ;  9th  Massachusetts,  Cap 
tain  John  Bigelow. 

Second  Volunteer  Brigade.—  Captain  E.  D.  TAFT  Commanding.  Battery  B, 
1st  Connecticut;  1  Battery  M,  1st  Connecticut;  J  5th  New  York,  Captain  Elijah 
D.  Taft ;  2d  Connecticut,  Lieutenant  John  W.  Sterling. 

TJiird  Volunteer  Brigade. — Captain  JAMES  F.  HUNTINGTON  Commanding. 
Batteries  F  and  G,  1st  Pennsylvania.  Captain  James  Thompson;  Battery  H,  1st 
Ohio,  Captain  Jas.  F.  Huntington ;  Battery  A,  1st  New  Hampshire,  Captain  F. 
M.  Edgell ;  Battery  C,  1st  West  Virginia,  Captain  Wallace  Hill. 


1  Not  engaged. 

a  A  section  of  a  battery  attached  to  the  Purnell  Legion  was  with  Gregg  on  the  3d. 


APPENDIX  A.  221 

Fourth  Volunteer  Brlaade. — Captain  R.  H.  FITZHUGH  Commanding.  Battery 
B,  1st  New  York,  Captain  Jas.  McRorty  (killed) ;  Battery  G,  1st  New  York,  Cap 
tain  Albert  N.  Ames;  Battery  K,  1st  New  York  (llth  Battery  attached),  Cap 
tain  Robt.  H.  Fitzhugh  ;  Battery  A,  1st  Maryland,  Captain  Jas.  H.  Rigby :  Bat 
tery  A,  1st  New  Jersey,  Lieutenant  Augustin  N.  Parsons ;  6th  Maine,  Lieutenant 
Edwin  B.  Dow. 

Train  Guard.— Major  CHARLES  EWIJJG  Commanding.  4th  New  Jersey  In 
fantry. 

Headquarter  Guard. — Captain  J.  C.  FULLER  Commanding.     Battery  C,  32d 

Massachusetts. 


DETACHMENTS    AT    HEADQUARTERS   ARMY    OF    THE 
POTOMAC. 

Command  of  the  Provost- Marshal- General. — Brigadier  General  M.  R.  PATRICK 
Commanding.  93d  New  York,1  8th  United  States,1  1st  Massachusetts  Cavalry,  2d 
Pennsylvania  Cavalry.  Batteries  E  and  I,  6th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  Detachment 
Regular  Cavalry,  United  States  Engineer  Battalion,1  Captain  Geo.  H.  Mendel, 
United  States  Engineers. 

Guards  and  Orderlies.— Captain  D.  P.  MANN  Commanding.  Independent  Com 
pany  Oneida  Cavalry. 

1  Not  engaged. 


APPENDIX  B. 

Organization  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  June  1, 
1863. 

GENERAL  ROBERT  E.  LEE  COMMANDING. 

STAFF. 
COLONEL  W.  H.   TAYLOR,  Adjutant-General. 

"          C.  S.  VENABLE,  A.D.C. 

"          CHARLES   MARSHALL,  A.D.C. 

u          JAMUS   L.   CORLEY,  Chief  Quartermaster. 

"          R.  G.  COLE,  Chief  Commissary. 

"          B.  G.   BALDWIN.  Chief  of  Ordnance. 

"          H.  Li  PEYTON,  Assistant  Inspector-General. 
GENERAL  W.  N.  PENDLETON,  Chief  of  Artillery. 
DOCTOR  L.  GUILD,  Medical  Director. 
COLONEL  W.  PROCTOR   SMITH,  Chief  Engineer. 
MAJOR  H.  E.  YOUNG,  Assistant  Adjutant-General. 
"       G.  B.  COOK,  Assistant  Inspector-General. 

FIRST  CORPS. 
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  JAMES  LONGSTREET  COMMANDING. 

McLAWS'S   DIVISION. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  L.  McLAWS  COMMANDING. 

Kershaitfs  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  J.  B.  KERSHAW  Commanding.  15th 
South  Carolina  Regiment,  Colonel  W.  D.  I)e  Saussure  :  8th  South  Carolina  Regi 
ment,  Colonel  J.  W.  Mamminger ;  2d  South  Carolina  Regiment,  Colonel  John  D. 
Kennedy;  3d  South  Carolina  Regiment,  Colonel  James  D.  Nance;  7th  South 
Carolina  Regiment,  Colonel  D.  Wyatt  Aiken ;  3d  (James's)  Battalion  South  Caro 
lina  Infantry.  Lieut. -Colonel  R.  C.  Rice. 

Bennlng's  Brigade.— Brigadier-General  H.  L.  BENNING  Commanding.  5dth 
Georgia  Regiment,  Colonel  W.  R.  Manning:  51st  Georgia  Regiment.  Colonel  W. 
M.  Slaughter;  53d  Georgia  Regiment,  Colonel  James  P.  Somms;  10th  Georgia 
Regiment,  Lieut. -Colonel  John  B.  Weems. 


APPENDIX  B.  223 

IlarkxdiiWx  Brigade.— Brigadier-General  WM.  BARKSDALE  Commanding.  13th 
Mississippi  Regiment.  Colonel  J.  W.  Carter;  17th  Mississippi  Regiment,  Colonel 
W.  D.  Holder  ;  18th  Mississippi  Regiment.  Colonel  Thomas  M.  Griffin  ;  21st  Mis 
sissippi  Regiment,  Colonel  B.  G.  Humphreys. 

Woffard'ft  Brigade.—  Brigadier-General  W.  T.  WOFFARD  Commanding.  18th 
Georgia  Regiment,  Major  E.  Griffs;  Phillips' s  Georgia  Legion,  Colonel  W.  M. 
Phillips;  24th  Georgia  Regiment.  Colonel  Robert  McMillan:  l(jth  Georgia  Regi 
ment,  Colonel  Goode  Bryan  ;  Cobb's  Georgia  Legion,  Lieut. -Colonel  L.  D.  Glewn. 


PICKETT'S   DIVISION. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  GEORGE  E.  PICKETT  COMMANDING. 

(,'arnetfs  Brigade.—  Brigadier-General  R.  B.  GARNETT  Commanding.  8th  Vir 
ginia  Regiment,  Colonel  Eppa  Hunton;  18th  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel  R.  E. 
Withers  ;  l»th  Virginia  Regiment.  Colonel  Henry  Gantt ;  28th  Virginia  Regiment, 
Colonel  R.  C.  Allen  ;  56th  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel  W.  D.  Stuart. 

Armistead'x  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  L.  A.  ARMTSTEAD  Commanding.  9th 
Virginia  Regiment,  Lieut. -Colonel  J.  S.  Gilliam  ;  14th  Virginia  Regiment.  Colo 
nel  J.  G.  Hodges;  38th  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel  E.  C.  Edmonds;  53d  Vir- 
g  nia  Regiment,  Colonel  John  Grammer ;  57th  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel  J.  B. 
Magruder. 

Kemper^s  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  J.  L.  KEMPER  Commanding.  1st  Vir 
ginia  Regiment.  Colonel  Lewis  B.  Williams,  Jr. :  3d  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel 
Joseph  Mayo,  Jr.:  7th  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel  W.  T.  Patton ;  llth  Virginia 
Regiment,  Colonel  David  Funston  ;  24th  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel  W.  R.  Terry. 

Toombtf*  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  R.  TOOMBS  Commanding.  2d  Georgia 
Regiment,  Colonel  E.  M.  Butt;  15th  Georgia  Regiment,  Colonel  E.  M.  DnBose; 
1  Tth  Georgia  Regiment,  Colonel  W.  C.  Hodges ;  20th  Georgia  Regiment,  Colonel 
J.  B.  Cummings. 

Corse's  Brigade.— Brigadier-General  M.  D.  CORSE  Commanding.  15th  Virginia 
Regiment.  Colonel  T.  P.  August ;  17th  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel  Morton  Marye  ; 
3Uth  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel  A.  T.  Harrison  ;  32d  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel 
E.  B.  Montague. 

HOOD'S  DIVISION". 
MAJOR-GENERAL  J.  B.  HOOD. 

RoberttovZs  Brigade.— Brigadier-General  J.  B.  ROBERTSON  Commanding.  1st 
Texas  Regiment,  Colonel  A.  T.  Rainey :  4th  Texas  Regiment,  Colonel  J.  C.  G. 
Key :  5th  Texas  Regiment,  Colonel  R.  M.  Powell ;  3d  Arkansas  Regiment,  Colo 
nel  Van  H.  Manning. 

Lawffs  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  E.  M.  LAWS  Commanding.  4th  Alabama 
Regiment,  Colonel  P.  A.  Bowls :  44th  Alabama  Regiment,  Colonel  \V.  H.  Perry : 
15th  Alabama  Regiment,  Colonel  James  Canty ;  47th  Alabama  Regiment,  Colo 
nel  J.  W.  Jackson  ;  48th  Alabama,  Colonel  J.  F.  Shepherd. 

Anderson's  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  G.  T.  ANDERSON  Commanding.  10th 
Georgia  Battalion,  Major  J.  E.  Rylander ;  Ith  Georgia  Regiment,  Colonel  W.  M. 
White:  8th  Georgia  Regiment,  Lieut. -Colonel  J.  R.  Towers;  9th  Georgia  Regi 
ment,  Colonel  B.  F.  Beck;  llth  Georgia  Regiment,  Colonel  F.  H.  Little. 

Jenkins's  Brigade.—  Brigadier-General  M.  JENKINS  Commanding.  2d  South 
Carolina  Rifles,  Colonel  Thomas  Thompson  ;  1st  South  Carolina  Regiment.  Lieut.  - 
Colonel  David  Livingstone  ;  5th  South  Carolina  Regiment,  Colonel  A.  Coward  ; 
fith  South  Carolina  Regiment,  Colonel  John  Bratton  ;  Hampton's  Legion,  Colonel 
M.  W.  Gary. 

ARTILLERY  OF  THE  FIRST  CORPS. 
COLONEL  J.   B.   WALTON  COMMANDING. 

Battalion.— Colonel  H.  C.  CABELL  ;  Major  HAMILTON.  Batteries:  McCarty'B, 
Manly's,  Carlton's,  Fraser's. 


224    CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

Battalion. — Major  DEARING;  Major  REED.  Batteries:  Macon's,  Blount's, 
Stribling's,  Caskie's. 

Battalion. — Major  HENRY.  Batteries :  Bachman's,  Rielly's,  Latham's,  Gor 
don's. 

Battalion.— Colonel  E.  P.  ALEXANDER;  Major  HUGER.  Batteries:  Jordan's, 
Rhett's,  Moody's,  Parker's,  Taylor's. 

Battalion. — Major  ESHLEMAN.  Batteries:  Squires' s,  Miller's.  Richardson's, 
Norcom's. 

Total  number  of  guns,  Artillery  of  the  First  Corps,  83. 


SECOND  CORPS. 
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  R.  S.  EWELL. 

EARLY'S  DIVISION. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  J.  A.  EARLY  COMMANDING. 

HayJx  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  H.  S.  HAYS  Commanding.  5th  Louisiana 
Regiment,  Colonel  Henry  Forno;  6th  Louisiana  Regiment,  Colonel  William 
Monaghan  :  7th  Louisiana  Regiment,  Colonel  D.  B.  Penn ;  8th  Louisiana  Regi 
ment,  Colonel  Henry  B.  Kelley ;  9th  Louisiana  Regiment,  Colonel  A.  L.  Stafford. 

Garden's  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  J.  B.  GORDEN  Commanding.  13th 
Georgia  Regiment,  Colonel  J.  M.  Smith  ;  26th  Georgia  Regiment,  Colonel  E.  N. 
Atkinson ;  31st  Georgia  Regiment,  Colonel  C.  A.  Evans ;  38th  Georgia  Regiment, 
Major  J.  D.  Matthews;  60th  Georgia  Regiment,  Colonel  W.  H.  Stiles;  61st 
Georgia  Regiment,  Colonel  J.  H.  Lamar. 

Smithes  Brigade.— Brigadier-General  WILLIAM  SMITH  Commanding.  13th  Vir 
ginia  Regiment.  Colonel  J.  E.  B.  Ten-ill ;  31st  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel  John 
S.  Hoffman ;  49th  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel  Gibson  ;  52d  Virginia  Regiment, 
Colonel  Skinner ;  58th  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel  F,  H.  Board. 

H<>ke\<t  Brigade. — Colonel  J.  E.  AVEEY  Commanding  (General  R.  F.  HOHE  be 
ing  absent,  wounded).  5th  North  Carolina  Regiment,  Colonel  J.  E.  Avery  ;  21st 
North  Carolina  Regiment,  Colonel  W.  W.  Kirkland ;  54th  North  Carolina  Regi 
ment,  Colonel  J.  C.  T.  McDowell ;  57th  North  Carolina  Regiment,  Colonel  A.  C. 
Godwin  ;  1st  North  Carolina  Battalion,  Major  R.  H.  Whartou. 

RHODES'S  DIVISION. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  R.  E.  RHODES  COMMANDING. 

DanieTs  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  JUNIUS  DANIEL  Com  manding.  32d  North 
Carolina  Regiment,  Colonel  E.  C.  Brabble ;  43d  North  Carolina  Regiment,  Colo 
nel  Thomas  S.  Keenan  ;  45th  North  Carolina  Regiment,  Lieut.-Colonel  Saml.  II. 
Boyd  ;  53d  North  Carolina  Regiment,  Colonel  W.  A.  Owens ;  2d  North  Carolina 
Battalion,  Lieut.-Colonel  H.  S.  Andrew. 

Doles' s  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  GEORGE  DOLES  Commanding.  4th  Geor 
gia  Regiment,  Lieut.-Colonel  D.  R.  E.  Winn ;  12th  Georgia  Regiment,  Colonel 
Edward  Willis;  21st  Georgia  Regimeut,  Colonel  John  T.  Mercer;  44th  Georgia 
Regiment,  Colonel  S.  P.  Lumpkin. 

/person's  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  ALFRED  IVERSON  Commanding.  5th 
North  Carolina  Regiment,  Captain  S.  B.  West ;  12th  North  Carolina  Regiment, 
Lieut. -Colonel  W.  S.  Davis;  20th  North  Carolina  Regiment,  Lieut.- Colonel  N. 
Slough  ;  23d  North  Carolina  Regiment,  Colonel  D.  H.  Christie. 

Ranvteur'**  Brigade.—  Brigadier-General  S.  D.  RAMSEUR  Commanding.  2d 
North  Carolina  Regiment,  Major  E.  W.  Hurt;  4th  North  Carolina  Regiment, 
Colonel  Bryan  Grimes;  14th  North  Carolina  Regiment,  Colonel  R.  T.  Bennett; 
30th  North  Carolina  Regiment,  Colonel  F.  M.  Parker. 


APPENDIX  B.  225 

Rodes's  Brigade.— Colonel  K.  A.  O'NEAL  Commanding:.  3d  Alabama  Regi 
ment,  Colonel  C.  A.  Battle;  5th  Alabama  Regiment,  Colonel  J.  M.  Hall;  (ith 
Alabama  Regiment,  Colonel  J.  N.  Lightfoot;  12th  Alabama  Regiment,  Colonel  S. 
B.  Pickens;  26th  Alabama  Regiment,  Lieut. -Colonel  J.  C.  Goodgame. 

JOHNSON'S  DIVISION. 
MAJOR-GENEKAL  ED.  JOHNSON  COMMANDING. 

Steuarfs  Brigade.—  Brigadier-General  GEO.  H.  STEITART  Commanding.  10th 
Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel  E.  T.  H.  Wan-en  ;  23d  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel  A. 
G.  Taliaferro ;  27th  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel  T.  V.  Williams ;  1st  North  Caro 
lina  Regiment,  Colonel  J.  A.  McDowell;  3d  North  Carolina  Regiment,  Lieut.  - 
Colonel  Thurston. 

"Stonewall"  Brigade.— Brigadier-General  JAMES  A.  WALKER  Commanding. 
2cl  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel  J.  Q.  A.  Nadenbousch  ;  4th  Virginia  Regiment, 
Colonel  Charles  A.  Ronald  ;  5th  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel  J.  H.  S.  Funk,  27th 
Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel  J.  K.  Edmondson ;  33d  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel 
F.  M.  Holladay. 

Jones's  Brigade.— Brigadier-General  JOHN  M.  JONES  Commanding.  21st  Vir 
ginia  Regiment,  Captain  Moseley ;  42d  Virginia  Regiment.  Lieut. -Colonel  With 
ers  :  44th  Virginia  Regiment,  Captain  Buckner  :  48th  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel 
T.  S.  Garnett ;  5(Jth  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel  Vandeventer. 

Nichollfi'a  Brigade. — Colonel  J.  M.  WILLIAMS  Commanding  (General  F.  T. 
Nicholls  being  absent,  wounded).  1st  Louisiana  Regiment,  Colonel  William  R. 
iShirers :  2d  Louisiana  Regiment,  Colonel  J.M.Williams  :  10th  Louisiana  Regiment, 
Colonel  E.  Waggaman  ;  14th  Louisiana  Regiment,  Colonel  Z.  York  ;  15th  Louisiana 
Regiment,  Colonel  Edward  Pendleton. 

ARTILLERY  OF  THE  SECOND  CORPS. 
COLONEL  S.  CRUTCHFIELD,  COMMANDING. 

Battalion.—  Lieut.-Colonel  Thomas  H.  Carter  ;  Major  Carter  M.  Braxton.  Bat 
teries:  Page's,  Fry's,  Carter's,  Reese's. 

Battalion. — Lieut.-Colonel  H.  P.  JONES;  Major  BROCKENBOROBGH.  Batteries: 
Carrington's,  Garber's,  Thompson's,  Tanner's. 

Battalion. — Lieut.-Colonel  S.  ANDREWS  ;  Major  LATIMER.  Batteries:  Brown's, 
Dermot's,  Carpenter's,  Raine's. 

Battalion.— Lieut.-Colonel  NELSON;  Major  PAGE.  Batteries:  Kirkpatrick's, 
Massie's.  Millege's. 

Battalion. — Colonel  J.  T.  BROWN  ;  Major  HARDAWAY.  Batteries:  Dance's, 
Watson's,  Smith's,  Huff's,  Graham's. 

Total  number  of  guns,  Artillery  of  the  Second  Corps,  82. 


THIRD  CORPS. 
LIEUT. -GENERAL  A.  P.  HILL,  COMMANDING. 

R.  H.  ANDERSON'S  DIVISION. 

Wilcotfs  Brigade.— Brigadier- General  C.  M.  WILCOX  Commanding.  8th  Ala 
bama  Regiment.  Colonel  T.  L.  Royster;  9th  Alabama  Regiment,  Colonel  S. 
Henry;  10th  Alabama  Regiment,  Colonel  W.  H.  Forney;  llth  Alabama  Regi 
ment,  Colonel  J.  C.  C.  Saunders ;  14th  Alabama  Regiment,  Colonel  L.  P.  Pink- 
hard. 

Mahone's  Brigade.—  Brigadier-General  WILLIAM  MAHONE  Commanding.  6th 
Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel  G.  T.  Rogers  ;  12th  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel  D.  A. 
Weisiger;  16th  Virginia  Regiment,  Lieut.-Colonel  Joseph  H.  Ham  ;  41st  Virginia 
Regiment,  Colonel  \V.  A.  Parham ;  61st  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel  V.  D. 
Groner. 

10* 


226    CHAXCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

Powf*  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  CAKOT  POSEY  Commanding.  -16th  Mis 
sissippi  Regiment.  Colonel  Jos.  Jayne ;  16th  Mississippi  Regiment,  Colonel  Saml. 
E.  Baker ;  19th  Mississippi  Regiment,  Colonel  John  Mullins ;  12th  Mississippi 
Regiment,  Colonel  \V.  H.  Taylor. 

Wright's  Brigade. — Brigadier -General  A.  R.  WRIGHT  Commanding.  2d  Geor 
gia  Battalion,  Major  G.  W.  Ross ;  3d  Georgia  Rogiment,  Colonel  E.  J.  Walker ; 
22d  Georgia  Regiment,  Colonel  R.  H.  Jones ;  48th  Georgia  Regiment,  Colonel 
William  Gibson. 

Perry's  Brigade.—  Brigadier-General  E.  A.  PERRY  Commanding.  2d  Florida 
Regiment,  Lieut. -Colonel  S.  G.  Pyles ;  5th  Florida  Regiment,  Colonel  J.  C. 
Hately  ;  8th  Florida  Regiment,  Colonel  David  Long. 

HETH'S  DIVISION. 

First,  Pettigrew's  Brigade.— 42d,  llth,  26th,  44th,  47th,  52d,  and  17th  North 
Carolina  Regiments. 

Second,  field's  Brigade.— 40th.  55th,  and  47th  Virginia  Regiments. 

Third,  Archer' x  Brigade. — 1st,  7th,  and  14th  Tennessee,  and  13th  Alabama  Regi 
ments. 

Fourth,  Cook's  Brigade.—  15th,  27th,  46th,  and  48th  North  Carolina  Regiments. 

FENDER'S  DIVISION. 

First,  Me  Gowarfs  Brigade.— 1st,  12th,  13th.  and  14th  North  Carolina  Regiments. 
Second,  lane's  Brigade.—  7th,  18th,  28th,  33d,  and  37th  Georgia  Regiments. 
Third,  Thomas's  Brigade. — 14th,  35th,  45th,  and  4flth  Georgia  Regiment3. 
Fourth,  Fender's  Old  Brigade.— 13th.  16th,  22d,  34th,  and  38th  North  Carolina 
Regiments. 

ARTILLERY   OF   THE   THIRD    CORPS. 
COLONEL  R.  LINDSEY  WALKER  COMMANDING. 

Battalion.—  Major  D.  G.  MC!NTOSH  ;  Major  W.  F.  POAGUK.  Batteries  :  Hurt's 
Rice's,  Luck's,  Johnson's. 

Battalion. — Lieut.-Colonel  GARNETT;  Major  RICHARDSON.  Batteries:  Lewis's, 
Maurin's,  Moore's,  Grandy's. 

Battalion. — Major  CUTSHAW.     Batteries  :  Wyatt's,  Woolfolk's,  Brooke's. 

Battalion. — Major  WILLIE  P.  PEGRAM.  Batteries:  Branson's,  Davidson's, 
Crenshaw's,  McGraw's,  Marye's. 

Battalion.—  Lieut.-Colonel  CUTTS  ;  Major  LANE.  Batteries:  Wingfield's, 
Ross's,  Patterson's. 

Total  number  of  guns,  Artillery  of  the  Third  Corps,  83. 

Total  number  of  guns,  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  248. 

LIEUT.-GENERAL  J.  E.  B.  STUART'S  CAVALRY  CORPS. 

Brigadier-General  Wade  Hampton's  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  Fitz  Hugh  Lee's  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  Brigade,  under  Colonel  Chambliss. 

Brigadier-General  B.  H.  Robertson's  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  William  E.  Jones's  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  J.  D.  Imboden's  Brigade. 

Brigadier- General  A.  G.  Jenkins's  Brigade. 

Colonel  White's  Battalion. 

Baker's  Brigade. 

[NOTE  —The  regimental  roster  of  this  Cavalry  Corps  is  unfortunately  unob 
tainable.] 


INDEX. 


NOTE. — Regiments,  batteries,  etc.,  arc  indexed  under  the  names  of 
their  States,  excepting  batteries  called  by  their  captain's  or  by  some 
other  special  name.  These  are  indexed  under  BATTERIES. 


ABERCIIOMBIE,  division  of,  105 

Adjutant-General   at    Richmond,  \ 
112 

Alabama,  regiment  of  :  Fourth,  198 

Alabama,  the,  77 

Alden,  his  "  History  of  the  Great  ! 
Rebellion, "71,  72 

Aldie  Gap,  100,  101 

Aldie,  Va.,  100,  102  et  seq. 

Alexander,  Colonel,  Chief  of  Long-  , 
street's  artillery,  65,  90,  206 

Ames,  Brigadier-General  Adelbert, 
brigade  of,  82,  161,  182 

Anderson,   brigade  of,    168,   173  ;  ! 
Georgia  brigade,  198 

Anderson,  Gen.  R.  H.,  commander 
of  Third  Division  of  Hill's 
corps,  2;  begins  to  fortify 
Tabernacle  Church,  8  ;  joined 
by  Jackson  there,  11 ;  pressed 
by  Pleasonton's  cavalry,  11  ; 
reinforces  McLaws,  13,  17 ; 
checks  Williams,  24, 34;  makes 
a  junction  with  Stuart,  49  et 
seq.;  detached  against  Sedg- 


wick,  51,  54,  59  et  seq. ;  reinfor 
ces  McLaws,  63  et  seq. ,  72  ;  on 
the  Chamber sburg  Road,  120, 
138, 152;  at  Peach  Orchard,  175 

Anderson,  General  G.  T.,  wounded, 
210 

Applebie  Ridge,  91 

Appomattox,  173 

Archer,  46;  brigade  of,  126,  129, 
131 ;  taken  prisoner,  132  ;  bri 
gade  of,  133,  161,  210 

Armistead,  General,  brigade  of, 
193,  194  ;  shot  down,  195,  210 

Ashby's  Gap,  99  et  seq. 

Ashland,  70 

Author  (see  Doubleday,  General) 

Averill,  4,  7,  39;  supplanted  by 
Pleasonton,  69 

Avery,  Colonel,  181 

Ayers,  General,  173 


BACHE,  Dr.  Thos.  H.,  208 
Backman,  battery  of,  198 
Baird,  Gen.  A. ,  at  Chickamauga,  53 


228 


INDEX. 


Baird,  Adjutant-General,  148 
Baltimore,  Md.,  80,  107,  108,  112, 

115  et  seq.,  134,  150,  152,  184, 

200,  209 
Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad,  80, 

92,  105,  110 
Bankhead,   Colonel,  on  Reynolds's 

staff,  142 
Bank's  Ford,  Va.,  1,  4,  10  et  seq., 

42,  44,  47,  57,  61,  63  etseq.,  79 
Barksdale,  General,  10,  58,  168,  170 

etseq.,  175;  wounded,  210 
Barlow,  General  F.  C.,  23,  25,  32, 

33,    38 ;     takes    command    of 

Schurz's  division,  137  et  seq., 

140;  shot  down,  142,  161,  210 
Barnes,  General,  division  of,  168 

etseq.,  172,  210 
Bartlett,  brigade  of,  60,  61,  64 
Bath,  W.  Va.,  94 
Batteries :     Alexander's,    65,    90; 

Backman's,    193;    Best's,   48; 

Bigelow's,   170,  171  ;  Brown's, 

194  ;  Butlers,  66  ;  Calef's,  135, 

140;     Clark's,    23,    164,    170; 

Cooper's,  135,  186,  140 ;  Cush- 

ing's,     194;     Dilger's,     145; 

Dimick's,    40;    Elder's,    19S; 

Ewell's,  140;   Graham's,  198; 

Hall's,  128, 129,  140,  150;  Haz- 

lett's,  169  ;  Huntingdon's,  46  ; 

Knap's,  17  ;  Livingston's,  23  ; 

McGilvery's,  171  ;  Macintosh's, 

137  ;  Martin's,  36  ;   Pegram's,  | 

134,  137  ;    Pennington's,  200,  I 
201;   Phillip's,   171;   Pleason- j 
ton's,     36;      Randolph's,    23; 
Randol's,  200, 201 ;  Reynolds's, 

135,  140,  149,  182  ;  Ricketts's, 
182;  Stevens's,  135,  182;  Stew 
art's,  135,  140,  145,  148,  155; 
Stuart's,     182;     Weed's,     52; 


Weidrick's,  182;  Wheeler's, 
145,  194;  Wilkeson's,  142; 
Williston's,  60 

Baxter,  Brigadier-General  Henry, 
brigade  of,  142  et  seq.,  145, 149, 
161 

Bealton,  95 

Beauregard,  107 

Benham,  General  H.  W.,  Engineer 
Corps,  61 ,  65,  66 

Benner's  Hill,  181 

Benning,  General,  brigade  of,  168, 
173,  197  et  seq. 

Berdan,  sharpshooters  of,  23 

Berry,  reserve  forces  under,  26; 
division  of,  35,  38,  41,  42,  44, 
45 ;  death  of,  49 

Berry ville,  Va.,  89,  90 

Best,  Captain,  38,  44,  45,  47,  48 

Best,   Colonel,  Chief  of  Artillery 

to  Twelfth  Corps,  36 
i  Beverly  Ford,  81  et  seq. 
;  Biddle,  Colonel  Chapman,  brigade 
of,  136, 139  et  seq.,  145 ;  forced 
back  from  the  ridge,  147,  161 
i  Bigelow,  battery  of,  170  et  seq. 

Birney,  General,  commander  of 
Third  Corps,  16,  22,  £3,  34,  38, 
44,  45,  113,  163;  division  of, 
164,  167  et  seq.  ;  takes  com 
mand  of  Third  Corps,  171  et 
seq.  ;  assumes  Sickles' s  com 
mand,  174,  189,  208 

Bixby,  Captain,  102,  103 

Bloody  Run,  94 

Blue  Ridge,  84,  87,  99,  100,  106 

Boonsborough,  Md.,  108 

Bottom's  Bridge,  Va.,  100 

Bowling  Green  Road,  4i,  56 

Bowman,  Colonel,  47 

Brandy  Station,  Va.,  7  ;  battle  of, 
81  etseq.,  88,  101,  111 


INDEX. 


229 


Brockenborough,  brigade  of,  126, 
145,  161 

Brooke,  Colonel  John  R.,  brigade 
of,  165,  172,  210 

Brooke-Rawle,  Lieutenant-Colonel 

W.,  201 
^Brookeville,  112 

Brooklyn,  L.  I.,  128 

Brooklyn,  regiment  of :  Four 
teenth,  128,  129 

Brooks,  Major-General  Wm.  T.  H., 
division  of,  9,  59  et  seq.,  64 
et  seq.,  97 

Brown,  Colonel  Campbell,  on 
E well' a  staff,  153 

Buckland,  110 

Buford,  General,  4,  S3  etseq.,  103  ; 
division  of,  113,  115  ;  brigades 
of,  118,  123  ;  at  Gettysburg, 
124  et  seq.,  130,  133;  cavalry 
of,  146 ;  cavalry  of,  149,  164 

Bullock's  House,  52 

Bull  Run,  100,  102,  173,  195 

Bunker  Hill  Monument,  112 

Bunker  Hill,  Va.,  90 

Burbank,  173 

Burnham,  Colonel,  58 

Burnside,  General,  1,  3,  58 

Buschbeck,  Colonel  Adolph,  29, 
30,  33,  34,  36,  41 

Butler,  battery  of,  66 

Butterfield,  General,  remonstrance 
of,  114,  179,  210 


CALDWELL,    division   of,  172   et 

seq.,  189,  197 
Calef,  battery  of,  135,  140 
Carlisle,  Penn.,  97,  107,  108,  111 

etseq.,  120  etseq.,  138,  142 
Carolinas,  the,  112 
Carroll,  brigade  of,  48,  183 


Carter,  Colonel,  49 
,  Cashtown,  Penn.,  118,  120,  122 

Catlett's  Station,  80,  95,  100         • 
:  Cedarsville,  89 

Cemetery  Ridge,    Penn.,    126   et 
seq.,  138, 141, 146,148, 150, 153, 
156,  158,162,  181,  183,  199 
|  Centreville,  Va.,  98,  100,  102,  103 
:  Central  Railroad,  108 

Chambersburg,  Penn.,  96,  106  et 
seq.,  112,  115,  118  et  seq.,  123, 
130,  134  etseq.,  138 

Chancellorsville  House,  Va.,  12, 
21,  35,  46,  50,  53,  54 

Chancellorsville,  Va.,  1,  7  et  seq., 
13  et  seq.,  34,  36,  39,  42  et 
seq.,  50,  52,  53,  56,  59,  62,  64, 
68 ;  losses  at,  71.  72,  76,  79,  87, 
121,  146.  150 

Chambliss,  200 

Chester  Gap,  88 

Chester,  Lieutenant,  200  et  aeq. 

Chickahominy,  70,  100 

Chickamauga,  53 

City  Point,  179 

Clark,  battery  of,  23,  164,  170 

Colston,  division  of,  27,  34,  38 

Columbia,  Penn.,  113 

Columbia,  Va. ,  canal  at,  70 

Congressional  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War,  unrelia 
ble  investigations,  32 

Connecticut,  regiments  of  :  Seven 
teenth  infantry,  29, 30 ;  Twen 
ty-seventh,  50 

Cookesville,  112 

Cooper,  battery  of,  135,  140 

"Copperheads,"  77,  111 

Couch,  Major-General  Darius  M., 
4,  11,  14,  16,  21,  30,  35,  45  ; 
succeeds  to  command  after 
Hooker  is  wounded,  53  et 


230 


INDEX. 


seq.,  55,  68  ;„  succeeded  by 
Hancock  in  command  of 
Second  Army  Corps,  9  ;  placed 
under  Meade's  orders,  116 

Cowdry,  Lieutenant,  on  Double- 
day's  staff,  196 

Cox's  house,  60 

Crampton's  Gap,  Md.,  108 

Crawford,  General  S.  Wiley,  di 
vision  of,  105,  164,  166 ;  heads 
a  gallant  charge,  173  et  seq.  ; 
letter  from  Wofford  to,  187 ; 
division  of,  205  et  seq. 

Cress  Run,  184 

Cross,  Colonel,  killed,  173 

Crutchfield,  Colonel,  37 

Culpeper,  Va.,  4,  7,  79,  80,  83,  95. 
99,  107  , 

s  Hill,  151  et  seq.  ;  156,  162, 
177,  179  et  seq.,  189 

Cumberland,  105 

Cumberland  Valley,  106,  107,  116 

Curtin,  Governor,  of  Pennsylva 
nia,  98,  111 

Cushing,  brave  death  of,  194 

Custer,  General,  121  ;  brigade  of, 
142,  184,  200  et  seq. 

Cutler,  Brigadier-General  Lysan- 
der,  brigade  of,  128, 130  et  seq., 
135  et  seq.,  139,  143,  148,  161 


DAHLGREN,  Captain  Ulric,  55; 
successful  raid  of,  123;  a  pris 
oner,  179 

Dana,  Colonel,  144;  takes  Wister's 
command,  145;  forced  back 
from  ridge,  147 

Daniels,  brigade  of,  141,  143  et 
seq.,  147,  161,  186 

Davis,  brigade  of,  126,  128  et  seq., 
13:3  et  seq.,  143,  145,  161 


Davis,  Colonel  Hasbrouck,  70 

Davis  Jefferson,  76,  77,  99, 100,  107, 
111,  113;  despatch  from.  179 

Dawes,  Lieutenant-Colonel  R.  R., 
131  et  seq. ,  155 

Day,  173 

Delaware,  regiment  of  :  First 
Cavalry,  117 

De  Peyster,  General,  53 

De  Peyster,  Major  J.  Watts,  65 

De  Trobriand,  48 ;  brigade  of,  167 
et  seq.,  172 

Devens,  brigade  of,  27,  29,  30,  33 
I  Devil's  Den,  167  et  seqM  174 

Devins,  Colonel,  cavalry  brigade 
of,  123  et  seq.,  128,  138,  146 

Dilger,  battery  of,  145 

Dimick,   battery  of,   40 ;   Bravery 

of,  40,  note 

|  Dix,  General,  80,  99,  119 
j  Doles,  brigade  of,  46,  48,  141   ct 
seq.,  150,  161 

Double-day,  General  Abner,  5,  9, 
21,  27;  left  temporarily  in 
charge  of  First  Corps,  42,  55  ; 
letter  of,  73;  takes  command 
of  First  Army  Corps,  95,  98 ; 
at  Middletown,  113;  takes 
command  of  First  Corps,  124, 
128 ;  his  instructions  from 
Reynolds,  130 ;  assumes  com 
mand  of  battlefield,  132  ;  re 
ceives  orders  from  General 
Howard,  141 ;  asks  for  rein 
forcements,  146  ;  fight  and  re 
treat  from  the  seminary,  149 
et  seq.;  receives  orders  from 
Hancock,  151  ;  resumes  com 
mand  of  his  division,  154,  161, 
189,  192  ;  his  attention  to  Con 
federate  wounded,  196,  210 

Dover,  100,  107 


INDEX. 


231 


Dowdair s  Tavern,  Va. ,  1 2, 33,  39,  41 

Dragon  River,  74 

Drainsville,  112 

Dnffie,  Colonel,  82,  83,  101  et  seq. 

Dumfries,  Va.,  95 

Dwight,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Wal 
ton,  defends  the  railroad  cut, 
144 

EARLY,  General  Jubal  A.,  44,  56, 
57,  59,  60,  63  et  seq. ;  repulsed, 
64,  65,  91,  92,  94, 107, 108,  111, 
112;  levies  a  contribution  on 
York,  113,  119  et  seq.,  138, 
141  et  seq.  ;  discussions  of, 
158,  161,  181  et  seq.;  endea 
vors  to  save  the  trains,  208 

Edwards's  Ferry,  106,  108 

Egan,  Colonel,  168 

Elder,  brigade  of ,  198 

Elley's  Ford,  7,  8,  39,  43,  69 

Elliot,  General,  90,  92,  93 

Ely,  Colonel,  90  et  seq. 

Emmetsburg,  Md.,  115, 118 et  seq., 
122,  125,  130,  152,  158  et  seq., 
162  et  seq.,  167,  170,  174,  178, 
193 

England,  partiality  of,  toward  the 
Confederacy,  76,  77 

Ent,  Colonel,  205 

Estes,  squadron  of,  184 

Eustis,  57 

Ewell,  General  Benj.,  78  et  seq., 
88  et  seq.,  91,  94  et  seq.,  97, 
99,  103,  106  et  seq.,  Ill  etseq.  ; 
at  Heidlersburg,  120  et  seq.  ; 
corps  of,  128,  138  et  seq.,  142, 
152  ;  receives  suggestion  from 
Lee,  153  et  seq.  ;  holds  Gettys 
burg,  158,  161  et  seq.  ;  pickets 
of,  179  et  seq. ;  persistency  of, 
186,  202 


FAIRCHILD,  Colonel,  131 
Fairfax  Court  House,  Va. ,  98 
Fairneld,  Penn.,  115,  118  et  seq., 

130,  147,  205,  208 
Fairview,  15,  35,  36,  38,  45  et  seq. 
Falling  Waters,  209 
Falmouth,  Va.,  4,  44,  67,  74 
Farmer,    Captain  Geo.    E.,  testi 
mony  in  regard  to  Howard's 
misconduct,  31;    defence   of, 
31 
Farnsworth,     brigade     of,     184 ; 

killed,  198 

Fayetteville,  Penn.,  115,  118,  120 
Fisher,  brigade  of,  174 
Fleetwood,  battle  of  (see  Brandy 

Station,  battle  of) 
>  Fleetwood  Hill,  81,  84 
Flint  Hill,  88 
Flint  Ridge,  91 

Forbes,  Lieut. -Colonel  W.  E.,  2 
j  Fortress  Monroe,  Va.,  99 
j  Fort  Sims,  29 
Fort  Sumter,  195,  206,  notes 
Foundry,  23 

Fountaindale  Gap,  Md.,  122 
Fowler,  Colonel,  129,  132  et  seq. 
Franklin,  Colonel,  47 
Frederick,    Md.,  103,  112  et  seq., 

119,  209 

Fredericksburg,  Va.,  1,  3  et  seq.,  8 
et  seq.,  20,  44,  56,  58  et  seq., 
63  et  seq.,  74,  78,  87,  89,  95 
Fredericksburg      and     Richmond 

Railroad,  68 
Fredericksburg    Railroad,    4,    24, 

70 

French,  General,  11,  14,  16,  26,  38, 
45,  48,  50,  54,  111,  115 ;  moves 
from  Harper's  Ferry,  209 
French  Government,  partiality  to 
ward   the  Southern  States,  77 


232 


INDEX. 


Frick,   Colonel,    gives    orders  for 

destruction  of  bridge,  113 
Frizzelburg,  Md.,  119 
Front  Royal,  Va. ,  88  et  seq. 
Furnace,  the,  24,  34,  36 


GAINES'S  Cross  Roads,  88 

Gainesville,  Va.,  110 

Gamble,  brigade  of,  122,  124,  128, 
146 

Garnett,  General,  brigade  of,  193, 
210 

Gates,  Colonel  Theodore  B.,  139, 
193, 197 

Geary,  division  of,  17,  24,  34,  49, 
51,  180 et  seq.,  186  et  seq. 

Georgia,  regiments  of :  Seventh, 
199  ;  Ninth,  198, 199  ;  Twenty- 
third,  23 

Germania  Ford,  7,  8 

Getty,  General,  99,  100 

Gettysburg,  Penn. ,  53  ;  battle  of, 
87  et  seq.,  107;  map  of,  109; 
116,  118  et  seq.,  121  et  seq.; 
"  secret  history  "  of,  178,  179  ; 
et  seq. 

Gibbon,  General,  brigade  of,  4, 
56,  57,  59,  63,  185,  189,  192 
etseq. ;  wounded,  196,  199,  202, 
210 

Glenn,  Captain,  131.  149 

Gloucester  Point,  70,  74 

Goose  Creek,  103,  106 

Gordon,  66;  brigade  of,  113,  119, 
142,  153,  161,  181,  183 

Gordonsville,  Va.,  4,  7,  21,  22,  26, 
69 

Grant,  brigade  of,  66 

Graham,  Brigadier-General,  bri 
gade  of,  16,  41,  45  et  seq.,  50, 
167,  170;  wounded  and  taken 


prisoner,    171     et    seq.,     174 ; 

battery,  198,  210 
Greene,  General  Geo.  S.,  brigade 

of,  180  et  seq.,  186 
Greenwood,  Penn.,    108,   118,   120, 

138 
Gregg,  General  McM.,  70,  82,  S3, 

84,  101  et  seq.,  108;  division 

of,  115,  117  ;  divisions  of,  125, 

184,  200 

Gregg,  J.  Irvin,  brigade  of,  200 
Griffin,  division  of,  11,  12 
Guest's  House,  59 
Guilford,  Va.,  107 
Guiney's  Station,  39,  68 
Gum  Springs,  107,  110 


HAGERSTCHVN,  Md.,  109,  111,  130, 
209 

Hall,  battery  of,  128,  retreat  of, 
129,  133,  140,  150 

Hall,  Colonel  Norman  J.,  charge 
of,  195 

Halleck,  General,  80,  88 ;  refuses 
Hooker's  request,  114,  116, 
119  ;  arrests  Hooker,  116 

Hall,  Major,  aide  to  General  How 
ard,  126 

Halstead,  Major,  130,  146,  148 

Hamblin,  Colonel,  56 

Hamilton's  Crossing,  2 

Hampton,  Wade,  General,  brigade 
of,  81,  104,  121,  184,  201,  210 

Hancock,  General  Winfield  S., 
113  et  seq.,  16,  17,  21,  22,  24, 
34,  45,  49,  50,  53,  54 ;  succeeds 
Couch  in  command  of  Second 
Army  Corps,  96,  110;  given 
command  of  First  Corps,  138  ; 
supersedes  Howard,  150  et 
seq. ;  virtually  appointed  com- 


INDEX. 


233 


mander-in-chief,  153 ;  turns 
over  command  of  field  to  Slo- 
cum,  154  ;  Meade  disapproves 
his  battle-ground,  157,  162, 
172;  vigilance  of,  175,  177,  181 
et  seq.,  189,  195;  wounded, 
202,  210 

Hancock,  Md.,  94 

Hanover  Junction,  Pa.,  70,  99,  121, 
125,  184 

Harper's  Ferry,  W.  Va.,  89  et  seq., 
94  et  seq',  102,  106,  108,  111, 
113  et  seq.,  192,  209 

Harrisburg,  Penn.,  96,  98,  107, 
110,  112,  113,  115  et  seq.,  118 
et  seq. 

Hart,  Captain,  201 

Hartwood  Church,  12 

Haskell,  Lieutenant,  on  Gibbon's 
staff,  199 

Hayman,  brigade  of,  41,  46,  50 

Haymarket,  110 

Hays,  General  Wm.,  brigade  of, 
38  ;  taken  prisoner,  51 

Hays,  Confederate  general,  bri 
gade  of,  57,  59,  65,  142,  149, 
161,  181,  182  et  seq. 

Hays,  General  Alexander,  brigade 
of,  193  et  seq. 

Hazel  Grove,  Va.,  15,  24,  30,  36, 
41,  43  et  seq.,  56,  72 

Hazel  Run,  Va.,  58,  81 

Hazlett,  division  of,  169 ;  killed, 
170 

Heard,  Dr.  Theodore,  208 

Heidlersburg,  Penn.,  120,  128,  138 

Heintzelman,  General,  80,  105,  106 

Hebh,  General  Henry,  47,  118, 
124;  division  of,  125,  128,  133 
etseq.,  136  et  seq.,  161,  188 

Hill.  Lieutenant-General  A.  P., 
27;  at  Chancellorsville,  39; 


wounded,  40,  46  et  seq.  ;  sends 
for  reserves,  48;  at  Freder 
icks  burg,  79  ;  starts  for  Cul- 
peper,  95  ;  relieves  Longstreet 
there,  99  et  seq. ;  at  Winches 
ter,  104, 106 ;  crosses  the  Poto 
mac  at  Shepherdstown,  107; 
unites  with  Longstrset  at  Ha- 
gerstown,  111  ;  at  Chambers- 
burg,  112,  114;  at  Fayette- 
ville,  115,  118;  at  Cashtown 
and  Mummasburg,  120,  122 ; 
at  Gettysburg,  124,  128,  138 
etseq.,  143  et  seq.,  146;  losses 
of,  152  et  seq. ;  occupies  Sem 
inary  Ridge,  157,  161  ;  report 
of,  170 ;  distance  from  Long- 
street,  204,  207 

:  Hokes,  brigade  of,  65, 142, 149,  161, 
181 

Hood,  General,  78,  162;  division 
of,  166  et  seq. ,  170,  178,  205 

Hood's  Mill,  Md.,  116 

Hooker,  Major-General  Joseph, 
plans  of,  1  ;  force  of,  2 ;  popu 
larity  of,  3  ;  plan  of,  4,  5,  8, 
9  ;  delays  action,  10 ;  attacks 
Lee,  11,  12  et  seq.  ;  receives 
General  Birney's  report,  22 ; 
order  to  Generals  Slocum  and 
Howard  22,  25,  26 ;  sanctions 
Sickles's  movements,  23  ;  irre 
solution  of,  24,  28  ;  Hooker  de 
ceived  as  to  Jackson's  plan  of 
attack,  31  ;  investigation  of  his 
conduct  by  Congressional  Com 
mittee,  32;  Hooker's  defence 
of  himself,  32 ;  plans  for  pro 
tecting  Eleventh  Corps,  34 ; 
failure  to  rally  the  Eleventh 
Corps,  35  ;  discouragement  of, 
38,  43  ;  orders  to  Sickles,  41  ; 


231  INDEX. 

conference  with  General  Rey-    Howe,  division  of,  44,  57,  58,  61, 

nolds,  42;  order  to  Sedgwick,  64  et  seq.,  78 

44,    45 ;    refuses    to    send   re-    Huidekoper,     Lieutenant-Colonel. 

inforcements,    51  ;    wounded,  gallant  bayonet  charge  of,  145 

53  ;  succeeded  by  Couch,  54  ;    Humphreys,  General  A.  A.,  11,  25, 

orders  from  Lincoln,  55  ;  mis-  48,   50,   163,   division  of,   164, 

informed    as    to    Sedgwick's  166  et  seq.,  171,  174  et  seq, 

position,  56  ;    represented   by    Hungary  Station,  70 

Warren,     57;     resumes    com-    Hunt,  General,  chief  of  artillery, 

mand,  04,  C6 ;  order  to  Sedg-  163,  189  et  seq. 

wick,  67 ;  losses  of,  68 ;  order    Hunterstown,  123,  164.  184 

to  Averell,  69 ;  causes  of  his    Hunting  Creek,  43 

defeat,  71  ;  letter  to  Lincoln,    Huntingdon,  battery  of,  46 

78 ;  his  plans,  78,  79,  80 ;   dis-  : 

places  Stoneman   in  favor  of 

Pleasonton,  80,  82,  84,  87,  88,    ILLINOIS,  regiment  of,  Twelfth,  70 

89,  91 ;  starts  north,  95 ;  plans  ;  Imboden,  cavalry  of,  92,  105,  110 

of,  98  et  seq.  ;  his  resignation    Iverson,  brigade  of,  48,  141,  143  et 

accepted,  114;  wisdom  of  his  seq.,  161 

later  policy,  116 

Hopewell  Gap,  102,  103 

Homer's  Woods,  205  JACKSON,     General     Thomas     J. 

Howard,  General  O.  O.,  command-  !          (''Stonewall").  2,  5,  9,  10,  13, 
er  of  Eleventh   Corps,   3,   5,  17,  20  et  seq.;  preparations  for 

11,  15  et  seq.,  18,  20,  22;  or-  ,         attack,  27;    advance  of,    28; 
der  from  Hooker,  22,  24,  25  ;  advance   temporarily   stopped 

neglect    of,    26    et    seq.,    72;  :          by  Germans  in  Eleventh  Corps, 
conduct  investigated  by  Con-  29 ;    advance  continued,  30  et 

gressional  Committee,  32  ;  his  seq.,  33  ;  attack  of,  34 ;  pursuit 

defence,  32  ;  fruitless  exertions  l  of  Eleventh  Corps,  35  et  seq.  ; 
of,  34,  41  et  seq.,  68,  71,  72  ;  j  halt  of,  38;  death  of,  39,  41  ; 
at  Boonsborough,  113,  126  et  j  his  corps  commanded  by  Stu- 
seq.  ;  at  Gettysburg,  134  ;  !  art,  46,  47.  63,  71 ;  his  rout  of 
despatch  to  Meade,  135  ;  as-  |  Eleventh  Corps,  72,  187 
sumes  command  of  left  wing,  j  Jenkins,  General,  90,  94  ;  exactions 
137  et  seq.,  145;  Doubleday  I  of,  96;  occupies  Carlisle,  97% 
asks  him  for  reinforcements,  99,  106,  107,  112  ;  within  sight 

146;   says   he  sent  orders  to  ;         of  Harrisburg,  118,  122,210 
Doubleday  to  retreat,    149  et    Johns,    Colonel,   attacks    Marye's 
seq. ;  superseded  by  Hancock,  ;         Hill,  57  et  seq. ;  wounded,  58 
151  ;  receives  thanks  of  Con-    Johnson,  division  of,  91  et  seq.  ; 
gross,  152,  161,  183,  189,  200  prisoners,    horses,    etc.,    cap- 


INDEX. 


235 


tured  by,  94;  at  Chambers- 
burg,  107 ;  marches  on  Gettys 
burg.  119  et  seq.,  138  et  seq. , 
153,  179  et  seq.,  186  et  seq.,  200 

Jones,  General  J.  M.,  brigade  of, 
81,  103,  110,  122,  180,  210 

Jones,  Meredith  L.,  Doubleday's 
aide,  130,  148 

KANE,  brigade  of,  180 
Kearney,  General  Philip,  167 
Keenan,    Major  Peter,  35 ;   death 

of,  37 

Keifer,  Colonel,  83 
Kelly,  brigade  of,  172  et  seq. 
Kelly's  Ford,  Va.,  3,  5,  7,  83 
Kemper,  General,  brigade  of,  193,  ! 

197,  210 
Kershaw,  165,  167;  brigade  of,  170 

et  seq.,  113 
Keys,  General,  100 
Kilpatrick,    Colonel,   70,   74,    101, 

103  ;  division  of,  115,  117,  120  \ 

et  seq. ;  divisions  of,  125,  164 ;  ! 

at  Hunterstown  and  Two  Tav-  \ 

eras,  1 84 ;  spirited  attack  of,  i 

190,  197  et  seq.,  209 
Kingston,  112 
Knap,  battery  of,  17 
Kress,  Major,  126,  note 
Kryzanowski,  Colonel,  161 

LAMBUIN,  aide  of  Doubleday,  148 
Lane,  brigade  of,  47,  137,  161 
Lang,  Colonel,  192 
Law,  General,  brigade  of,  158,  197 

et  seq.,  205 

Lee,  Doubleday's  aide,  148 
Lee,  Fitz-Hugh,  7,  8,  12,  21,  27,  69, 

81,  100,  101,  103;  discussions 

of,  158,  201 


Lee,  General  Robert  E.,  2,  4,  5,  7; 
at  Fredericksburg,  8  et  seq., 
attacked  by  Hooker,  11,  15, 17, 
18,  20,  21,  24,  26,  27,  33;  at 
tack  of,  34,  39,  44,  52,  53,  56, 
63  et  seq. ;  despondency  of,  76  ; 
reasons  for  his  northward 
march,  77,  78,  79,  84  ;  plans  of, 
87  et  seq.,  91,  98;  invades 
Pennsylvania,  104,  106  et  seq.  ; 
his  lack  of  information  as  to 
Hooker's  movements,  108;  con 
tinues  his  advance,  113  et  seq.; 
turns  back,  115  ;  concentrates 
his  troops  at  Gettysburg,  11 8  et 
seq.  ;  forces  of,  123, 134  ;  sends 
a  recommendation  to  Ewell, 
153,  156  et  seq.,  167,  176;  in 
tentions  of,  179, 183, 187;  plans 
of,  188  ;  his  plans  thwarted, 
192  ;  disappointment,  199 ;  ral 
lies  his  troops,  203 ;  dis 
couragement  of,  204,  207  et  seq. 

Leesburg,  Va.,  102,  105  et  seq. 

Lee,  W.  H.  F.,  7,  8,  69,  81,  100, 
102,  103  ;  capture  of,  111 ;  bri 
gade  of,  200 

Lewis  Creek,  Va.,  11,  23 

Libby  Prison,  111,  208 

Lincoln,  President  Abraham,  54, 
75  ;  letter  from  Hooker  to,  78  ; 
calls  for  120.000  men,  97,  151 ; 
orders  from,  210 

Little  River,  102 

Little  Round  Top,  156,  163  et 
seq.,  168  et  seq.,  173  et  seq., 
177,  181,  190,  193,  197,  205 

Littlestown,  Penn.,  115,  117,  120 
et  seq. 

Livingston,  battery  of,  23 

Livingston,  Colonel,  on  Double- 
day's  staff,  149 


236 


INDEX. 


Lockwood,  brigade  of,  100,  175 

Locust  Grove,  Va.,  79 

Longstreet,  General,  his  corps,  2, 
10  ;  rejoins  Lee  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  73  et  seq. ,  78  ;  at  Locust 
Grove,  79,  91 ;  leaves  Culpeper, 
99  et  seq.  ;  at  Ashley's  Gap, 
104 ;  leaves  Chambersburg, 
118  et  seq.  ;  joins  Evvell  and 
Hill,  154;  occupies  Seminary 
Ridge,  157;  attack  of,  162, 
164 ;  his  instructions  from 
Lee,  167 ;  discouragement  of, 
174:  leads  advance  against 
Little  Round  Top,  178;  as 
sault  of,  179,  187;  distance 
from  Wilcox,  189,  190 ;  at  the 
Round  Tops,  197  ;  disappoint 
ment  of,  199,  202  et  seq.  ;  dis 
tance  from  Hill,  204 ;  report 
of,  206 

Loudon  and  Hampshire  Railroad, 
107 

Loudon  County,  101,  104 

Louisa  Court  House,  4,  7,  69 

Louisiana,  regiment  of  :  Eighth,  66 


McCANDLESS,  brigade  of,  174,  205 
McClellan,  Major,  81  et  seq. 
McConnellsburg,  Penn.,  119 
McGilvery,  Major,  170;    batteries 

of,  171 

McGowan,  brigade,  47,  137,  161 
Mclntosh,    General,    artillery    of, 

137 ;  brigade  of,  200  et  seq. 
McLaws,  Major-General,  Lafay 
ette,  commander  of  Fourth 
Division  of  Longstreet's  corps, 
2,  10,  12  et  seq.,  23,  34,  46,  50, 
54,  59  et  seq.,  63,  64,  78,  167, 
171,  175,  187 


McReynolds,  Colonel,  89  et  seq.,  94 

Me  Vicar,  Lieutenant  -  Colonel, 
death  of,  8 

Mahone,  brigade  of,  8,  13,  48,  175 

Maine,  regiments  of :  First,  70, 
101;  Twelfth,  170;  Twen 
tieth,  170  ;  Batteries  of  :  Sec 
ond,  128,  129,  140,  150;  Fifth, 
140,  182 

Manassas,  Va.,  98 

Manchester,    England,    active  aid 

to  the  Confederates,  77 
;  Manchester,  Md.,  120,  125 

Maps:  operations  on  the  1st  of 
May,  6,  19;  Sedgwick's  posi 
tion,  62;  country  from  the 
Potomac  to  Harrisburg,  109 ; 
Gettysburg  and  vicinity,  125, 
129,  133,  136,  160;  Little 
Round  Top,  165  ;  Gettysburg, 
191 

;  Marsh  Creek,  119,  122,  125 
1  Marten,  aide  of  Doubleday,  148 
I  Martin,  battery  of,  36 

Martinsburg,  W.  Va.,  90,  92,  93,  94 

Marye's  Hill,  Va.,  57  ;  Union  loss 
in  capture  of,  58,  59 

Maryland  Heights,  95,  106,  111 

Maryland,  invasion  of,  2,  84  ;  Gov 
ernor  of,  97  ;  troops  of,  106 

Maryland,  regiments  of :  First, 
70  ;  Third,  49  ;  Sixth,  90 

Massachusetts,  regiments  of  : 
First,  40;  Fifth,  58  ;  Seventh, 
57 ;  Thirty-third,  182 

Massaponax  Creek,  11 

Mattapony  River,  70 
|  Meade,  Gen.  Geo.  G.,  commander 
Fifth  Corps,  5,  11,  13,16  et 
seq.,  21,  31,  35,  48,  54,  55,  68; 
assigned  command  of  the  Ar 
my  of  thePotomac,  114  et  seq.  ; 


INDEX. 


237 


a  favorite  of  General  Halleck, 
1 1 6  ;  at  Pipe  Creek,  119  et  seq. ; 
forces  of,  123;  despatches 
from,  125,  133 ;  at  Taneytown, 
134  ;  misled  by  Howard's  de 
spatch,  135,  137  ;  orders  Han 
cock  to  supersede  Howard,  150 
et  seq.  ;  appoints  Hancock  to 
act  for  him,  153  et  seq.,  156 ; 
disapproves  of  Hancock's  bat 
tle-ground,  157,  158  et  seq.  ; 
unfortunate  order  of,  162  et 
seq.  ;  censures  Sickles's  move 
ment,  164,  167,  169,  175;  in 
terview  with  Tidball,  177,  178 
et  seq.  ;  displeasure  of,  184  et 
seq.,  187,  190,  199,  202  etseq.  ; 
inactivity  of,  204  et  seq.,  207 
et  seq. 

Meadow  Bridge,  70 

Mechanicstown,  Md. ,  118 

Melford  Ford,  81 

Meredith,  General,  brigade  of,  128, 
131 

Merritt,  brigade  of,  198 

Mexico,  war  with,  1,  131 

Michigan,  regiments  of :  First, 
201;  Fifth,  121,  201;  Sixth, 
121;  Seventh,  200;  Twenty- 
fourth,  130,  131,  146,  161 

Middleburg,  Md.,  100  et  seq.,  118, 
120 

Middletown,  Md.,  108 

Miles,  Colonel,  50 

Mill  Creek,  91 

Millwood,  Va.,  89 

Miiroy,  88  et  seq.  ;  perilous  situa 
tion  of,  93,  94,  95 

Mine  Road,  60 

Mississippi  River,  76 

Mobile   Ala.,  29 

Monocacy,  Md.,  84 


Monongahela,  Department  of,  97 

Morris,  Major,  90 

Morrow,  Colonel  Henry  A.,  130  efc 
seq.,  136,  139  et  seq.,  145  et 
seq.  ;  forced  back  from  ridge, 
147,  161 

Morton's  Ford,  Va.,  7 

Moss  Creek.  9 

Mott.  General,  42,  47 ;  wounded,  49 

Mott  Run,  Va.,  11,  45,  50 

Mummasburg,  Penn.,  120,  123,  143 


NAPOLEON,  2,  27 

Neil,  General,  66 

Nevins,  brigade  of,  174 

Newhall,  Captain,  on  Mclntosh's 
staff,  201 

New  Jersey,  regiments  of :  First, 
70,  200,  201  ;  Fifth,  48 ;  Sev 
enth,  47 

New  Kent  Court  House,  100 

Newton,  General  John,  56  et  seq., 
61,  64  et  seq.  ;  given  command 
of  First  Corps,  138;  takes 
charge  of  First  Corps,  154, 177, 
185,  189 

New  Windsor,  Md.,  115,  118 

New  York,  99,  107 

New  York,  Artillery  of :  First, 
145,  194;  Second,  135,  140, 
149,  182 

New  York,  Governor  of,  97 

New  York,  regiments  of :  Second, 
70 ;  Sixth  Cavalry,  8,  32,  37  ; 
Eighth  Cavalry,  36;  Twentieth 
Militia,  139, 193,  197  ;  Thirty- 
sixth,  58;  Fortieth,  41,  168; 
Forty-fourth,  170 ;  Sixty-first, 
50  ;  Seventy-third,  40 ;  Seven 
ty-sixth,  30,  128;  Ninety- 
fifth,  128,  129;  Ninety-seventh, 


238 


INDEX. 


154;  One  Hundred  and 
Fortieth,'  169;  One  Hundred 
and  Forty-seventh,  128,  133 

Nichols,  brigade  of,  48 

Noble, General,  statement  of,  28,  29 

North  Anna,  99 

North  Carolina,  regiment  of : 
Thirty-second,  144 

Northern  Central  Railroad,  112 

Northern  Virginia,  Army  of,  num 
ber  of,  2 

OAK  Hill,  139 

Ohio,  regiments  of  :  One  Hundred 
and  Tenth,  92,  9o ;  One  Hun 
dred  and  Twenty-second,  93 

Old  Guard,  27 

Old  Point  Comfort,  Va.,  80 

O'Neil,  brigade  of,  48,  141  et  seq., 
147,  161,  186 

Opequan  Creek,  90 

Orange  Court  House,  Plank  Road, 
31 

Orders :  to  Slocum  and  Howard, 
from  Hooker,  22,  25,  26  ;  from 
Hooker  to  Sickles,  41  ;  from 
Hooker  to  Sedgwick,  44.  45, 
67;  from  Hooker  to  Averill,  69 

O'Rorke,  Colonel,  killed,  169 

Osborne,  Major,  138 

Owens,  General  J.  T.,  17,  61 

PALFREY,  Colonel,  178 

Pamunkey  River,  4,  70 

Paris,  Count  of,  123,  210 

Paul,   General  Gabriel  R.,  144   et 

seq.;  shot  through  both  eyes, 

147,  210 

Paxton,  brigade  of,  49 
Payne,  Captain,  15 
Peach  Orchard,  159,  163   et  seq.. 


167    et  seq.,    170  et   seq.,  174 
et  seq. 

Pegram,  artillery  of,  134,  137 

Fender,  General  W.  D.,  39,  47, 
134 ;  division  of,  137,  147 ; 
wounded,  148,  161,  175,  182, 
189,  192,  210 

Pennington,  battery  of,  200,  201 

Pennsylvania,  Governor  of,  97 ; 
invasion  of,  104 

Pennsylvania,  regiments  of: 
Eighth  Cavalry,  16,  36; 
Eighth,  92 ;  Eleventh,  111  ; 
Seventeenth,  36,  38;  Fifty- 
first,  197;  Fifty-sixth,  128; 
Sixty -first,  58 ;  Sixty -ninth, 
195 ;  Seventy-first,  195 ; 
Seventy-second,  195 ;  Eighty- 
seventh,  92 ;  Ninty-ninth,  168 ; 
One  Hundred  and  Sixth,  183  ; 
One  Hundred  and  Tenth,  38 ; 
One  Hundred  and  Twenty- 
first,  161 ;  One  Hundred  and 
Forty-first,  171 ;  One  Hundred 
and  Forty-third,  144;  One 
Hundred  and  Forty-ninth, 
131;  One  Hundred  and  Fiftieth, 
144;  One  Hundred  and  Fifty- 
first,  145 

;  Pevrin.  brigade  of,  137,  147 
:  Perry,  brigade  of,  17,  175,  192 

Petersburg,  120 

Pettigrew,  General,  brigade  of, 
122,  126,  130,  145,  161,  188  et 
seq.,  192  et  seq.  ;  retreat  of, 
196;  loss  of  197,  210 

Philadelphia,  Penn.,   98,  99,    110,' 

112et  seq.,  118  et  seq. 
\  Philemont,  103 

Phillips,  battery  of,  171 
'  Phillips,  Wendell,  note,  176 

Pickett,  division  of,  119  et  seq.  ; 


INDEX. 


289 


conspicuous  by  his  absence, 
154,  158  ;  sent  against  Union 
centre,  183  et  seq.,  188  et  seq.; 
suffers  from  Union  artillery, 
192,  193  et  seq.  ;  retreat  of, 
196  et  seq.,  200,  202;  failure 
of  his  charge,  204,  206  et  seq. 

Piedmont,  Va.,  100 

Pillow,  General  Gideon  J.,  1 

Pipe  Creek,  Md.,  120 

Pittsburg,  Pa.,  97 

Plank  Road,  11,  16,  17,  24,  34  et 
seq.,  41,  44  et  seq.,  57,  59,  63 

Pleasonton,  Major-General  Al 
fred,  force  of,  note,  2;  di 
rected  to  report  to  Slocum.  7, 
8,  10;  cavalry  of,  11,  23,  24; 
spies  of,  28,  31  ;  at  Hazel 
Grove,  36  et  seq. ;  fortifies  it, 
44  ;  supplants  Averill,  69 ;  at 
Culpcper,  79  ;  succeeds  Stone- 
man,  80,  81  et  seq.,  88;  cav 
alry  of,  98  ;  success  at  Aldie 
Gap,  100  et  seq.  ;  103  et  seq.  ; 
ordered  to  occupy  Gettysburg, 
118;  forces  of,  123,  178 

Plum  Run,  172 

Poolesville,  Md.,  84, 106,  122 

Port  Conway,  5 

Port  Royal,  2,  5 

Posey,  brigade  of,  8,  175 

Potomac,  Army  of,  position  of,  ! 
1,  106,  107 

Potomac  River,  1,  94.  102,  106,  j 
107,  108,  112,  204 

Power's  Hill,  190,  199 

Pughtown,  91,  92 


RACCOON  Ford,  Va.,  7 
Ramseur,  brigade  of,    13,  48,   51, 
141  etseq.,  144,  147,  161 


Ramsey,  150 

Randol,  battery  of,  200  et  seq. 

Randolph,  battery  of,  23 

Rapidan  River,  7,  52 

Rapidan  Station,  7,  69 

Rappahannock  River,  4,  7,  16,  52, 
64,  81,  87,  100 

Rector's  Cross  Roads,  102 

Rectortown,  100 

Revere,  General,  retreats  without 
authority,  49 

Reynolds,  Captain,  battery  of, 
135, 137,  149, 182 

Reynolds,  Major-General,  at  Fred- 
ericksburg,  8 ;  ordered  to 
join  Hooker,  21,  42  et  seq.  ; 
his  eagerness  for  action,  54 
eb  seq.,  68;  placed  in  com 
mand  of  left  wing  of  army, 
95,  108;  at  Frederick,  113; 
halts  the  First  Corps  at  Marsh 
Creek,  119;  his  anxiety  for 
Pennsylvania,  122  ;  gives  com 
mand  of  First  Corps  to 
Doubleday,  1 24 ;  directs  How 
ard  to  bring  his  corps  forward, 
126  et  seq.  ;  his  instructions 
to  Doubleday,  130;  death  of, 
131,  133  et  seq.,  137,  1J59. 
210 

Rhode  Island,  regiment  of  :  First, 
103  ;  battery  of  :  Brown's,  194 

Rice,  Colonel,  takes  Vincent's 
command,  170 

Richmond, Va.,  4,  15,  32,  59,  65,  07, 
68,  70,  76,  79,  94,  98,  99,  103, 
107,  108,  110,  112, 119,  179,  209 

Ricketts,  battery  of,  182 

Rivanna,  70 

River  Road,  60 

Robertson,  81,  100,  103,  110;  bri 
gade  of,  122,  197 


240 


INDEX. 


Robinson,    General  J.  C.,  9,  136, 
142  et  seq.  ;  147  et   seq. ;  re 
treat  of,  154,  1S9 
Rock  Creek,  HO,  180, 184,  187 
Rockville,  Md.,  112,  117 
Rodes,  General  R.  E.,  division  of, 
13  ;  statement  of,  31 ;  division  i 
of,  34,  38,  46 ;   report  of,  51 ;  | 
division  of,  89  et  seq.,  94,  99, 
107 ;  division  of,  119  et  seq., 
138,  141;  report  of,    143,  161, 
181  et  seq.,  186,  203,  205 
Rogers,  Captain,  201 
Romney,  W.  Va.,  91,  92 
Rosengarten,  Lieutenant,  127 
Round  Top,  156, 159, 162,  170, 174, 

1&5,  195,  198,  205 
Rowley,    Brigadier-General  Thos. 

A.,  136,161,  197 
Ruger,  division  of,  187 
Russell,  brigade  of,  60,  64,  82 
Russia,  willingness  to  assist  the  ! 
Union,  77 


SAINT  James's  Church,  83 

Salem  Church,  Va.,  59  et  seq. 

Salem,  Va.,  100 

Scales,  General,  brigade  of,  137 ; 
wounded,  148 ;  brigade  of, 
149,  161,  210 

Schenck,  General,  troops  of,  80 ; 
orders  of,  88  et  seq.  ;  skir 
mishers  of  his  command,  104 
et  seq. 

Schimmelpfennig,  General  Alex 
ander,  29,  138,  140,  142,  161 

Schurz,  Major-General  Carl,  26, 
28,  29,  33,  137 ;  tries  to  rally 
his  men,  150,  161,  185 

Scott's  Dam,  Va.,  15,  61 

Sedgwick,   Major-General,   3  ;  be 


low  Fredericksburg,  8  et  seq. ; 
order  from  Hooker,  44,  46,  51 
et  seq.,  56  et  seq.;  at  Salem 
Church,  61  et  seq.  ;  attack  on 
force  of,  63  et  seq.  ;  order 
from  Hooker,  67 ;  losses  of, 
71,  73;  report  of,  78,  79,  95, 
162, 174,  177  et  seq.,  207  et  seq. 

Seminary  Ridge,  Penn.,  129,  136, 
138,  140  et  seq.,  147  et  seq., 
157  et  seq. 

Semmes,  General,  brigade  of,  60, 
172  et  seq.,  207,  210 

Shaler,  General,  brigade  of,  56,  58, 
184 

Shawl,  Colonel,  93 

Shenandoah  River,  104 

"  Sheanandoah,"  the,  77 

Shenandoah,  Valley  of  the,  80,  88, 
92,  95,  105 

Shepherdstown,  W.  Va.,  94,  107 

Sherman,  General,  131 

Sickles,  General,  commander  of 
Third  Corps  at  Chancellors- 
ville,  8  et  seq.,  12,  14,  16;  his 
suggestion  to  Hooker,  21  ;  at 
tacks  Jackson's  corps,  23  et 
seq.  ;  reinforced  by  Barlow, 
25,  28,  30  et  seq.;  his  instruc 
tions  to  Pleasonton,  36,  38 ; 
fights  his  way  back,  41  et  seq. ; 
wounded,  50,  54  ;  an  attack  on 
force  of,  63  ;  votes  a  retreat, 
63,  108,  152  ;  requests  aid,  158, 
162  et  seq.  ;  his  movement 
censured  by  'Meade,  164 ; 
forced  back,  166  et  seq.,  170'; 
loses  a  leg,  171,  174;  retreat 
of,  175,  177  et  seq. 

Sigel,  General  Franz,  withdrawn 
from  command  of  Eleventh 
Corps,  3,  150 


INDEX. 


241 


Simms,  Colonel,  207 

Slocum,  Major- General,  command 
er   of  Twelfth    Corps,  crosses  ' 
the  Rappahannock,    3  ;    com-  j 
mands  three    corps,    5,    7  et  ; 
seq.  ;    moves   to   attack    Lee,  j 
11,   13  et  seq.,  16  et  seq.,  21  ;  I 
order  from  Hooker,  22,  24,  35,  | 
44   et   seq. ,    68,     73 ;    sent   to  i 
Harper's  Ferry,  108  ;  not  per 
mitted  to  join  Hooker,  114; 
ordered  to  join  the  main  army, 
115;    at     Two   Taverns,    137, 
152etseq.;  reports  against  at 
tacking  Lee's  left,  156  et  seq.; 
begs      permission      to      keep 
Geary's  division,  180, 184, 191, 
200,  209 

Smith,  brigade  of,  153,  161,  181 

Smithfield,  94 

Smith,  General  W.  F.,  121,  209 

Snicker's  Gap,  99  et  seq. 

South  Anna  River,  70,  99 

South  Carolina,  100 

South  Mountain,  106,  107 

Spear,  Colonel,  Eleventh  Pennsyl 
vania,  111,  119 

Spear,   Colonel,  Sixty -first  Penn 
sylvania,  killed,  58 

Sperryville,  95 

Spottsylvania,  8 

Stafford  Hills,  95 

Stahl,  cavalry  of,  98 

Stannard,  General,  brigade. of,  98, 
153,  177, 195,  197 

Stanton,  Secretary  of  War,  note,  144 

Stein  wehr,  division  of,  29,  33,  138, 
142,  146,  150 

Stevens,  battery  of,  135,  182 

Stevensburg,  83 

Stewart,  battery  of,  135,  140,  145, 
148,  155,  182 

VI.-11 


Stone,  Colonel  Roy,  55,  135,  139  et 
seq.,  143  ;  wounded,  144,  145 
et  seq.,  161 

Stoneman,  directed  to  make  a  raid 
on  Lee,  4  et  SG\.  ;  at  Cul- 
peper,  7  et  seq.;  operations  of 
his  cavalry,  68  et  seq . ,  74  ;  dis 
placed  by  Hooker  in  favor  of 
Pleasonton,  80 

Strasburg  Road,  90  et  seq. 

Stuart,  Major-General  J.  E.  B., 
at  Brandy  Station,  7  et  seq.; 
attacks  Slocum's  corps,  17  et 
seq.,  20,  26,  31 ;  assigned  com 
mand  of  Jackson's  corps,  40, 
46;  Anderson  makes  a  junc 
tion  with,  49  et  seq.,  53  et  seq., 
72 ;  at  Brandy  Station,  81  et 
seq.,  89,  99  et  seq.,  107  ;  inju 
dicious  raid  of,  108  ;  driven  off 
by  Hancock,  110  ;  crosses  the 
Potomac,  112  ;  burns  bridge  at 
Sykesville,  117  ;  at  Hanover, 
120  et  seq.;  forces  of,  123, 184, 
200  et  seq. ;  follows  up  Kilpat- 
rick,  209 

Suffolk,  74 

Summit  Point,  90 

Sumter  Fort  (see  Fort  Sumter) 

Susquehanna,  Department  of,  96, 
97;  river,  108 

Sweitzer,  brigade  of,  172 

Sykes,  division  of,  11,  13, 162,  164; 
delays  reinforcing  Sickles,  167, 
168,  180  et  seq,,  202  et  seq. 

Sykesville,  117 


TABERNACLE  Church,  Va. ,  8, 10, 12 
Talley's,  15 

Taneytown,  Md.,  118  et  seq.,  125, 
134,  150,  154,  156,  159 


242 


INDEX. 


Tay lot's  Hill,  Va.,  64,  67 

Thomas,  brigade  of,  47,  137,  161 

Thomas,  General  George  H. ,  131 

Thompson's  Cross  Roads.  69 

Thoroughfare  Gap,  100,  102,  105, 
110 

Tidball,  General,  chief  of  artil 
lery,  177 

Tilton,  brigade  of,  172 

Todd's  Tavern,  8,  11,  14 

Toll  Gate,  59 

Toll  House,  Va.,  61 

Toombs,  Senator,  of  Georgia,  112 

Torbert,  brigade  of,  64 

Treichal,  Captain,  201 

Tremaine,  General,  54,  55 

Trimble,  General,  207 

Tunstall's  Station,  70 

Turner's  Gap,  Md.,  108 

Two  Taverns,  Penn.,  125, 137,  152, 
184 

Tyler,  Colonel,  94 

Tyler,  General,  95 


UNION,  102  et  seq. 

Union  Mills,  Md.,  117,  119 

Uniontown,  118 

United  States,  batteries  of  :  Third, 

131 ;  B— Fourth,  135, 140, 145, 

148,  155,  194;   L— Fifth,   92; 

Calefs,    135,    140;    Hazlett's, 

169 
United  States  Ford,  8,  21,  26,  42, 

79 

Upperville,  102,  104 
Urbanna,  74 


VAN  ALLEN,  Brigadier- General 
Jas.  H.,  aide-de-camp  to 
Hooker,  22 


Vermont,  regiments  of  :  First,  198; 
Second,  98,  153,  177,  193; 
Thirteenth,  193  ;  Fourteenth, 
193,  197;  Sixteenth,  193,  197 

Vicksburg,  Term.,  76 

Vincent,  Brigadier-General,  killed. 
169,  174,  210 

Virginia  Central  Railroad,  7,  21,  6'.) 

Virginia,  regiments  of :  First, 
200,  201 ;  Eleventh,  13 ;  Fif 
teenth,  100 

Von  Arnsberg,  Colonel,  brigade  of, 
142,  161 

Von  Gilsa,  Colonel,  brigade  of,  33, 
142,  161, 182 


WADSWORTH,  Captain,  42 

Wadsworth,  General  James  S.,  5, 
9 ;  at  Gettysburg,  125  et  seq.  ; 
orders  Cutler's  withdrawal, 
132,  135  et  seq.,  139  et  seq.  ; 
report  of,  146,  151  et  seq.,  156, 
161,  180,  189 

Wainwright,  Colonel,  Chief  of  Ar 
tillery,  140,  182 

Wainwright,  General,  30 

Walker,  brigade  of,  181 

Walsh,  Colonel,  rallies  John's  men 
in  attack  on  Marye's  Hill,  58 

Ward,  General  J.  H.  H.,  brigade 
of,  41,  46,  49,  164,  166  et  seq  , 
172 

Warren,  General,  Chief  Engineer 
on  Hooker's  staff,  14 ;  takes 
charge  of  batteries,  30,  35  et 
seq. ;  urges  an  assault,  57,  62, 
73  ;  reports  against  attacking 
Lee's  left,  157  et  seq.  ;  on 
Meade's  staff,  168  :  saves  Lit 
tle  Round  Top,  168,  177 ;  ac 
tivity  of,  178,  210 


INDEX. 


243 


Warrenton,  80,  08,  100,  104 
Washington,  D.  C.,  7'5,  79,  87,  88, 
95,  98,  99,  102,  105,  107,  108, 
112,  114  et  seq.,  134,  152,  157, 
178,  185,  187,  197,  209 
Waynesborough,  Perm.,  107 
Webb,  General  Alexander  S.,  54, 
175  efc  seq.  ;  bravery  of,  194  et 
seq.  ;  wounded,  1'XJ,  197,  210 
Weed,   General,   artillery  of,   52; 

mortally  wounded,  169,  210 
Weidrick,  battery  of,  182 
Welford  House,  23 
Westminster,  Md.,  115,  117,  119  et 

seq.,  164,  179 
West  Point,  N.  Y.,  57,  66,  131,  169, 

181 

West  Virginia,  Governor  of,  97 
Wheaton,  brigade  of,  57,  61,  65,  66, 

174,  184 

Wheeler,  battery  of,  145,  194 
Wheelock,  Colonel,  154 
Whipple,  General,  division  of,  23, 

38,  41,  44  et  seq.  ;  killed,  63 
White,  battalion  of,  110,  122 
White  House,  Va. ,  99,  100 
White  Plains,  103 
White's  Creek,  200 
Wickham,  cavalry  of,  17 
Wilbur,  Lieutenant,  140 
Wilcox,  General  Cadmus,  brigade 
of,  12,  57,  59;  fierce  charge  of ,  | 
60  et  seq.  ;  discussion  of,  158 ;  I 
brigade,    175    et   seq.,    188  et 
seq.,  192  etseq. 


Wilderness,  72 
Wilderness  Tavern,  39 
Wilkinson,  Adjutant,  29 
Wilkeson,  battery  of,  142 
Williams,  division  of,  24,   26,  34, 

38,  41,  44,  49 
Williamsport,  Md.,  94,  96  et  seq., 

99,  108,  115,  209 
Williston,  battery  of,  60 
Willoughby's  Run,  Penn.,  127,  131 

et  seq.,  136,  147 
Winchester,  Va.,  88  et  seq.,  94,  96, 

104 
Wisconsin,  regiments  of  :  Second, 

132;  Sixth,  131,  150,  155 
Wister,    Colonel,  takes   command 

of    Stone's  brigade,  144 ;  shot 

through  the  face,  145 
Wofford,  brigade  of,  165,  173;  let 
ter  from,  187 

Wood,  Dr.  J.  Robie,  176,  note 
Wright,    General  A.    R.,    brigade 

of,  8,  14,  17,  175  et  seq.,  189, 

197,  199 

Wrightsville,  Penn.,  108,  113,  119 
Wyndham,  Colonel,  70 


YORK,  Penn.,  107,  108,  111  et  seq., 

118,  120  etseq.,  134,  138,  179 
Yorktown,  99 


ZOOK.  General,  brigade  of,  172  et 
seq.;  killed,  171,  210 


MESSRS.  CHARLES   SCRIBNER'S  SONS 

have  much  pleasure  in  announcing  that  an  undertaking  which 
they  have  had  in  progress  for  several  years  is  now  completed  ; 
and  that  they  have  begun  the  publication  of  a  work  which  they 
believe  will  prove  the  most  important  of  recent  contributions 
to  American  History. 

Under  the  general  title  of  THE 

CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR, 

they  will  issue  a  series  of  volumes,  contributed  at  their  soli- 
ciation  by  a  number  of  leading  actors  in  and  students  of  the 
great  conflict  of  i86i-'65,  with  a  view  to  bringing  together, 
for  the  first  time,  a  full  and  authoritative  military  history  of 
the  suppression  of  the  Rebellion. 


The  final  and  exhaustive  form  of  this  great  narrative,  in  which  every 
doubt  shall  be  settled  and  every  detail  covered,  may  be  a  possibility 
only  of  the  future.  But  it  is  a  matter  for  surprise  that  twenty  years 
after  the  beginning  of  the  Rebellion,  and  when  a  whole  generation 
lias  grown  up  needing  such  knowledge,  there  is  no  authority  which  is 
at  the  same  time  of  the  highest  rank,  intelligible  and  trustworthy,  and 
to  which  a  reader  can  turn  for  any  general  view  of  the  field — for  a 
strong,  vivid,  concise  but  truly  proportioned  story  of  the  great  salient 
events. 

The  many  reports,  regimental  histories,  memoirs,  and  other  materi 
als  of  value  for  special  passages,  require,  for  their  intelligent  reading, 
an  ability  to  combine  and  proportion  them  which  the  ordinary  reader 
does  not  possess.  There  have  been  no  attempts  at  general  histories 
which  have  supplied  this  satisfactorily  to  any  large  part  of  the  public. 
Undoubtedly  there  has  been  no  such  narrative  as  would  be  especially 
welcome  to  men  of  the  new  generation,  and  would  be  valued  by  a  very 
great  class  of  readers; — and  there  has  seemed  to  be  great  danger  that 


the  time  would  be  allowed  to  pass  when  it  would  be  possible  to  give 
to  such  a  work  the  vividness  and  accuracy  that  come  from  personal 
recollection. 

These  facts  led  to  the  conception  of  the  present  work.  Its  possi 
bility  depended  first  of  all  on  the  consent  of  the  circle  of  authors  to 
whom,  only,  the  publishers  could  look  to  carry  it  out  worthily  : — but 
the  cordial  reception  which  the  suggestion  at  once  received  from  them 
and  from  all  others  consulted,  speedily  removed  all  doubt  upon  this 
subject. 

From  every  department  of  the  Government,  from  the  officers  of  the 
army,  and  from  a  great  number  of  custodians  of  records  and  special 
information  everywhere,  both  authors  and  publishers  have  received 
every  aid  that  could  be  asked  in  this  undertaking  ;  and  it  announcing 
the  issue  of  the  work  the  publishers  take  this  occasion  to  convey  the 
thanks  which  the  authors  have  had  individual  opportunities  to  express 
elsewhere. 


The  volumes  of  the  series  will  be  duodecimos  of  about  250 
pages  each,  illustrated  by  maps  and  plans  prepared  under 
the  direction  of  the  authors.  They  will  appear,  as  far  as 
possible,  in  the  chronological  order  of  the  Campaigns  of 
which  they  treat ;  and  by  their  preliminary  and  concluding 
chapters  will  be  so  far  connected  that  the  completed  work 
will  practically  cover  the  entire  field  of  the  war.  The  price 
of  each  volume  will  be  $1.00. 


The  following  volumes  are  now  ready,  or  far  advanced  in 
preparation,  and  will  appear  at  short  intervals  : 

I.— THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION.  By  JOHN  G. 
NlCOLAY,  Esq.,  Private  Secretary  to  President  Lincoln;  late 
Consul-General  to  France,  etc.  Now  Ready. 

A  preliminary  volume,  describing   the  opening    of  the    war,    and   covering    the 
period  from  the  election  of  Lincoln  to  the  end  of  tnc  tirst  Battle  of  Bull  Run. 


II.— FROM  FORT  HENRY  TO  CORINTH.  By  the  Hon. 
M.  F.  FORCE,  Justice  of  the  Superior  Court,  Cincinnati  ;  late 
Brigadier-General  and  Bvt.  Maj.  Gen'l,  U.S.V.,  commanding 
First  Division,  17th  Corps;  in  1862,  Lieut.  Colonel  of  the 
2Oth  Ohio,  commanding  the  regiment  at  Shiloh  ;  Treasurer  of 
the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.  Now  Ready. 

The  narrative  of  events  in  the  West  from  the  Summer  of  1861  to  May,  1862  ; 
covering  the  capture  of  Fts.  Henry  and  Donelson,  the  Battle  of  Shiloh,  etc.,  etc. 


III.— THE  PENINSULA.  By  ALEXANDER  S.  WEBB,  LL.D., 
President  of  the  College  of  the  City  of  New  York  ;  Assistant 
Chief  of  Artillery,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  i86i-'62;  Inspector 
General  Fifth  Army  Corps;  General  Commanding  2d  Div., 
2d  Corps ;  Major-General  Assigned,  and  Chief  of  Staff,  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  Now  Ready. 

The  history  of  McClellan's  Peninsula  Campaign,   from  his  appointment  to  the 
end  of  the  Seven  Days'  Fight. 


IV.— THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE.  By  JOHN  C.  ROPES, 
Esq.,  of  the  Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts,  the 
Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  etc.  Now  Ready. 

From  the  appointment  of  Pope  to  command  the  Army  of  Virginia,  to  the  appoint 
ment  of  McClellan  to  the  general  command  in  September,  1862. 


V.— THE    ANTIETAM    AND    FREDERICKSBURG.      By 

FRANCIS  WINTHROP  PALEREY,  Bvt.  Brigadier  Gen'l,  U.S.V., 
and  formerly  Colonel  2Oth  Mass.  Infantry  ;  Lieut.  Col.  of  the 
2Oth  Massachusetts  at  the  battle  of  the  Antietam  ;  Member  of 
Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts,  of  the  Massachu 
setts  Historical  Society,  etc.  Now  Ready. 

From  the  appointment  of  McClellan  to  the  general  command,  Sept.  1862,  to  the 
end  of  the  Battle  of  Fredericksburg. 

VI.— CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG.     By 

ABNER  DOUBLEDAY,  Bvt.  Maj.  Gen'l,  U.S.A.,  and  Major 
Gen'l,  U.S.V.;  commanding  the  First  Corps  at  Gettysburg, 
etc.  Now  Ready. 

From  the  appointment  of  Hooker,  through  the  campaigns  of  Chancellorsville  and 
Gettysburg,  to  the  retreat  of  Lee  after  the  latter  battle. 


VII.— THE  ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND.  By  HENRY 
M.  CIST,  Brevet  Brig  Gen'l  U.S.V.;  A.A.G.  on  the  staff  of 
Major  Genl  Rosecrans,  and  afterward  on  that  of  Major  Gen'l 
Thomas;  Corresponding  Secretary  of  the  Society  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland. 

From  the  formation  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  to  the  end  of  the  battles  at 
Chattanooga,  November,  1863. 

IX.— THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  ATLANTA.  By  the  lion. 
JACOB  D.  Cox,  Ex-Governor  of  Ohio  ;  late  Secretary  of  the 
Interior  of  the  United  States;  Major  General  U.S. V. ,  com 
manding  Twenty-third  Corps  during  the  campaigns  of  Atlanta 
and  the  Carolinas,  etc. ,  etc. 

From  Sherman's  first  advance  into  Georgia  in  May,  1864,  to'the  beginning  of 
the  March  to  the  Sea. 

X.— THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA— FRANKLIN  AND 
NASHVILLE.  By  the  Hon.  JACOB  D.  Cox. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  March  to  the  Sea  to  the  Surrender  of  Johnston- 
including  also  the  operations  of  Thomas  in  Tennessee. 

XI.— THE    CAMPAIGNS    OF    GRANT    IN    VIRGINIA. 

By   ANDREW   A.    HUMPHREYS,   Brigadier  General  and  Bvt. 
Major-General,    U.S.A.;    late   Cliief  of  Engineers;    Chief  of 
Staff,   Army  of  the  Potomac,    i863-'64;   commanding  Second 
Corps,  i864-'65,  etc.,  etc. 
Covering  the  Virginia  Campaigns  of  1864  and  '65,  to  Lee's  surrender. 


VIII.— THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

and  one  other  volume,  completing  the  series,  are  in  course  of 
preparation,  and  their  contents  and  authors  will  be  announced 
in  a  short  time. 


%*  The  above  books  for  sale  by  all  booksellers,  or  will  be  sent,  post-paid^  upon 
r  eceipt  of  price  by 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS, 

743  AND  745  BROADWAY,  NEW  YORK- 


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14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


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